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atha sāmānyenādheyātiśayādivikalpamapāsya pārārthyamātraṃ sādhyata ititṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ tadāpi siddhasādhyatā cittopakāritvena cakṣurādīnāmiṣṭatvāt / atha cittam api sādhyadharmitvenābhyupagamyate yathā naiyāyikair abhyupagatam / | (c) Lastly if these alternatives are excluded, and what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of ‘being for another’s purpose’, even so it would be proving what is already admitted; as the Eye and the rest are actually admitted (by us) to be helpful to the Mind. If the Mind also is included in the Probandum (along with the Eye etc.), as held by the Naiyāyikas, even so, what you desire is not proved; |
evam api bhavatāṃ neṣṭasiddhiḥ cittavyatirekeṇātmano 'niṣṭatvāt / | as you do not hold the Spirit to be other than the Mind. |
nāpi naiyāyikānām abhimatārthasiddhiḥ parasparopakāritvena cakṣurādīnāmparopakāropagraheṇotpatteḥ saṃghātatvaṃ kalpitamastyeveti hetor api nāsiddhiḥ // | Nor does the argument prove what is wanted by the Naiyāyikas; because it is already admitted that the Eye and the rest are ‘for another’s purpose’, in the sense that they are helpful to one another; specially as the notion of ‘another’ is purely relative, like the notion of ‘near and far’, |
iti kāpilakalpitātmaparīkṣā // [p.118] | and to this extent your reason would be ‘unproven’ also (if the Mind also is included among ‘the Eye and the rest’). |
Digambaraparikalpitātmaparīkṣā | End of the Examination of the Sāṃkhya Doctrine of ‘Soul’. |
jaiminīyā iva prāhur jaināścillakṣaṇaṃ naram / | This Jainas, like the Mīmāṃsakas, assert that the person (soul) is characterised by ‘sentience’; |
dravyaparyāyarūpeṇa vyāvṛttyanugamātmakam // | that, in the form of ‘substance’, it is inclusive, and in the form of ‘successive factors’, it is exclusive. |
jainā iti / | ‘Jainas’, i.e., the Digambaras. |
digambarās ta evaṃ prāhuḥ cillakṣaṇa evātmā sa ca dravyarūpeṇa sarvāvasthāsvabhinātvād anugamātmakaḥ paryāyarūpeṇa tu pratyavasthaṃ bhinnatvādvyāvṛttyātmakaḥ / | They assert as follows The Soul is characterised by Sentience only; and in the form of Substance, it remains the same under all states, and as such is ‘inclusive’ (comprehensive) in its nature; while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is ‘exclusive’ in its nature. |
etac ca pratyakṣata eva siddhamātmano dvairūpyam iti na pramāṇāntarataḥ prasādhyam / | This two-fold character of the Soul is cognised by direct Perception, and hence does not stand in need of being proved by other proofs. |
tathā hi sukhādyavasthābhede 'pi yadavasthātṛ sarvāvasthāsu caitanyamupalabhyate taddravyam / | Thus that ‘Sentience’ which is found to continue to exist through all the states, even though these states are diverse, in the forms of Pleasure and the rest, is ‘substance’; |
paryāyas tu kramabhāvinaḥ sukhādyavasthābhedāḥ / | while the ‘successive factors’ consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other; |
te ca pratyakṣata eva siddhā iti parasya bhāvaḥ // | and all these are distinctly perceived”. Such is the view of the other party (the Digambara Jainas). |
tatrāpītyādinā pratividhatte / | The refutation of this view proceeds with the following [see verse 312 next] |
tatrāpyavikṛtaṃ dravyaṃ paryāyair yadi saṅgatam / na viśeṣo 'sti tasyeti pariṇāmi na tadbhavet // | Under this view also, if. the unmodified substance is connected with the successive factors, then there is no difference (change) in it, and, in that case, it could not be liable to modification. |
atra pakṣadvayam yattaccaitanyātmakaṃ dravyaṃ tatparyāyaiḥ kadācid avikṛtamatyaktapaurastyacaitanyādirūpaṃ satsambadhyate yadvā parityaktapūrvarūpam / | There are two opinions possible: (a) The Substance that exists in the form of Sentience may be connected with the ‘successive factors in its unmodified form, i.e., without renouncing its previous character of ‘Sentience’, or (b) it is connected with the ‘successive factors’, in its modified form, i.e., in a form in which the previous character has been abandoned. |
tatra yadyanantaraḥ pakṣas tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ avasthātuḥ kasyacidapyabhāvāt / | If this latter view he accepted, then there is disappearance of the ‘eternality’ (of the Soul); as under this view, there would be no single entity existing throughout the series of successive factors. |
athāvikṛtam iti prathamapakṣas tadā pūrvottarayor avasthayor na viśeṣaḥ anyathātvam astīti pariṇāmi tacaitanyaṃ na bhavet na prāpnoti / | If the former view be accepted that it is connected in its unmodified form, then there is no difference, i.e,, change, as between the preceding and succeeding states; so that the sentience would not be liable to modification; i.e., it has to be regarded as unmodifiable; |
anyathātvalakṣaṇatvāt pariṇāmasya / | as ‘modification is of the nature of ‘change’, becoming something else. |
iṣṭaṃ ca pariṇāmi / | And yet it is held to be modifiable. |
prayogaḥ yat pūrvottarāvasthāsu na viśeṣyate tat pariṇāmi na bhavati yathākāśam na viśiṣyate ca caitanyaṃ sarvāvasthāsviti vyākānupalabdheḥ // | The argument may be formulated as follows: When a thing cannot be differentiated between its preceding and succeeding states, it cannot be regarded as modifiable; e.g. the Ākāśa; Sentience is not differentiated at all in any state; so that the wider character being absent (the narrower one must be denied). |
deśakālasvabhāvānām ityādinā hetoḥ paramatenāsiddhimāśaṅkate | when it is spoken of as ‘different’, it is with reference to number, characteristic, name and function. |
deśakālasvabhāvānām abhedādekatocyate / saṅkhyālakṣaṇasaṃjñārthabhedād bhedas tu varṇyate // rūpādayo ghaṭaśceti saṅkhyāsaṃjñāvibheditā / | When we speak of the ‘jar’ (singular) and its ‘colour and the rest’ (plural), there is difference of ‘number’ and ‘name’; there is also difference of ‘nature’, inasmuch as ‘inclusiveness’ (comprehensiveness) is the nature of the substance jar, while ‘exclusiveness’ (distributiveness) is the nature of the successive factors in the form of colour and the rest; |
kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛttī lakṣaṇārthavibheditā // | and there is difference also of ‘function’; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different. |
dravyaparyāyayor evaṃ naikāntenāviśeṣavat / dravyaṃ paryāyarūpeṇa viśeṣaṃ yāti ce{tsva}yam // | Similarly between the ‘sub stance’ and the ‘successive factors’. Thus substance is not absolutely undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors (313-315) |
tathā hi yadyekāntena paryāyebhyo dravyaṃ vyatireki bhavet tadā syāt tasyā viśeṣaḥ [p.119] yāvatā deśakālasvabhāvābhedād dravyaparyāyayor aikyamiṣṭam / | If the Substance were absolutely different from the successive factors, then no differentiation in it would be possible; because, on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one and the same; |
saṅkhyādibhedāt tu bhedaḥ / | as a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors; |
tatra saṅkhyā ekatvabahutvādi / tathā hi dravyamekasaṅkhyāyuktam paryāyās tu sukhādayonekasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭāḥ / | for instance, the difference regarding number is that while the substance is one, the successive factors are many; that is, the Substance is characterized by the number ‘one’, while the Successive Factors Pleasure and the rest are characterized by the number ‘many’; |
lakṣaṇam api bhinnam / | The term ‘saṃjñā’ stands for Name; |
yato 'nuvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ dravyam paryāyās tu vyāvṛttilakṣaṇāḥ saṃjñā nāma arthaḥ kāryam / | and ‘artha’ for action, function. |
tathā coktam deśakālasvabhāvābhedābhedo dharmadharmiṇoḥ saṅkhyāsaṃjñālakṣaṇakāryabhedāt tu bhedaḥ tadyathā ghaṭasya rūpādīnāṃ ceti / | This has been thus stated: ‘Between the qualified and the qualification, there is non-difference, due to non-difference in their place, time and nature, but there is difference due to difference in their number^ name, nature and function, as is found between the Jar and its Colour and other properties’; |
tathā hi ghaṭatadrūpādīnāṃ deśādibhir abhedaḥ ya eva hi deśakālasvabhāvaś ca ghaṭasya sa eva rūpādīnām saṅkhyādibhiś ca ghaṭāt teṣāṃ bhedaḥ / | that is, between the Jar and its Colour, etc., there is non-difference regarding place, etc., while the Jar is different from Colour etc., regarding number, etc.; |
tathā hyeko ghaṭo bahavas tu rūpādaya iti saṅkhyābhedaḥ / | e.g. the Jar is one while its properties, Colour and the rest, are mnay. |
ghaṭo rūpādaya iti ca saṃjñābhedaḥ / anuvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ ghaṭādidravyaṃ vyāvṛttilakṣaṇās tu rūpādayaḥ paryāyā iti lakṣaṇabhedaḥ / | There is difference in their name also: while the one is named ‘Jar’, the other is named ‘Colour and the rest’, There is difference regarding their nature also: while the Substance, in the shape of the Jar, etc., is comprehensive in its nature, the Successive Factors, Colour etc., are distributive. |
ghaṭenodakāharaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kriyate rūpādibhis tu vastrarāgādīti kāryabhedaḥ / | There is difference in their function also: the Jar serves the purpose of containing water, while Colour and the rest serve the purpose of lending colour to the cloth and so forth. |
evam ātmadravye 'pi caitanyātmake sukhaduḥkhādiṣu paryāyeṣu cohyam / kāryabhedas tu tatraivaṃ boddhavyaḥ caitanyenārthānubhavaḥ kriyate sukhādibhis tu pīḍānugrahādīti / | What has been said above (regarding the Jar and Colour etc.) should be understood to hold respecting the substance ‘Soul’ which is of the nature of ‘Sentience’ and the Successive Factors, ‘Pleasure, Pain and the rest’, In this case, the difference of ‘function’ should be understood as follows: The function performed by Sentience is the ‘apprehension of things’, while that performed by Pleasure, Pain, etc. is happiness, unhappiness, and the like. |
tadetaddarśayati rūpādaya ityādi / saṅkhyāsaṃjñāvibhediteti / | This is what is shown by the Text, in the words ‘Rūpādayaḥ,.., saṃkhyāsaṃjñāvibheditā’; |
dravyaparyāyayor iti vakṣyamāṇaṃ sambadhyate / | the latter term is to be construed with the term ‘dravyaparyāyayoḥ’ appearing later on (under text 315); |
kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛttī lakṣaṇārthavibhediteti / yathāyogaṃ sambandhaḥ / kāryabhedo 'rthavibheditā anuvṛttivyāvṛttīlakṣaṇavibhediteti sambandhaḥ / | the various terms in the second line of Text 314 are to be construed along with their respective correlates: the construction being ‘Kāryabheda’ ‘difference of purpose’ constitutes the ‘difference of functions’, and ‘anuvṛtti,., vyāvṛtti’, ‘Comprehensiveness and Distributiveness’ constitute the ‘difference of nature’. |
dravyaparyāyor ityatra chedaḥ / | One sentence ends with the word ‘dravyaparyāyayoḥ’ ‘similarly between the substance and the successive factors’ (in line I of text 315); |
evam ityādinā hetor asiddhim upasaṃharati / | ‘Thus the Substance, etc.’, this sums up the fallacy of being ‘unproven’ in the Reason (put forward by the Buddhist as against the Jaina). |
evaṃ ca kṛtvā dravyam ekāntena nāviśiṣṭaṃ kintu paryāyarūpabhedena viśeṣaṃ pratipadyate / tena paryāyebhyo dravyasyaikāntena bhedābhāvād ityasiddho hetuḥ // | as a matter of fact, it becomes differentiated through the diversity in the forms of the Successive Factors; and thus Substance not being absolutely different from the Successive Factors, the reason put forward (by the Buddhist, in Text 312) ‘because there is no difference’ is ‘unproven’, ‘not true’, (313-315) |
svabhāvābheda ityādinā pratividhatte svabhāvābheda ekatvaṃ tasmin sati ca bhinnatā / kathañcidapi duḥsādhyā paryāyātmasvarūpavat // | ‘One-ness’ (sameness, identity) consists in non-difference of nature were there if this ‘one-ness’ (between two things), then ‘difference’ (between them) world be hard to prove in any way; as in the case of the forms of the successive factors themselves. |
yadi hi dravyaparyāyayor abhedo 'pyaṅgīkriyate / | Even admitting that there is non-difference between the ‘Substance’ and the ‘Successive Factors’, such being the case, the ‘non-difference’ should be absolute; |
tadā sarvātmanaivābhedo 'yaṃ bhavet bhedaś ca tadviparītaḥ kathaṃ bhavet na hyekasyaikadā vidhipratiṣedhau parasparaviruddhau yuktau / | how then could there be ‘difference’ between them, which is the contradictory of ‘non-difference’? It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory. |
tathāhyekamityanena bhedaniṣedhanāntarīyakaḥ svabhāvābheda ucyate tasmiṃś ca svabhāvābhede sati kathaṃ tadānīm eva bhedas tatpratiṣedhātmā bhavet / prayogaḥ yatrābhedas tatra tadviparīto na bhedo 'vakāśaṃ labhate yathā teṣām eva paryāyāṇāṃ dravyasya ca yat pratiniyatamasādhāraṇamātmarūpaṃ tasyana svabhāvād bhedaḥ abhedaś ca dravyaparyāyayor avasthita iti viruddhopalabdheḥ // | For instance, when two things are spoken of as ‘one’, what is meant is that there is ‘nondifference in their nature (character)’, this ‘non-difference’ being inseparable from ‘negation of difference’; and when there is such ‘non-difference of character'’ (between the ‘substance’ and the ‘successive factors’), how could there be, at the same time, ‘difference’, which is the negation of ‘non-difference’? This argument may be formulated as follows: In a case where there is non-difference between two things, there can be no room for difference, which is the contradictory of ‘non-difference’; e.g. as is found in the case of the same ‘successive factors’ and the ‘substance’, in regard to the specific individuality of each, where there is non-difference of character; |
[p.120] tataś ca paramārthena dravyaparyāyayor abhede sati lakṣaṇabhedo 'pi na prāpnotīti darśayati agauṇe caivam ityādi / | and between ‘substance’ and ‘successive factors’, non-differencel is clearly present (hence there is perception of what is contrary to the Probandum, i.e. difference). Thus in reality, there being non-difference between ‘Substance’ and the ‘Successive Factors’, there cannot be any difference between them as regards their ‘characteristics’ also; |
agauṇe caivam ekatve dravyaparyāyayoḥ sthite / vyāvṛttimadbhaveddravyaṃ paryāyāṇāṃ svarūpavat // | The ‘one-ness’ thus between ‘substance’ and the ‘successive factors’ being not-figurative (i.e. real), the ‘substance’ also should be distributive (exclusive), like the forms of the ‘successive factors’; |
yadi vā te 'pi paryāyāḥ sarve 'pyanugatātmakāḥ / dravyavat prāpnuvantyeṣāṃ dravyeṇaikātmatā sthiteḥ // | or those ‘successive factors’ themselves should be comprehensive in their character, like the ‘substance because the one-ness of these with ‘substance’ is duly established. |
yadvyāvṛttimadrūpābhinnasvabhāvaṃ tadvyāvṛttimat yathā paryāyāṇāṃ svarūpam vyāvṛttimadrūpāvyatiriktaṃ ca dravyam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | When a thing is non-different from another thing which is ‘exclusive’ in its nature, the former also must be exclusive; as for example, the forms of the Successive Factors themselves; and Substance is non-different from the Successive Factors, which are exclusive; |
atha vā yadanugatātmarūpāvyatiriktaṃ tadanugatātmakam eva yathā dravyarūpam anugatātmarūpāvibhinnasvabhāvāś ca sukhādayaḥ paryāyā iti svabhāvahetur eva / | so that there is a natural reason (for the Substance also being exclusive). Or (the argument may be stated in another form) When a thing is non-different from another which is inclusive in character, the former also must be inclusive; e.g. the form of the ‘Substance and the ‘Successive Factors’ in the form of Pleasure, etc. are non-different from the ‘Substance’ which is inclusive; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding these as inclusive). |
anyathā vibhinnayogakṣematvād bheda eva bhavet / | If this were not so, then as the fate befalling them would be different, the two would have to be regarded as different. |
viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve bhedavyavahāroccheda eva syād iti viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | There is also an argument which annuls the contrary of the conclusion, in the form that “if things possessed of contradictory properties would be regarded as one, there would be an end to all business.” (317-318) |
tato nāvasthitaṃ kaścid dravyamātmādi vidyate / | From all this it follows that there is no such lasting ‘substance’ as the ‘soul’ and the like; |
pāryāyāvyatiriktatvāt paryāyāṇāṃ svarūpavat // | because they are not different from the ‘successive factors’, like the form of the ‘successive factors’ themselves. |
ādiśabdena ghaṭavrīhyādiparigrahaḥ // | The phrase ‘and the like’ is meant to include the Jar, Grains and other things. |
na cetyādinā dvitīyaprasaṅgasādhanaphalamāha | The following text sets forth the upshot of the second, ‘indirect’, proof: [see verse 320 above] |
dravyādavyatiriktatvāt taddravyaniyatātmavat // tasyāpi dravyasya paryāyarūpeṇodayavyayākrāntasyeṣṭatvādato mābhūt sādhyavaikalyaprasaṅga iti niyatātmavad ityuktam / niyataścāsāvātmā svabhāvo dravyādirūpeṇeti viśeṣaṇasamāsaḥ // | The text has added the clause ‘like the permanent form of the Substance’ in view of the argument that “Inasmuch as Substance also is held to be beset with appearance and disappearance, there can be no absence of the Probandum in the Reason”. The compound ‘niyatātma’ is to be taken as a Karmadhāraya, the meaning being ‘the eternal form nature in the shape of Substance and so forth’. |
tato niranvayaṃ ityādinā nigamayati | The following Text clinches the argument: [see verse 321 next] |
tato niranvayo dhvaṃsaḥ sthiraṃ vā sarvam iṣyatām / | For this reason it should be admitted, either that there is absolute destruction of all, or that all is permanent (eternal); |
ekātmani tu naiva sto vyāvṛttyanugamāvimau // | exclusiveness and inclusiveness could not exist in any single thing. |
na kevalaṃ paryāyād abhinnasvabhāvād dravyarūpasyānugatātmano 'siddhiḥ ito 'pi paryāyavyatirekeṇopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher asadvyavahāraviṣayatvam evāsyeti darśayann āha na cetyādi / | Any such comprehensive entity as ‘substance’, cannot be accepted, not only because it is non-different in nature from the ‘successive factors’, but also for the following reason (shown in the next text), it is not perceived apart from the ‘successive factors’ even when the conditions of its perception are present, and hence it should be treated as ‘non-existent.’ |
[p.121] | This is what is explained in the following [see verse 322 next] |
na copalabhyarūpasya paryāyānugatātmanaḥ / dravyasya pratibhāso 'sti tannāsti gaganābjavat // | As a matter of fact, there is no perception of ‘substance’, which should be perceptible, as something permeating through (and comprehensive of) the ‘successive factors’, hence it cannot be regarded as existing, like the ‘sky-lotus’. |
tena yad uktam pratyakṣata evānugato dravyātmā siddha iti, tad asiddham / | This shows that the statement that “The Soul, in the form of Substance, is permeating through the ‘Successive Factors’, is apprehended by perception itself” is not true; |
na hi paryāyavyatiricyamānaśarīraḥ kvacid api vijñāne pratyakṣasaṃmate pratibhāsamāno 'nugataikarūpo dravyātmā lakṣyate // | because as a matter of fact, no such substance as ‘Soul’ is perceived to appear, in that comprehensive (all-embracing) form, in any such Cognition as is admitted (by all parties) to be ‘Sense-perception’. |
vividhārthakriyāyogyās tulyādijṇyānahetavaḥ / | In fact, things are capable of diverse fruitful actions; they are causes of the notions of ‘similarity’ and the best; |
tathāvidhārthasaṅketaśabdapratyayagocarāḥ // | and they are amenable to conventional verbal expressions connoting such things. |
vividhāḥ nānāprakārāḥ arthakriyāḥ rūpādīnāṃ paryāyāṇāṃ samānāsamānabhedāt tatra samānā jalasaṃdhāraṇādilakṣaṇāḥ asamānā vastrarāgalocanādijñānotpādalakṣaṇāḥ tatra yogyāḥ samarthā iti vigrahaḥ / | The ‘fruitful actions’, of the ‘successive factors’. Colour etc., are ‘diverse’ of various kinds distinguished as similar and dissimilar; the ‘similar’ actions arc the Holding of water and the like, and the ‘dissimilar’ actions are the colouring of cloth, the bringing about of visual perception and the like; of these actions, the ‘Successive Factors’ are capable. Thus is the compound to be analysed. |
tatra sādhāraṇe kārye sarveṣām eva yaugapadyenopayoga iti samastānāṃ hetutvajñāpanārthamabhinnadravyarūpābhāve 'pi ta eva bhedino 'pi ghaṭa ityādināśabdenaikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭā ucyante / asādhāraṇakāryopayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ tu nānāsaṃkhyāsta iti saṅkhyābhedaḥkāryabhedaś ca teṣu vyavasthāpyate / | As regards the ‘similar action’, all the ‘Successive Factors’ are used simultaneously; hence in order to indicate their common causal efficiency, even though there is no common identical Substance permeating through them, and even though they are different from each other, yet they are spoken of by means of the single term ‘Jar’, as being one in number; and when it is intended to indicate the dissimilar specific actions of each of the ‘Successive Factors’, they are spoken of by means of words expressive of the plural number; it is in this way that the diversity in number, as also diversity in action (purpose) is explained. |
lakṣaṇabhedas tarhi katham ity āha tulyādijñānahetava iti / | “How then is there diversity of characteristics?” They are causes of the notions, etc. etc. |
āmapakvādyavasthāsu pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsino 'pi sadṛśasanniveśā viśeṣā evotpadyamānā nirvikalpānubhavaviṣayā anubhūyamānāḥ sarvāvasthāsu ghaṭo ghaṭa ityādisadṛśapratyayahetavo bhavanti / śyāmalohitādivarṇavailakṣaṇyena jāyamānā atulyapratyayahetava ityevam ekarūpānugamamantareṇāpi tulyātulyajñānahetavo bhavanto 'nuvṛttivyāvṛttirūpeṇavyavasthāpyanta iti lakṣaṇabhedo vyavasthāpyate / | The things, Jar e.g., become ‘causes of notions of similarity’, when under all conditions, of baked, unbaked, etc., they are conceived of as ‘Jar’ and ‘Jar’ only, being apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognitions; as even though they are destroyed every moment, they are produced at each succeeding moment as particular things, but of similar shape. But when they become produced in the different colours of dark, red, and the like, they become ‘causes of notions of dissimilarity’, Thus even in the absence of any simple comprehensive entity permeating through them, the things become the causes (basis) of notions of similarity and dissimilarity, and thereby come to be regarded as ‘comprehensive’ and ‘exclusive’ in character; and thus the diversity of character becomes established. |
tulyādītyādigrahaṇenātulyaṃ jñānaṃ gṛhyate / | The term ‘ādi’ in the compound ‘tulyādi’ is meant to include the ‘atulya’, ‘notions of dissimilarity’, |
kas tarhi saṃjñābheda ity āha tathāvidhetyādi / | “To what then is the diversity in Name due?” |
tathāvidhaḥ vividhārthakriyāyogyastulyādijñānahetuśca padārtho rūpādiḥ arthaḥ viṣayo yasya ghaṭa iti rūpādaya iti ca saṅketasya sa tathoktaḥ tathāvidhārthaḥ saṅketo yeṣāṃ śabdapratyayānāṃ te tathoktāḥ teṣāṃ gocarā iti vigrahaḥ // | ‘They are amenable etc.’ ‘Such things’, i.e. things like Colour, which are capable of diverse fruitful actions and are causes of notions of similarity and dissimilarity; such things form the ‘object’ connotation of such conventional verbal expressions as ‘Jar’ and ‘Colour’ etc.; and the said things are amenable to such verbal expressions (names). |
tena pratyakṣata eva bhāvānāṃ nairātmyaṃ prasiddhamityupasaṃhāreṇa darśayati udayetyādi / | Thus what is proved by Perception is the fact that things are without ‘Soul’, this is what, by way of recapitulation, is pointed out in the following [see verse 324 next] |
udyayavyayadharmāṇaḥ paryāyā eva kevalāḥ / | In fact, it is only the ‘successive factors’ that are cognised as characterised by ‘appearance and disappearance’; |
saṃvedyante tataḥ spaṣṭaṃ nairātmyaṃ cātinirmalam // | hence pure ‘soullessness’ becomes clearly established. |
rūpādayaḥ svasaṃviditasvabhāvāśca duḥkhādayaḥ / | ‘Successive Factors’ i.e. Colour etc., as also Pain etc. as felt in their own nature; |
kevalā iti / abhinnaikadravyarūpavirahiṇaḥ / nityasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt / | ‘only’ i.e. without any one ‘substance’ non-different from them: because for an eternal entity, any fruitful action, either simultaneous or consecutive, is incompatible. |
arthakriyākāritvameṣāmudayavyayadharmitva eva sati yujyata ityanumānato 'pyeṣāmarthakriyākāriṇāṃ satvaliṅgānnairātmyaṃ prasiddham // | In fact, fruitful action in the case of things is possible only when they are liable to ‘appearance and disappearance Thus, through Inference also, it becomes established that those things which are capable of fruitful action are ‘without Soul’, this being indicated by their mere existence. |
yaduktaṃ na copalabhyarūpasyetyādi tatrārthetyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | Against what the Buddhist has said under Text 322 above, the author anticipates the following objection from the opponent’s (Jaina’s) standpoint: [see verse 325 above] |
saṃmūrcchitam ekalolībhūtam ato vivekena dravyarūpaṃ na pratibhāsate vidyamānam apīti bhāvaḥ / saṃmūrcchitatve kāraṇam āha taddvirūpaṃ hītyādi / | that is why the form of the ‘Substance’, though existent, is not perceived: The next sentence explains the reason for its being thus ‘mixed’ in character: Because it is held to be etc., i.e. because the Soul and otherngs, though dual in form, are held to be impartite, like Narasiṃha; |
yasmāt taddvirūpam api sannirbhāgamiṣyate yathā narasiṃhas tasmānnirbhāgatvāt saṃmūrchitobhayarūpaṃ taditi na pṛthagupalabhyate // | and because the Soul is impartite, therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately. |
tadetat parasparaparāhatamabhidhīyate bhavateti darśayann āha nanvityādi / | That this assertion (of the Jaina) involves self-contradiction is pointed out in the following [see verse 326 next] |
yadi hi nirbhāgaṃ tadā dvirūpam tiyetad vyāhatam nānārthavinibandhanatvādāsya vyapadeśasya kasmāt rūpaśabdena svabhāvasyābhidhānāt / | The assertion that ‘a certain thing is of dual form’ can be based on the existence of several things, because the term ‘form’ connotes nature. If theng is ‘impartite’, then, to speak of it as ‘of dual form’ is a contradiction in terms; |
tathā hi dve rūpe dvau svabhāvau yasya sa dvirūpa ucyate na caikasya svabhāvadvayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | because when a thing is spoken of as ‘dvi-rupa’, ‘of dual form’, what is meant is that ‘it has two forms two natures’; and one and the same thing cannot have ‘two natures’; |
kevalaṃ dvāveva svabhāvau bhavatā pratipāditau na punar ekaṃ vastu dvirūpamparasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvād ekatvānekatvayoḥ // | What you have proved is only that there are two forms or characters, and not that there is a single entity with two forms; and that for the simple reason that the characters of being one and being many are mutually contradictory and preclusive. |
narasiṃho 'pi naivaiko dvyātmakaścopapadyate / | Narasiṃha also cannot be one and also of ‘dual nature’; |
anekāṇusamūhātmā sa tathā hi pratīyate // | as he is perceived as such because he is an aggregate of many atoms. |
kevalaṃ vivādāspadībhūtaṃ nopapadyata ityapiśabdaḥ / sa iti / narasiṃhaḥ / | As regards Narasiṃha, he is one only and is not regarded as of ‘dual form’, this is pointed out in the following [see verse 327 above] |
tatheti / avayavavaicitryeṇa pṛthutaradeśākrāntirūpeṇa ca /. | What is meant by ‘also’ is that it is not only the thing under dispute that cannot be ‘of dual form’, ‘He’ i.e. Narasiṃha ‘as such’, through the diverse character of the parts of his body, and also through His occupying larger space; |
anyathaivaṃ na pratibhāṣeta / | otherwise He would not appear as He does. |
makṣikāpadamātreṇāpi ca pidhāne tasya tathāvidhasyāvaraṇaprasaṅgaś ca / etena mecakamaṇikalpā varṇādayaḥ pratyuktāḥ / | If even a small part of the size of the fly’s leg of His body were concealed, He would be hidden to that extent. This same argument also sets aside the fact of His being of the Colour of the Emerald. |
etac ca vistareṇāvayaviniṣedhe pratipādayiṣyāma iti bhāvaḥ // | All this we are going to explain in detail under the chapter on ‘The Refutation of the Composite Whole’, |
Aupaniṣadikātmaparīkṣā | End of Chapter on the Jaina ‘Doctrine of the Soul’. |
[p.123] apare 'dvaitadarśanāvalambinaścaupaniṣadikāḥ kṣityādipariṇāmarūpanityaikajñānasvabhāvamātmānaṃ kalpayanti / | Others, upholding the Advaita (Monistic) system of Philosophy, who are followers of the Upaniṣads, postulate the ‘Soul’ to be Eternal, One and of the nature of Consciousness, which appears in the form of the illusory modifications of Earth etc. |
atasteṣām eva matamupadarśayann āha nityetyādi / | This is the view set forth in the following Texts. [see verse 328 above] |
nityajñānavivarto 'yaṃ kṣititejojalādikaḥ / ātmā tadātmakaśceti saṃgirante 'pare punaḥ // | This is what constitutes the Soul That is, the Soul is of the nature of one Eternal Consciousness of which Earth etc. are illusory modifications. |
apara iti / aupaniṣadikāḥ // | ‘Others’ i.e. the followers of the Upaniṣads. |
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