buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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abhoktravasthāto bhoktravasthāyāṃ viśeṣābhāvāt / tathā coktaṃ kumārilena	specially as there would be no difference between the ‘state of experiencing’ and the ‘state of not-experiencing’, This has been thus asserted by Kumārila;
tasmād ubhayahānena vyāvṛttyanugamātmakaḥ / puruṣo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ kuṇḍalādiṣu sarpavat // %QUOTE Ślokavārttika	‘Thus both the absolute conditions being impossible, the Spirit (Soul) should be held to be of the nature of both Exclusion and Inclusion, just like the Serpent in the coiled and other forms’, (Ślokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 28).” (226)
na ca kartṛtvabhoktṛtve puṃso 'vasthāṃ samāśrite /	“The soul’s characters of ‘doer’ and ‘experiencer’ are not dependent upon the state;
tato 'vasthāsu tat tatvāt kartaivāpnoti tatphalam //	hence, as it is the soul itself that remains the same through the various states, it is the doer of the act that always obtains (experiences) the fruit of that act.” (227)
[p.96] na hi puṃsaḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtve avasthāṃ samāśrite kintu puruṣam eva /	Objection If the Spirit (Soul) is of the nature of both states, the state that does the act would not be the same that experiences its effects;
yasmāt pumān eva karoti bhuṅkte ca na tvavasthā /	The character of being the Doer and that of being the Experiencer are not dependent upon the state of the Soul;
tataḥ tasmāt avasthāvataḥ puruṣasya tattvāt parityaktapūrvarūpatvāt kartaiva tatphalam tasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āpnotītyadoṣaḥ //	as it is the Soul itself, not its condition or state which does the Act and experiences its effects. Hence, for this reason, inasmuch as the Soul to whom the states belong remains the same and does not abandon its previous form, it is the Doer himself who secures the fruit of that Act.
kiṃ punar asyātmano 'stitve sādhakaṃ pramāṇam ity āha pumān ity āha	So that this doctrine is not open to the said objection.
pumānevamvidhaścāyaṃ pratyabhijñānabhāvataḥ /	“The spirit (or soul) as described is proved by the presence of recognition;
pramīyate prabādhā ca nairātmyasyāmunaiva hi //	and the doctrine of ‘no-soul’ is disproved by this same (recognition).” (228)
ahameva jñātavān aham evas vedmītyāderekakartṛviṣayasya pratyabhijñānasya bhāvataḥ satvāt ātmā prasiddhaḥ /	By the presence of Recognition, involved in such notions as ‘I cognised it’, ‘I am cognising it’ and so forth, where there is ‘recognition’ of the same ‘doer’ (cogniser) is proved the existence of the Soul.
amunaiva ca pratyabhijñānena bauddhādiparikalpitasya nairātmyasya bādhāpi siddhā /	By this same Recognition also is disproved the doctrine of ‘No Soul’, as propounded by the Buddhist and others;
yathoktam tenātmāt pratyabhijñānāt sarvalokāvadhāritāt / nairātmyavādabādhaḥ syāt iti //	as has been thus declared ‘Thus from this fact Recognition which is admitted by all men, follows the refutation of the doctrine of No-Soul’ (Ślokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 136).
ahaṃ vedmītyahambuddhir jñātāraṃ pratipadyate /	“The notion of ‘I’ involved in the conception ‘I know’ envisages the cogniser;
sa cātmā yadi vā jñānaṃ syād ekāntavinaśvaram //	this cogniser may be either the ‘soul’ or the absolutely evanescent ‘cognition’ (idea).
yadyātmā viṣayas tasyāścaturastraṃ tadākhilam / kṣaṇikajñānapakṣe tu sarvamevātidurghaṭam //	If it is the ‘soul’ that is the objective of that notion, then all is square; on the other hand, if the momentary ‘cognition’ (idea) is held to be so, then all becomes inexplicably confounded.
tathā hi jñātavān pūrvamaham eva ca samprati / aham eva pravedmīti yā buddhirupajāyate // tasyā jñānakṣaṇaḥ ko nu viṣayaḥ parikalpyate / atītaḥ sāmprataḥ kiṃ vā kiṃ vāsāvatha santatiḥ // tatrādye viṣaye jñāte jñātavāniti yujyate /	For instance, the notion that appears in the form ‘it was I who cognised this thing on a previous occasion, and it is I who am cognising it now’, of this notion, what ‘cognitive moment’ is assumed to be the objective? would such a ‘moment’ be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) in the form of a continued series? if it be the first (a), the moment could well be the objective of the notion ‘I cognised it (in the past)’;
jānāmīti na yuktaṃ ca nedānīṃ vetyasau tataḥ //	but it could not be the objective of the notion ‘I am cognising it (now)’, because the cogniser is not cognising the thing at the moment of speaking;
vartamāne tu viṣaye pravedmītyupapadyate / jñātavānityasatyaṃ tu naivāsīt prāgidaṃ yataḥ //	it is only when the object is present at the time (of cognition) that it can be spoken of as ‘I am cognising it but (in regard to such a present object) it would not be true to say ‘I cognised it’, because the object did not exist in the past.
ata eva dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ naiva tasyāḥ prakalpyate /	From this it follows that both of these (past and present) cannot form the objective of the said notion.
na hyubhau jñātavantau vā jānīto vādhunā punaḥ //	Nor did both ‘cognitive moments’ cognise the thing in the past; nor do they both cognise it in the present.
santāno 'pi na tadbāhyo dvitayasyāpyasambhavāt /	(c) Nor can the ‘series’ be regarded as the ‘cognised object’, as both are impossible;
na hyasau jñātavān pūrvam avastutvān na vādhunā // [p.97]	the ‘series’ could not cognise it in the past; and as it is not an entity, it cannot cognise in the present.
tasmād ayamahaṅkāro vartate yatra gocare / uktādanyatra siddho 'sāvātmā śāśvatarūpavān //	For all these reasons, it is established that that wherein ‘I-consciousness’ subsists, which must be something distinct from the said cognition, is the ‘soul’ of the eternal form.” (229-237)
ahaṃ vedmītyayam ahampratyayo jñātāraṃ pratipadyata ityatrāvivāda eva vedmīti kartṛpratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyāt /	The answer is as follows: [see verses 229-237 above] That the conception ‘I know’ envisages the Cogniser, is beyond all dispute; as the verb ‘I know’ connotes the notion of the person who does the cognising.
sa ca jñātā bhavannātmā vā bhavet jñānaṃ vā bhavatparikalpitamekāntavinaśvaraṃ kṣaṇikamiti kalpanādvayam /	Now in regard to this Cogniser, there are two theories possible: (1) that it is the ‘Soul’, or (2) the absolutely evanescent Cognition (Idea) as postulated by you (Buddhists).
tatra yadyātmeti pakṣastadākhilaṃ caturastram abhimatārthaprasiddheḥ /	If the theory that ‘it is the Soul’ be accepted then all becomes square, as it accomplishes what is desired.
atha jñānam iti pakṣas tadā sarvamatidurghaṭam /	If, on the other hand, the other view is accepted that it is the Idea, then all becomes extremely inexplicable.
tathā hi ahaṃ jñātavānaham eva ca sāmprataṃ vedmīti yo 'yam ekakartṛpratyavamarśenāhambuddhirupajāyate tasyāvijñānakṣaṇo viṣayatvena kalpyamānaḥ kadācidatīto vā kalpyate yadvā sāmprato vartamāna utātītasāmprato yadvā santatir iti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ / tatrādye atīte jñāne viṣayatvena kalpyamāno jñātavānityayam ākārāvasāyo yujyate pūrvaṃ tena jñātatvāt /	Because, the conception appears in the form ‘I cognised this in the past and I am cognising it in the present’, and herein there is a clear conception, the notion of ‘I’ being the Cogniser in both cases; of this conception of ‘I’, if the ‘Cognitive Moment’ be assumed to be the object, would this ‘moment’ be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) both present and past, or (d) in the form of a continued series? There are these four possible alternatives. Now as regards (a), the past ‘moment’ being assumed as the object of the notion of ‘I’, the idea that ‘I cognised’ might be all right, as the thing had been cognised in the past;
samprati jānāmītyetat tu na yuktam na hyasāvatītajñānakṣaṇa idānīṃ vartamānakāle vetti tasya pūrvaniruddhatvāt /	but the idea that ‘I am cognising it now’ could not be true, because the past ‘Cognitive Moment’ does not cognise the thing at the present time, as ex-hypothesi it has already disappeared.
atha vartamānaṃ viṣaya iti dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā vedmītyetadyuktam idānīṃ tasya vedakatvāt /	(b) If the second alternative is accepted that the present ‘Cognitive Moment’ is the object of the notion of ‘I’, then the idea that ‘I am cognising’ would be all right, as it is really the Cogniser at the present moment;
jñātavānityevam ākāragrahaṇaṃ tu na yuktam / kasmātnaivāsīt prāgidaṃ yataḥ /	but the idea that ‘I knew it in the past’ would not be true, why? because it did not exist at the previous time.
idam iti vartamānaṃ jñānam /	The word ‘idam’ (in the Text) stands for the present Cognition.
ata eva asyā buddher vaimukhyena pravṛtteḥ nātītaṃ sāmprataṃ ca vijñānadvayaṃ grāhyamiti siddham /	Thus then, inasmuch as the conception operates both ways, it becomes established that the present and the past, both, Cognitive Moments cannot form the object of the notion of ‘I’;
na hi vartamānātītāvubhau jñānalakṣaṇau jñātavantau nāpi sāmprataṃ jānītaḥ /	as both these ‘Cognitive Moments’ did not cognise the thing in the past, nor do they cognise it in the present;
kiṃ tarhieko jñātavānaparo jānāti /	as a matter of fact, one ‘Moment’ cognised it in the past, and another ‘Moment’ is cognising it in the present.
ata eva santāno 'pi tayāhambuddhyā grāhyo na bhavati dvitayasya atītavartamānajñānakriyādvayasyāsambhavāt /	For the same reason the ‘Series’ also cannot form the object of the notion of ‘I’; as both the past and the present acts of cognition are impossible.
tathā hi nāsau santāno jñātavān pūrvaṃ nāpyadhunā jānāti tasya kalpitatvenāvastutvāt na cāvastuno jñātṛtvaṃ bhavati tasya vastudharmatvāt /	Because this ‘Series’ did not cognise the thing in the past, nor does it cognise it in the present; because being only ‘conceptual’, it is not a thing, an entity; and what is not an entity cannot be the Cogniser, as being a Cogniser is a property that can belong only to an entity.
tasmād yathoktajñānavyatirekeṇa yatra viṣaye 'yamahaṅkāro vartate sa ātmetisiddham //229-	From all this it follows that, that thing wherein the notion of ‘I’ (I-conscionsness) subsists, and as shown above, it must be something distinct from the said Cognition, is the Soul.
vyatītāhaṅkṛtiścādyo jñātādyāpyanuvartate / ahampratyayagamyatvād idānīntaraboddhṛvat //	“The ‘cogniser’ who formed the object of ‘I-consciousness’ in the past must be regarded as continuing to exist to-day, because he is the object of ‘I-consciousness’, like the cogniser in the present.
eṣa vā hyastano jñātā jñātṛtvāt ata eva vā /	or because of the same reason (of being the object of ‘I-consciousness’), like the cogniser of yesterday;
hyastanajñātṛvat teṣāṃ pratyayānāṃ ca sādhyatā //	and all these fulfill the conditions of the probandum.” (238-239)
[p.98] yo 'hampratyayagamyaḥ so 'dyāpyanuvartate;yathedānīntano boddhā /	He who formed the object of ‘I-consciousness’ in the past continues to exist to-day; just like the Cogniser in the present;
ahampratyayagamyaścāyam idānīntano boddheti svabhāvahetuḥ / eṣa veti /	and the Cogniser in the present is the object of ‘I-consciousness’; this is the Reason based up the real state of things.
tata eveti /	‘Or, he’ i.e. the present Cogniser.
ahampratyayagamyatvāt / evaṃ jñātāraṃ dharmiṇaṃ kṛtvā prayogo darśitaḥ /	‘Because of the same reason’ i.e. because of being the object of ‘I-consciousness’. This argument has been formulated in reference to the Cogniser as the Subject.
sāmpratamahampratyayānāṃ sādhyadharmitāṃ kṛtvā prayogāntaraṃ darśayannāha teṣām ityādi /	The Author next proceeds to set forth another argument on the basis of the present I-notions as appertaining to the Probandum All these, etc.
teṣām iti atītādyananānām ahampratyayānām;sādhyateti /	‘all these’ I-notions, of the past and of the present fulfil the conditions of the Probandum, i.e. come to appertain to the Probandum.
katham ity āha ekasantānetyādi /	The following Text proceeds to show how this is so: [see verse 240 next]
ekasantānasambandhajñātrahampratyayatvataḥ / hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve tulyārthā ekabuddhivat //	“All (I-notions) of yesterday and of to-day must have the same object, because they are i-notions belonging to the cogniser connected with one and the same ‘chain’, like any single cognition.” (240)
hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve ahampratyayā ityayaṃ sādhyadharminirdeśaḥ /	‘All I motions of yesterday and of to-day’, this states the Subject in regard to which the Probandum is to be predicated;
tulyārthā iti sādhyadharmaḥ / ekaviṣayā ity arthaḥ /	‘must have the same object’, this states the Probandum; the meaning is that they should have one and the same object.
ekena devadattādisantānena sambaddho yo jñātā tatra tasya vā ye 'hampratyayā ekasantānasambaddhajñātrahampratyayāḥ tadbhāvastatvam /	The Probans is stated thus: Being such I-notions as belong to a Cogniser who is connected with one and the same Chain, such as that of a single person like Devadatta. The mere character of being I-notion is present in the ī-notions of other persons also;
ayaṃ ca hetunirdeśaḥ /	hence if the Probans had been stated in that form, it would be ‘Inconclusive’;
ahampratyayatvamātraṃ puruṣāntarīyeṣvapyahaṅkāreṣu pravartata ityato 'naikāntikatvaparihārārtham ekasantānasambaddhajñātṛviṣayatvaṃ hetuviśeṣaṇaṃ kṛtam /	hence in order to avoid that contingency, the Probans has been stated as qualified by the qualification of ‘pertaining to a cogniser connected with one and the same Chain’.
ekabuddhivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	‘Like any single Cognition’, this is the Corroborative Instance;
tad atretyādinottarapakṣam ārabhate /	it means ‘like any single intended Cognition among these same I-notions’.
tad atra cintyate nityamekaṃ caitanyamiṣyate / yadi buddhir api prāptā tadrūpaiva tathā sati //	In this connection, the following points are to be considered: if intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then, cognition also should have to be regarded as of the same character.
yadi hi caitanyaṃ nityaikarūpamaṅgīkriyate tadā buddhir api caitanyarūpāvyatirekānnityaikarūpā prāpnoti /	If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also which has no form other than that of Intelligence, should have to be regarded as eternal and one.
na caivamiṣṭamato 'bhyupagamavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ /	This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine.
tathā hi bhāṣyakāreṇoktam kṣaṇikā hi sā na buddhyantarakālamavatiṣṭhata iti / tathā jaiminināpy uktam satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tatpratyakṣam iti /	For instance, the author of your Bhāṣya (Śabara) has declared [under Sūtra 1.1.5, page 9, line 17, Bib. Indica Edition] that ‘Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition’, Jaimini also has asserted (under Sū. 5) that ‘Perception is that Cognition of man which is produced on the contact of an existing thing’;
nityatve sati janmāyogāt /	and if Cognition were eternal, there could be no ‘production’ of it.
svavacanavirodhaś ca kumārilasya yathoktaṃ tenaiva na hi tatkṣaṇamapyāste jāyate vāpramātmakam / yenārthagrahaṇe paścād vyāpriyetendriyādivat //	It would also involve self-contradiction on the part of Kumārila himself: He has declared for instance that ‘It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like’ (Ślokavārtika, Pratyakṣa-Sūtra, 55).
ekatvāc ca buddheḥ pramāṇaṣaṭkābhyupagamavirodhaś ca /	Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of ‘Six Means and Forms of Cognition’, It would also be contrary to Perception also;
buddhīnām api caitanyasvābhāvyātpuruṣasya ca / nityatvamekatāceṣṭā bhedaścedviṣayāśrayaḥ //	as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations. “Cognitions, and the soul also, are held to be eternal and one, on the ground of their being of the nature of ‘intelligence’;
[p.99] buddhīnāṃ puruṣasya ca nityatvamekatā ceṣṭā kasmātcaitanyasvābhāvyāt buddhilakṣaṇacaitanyasvābhāvyāt puruṣasyāsmanmatenetyarthaḥ /	[This is a quotation, from Ślokavārtika, Chapter on Eternality of Sound, 401]. Cognitions and the Soul also are regarded as eternal and one; why? because they are of the nature of Intelligence; that is, because, under our view Spirit is of the nature of Intelligence in the form of Cognitions.
kathaṃ tarhi rūpabuddhī rasabuddhir ityādi bhedaḥ pratīyata ity āha bhedaścedviṣayāśraya iti /	Question How then is it that such diversity (in Cognitions) is recognised as ‘Colour-Cognition’, ‘Taste-Cognition’ and so forth?
cecchabdaḥ paramatābhyupagame /	Answer “If there is diversity, it is due to the object;
yadyevaṃ kalpyata ity arthaḥ //	the sense being ‘If in case diversity be assumed”.
syād etad yadi nityaikā buddhis tadā kimiti krameṇa rūpādīn pratipadyate / yāvatā sakṛdeva pratīyād viśeṣābhāvād ity āha svarūpeṇetyādi /	Objection (to Kumārila’s position) If Cognition is eternal and one, then, how is it that it apprehends Colour and other things consecutively? It should apprehend all at once, there being no distinction (to which the successiveness would be due).
svarūpeṇa tathā vahnir nityaṃ dahanadharmakaḥ / upanītaṃ dahatyarthaṃ dāhyaṃ nānyan na cānyadā // yathā kila vahnir nityaṃ dahanātmako 'pi san na sarvadā dahati kiṃ tarhiupanītam ḍhaukitam eva dahati /	“Though, by its very nature, fire is always of the nature of a burner, it burns only what is presented to it, and that also only a thing that is capable of being burnt, not any other thing, nor at any other time.” (243) Fire is eternally of the nature of a Burner, and yet it does not burn all things at all times.
tatrāpi yadeva dāhyaṃ dagdhuṃ śakyaṃ tadeva dahati nābhrādikam ityato dāhyam ity āha //	It burns only what is brought to it; and then also, It burns only a thing that is capable of being burnt, and not the Sky or any such thing.
yathā vetyādinā dṛṣṭāntāntaram āha	In the following Text, he cites another example: [see verses 244-245 next]
yathā vā darpaṇaḥ svaccho yathā vā sphaṭikopalaḥ /	“Or, the clean mirror, or the rock-crystal, reflects the image of only what is placed before it in the same manner, souls, though possessed of eternal sentience, apprehend colour and other things only when they are themselves in the body and the things are presented to them by the organs.
yadevādhīyate tatra tacchāyāṃ pratipadyate //	and on this account, the resultant Cognition is recognised as evanescent;
tathaiva nityacaitanyaḥ pumāṃso dehavṛttayaḥ / gṛhṇantī karaṇānītān rūpādīndhīrasau ca naḥ // malinasya cchāyāpratipattyabhāvāt svaccha ityuktam /	as regards the cognitions of the jar, the elephant and so forth, their diversity is held by people to be due to the diversity among those things.” (247) Question How do you know that Cognition is eternal? Answer: [see verse 247 above]
ḍhaukyata ity arthaḥ / tathaiveti dārṣṭāntikopadarśanam /	The term ‘tatra’ is a meaningless term used as introducing the sentence ‘Being of the nature of Intelligence’;
yattvetannityaṃ caitanyamasāvasmākaṃ dhīḥ; buddhiḥ na tu sāṅkhyavat tadvyatirekīi buddhiḥ //	because it is always recognised as ‘Cognition’, it is eternal, like the Word-Sound.
yadyevaṃ katham asau dhīrbhaṅginī prasiddhetyetadāśaṅkya tenetyādinā sūcitam eva kāraṇamupadarśayan buddher bhaṅginītvaṃ samarthayate /	“If that be so, then how is it that in common parlance, we find such distinction among Cognitions accepted by observers as ‘this is the Cognition of the Jar’, ‘that is the Cognition of the Cloth’ and so forth?” Answer As regards the Cognitions of the Jar, etc. etc.;
tenopanetṛsaṃrambhabhaṅgitvād bhaṅginī matiḥ /	‘due to the diversity among those things’, i.e. the diversity among the Jar, the Elephant and the rest.
tatra bodhātmakatvena pratyabhijñāyate matiḥ /	The same idea is further clarified by the following Text: [see verse 248 next]
saiveti nocyate buddhir arthabhedānusāribhiḥ / na cāstyapratyabhijñānam arthabheda upāśrite // arthabhedānusāribhir iti /	“People who follow up the diversity among the objects cognised do not speak of the cognition as ‘that same cognition’; nor is there non-recognition of it as ‘cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects.” (248)
pratipattṛbhiḥ /	People who follow up, etc.;
anenānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ arthabhedakṛta eva buddhirbheda iti darśayati /	What this Text shows, by means of affirmative and negative premisses, is that the diversity in Cognitions is due only to diversity among the objects cognised.
na cāstyapratyabhijñānam iti /	Nor is there non-recognition, etc.; that is, there is recognition.
nanv ityādinā pratividhatte /	If such is the case, then, on the occasion when there appear.
pratyayā ye pravartante bhedas tatra kimāśrayaḥ // yadi hyarthabhedakṛta eva buddhirbhedas tadā ye hastyādiśūnyāyāṃ bhuvi krameṇa gajaturagādīnavasthitān samāropayantaḥ pratyayāḥ pravartante teṣu bhedaḥ kimāśrayaḥ pratīyeta / naiva kaścidbhedavyavasthāśrayo 'stīti yāvat /	cognitions imposing the concepts of ‘elephant’ and the rest in reference to spots where these animals do not exist, to what is the diversity in such cognitions due? (249) If the diversity of the Cognition is due to the diversity in the objects cognised, then, what is the basis for the diversity that appears in the ease of those Cognitions which successively impose the concepts of the ‘elephant’, ‘horse’ and the rest upon a place where the elephants do not really exist? The meaning is that in such cases there is no basis at all for the notion of such diversity.
tathā hi na svato bhedo 'sti /	Because, there is no difference in the Cognitions per se;
sravabuddhīnām ekatvābhyupagamāt /	as all Cognition is held to be one (by the Mīmāṃsaka).
nāpyupadhānabhūtaviṣayanānātvāt tatropadhāyakasya kasyacid arthasyābhāvāt //	Nor can the diversity be due to the multiplicity of the objects imposed; as there is no object that does the imposing.
svaprādipratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā nahi neṣyate / sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam // iti tadetad āśaṅkate anyadeśādibhāvinya ityādi /	If the individual objects existing at other times and places be held to supply the basis for such imposed cognitions, on the ground that in all cognitions the basis of reality is supplied by objects existing at times and places other than those of the appearance of the cognitions themselves, [then the answer would be as stated in the following text].
anyadeśādibhāvinyo vyaktayaś cen nibandhanam /	The following might be urged: “The idea that a Cognition may be devoid of a real object is not true;
sarvatrālambanaṃ yasmād deśakālāny athātmakam // [p.101] nibandhanam iti /	in every case there is an external background, only conceived of in connection with a wrong place and time’, [ Ślokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 107-108].”
buddher bhedavyavasthānaṃ prati kāraṇam ity arthaḥ /	‘Basis’, i.e. the cause of the notion of diversity among Cognitions.
deśakālāvanyathātmakāvanyaprakārau yasya tat tathoktam deśakālābhyāṃ vānyathātmā yasyeti vigrahaḥ //	The compound ‘deśakālānyathātmakam’ is to be analysed as ‘that of which the time and place are otherwise’, or as ‘that of which the differentiation is done by time and place’.
nanvityādinā pratividhatte	The answer to this is given in the following Text: [see verse 251 next]
nanu taddeśasambandho naiva tāsāṃ tathāsti tat /	But as a matter of fact, the cognitions in question have no such connection with that particular place;
kimiti pratibhāsante tena rūpeṇa tatra ca //	why then should they appear in that form at that place? (251)
yasmin hi deśe yena krameṇa tāḥ samāropitā vyaktayas tadā pratibhāsante tena deśena sambnadho naiva tāsāṃ deśāntarakālāntaragatānāṃ tathā tena krameṇāsti; tat kimiti tena svecchāsamāropitarūpeṇa pratibhāsante /	When at a certain place, a number of individual objects actually appear as ‘imposed’ upon Cognitions in a certain order of sequence, there is no connection between the Cognition and those individual objects existing at other times and places, in the same order of sequence.
na hyanyena rūpeṇānyasya pratibhāsanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	it that they appear in the form that is imposed upon them arbitrarily? Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to appear in the form of another thing;

abhoktravasthāto bhoktravasthāyāṃ viśeṣābhāvāt / tathā coktaṃ kumārilena

specially as there would be no difference between the ‘state of experiencing’ and the ‘state of not-experiencing’, This has been thus asserted by Kumārila;

tasmād ubhayahānena vyāvṛttyanugamātmakaḥ / puruṣo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ kuṇḍalādiṣu sarpavat // %QUOTE Ślokavārttika

‘Thus both the absolute conditions being impossible, the Spirit (Soul) should be held to be of the nature of both Exclusion and Inclusion, just like the Serpent in the coiled and other forms’, (Ślokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 28).” (226)

na ca kartṛtvabhoktṛtve puṃso 'vasthāṃ samāśrite /

“The soul’s characters of ‘doer’ and ‘experiencer’ are not dependent upon the state;

tato 'vasthāsu tat tatvāt kartaivāpnoti tatphalam //

hence, as it is the soul itself that remains the same through the various states, it is the doer of the act that always obtains (experiences) the fruit of that act.” (227)

[p.96] na hi puṃsaḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtve avasthāṃ samāśrite kintu puruṣam eva /

Objection If the Spirit (Soul) is of the nature of both states, the state that does the act would not be the same that experiences its effects;

yasmāt pumān eva karoti bhuṅkte ca na tvavasthā /

The character of being the Doer and that of being the Experiencer are not dependent upon the state of the Soul;

tataḥ tasmāt avasthāvataḥ puruṣasya tattvāt parityaktapūrvarūpatvāt kartaiva tatphalam tasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āpnotītyadoṣaḥ //

as it is the Soul itself, not its condition or state which does the Act and experiences its effects. Hence, for this reason, inasmuch as the Soul to whom the states belong remains the same and does not abandon its previous form, it is the Doer himself who secures the fruit of that Act.

kiṃ punar asyātmano 'stitve sādhakaṃ pramāṇam ity āha pumān ity āha

So that this doctrine is not open to the said objection.

pumānevamvidhaścāyaṃ pratyabhijñānabhāvataḥ /

“The spirit (or soul) as described is proved by the presence of recognition;

pramīyate prabādhā ca nairātmyasyāmunaiva hi //

and the doctrine of ‘no-soul’ is disproved by this same (recognition).” (228)

ahameva jñātavān aham evas vedmītyāderekakartṛviṣayasya pratyabhijñānasya bhāvataḥ satvāt ātmā prasiddhaḥ /

By the presence of Recognition, involved in such notions as ‘I cognised it’, ‘I am cognising it’ and so forth, where there is ‘recognition’ of the same ‘doer’ (cogniser) is proved the existence of the Soul.

amunaiva ca pratyabhijñānena bauddhādiparikalpitasya nairātmyasya bādhāpi siddhā /

By this same Recognition also is disproved the doctrine of ‘No Soul’, as propounded by the Buddhist and others;

yathoktam tenātmāt pratyabhijñānāt sarvalokāvadhāritāt / nairātmyavādabādhaḥ syāt iti //

as has been thus declared ‘Thus from this fact Recognition which is admitted by all men, follows the refutation of the doctrine of No-Soul’ (Ślokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 136).

ahaṃ vedmītyahambuddhir jñātāraṃ pratipadyate /

“The notion of ‘I’ involved in the conception ‘I know’ envisages the cogniser;

sa cātmā yadi vā jñānaṃ syād ekāntavinaśvaram //

this cogniser may be either the ‘soul’ or the absolutely evanescent ‘cognition’ (idea).

yadyātmā viṣayas tasyāścaturastraṃ tadākhilam / kṣaṇikajñānapakṣe tu sarvamevātidurghaṭam //

If it is the ‘soul’ that is the objective of that notion, then all is square; on the other hand, if the momentary ‘cognition’ (idea) is held to be so, then all becomes inexplicably confounded.

tathā hi jñātavān pūrvamaham eva ca samprati / aham eva pravedmīti yā buddhirupajāyate // tasyā jñānakṣaṇaḥ ko nu viṣayaḥ parikalpyate / atītaḥ sāmprataḥ kiṃ vā kiṃ vāsāvatha santatiḥ // tatrādye viṣaye jñāte jñātavāniti yujyate /

For instance, the notion that appears in the form ‘it was I who cognised this thing on a previous occasion, and it is I who am cognising it now’, of this notion, what ‘cognitive moment’ is assumed to be the objective? would such a ‘moment’ be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) in the form of a continued series? if it be the first (a), the moment could well be the objective of the notion ‘I cognised it (in the past)’;

jānāmīti na yuktaṃ ca nedānīṃ vetyasau tataḥ //

but it could not be the objective of the notion ‘I am cognising it (now)’, because the cogniser is not cognising the thing at the moment of speaking;

vartamāne tu viṣaye pravedmītyupapadyate / jñātavānityasatyaṃ tu naivāsīt prāgidaṃ yataḥ //

it is only when the object is present at the time (of cognition) that it can be spoken of as ‘I am cognising it but (in regard to such a present object) it would not be true to say ‘I cognised it’, because the object did not exist in the past.

ata eva dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ naiva tasyāḥ prakalpyate /

From this it follows that both of these (past and present) cannot form the objective of the said notion.

na hyubhau jñātavantau vā jānīto vādhunā punaḥ //

Nor did both ‘cognitive moments’ cognise the thing in the past; nor do they both cognise it in the present.

santāno 'pi na tadbāhyo dvitayasyāpyasambhavāt /

(c) Nor can the ‘series’ be regarded as the ‘cognised object’, as both are impossible;

na hyasau jñātavān pūrvam avastutvān na vādhunā // [p.97]

the ‘series’ could not cognise it in the past; and as it is not an entity, it cannot cognise in the present.

tasmād ayamahaṅkāro vartate yatra gocare / uktādanyatra siddho 'sāvātmā śāśvatarūpavān //

For all these reasons, it is established that that wherein ‘I-consciousness’ subsists, which must be something distinct from the said cognition, is the ‘soul’ of the eternal form.” (229-237)

ahaṃ vedmītyayam ahampratyayo jñātāraṃ pratipadyata ityatrāvivāda eva vedmīti kartṛpratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyāt /

The answer is as follows: [see verses 229-237 above] That the conception ‘I know’ envisages the Cogniser, is beyond all dispute; as the verb ‘I know’ connotes the notion of the person who does the cognising.

sa ca jñātā bhavannātmā vā bhavet jñānaṃ vā bhavatparikalpitamekāntavinaśvaraṃ kṣaṇikamiti kalpanādvayam /

Now in regard to this Cogniser, there are two theories possible: (1) that it is the ‘Soul’, or (2) the absolutely evanescent Cognition (Idea) as postulated by you (Buddhists).

tatra yadyātmeti pakṣastadākhilaṃ caturastram abhimatārthaprasiddheḥ /

If the theory that ‘it is the Soul’ be accepted then all becomes square, as it accomplishes what is desired.

atha jñānam iti pakṣas tadā sarvamatidurghaṭam /

If, on the other hand, the other view is accepted that it is the Idea, then all becomes extremely inexplicable.

tathā hi ahaṃ jñātavānaham eva ca sāmprataṃ vedmīti yo 'yam ekakartṛpratyavamarśenāhambuddhirupajāyate tasyāvijñānakṣaṇo viṣayatvena kalpyamānaḥ kadācidatīto vā kalpyate yadvā sāmprato vartamāna utātītasāmprato yadvā santatir iti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ / tatrādye atīte jñāne viṣayatvena kalpyamāno jñātavānityayam ākārāvasāyo yujyate pūrvaṃ tena jñātatvāt /

Because, the conception appears in the form ‘I cognised this in the past and I am cognising it in the present’, and herein there is a clear conception, the notion of ‘I’ being the Cogniser in both cases; of this conception of ‘I’, if the ‘Cognitive Moment’ be assumed to be the object, would this ‘moment’ be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) both present and past, or (d) in the form of a continued series? There are these four possible alternatives. Now as regards (a), the past ‘moment’ being assumed as the object of the notion of ‘I’, the idea that ‘I cognised’ might be all right, as the thing had been cognised in the past;

samprati jānāmītyetat tu na yuktam na hyasāvatītajñānakṣaṇa idānīṃ vartamānakāle vetti tasya pūrvaniruddhatvāt /

but the idea that ‘I am cognising it now’ could not be true, because the past ‘Cognitive Moment’ does not cognise the thing at the present time, as ex-hypothesi it has already disappeared.

atha vartamānaṃ viṣaya iti dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā vedmītyetadyuktam idānīṃ tasya vedakatvāt /

(b) If the second alternative is accepted that the present ‘Cognitive Moment’ is the object of the notion of ‘I’, then the idea that ‘I am cognising’ would be all right, as it is really the Cogniser at the present moment;

jñātavānityevam ākāragrahaṇaṃ tu na yuktam / kasmātnaivāsīt prāgidaṃ yataḥ /

but the idea that ‘I knew it in the past’ would not be true, why? because it did not exist at the previous time.

idam iti vartamānaṃ jñānam /

The word ‘idam’ (in the Text) stands for the present Cognition.

ata eva asyā buddher vaimukhyena pravṛtteḥ nātītaṃ sāmprataṃ ca vijñānadvayaṃ grāhyamiti siddham /

Thus then, inasmuch as the conception operates both ways, it becomes established that the present and the past, both, Cognitive Moments cannot form the object of the notion of ‘I’;

na hi vartamānātītāvubhau jñānalakṣaṇau jñātavantau nāpi sāmprataṃ jānītaḥ /

as both these ‘Cognitive Moments’ did not cognise the thing in the past, nor do they cognise it in the present;

kiṃ tarhieko jñātavānaparo jānāti /

as a matter of fact, one ‘Moment’ cognised it in the past, and another ‘Moment’ is cognising it in the present.

ata eva santāno 'pi tayāhambuddhyā grāhyo na bhavati dvitayasya atītavartamānajñānakriyādvayasyāsambhavāt /

For the same reason the ‘Series’ also cannot form the object of the notion of ‘I’; as both the past and the present acts of cognition are impossible.

tathā hi nāsau santāno jñātavān pūrvaṃ nāpyadhunā jānāti tasya kalpitatvenāvastutvāt na cāvastuno jñātṛtvaṃ bhavati tasya vastudharmatvāt /

Because this ‘Series’ did not cognise the thing in the past, nor does it cognise it in the present; because being only ‘conceptual’, it is not a thing, an entity; and what is not an entity cannot be the Cogniser, as being a Cogniser is a property that can belong only to an entity.

tasmād yathoktajñānavyatirekeṇa yatra viṣaye 'yamahaṅkāro vartate sa ātmetisiddham //229-

From all this it follows that, that thing wherein the notion of ‘I’ (I-conscionsness) subsists, and as shown above, it must be something distinct from the said Cognition, is the Soul.

vyatītāhaṅkṛtiścādyo jñātādyāpyanuvartate / ahampratyayagamyatvād idānīntaraboddhṛvat //

“The ‘cogniser’ who formed the object of ‘I-consciousness’ in the past must be regarded as continuing to exist to-day, because he is the object of ‘I-consciousness’, like the cogniser in the present.

eṣa vā hyastano jñātā jñātṛtvāt ata eva vā /

or because of the same reason (of being the object of ‘I-consciousness’), like the cogniser of yesterday;

hyastanajñātṛvat teṣāṃ pratyayānāṃ ca sādhyatā //

and all these fulfill the conditions of the probandum.” (238-239)

[p.98] yo 'hampratyayagamyaḥ so 'dyāpyanuvartate;yathedānīntano boddhā /

He who formed the object of ‘I-consciousness’ in the past continues to exist to-day; just like the Cogniser in the present;

ahampratyayagamyaścāyam idānīntano boddheti svabhāvahetuḥ / eṣa veti /

and the Cogniser in the present is the object of ‘I-consciousness’; this is the Reason based up the real state of things.

tata eveti /

‘Or, he’ i.e. the present Cogniser.

ahampratyayagamyatvāt / evaṃ jñātāraṃ dharmiṇaṃ kṛtvā prayogo darśitaḥ /

‘Because of the same reason’ i.e. because of being the object of ‘I-consciousness’. This argument has been formulated in reference to the Cogniser as the Subject.

sāmpratamahampratyayānāṃ sādhyadharmitāṃ kṛtvā prayogāntaraṃ darśayannāha teṣām ityādi /

The Author next proceeds to set forth another argument on the basis of the present I-notions as appertaining to the Probandum All these, etc.

teṣām iti atītādyananānām ahampratyayānām;sādhyateti /

‘all these’ I-notions, of the past and of the present fulfil the conditions of the Probandum, i.e. come to appertain to the Probandum.

katham ity āha ekasantānetyādi /

The following Text proceeds to show how this is so: [see verse 240 next]

ekasantānasambandhajñātrahampratyayatvataḥ / hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve tulyārthā ekabuddhivat //

“All (I-notions) of yesterday and of to-day must have the same object, because they are i-notions belonging to the cogniser connected with one and the same ‘chain’, like any single cognition.” (240)

hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve ahampratyayā ityayaṃ sādhyadharminirdeśaḥ /

‘All I motions of yesterday and of to-day’, this states the Subject in regard to which the Probandum is to be predicated;

tulyārthā iti sādhyadharmaḥ / ekaviṣayā ity arthaḥ /

‘must have the same object’, this states the Probandum; the meaning is that they should have one and the same object.

ekena devadattādisantānena sambaddho yo jñātā tatra tasya vā ye 'hampratyayā ekasantānasambaddhajñātrahampratyayāḥ tadbhāvastatvam /

The Probans is stated thus: Being such I-notions as belong to a Cogniser who is connected with one and the same Chain, such as that of a single person like Devadatta. The mere character of being I-notion is present in the ī-notions of other persons also;

ayaṃ ca hetunirdeśaḥ /

hence if the Probans had been stated in that form, it would be ‘Inconclusive’;

ahampratyayatvamātraṃ puruṣāntarīyeṣvapyahaṅkāreṣu pravartata ityato 'naikāntikatvaparihārārtham ekasantānasambaddhajñātṛviṣayatvaṃ hetuviśeṣaṇaṃ kṛtam /

hence in order to avoid that contingency, the Probans has been stated as qualified by the qualification of ‘pertaining to a cogniser connected with one and the same Chain’.

ekabuddhivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

‘Like any single Cognition’, this is the Corroborative Instance;

tad atretyādinottarapakṣam ārabhate /

it means ‘like any single intended Cognition among these same I-notions’.

tad atra cintyate nityamekaṃ caitanyamiṣyate / yadi buddhir api prāptā tadrūpaiva tathā sati //

In this connection, the following points are to be considered: if intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then, cognition also should have to be regarded as of the same character.

yadi hi caitanyaṃ nityaikarūpamaṅgīkriyate tadā buddhir api caitanyarūpāvyatirekānnityaikarūpā prāpnoti /

If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also which has no form other than that of Intelligence, should have to be regarded as eternal and one.

na caivamiṣṭamato 'bhyupagamavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ /

This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine.

tathā hi bhāṣyakāreṇoktam kṣaṇikā hi sā na buddhyantarakālamavatiṣṭhata iti / tathā jaiminināpy uktam satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tatpratyakṣam iti /

For instance, the author of your Bhāṣya (Śabara) has declared [under Sūtra 1.1.5, page 9, line 17, Bib. Indica Edition] that ‘Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition’, Jaimini also has asserted (under Sū. 5) that ‘Perception is that Cognition of man which is produced on the contact of an existing thing’;

nityatve sati janmāyogāt /

and if Cognition were eternal, there could be no ‘production’ of it.

svavacanavirodhaś ca kumārilasya yathoktaṃ tenaiva na hi tatkṣaṇamapyāste jāyate vāpramātmakam / yenārthagrahaṇe paścād vyāpriyetendriyādivat //

It would also involve self-contradiction on the part of Kumārila himself: He has declared for instance that ‘It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like’ (Ślokavārtika, Pratyakṣa-Sūtra, 55).

ekatvāc ca buddheḥ pramāṇaṣaṭkābhyupagamavirodhaś ca /

Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of ‘Six Means and Forms of Cognition’, It would also be contrary to Perception also;

buddhīnām api caitanyasvābhāvyātpuruṣasya ca / nityatvamekatāceṣṭā bhedaścedviṣayāśrayaḥ //

as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations. “Cognitions, and the soul also, are held to be eternal and one, on the ground of their being of the nature of ‘intelligence’;

[p.99] buddhīnāṃ puruṣasya ca nityatvamekatā ceṣṭā kasmātcaitanyasvābhāvyāt buddhilakṣaṇacaitanyasvābhāvyāt puruṣasyāsmanmatenetyarthaḥ /

[This is a quotation, from Ślokavārtika, Chapter on Eternality of Sound, 401]. Cognitions and the Soul also are regarded as eternal and one; why? because they are of the nature of Intelligence; that is, because, under our view Spirit is of the nature of Intelligence in the form of Cognitions.

kathaṃ tarhi rūpabuddhī rasabuddhir ityādi bhedaḥ pratīyata ity āha bhedaścedviṣayāśraya iti /

Question How then is it that such diversity (in Cognitions) is recognised as ‘Colour-Cognition’, ‘Taste-Cognition’ and so forth?

cecchabdaḥ paramatābhyupagame /

Answer “If there is diversity, it is due to the object;

yadyevaṃ kalpyata ity arthaḥ //

the sense being ‘If in case diversity be assumed”.

syād etad yadi nityaikā buddhis tadā kimiti krameṇa rūpādīn pratipadyate / yāvatā sakṛdeva pratīyād viśeṣābhāvād ity āha svarūpeṇetyādi /

Objection (to Kumārila’s position) If Cognition is eternal and one, then, how is it that it apprehends Colour and other things consecutively? It should apprehend all at once, there being no distinction (to which the successiveness would be due).

svarūpeṇa tathā vahnir nityaṃ dahanadharmakaḥ / upanītaṃ dahatyarthaṃ dāhyaṃ nānyan na cānyadā // yathā kila vahnir nityaṃ dahanātmako 'pi san na sarvadā dahati kiṃ tarhiupanītam ḍhaukitam eva dahati /

“Though, by its very nature, fire is always of the nature of a burner, it burns only what is presented to it, and that also only a thing that is capable of being burnt, not any other thing, nor at any other time.” (243) Fire is eternally of the nature of a Burner, and yet it does not burn all things at all times.

tatrāpi yadeva dāhyaṃ dagdhuṃ śakyaṃ tadeva dahati nābhrādikam ityato dāhyam ity āha //

It burns only what is brought to it; and then also, It burns only a thing that is capable of being burnt, and not the Sky or any such thing.

yathā vetyādinā dṛṣṭāntāntaram āha

In the following Text, he cites another example: [see verses 244-245 next]

yathā vā darpaṇaḥ svaccho yathā vā sphaṭikopalaḥ /

“Or, the clean mirror, or the rock-crystal, reflects the image of only what is placed before it in the same manner, souls, though possessed of eternal sentience, apprehend colour and other things only when they are themselves in the body and the things are presented to them by the organs.

yadevādhīyate tatra tacchāyāṃ pratipadyate //

and on this account, the resultant Cognition is recognised as evanescent;

tathaiva nityacaitanyaḥ pumāṃso dehavṛttayaḥ / gṛhṇantī karaṇānītān rūpādīndhīrasau ca naḥ // malinasya cchāyāpratipattyabhāvāt svaccha ityuktam /

as regards the cognitions of the jar, the elephant and so forth, their diversity is held by people to be due to the diversity among those things.” (247) Question How do you know that Cognition is eternal? Answer: [see verse 247 above]

ḍhaukyata ity arthaḥ / tathaiveti dārṣṭāntikopadarśanam /

The term ‘tatra’ is a meaningless term used as introducing the sentence ‘Being of the nature of Intelligence’;

yattvetannityaṃ caitanyamasāvasmākaṃ dhīḥ; buddhiḥ na tu sāṅkhyavat tadvyatirekīi buddhiḥ //

because it is always recognised as ‘Cognition’, it is eternal, like the Word-Sound.

yadyevaṃ katham asau dhīrbhaṅginī prasiddhetyetadāśaṅkya tenetyādinā sūcitam eva kāraṇamupadarśayan buddher bhaṅginītvaṃ samarthayate /

“If that be so, then how is it that in common parlance, we find such distinction among Cognitions accepted by observers as ‘this is the Cognition of the Jar’, ‘that is the Cognition of the Cloth’ and so forth?” Answer As regards the Cognitions of the Jar, etc. etc.;

tenopanetṛsaṃrambhabhaṅgitvād bhaṅginī matiḥ /

‘due to the diversity among those things’, i.e. the diversity among the Jar, the Elephant and the rest.

tatra bodhātmakatvena pratyabhijñāyate matiḥ /

The same idea is further clarified by the following Text: [see verse 248 next]

saiveti nocyate buddhir arthabhedānusāribhiḥ / na cāstyapratyabhijñānam arthabheda upāśrite // arthabhedānusāribhir iti /

“People who follow up the diversity among the objects cognised do not speak of the cognition as ‘that same cognition’; nor is there non-recognition of it as ‘cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects.” (248)

pratipattṛbhiḥ /

People who follow up, etc.;

anenānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ arthabhedakṛta eva buddhirbheda iti darśayati /

What this Text shows, by means of affirmative and negative premisses, is that the diversity in Cognitions is due only to diversity among the objects cognised.

na cāstyapratyabhijñānam iti /

Nor is there non-recognition, etc.; that is, there is recognition.

nanv ityādinā pratividhatte /

If such is the case, then, on the occasion when there appear.

pratyayā ye pravartante bhedas tatra kimāśrayaḥ // yadi hyarthabhedakṛta eva buddhirbhedas tadā ye hastyādiśūnyāyāṃ bhuvi krameṇa gajaturagādīnavasthitān samāropayantaḥ pratyayāḥ pravartante teṣu bhedaḥ kimāśrayaḥ pratīyeta / naiva kaścidbhedavyavasthāśrayo 'stīti yāvat /

cognitions imposing the concepts of ‘elephant’ and the rest in reference to spots where these animals do not exist, to what is the diversity in such cognitions due? (249) If the diversity of the Cognition is due to the diversity in the objects cognised, then, what is the basis for the diversity that appears in the ease of those Cognitions which successively impose the concepts of the ‘elephant’, ‘horse’ and the rest upon a place where the elephants do not really exist? The meaning is that in such cases there is no basis at all for the notion of such diversity.

tathā hi na svato bhedo 'sti /

Because, there is no difference in the Cognitions per se;

sravabuddhīnām ekatvābhyupagamāt /

as all Cognition is held to be one (by the Mīmāṃsaka).

nāpyupadhānabhūtaviṣayanānātvāt tatropadhāyakasya kasyacid arthasyābhāvāt //

Nor can the diversity be due to the multiplicity of the objects imposed; as there is no object that does the imposing.

svaprādipratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā nahi neṣyate / sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam // iti tadetad āśaṅkate anyadeśādibhāvinya ityādi /

If the individual objects existing at other times and places be held to supply the basis for such imposed cognitions, on the ground that in all cognitions the basis of reality is supplied by objects existing at times and places other than those of the appearance of the cognitions themselves, [then the answer would be as stated in the following text].

anyadeśādibhāvinyo vyaktayaś cen nibandhanam /

The following might be urged: “The idea that a Cognition may be devoid of a real object is not true;

sarvatrālambanaṃ yasmād deśakālāny athātmakam // [p.101] nibandhanam iti /

in every case there is an external background, only conceived of in connection with a wrong place and time’, [ Ślokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 107-108].”

buddher bhedavyavasthānaṃ prati kāraṇam ity arthaḥ /

‘Basis’, i.e. the cause of the notion of diversity among Cognitions.

deśakālāvanyathātmakāvanyaprakārau yasya tat tathoktam deśakālābhyāṃ vānyathātmā yasyeti vigrahaḥ //

The compound ‘deśakālānyathātmakam’ is to be analysed as ‘that of which the time and place are otherwise’, or as ‘that of which the differentiation is done by time and place’.

nanvityādinā pratividhatte

The answer to this is given in the following Text: [see verse 251 next]

nanu taddeśasambandho naiva tāsāṃ tathāsti tat /

But as a matter of fact, the cognitions in question have no such connection with that particular place;

kimiti pratibhāsante tena rūpeṇa tatra ca //

why then should they appear in that form at that place? (251)

yasmin hi deśe yena krameṇa tāḥ samāropitā vyaktayas tadā pratibhāsante tena deśena sambnadho naiva tāsāṃ deśāntarakālāntaragatānāṃ tathā tena krameṇāsti; tat kimiti tena svecchāsamāropitarūpeṇa pratibhāsante /

When at a certain place, a number of individual objects actually appear as ‘imposed’ upon Cognitions in a certain order of sequence, there is no connection between the Cognition and those individual objects existing at other times and places, in the same order of sequence.

na hyanyena rūpeṇānyasya pratibhāsanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

it that they appear in the form that is imposed upon them arbitrarily? Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to appear in the form of another thing;