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naikayogakṣemāś ca sukhādyvasthāḥ puṃsā saheti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ // | If your ‘states’ become merged into the soul in their own form, then, on the appearance of happxness, unhappiness also should be felt. |
yac coktam na cāyamavasthāntarotpāde pūrvātyantaṃ vinaśyatīti tatrāha svarūpeṇaivetyādi / | It has been asserted that “on the appearance of another State, the preceding State is not entirely destroyed”; the following Text supplies the answer to this: [see verse 270 above] |
avasthā hi sāmānyātmani līyamānāḥ svarūpeṇaiva vā līyeran, paraūpeṇa vā / | When the States become merged in the Common Soul, they could be so merged either in their own form or in some other form; |
yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tadā sukhādisamudbhave 'pi sukhādyavasthānubhave 'pi, tadduḥkhamapyanubhūyeta upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvāt // atha pararūpeṇeti pakṣaḥ, tatrāha na cetyādi / | if it is the former that is meant, then on the appearance of Happiness, i.e. when there is feeling of the State of Happiness, Unhappiness also should be felt; as this latter also is possessed of the common character of ‘feeling (270) If they become merged in some other form, then there would be the following difficulty: [see verse 271 next] |
na cānyarūpasaṅkrāntāv anyasaṅkrānti{sambhavaḥ} / | As a matter of fact, when there is transference of one form to something, there can be no transference of another form. |
tādātmyena ca saṅkrāntir ity ātmodayavān bhavet // | so that if the states became transferred (merged into the soul) in their own form, then the soul also would be something liable to origination. |
kiṃ ca puṃsi sukhādīnāṃ saṃkrāntis tādātmyenaiveṣṭā / | Further, the transference (mergence) of Happiness and other States into the Soul could be possible only in their own forms; |
tataś ca duḥkhādivat tadavyatirekād ātmā puruṣa udayavān utpattimān bhavet // | and in that case, like Unhappiness and the other States, the Soul also, being non-different from them, would be something liable to origination, capable of being produced. |
yadi kartṛtvabhoktṛtve naivāvasthāṃ samāśrite / tadavasthāvatas tatvān na kartṛtvādisambhavaḥ // | If the characters of doer and experiencer are not dependent upon the state, then the said characters cannot belong to the soul, as they can belong to only one who has that state. |
yadi hi pumāṃsamevāśritaṃ kartṛtvādi syāt tadatyaktapūrvarūpasyātmano na sambhavet / | If the character of ‘Doer’, etc. rested in the Souls themselves, then these could never belong to the Soul, which never abandons its previous charactor. |
prayogaḥ yo 'parityaktākartrabhoktravasthaḥ sa na karoti na cāpi bhuṅkte, yathākāśam, aparityaktākartrabhoktravasthaś ca sarvadā puruṣa iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ // | This argument may be formulated thus: One who has not abandoned his previous States of non-doer and non-experiencer can never do or experience, e.g. the Ākāśa, and the Soul never abandons its State of nondoer and non-experiencer; |
iti yad etad ācāryadiṅnāgapādair uktaṃ tatra kumārilenoktam | hence we find (in the assertion concerned) conditions contrary to the more extensive character. |
nānityaśabdavācyatvam ātmano vinivāryate / | For these reasons, we are not denying the fact of the soul being spoken of by the term ‘eternal’; |
vikriyāmātravācitvāt tadvyucchedo 'sya tāvatā // | but on account of its form being subject to modification, there mest be destrection of it. |
iti tadatra nigamanavyājena doṣamāha tadityādi / tannityaśabdavācyatvaṃ nātmano vinivāryate / | in answer to this declaration, Kumārila has argued as follows: “We are not denying the fact of the Soul being expressed (spoken of) by the term ‘non-eternal’; |
svarūpavikriyāvattvād vyucchedas tasya vidyate // | but if the term meant mere modification, then that alone would not imply the destruction of the Soul.” (Ślokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 22). |
tat tasmāt, nityaśabdavācyatvaṃ na vāryate 'smābhiḥ, svopādānapurassarasya pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsinaścaitanyasyāsaṃsāramavicchedāt / | For these reasons, we are not denying the fact of the Soul being spoken of as ‘eternal’, on the ground that Sentience, which is in a State of perpetual flux, continues undestroyed, along with its Cause, as long as the world lasts. |
kintu svarūpasya svabhāvasya, vikriyāvatvāt niyamena pūrvasvabhāvaparityāgāt, svabhāvāntaraprādurbhāvaśceti, vyucchedaḥ vināśo 'tra sphuṭataramevāsajyate // | But its form, nature being subject to modification, as there is always the abandoning of the preceding and the appearance of the succeeding form, its liability to destruction is clearly indicated. |
sarpo 'pi kṣaṇabhaṅgitvāt kauṭilyādīn prapadyate / | The serpent also is liable to become crooked and so forth, becaese it is sebject to perpetual flex; |
sthirarūpe tu puṃsīva nāvasthāntarasaṅgatiḥ // | if it had a permanent form, then, like the soul, it could neyer come by another state. |
yathaiva hi puṃsi sthiraikarūpatvād avasthāntarasambhavo na yuktas tathā sarpasyāpi / | Just as in the case of the Soul, because of its being always of one lasting character, there is no possibility of another State, so in the case of the Serpent also. |
yadānukṣaṇabhaṅgitāsya bhavet tadā yukto 'vasthāntarasambhavaḥ, svabhāvāntarodayalakṣaṇatvād avasthāntaraprādurbhāvasya // | If it were subject to destruction (modification) every moment, then alone could it have another State; as the ‘appearance of another State’ is always in the form of the ‘appearance of another character (274) As a matter of fact, the ‘notion of I’ comes about without a real basis, through the force of the beginningless seed of the vision of being; |
yac coktam ahaṃ vedmītyahambuddhir jñātāraṃ pratipadyata iti tadasiddham iti darśayann āha nirālambana evāyam ityādi / | It has been argued (under Text 229) that “The conception of I in the notion I know apprehends the Cogniser”; the following Text proceeds to show that this is ‘unproven’ (not admitted by all parties): [see verse 275 above] |
na hyasyāhaṅkārasya paramārthataḥ kiñcid ālambanam asti yenāsya viṣayo jñātā syāt / | The said ‘I-notion’ has no real background, by virtue of which the ‘Cogniser’ could form its object. |
yadyevaṃ kimasyotpatter nibandhanam ity āha anādītyādi / | “If that is so, then what is the cause of its origin?” |
sattvadṛk satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ, tasyā bījam vāsanāśaktirity arthaḥ / anādi ca tat sattvadṛgbījaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / | The answer is that It proceeds from the beginningless, etc. etc. ‘Vision of Being’ is the vision of the existing body; the ‘seed’ of this vision is the Potency of Dispositions; and this ‘seed’ is beginningless; |
tasya prabhāvaḥ ādhipatyam / | and it is through the force of this that ‘I-consciousness’ is brought about; |
kvacid eveti / adhyātmaniyata eva ṣaḍāyatane // | and that also only in some places, i.e. only in the internal economy of the Sextuple Body. |
kecid eva hi saṃskārās tadrūpādhyavasāyini / | It is only some (not all) impressions that secure the requisite potency for bringing about the said notion apprehending that particular form; |
ādhipatyaṃ prapadyante tan na sarvatra vartate // [p.109] tadrūpādhyavasāyinīti / | hence it does not appear everywhere. Question. “Why does not the ‘I-notion’ come about everywhere?” The Answer is supplied in the following: [see verse 276 above] |
pūrvottarakālānuyāyijñātṛrūpādhyavasāyinyahaṅkāre / na sarvatreti / sāntānāntare ghaṭādau // | ‘The said notion, etc.’, i.e. the ‘I-notion, apprehending the form of the Cogniser, as existing through the preceding and succeeding points of time’, ‘Not everywhere’, i.e. in other ‘chains’, like those of the Jar and other things. |
tulyaḥ paryanuyogo 'yam anyathā puruṣe 'pi vaḥ / | If this were not so, the objection in question could be urged with equal force against your ‘soul’ also; |
tacchaktibhedasadbhāvāt sarvam eva nirākulam // | but all difficulties are removed by the fact that there is diversity in its potencies. |
kiṃ cātmālambanatve 'pyahaṅkārasya, tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ kimityātmāntare 'pi na pravartata iti / śaktipratiniyamānnaivam iti cet, yadyevam asmākam api śaktiniyamāt kvaciddevādhyātmike vastuni pravartate, na sarvatreti vyavasthānaṃ sarvam eva nirākulam // | Further, even when the ‘I-notion’ is held to have the Soul for its basis, the objection in question would apply with equal force: Why does the said notion not appear in connection with another Soul also? It might be answered that “it is not so because of the restrictions imposed by the potency ofngs”, then, for us also the same answer would be available, that the notion appears only in regard to some internal objects, and not in regard to all. |
nityālambanapakṣe tu sarvāhaṅkṛtayas tataḥ / sakṛd eva prasūyeran śaktahetuvyavasthiteḥ // | So that all difficulties would be removed. If the said notion (of ‘I’) had an eternal thing for its basis, then all ‘I-notions’ would come about all at once, as their efficient cause would be always present. |
anityālambanatve 'pi spaṣṭābhāḥ syus tataḥ pare / | if it had a non-eternal basis, then all these notions would be equally clearly manifest. |
ālambanārthasadbhāvaṃ vyarthaṃ paryanuyuñjate // | hence (it follows that) the other parties needlessly raise questions regarding the existence of the basis of the said I-notion. |
tathā hyasyālambanaṃ bhavannityaṃ vā bhaved anityaṃ vā / | The basis (background) of this ‘I-notion’ could be either eternal or non-eternal; |
yadi nityam, tadā sarvā ahaṅkṛtayaḥ ahaṅkārā yugapad bhaveyur avikalakāraṇatvāt / | if it is eternal, then all ‘I-notions’ ‘I-consciousness’ would come about (appear) simultaneously, as their cause would be present in its perfect condition; |
na hyakāraṇamālambanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | nor can the said basis be without cause; |
na cāpi śaktasya kāraṇasya sahakārikāraṇāpekṣā bhavatītyasakṛccarvitam etat / | nor can an efficient cause stand in need of auxiliary causes; |
na caika evāyam ahaṅkāra iti śakyaṃ vaktum, kādācitkatayānekatvasiddheḥ / | Nor can it be urged that “there is only one I-consciousness”, because its multiplicity is clearly proved by its appearing only occasionally. |
tathā hi gāḍhasvāpamadamūrchāsu nāhaṅkāraḥ saṃvedyate, punar anyadā ca saṃvedyata iti siddham asya sarvadānupalambhāt kādācitkatvam / | For instance, during the states of deep sleep, or of intoxication, or of swoon, there is no ‘I-consciousness’ felt, and yet at other times, it is actually felt; and this non-apprehension of it at certain times shows that it appears only occasionally; |
kādācitkatvāccānekatvam api siddham iti sarvā ahaṅkṛtayas tadbhāvamātrabhāvinyo yugapat prasūyeran / | and because it appears only occasionally, therefore it must be regarded as many also. Thus it is clear that all these ‘I-notions’ would come about simultaneously, as their coming about is dependent upon the presence of the said cause only. |
athānityamālambanam iti pakṣaḥ tadā cakṣurādivijñānavat sphuṭatarapratibhāsāḥ sarvā ahaṃkṛtayaḥ prasajyeran / | If then the other view be accepted that the basis of the ‘I-notion’ is non-eternal, then all I-notions should be all as clearly manifest as the Visual and other Cognitions; |
sākṣādvastusvalakṣaṇagrāhitvāt / | as they would be directly apprehending the specific individuality of the thing concerned. |
tataḥ tasmāt, pare tīrthikāḥ kumārilaprabhṛtayo vyartham evāsyālambanaṃ paryanuyuñjate / tasyājñānalakṣaṇaḥ ko nu viṣayaḥ parikalpita ityādi // | For these reasons, we conclude that ‘other people’ other philosophers, like Kumārila and others needlessly raise questions regarding the basis of the I-notion in question, in such words as (those under Text 232) “Of that notion, what cognitive-moment is assumed to be the object?” and so forth. |
tatra yaduktamanālambana evāyam ahaṅkāro 'nādisatkāyadṛṣṭivāsanābalād bhrāntaḥ pravartata iti / atra kumārilenoktaṃ dūṣaṇamāśaṅkate jñātarītyādi / | In this connection, it has been asserted by the Buddhist that the ‘I-notion’ is entirely baseless, and it appears only as an Illusion due to the beginningless Dispositions of the “Vision of the Body of Being As against this, Kumārila has raised an objection, which is set forth below: [see verses 280-281a next] |
jñātari pratyabhijñānaṃ vāsanā kartumarhati / | “What the disposition can do is to bring about the recognition of the cogniser; |
nātasmin sa iti prajñāṃ na hyasau bhrāntikāraṇam // | Thus the ‘I-notion’ cannot be regarded as an illusion; as there is nothing to annul it (and hence prove it to be wrong)”; |
[p.110] | (280-281a) |
tan nāhampratyayo bhrāntir iṣṭaś ced bādhavarjanāt / | What has been urged is hot right; as the reasoning adduced above is clearly found to be subversive of the said idea. |
281ab | (281b) |
vāsanā hi jñātṛviṣayāṃ pratyabhijñāṃ kartum arhati / na punar atasmin ajñātari, saḥ jñātā, iti prajñām jñānaṃ vāsanā kartumarhatīti sambandhaḥ / | What the Disposition can do is to bring about the Recognition of the Cogniser, and not the Cognition of a thing Cogniser as what it is not, i.e. as not-Cogniser; the construction is that Disposition cannot bring about this latter Cognition. |
kasmātna hyasau bhrāntikāraṇam, api tu yathānubhūtārthaviṣayamevāsaujñānaṃ janayati na bhrāntamity arthaḥ / | “why?” because it cannot be the cause of Illusion; in fact it always brings about the Cognition of a thing exactly as it had been cognised on the previous occasion, and not a wrong Cognition. |
tasmād ayam ahaṅkāro vāsanāta utpadyamānatvāt bādhakapramāṇābhāvāc ca na bhrānto yukta iti / | Thus then, because this I-notion is produced from Dispositions, and because there is no valid reason for annulling it, it cannot be regarded as an Illusion. |
cecchabdo bhinnakramo bādhavarjanādityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ // | The term ‘chet’, ‘if this be urged should be construed away from its place, after the end of the sentence. |
netyādinā pratividhatte / | ‘Adduced above’ under Text 278. |
īśvarādiṣu bhaktānāṃ taddhetutvādivibhramāḥ / vāsanāmātrabhāvāc ca jāyante vividhāḥ katham // | (281b) How is it that, entirely from dispositions, such diverse illusions come about as those that devotees have in regard to god and other beings as being the cause of things and so forth? |
tan nāhampratyayagrāhyo jñātā kaścana vidyate // | It has been argued that “Disposition cannot be the cause of Illusion”; |
tataḥ sarvapramāṇeṣu na dṛṣṭānto 'sti siddhibhāk / | this reason is ‘Inconclusive’; |
hetavāś cāśrayāsiddhā yathāyogam udāhṛtāḥ // | this is shown in the following Text: [see verse 282 above] |
yadi hi vāsanā bhrāntikāraṇaṃ na bhavet tadānīmīśvaraḥ sarvotpattimatāṃ hetuḥ sarvajño nityabuddhisamāśraya ityādayo vibhramāḥ katham iva vāsanāmātrasambhavād udbhaveyuḥ / | If Disposition were not the cause of Illusion, then how could such Illusions appear, purely out of Dispositions, as ‘God is the cause of all products, omniscient, the receptacle of eternal cognition’ and so forth? In fact, Kumārila himself has denied a creator of the world, like God and other Beings. |
vāsanāmātrabhāvacceti mātragrahaṇaṃ tathābhūtālambanārthavyavacchedārtham / | In the phrase ‘proceeding entirely from Disposition’, the term ‘entirely’ is for the purpose of excluding a real background. |
tasmād ahaṅkārasya nirālambanatvān na tadgrāhyo jñātā kaścit prasiddho 'stīti na tasmād ātmā siddhyatīti / | Thus ‘I-consciousness’ being baseless, there can be no Cogniser who could be admitted to be the object of that consciousness. Hence the existence of the ‘soul’ is not proved. |
yac ca vyatītāhaṅkṛtigrāhya ityādinityasādhanam uktam tatrāha tadityādi / | The other party has adduced (under Text 238, et seq.) such reasons as ‘because he has been apprehended by past I-notions’ and so forth, for proving the eternity of the Soul; |
kaścaneti / | against this it is urged that there can be no Cogniser, etc. |
nityo 'nityo vā jñātā dṛṣṭāntadharmī nāstītyasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | i.e. neither an eternal nor a non-eternal Cogniser is there who could serve as the corroborative instance; |
tathā hi prathamadvitīyoḥ prayogayor dharmyasiddhir dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ idānīṃtanasya hyastanasya cāhampratyayagamyasya jñātuḥ kasyacid abhāvāt / | For instance, the first and second reasonings (set forth by the opponent) are open to the objection that the corroborative Instance is beset with the defect of having its subject unknown; as there is no such Cogniser known as is the object of the ‘I-notion’ of to-day and also of yesterday. |
tṛtīye tu prayoge ekabuddhivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyasādhanavikallaḥ / | As regards the third reasoning, the Instance cited ‘like the single Cognition’ is devoid of the Probandum and the Probans; |
abhima [p.111] tāyā ekabuddher ekasantānasambaddhajñātrahampratyayatvasya ekaviṣayatvasya cāsiddhatvāt / | because the ‘one Cognition’ intended to be the ‘I-notion’ of the cogniser connected with the same chain, and also to appertain to a single object, is ‘not proven’ (not admitted by all parties). |
ato dharmadvayasiddhimukhenāsyāpyasiddhatvam uktam / | Thus, on account of the two characters being ‘unproven’, the Instance itself has been declared to be ‘unproven |
udāhṛtāḥ pūrvam upanyastā ye hetavaḥ yathāyogam yathāsambhavam / | Addled in due course, i.e. those Reasons that have been adduced above; ‘in due course’ according to the nature of the defect found in each. |
tathā hi prathamadvitīyayoḥ prayogayor ye hetavas ta āśrayāsiddhāḥ ahampratyayagrāhyasya kasyacid api dharmiṇo jñātur asiddhatvāt / | ‘Unproven regarding their substratum’, for instance, in the first and second arguments, the Reasons adduced are ‘unproven regarding their substratum’, as it is not admitted that there is any such object as ‘the Cogniser apprehended by I-notion’; |
tṛtīye tu prayoge nāśrayasiddhiḥ / pratyayānāṃ dharmiṇāṃ siddhatvāt / kintu teṣām ekasantānasambaddhajñātṛviśeṣeṇamasiddham / nirālambanatvasya prasiddhatvāt / | in the third argument, though the substratum is not ‘unproven’, inasmuch as the ‘Cognitions’ which form the subject are well-recognised entities, yet, what is ‘not proven’ in regard to them is the fact of their being qualified by a ‘Cogniser connected with a single chain’, because it is well known that Cognitions are baseless (devoid of any basis in reality). |
ato yathāyogamityuktam //282- | This is the reason why the Text has used the qualifying term, ‘in due course (283-284) |
iti Mīmāṃsakaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā // | End of section 7 (b) dealing with the Mīmāṃsaka’s Doctrine of the ‘Soul’. |
caitanyam anye manyante bhinnaṃ buddhisvarūpataḥ / | Others hold caitanya ‘sentience’ to be distinct from the form of buddhi, intellect (cognition). |
ātmanaś ca nijaṃ rūpaṃ caitanyaṃ kalpayanti te // | They postulate ‘sentience’ as the ‘spirit’s’ own form; |
pradhānenopanītaṃ ca phalaṃ bhuṅkte sa kevalam / | he only enjoys the fruits presented to him by primordial matter; |
kartṛtvam naiva tasyāsti prakṛter eva tanmatam // | he is not the ‘doer’; the character of ‘doer’ is held to belong to primordial matter alone. |
anya iti sāṃkhyāḥ / | ‘Others’ the Sāṃkhyas. |
te hi buddhivyatiriktaṃ caitanyamātmano nijaṃ rūpaṃ kalpayanti / yato buddhiḥ pradhānasvabhāvā caitanyaṃ tu puruṣasyaiva svarūpam iti teṣāṃ samayaḥ / | They postulate the Spirit’s own form as consisting of Caitanya, ‘sentience’, which is something different from Buddhi (of the Sāṃkhyas, which is Cosmic Intellect); as their doctrine is that Buddhi is of the nature of Primordial Matter, while Caitanya is the form of the Spirit alone. |
sa ca puruṣaḥ śubhāśubhakarmaphalasya pradhānopanītaya bhoktā na tu karmaṇāṃ kartā prakṛter evāśeṣajagatpariṇatirūpāyāḥ kartṛtvasyeṣṭatvāt / | This ‘Spirit’ is the enjoyer of the fruit of good and bad deeds, presented by Primordial Matter, but he is not the doer of the deeds; as the character of the doer is held to belong to Primordial Matter alone, which contains within itself the evolution of the whole world. |
atra ca pramāṇayanti yat saṃghātarūpaṃ vastu tatparārthaṃ dṛṣṭam tadyathā śayanādi saṃghātarūpāś ca cakṣuradaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | In support of this doctrine they adduce the following proof: Whatever is of the nature of an aggregate is found to be for another’s purpose, e.g. Beds and such things; the eye and the rest are of the nature of aggregates; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things; |
yaścāsau paraḥ sa sāmarthyād ātmeti siddham / iti parasya bhāvaḥ //285- | and this ‘another’ is, by implication, the Spirit (or Soul): This is what the other party means. |
tatrāpi rūpaśabdādicetasāṃ vedayte katham / suvyaktaṃ bhedavadrūpam ekā cec cetaneṣyate // | As regards this doctrine, if ‘sentience’ is held to be one only, then how is it that, in the cognitions of colour, sound and other objects, what is clearly perceived is a form beset with diversity? (287). |
tathā hi caitanyaṃ puruṣasya nijaṃ rūpam iti bruvatā caitanyaṃ nityaikarūpam iti pratijñātaṃ bhavati nityaikarūpātpuruṣāt tasyāvytiriktatvāt / | To explain When the Sāṃkhya says that “Sentience is the Soul’s own form”, what becomes postulated is that sentience is eternal and of one form, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Soul who is eternal and of one form, This however is contrary to facts of perception; |
etac ca pratyakṣaviruddham yato rūpaśabdādicetasāṃ suvyaktam sphuṭataram eva svasaṃvidā bhedavadrūpam bhinnasvabhāvaḥ vedyate / | inasmuch as in the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and other things, what is clearly distinctly perceived, through their own Cognition itself is a form beset with diversity, i.e. a diverse character is perceived; |
taccaikatve sati cetanāyā nopapadyate // | and this could not be possible if Sentience were only one. |
ekarūpe ca caitanye sarvakālamavasthite / nānāvidhārthabhoktṛtvaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapadyate // | If ‘sentience’ is of one form and continues to exist for all time, then, how is it possible for the sentient soul to be the enjoyer of things of many kinds? (288) |
ekarūpaścātmā atha ca nānāvidhasyārthasya bhokteti parasparaviruddham / | The Soul is of one form, and yet the enjoyer of many kinds of things, this involves self-contradiction; |
abhoktavasthānirviśiṣṭatvāt // didṛkṣādiyogād avirodha iti cedāha netyādi / na didṛkṣādayo bhinnās tasya bhoganibandhanam / | specially as it cannot be distinguished from the state in which one is not the enjoyer. The ‘desire to see’ and the like, which are diverse, do not come into existence as forming the basis of the spirit’s experience; |
bhavanti hi tathā bhāve pumānutpattimān bhavet // | for, if they did so, then the soul itself would be something produced. |
yadi rūpādiṣu didṛkṣāśuśrūṣādayas tasya parasparato bhinnā bhoganibandhanatvenopakalpitās te 'pyasyātmano na bhavanti na jāyante / | If, in regard to colour, etc. the ‘desire to see’, ‘desire to hear’ and so forth, which are different from one another, be assumed to be the basis of the Spirit’s experience, then no such can come into existence. |
yadi hi jāyeras tadā tathā bhedena bhāve jātau satyām pumānutpattimān bhavet / didṛkṣādivat tadavyatirekāt // | If they did come into existence, then, i.e. if they came into existence as distinct from each other, the Spirit also would be something produced, just like the ‘desire to see’, etc. as it is non-different from these. |
etad eva vyaktīkurvann āha caitanyavyatiriktaṃ hītyādi / | This same point is made clearer in the following: [see verse 290 next] |
caitanyavyatiriktaṃ hi na didṛkṣādi vidyate / | The ‘desire to see’ and the rest are not anything distinct prom ‘sentience’; |
tasyodayavyayāveśe durvāraḥ puruṣe 'pyasau // vyatireke hi tasya ta iti sambandhānupapattiḥ / | and if this latter were liable to ‘appearance and disappearance’, then the same could not be denied of the soul. |
asāviti / udayavyayasamāveśaḥ / | ‘The same’, i.e. the attributing of ‘appearance and disappearance’. |
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