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sāmarthyabhedād bhinno 'pi bhavatyekanibandhanam // | specially as even things that are diverse by reason of the diversity of their powers become the basis of an effect conceived of as one. |
mayā dṛṣṭaṃ mayā śrutam ityevaṃ yadekajñātṛnimittatvena pratyayānāṃ ghaṭanalakṣaṇaṃ pratisandhānaṃ tadetadanaikāntikam / | ‘Seen by me and heard by me, etc. etc.’, the ‘recalling’, in the ‘associating’ of several such cognitions, has been put forward as the reason for their having a single Cause (in the shape of the ‘Soul’). |
yataḥ kṣaṇikeṣvapi bhāveṣu bhrāntād ekakartṛtvābhimānataḥ pratisandhānasambhavāt / | as even in regard to momentary things, such ‘recalling’ is possible through the false assumption of their being due to a single Cogniser. |
tasmād evambhūtātpratisandhānān na yuktā vastuvyavasthā / | Hence it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true nature of things from the fact of such ‘recalling’, |
kathaṃ punarbhavataḥ kṣaṇāḥ pratisandhānanimittatāmupagacchantītyāha sāmkarthyabhedād ityādi / | Question “In what way do your Moments (Momentary entities) come to be the cause of the said Recalling (of Cognitions)?” |
sāmarthyabhedāt sāmarthyaviśeṣāt / | Answer By reason of the diversity of their powers, etc.; |
aneko 'pyartha ekākāraparāmarśādikāryasyaikasya nibandhanam kāraṇam; yathā guḍūcyādayo jvarādiśamana iti paścād vistareṇa pratipādayiṣyati //195- | i.e. by reason of the peculiarity of its powers, the thing which is many (diverse) becomes the ‘basis’ cause of such single effects being recalled in one form; as is found in the case of such medicines of fever as Guḍūci and the rest; |
atha bhrāntatvam eva katham asya niścitamityāha ekānugāmītyādi / | all which is going to be explained in detail later on. |
ekānugāmikāryatve paurvāparyaṃ virudhyate / rūpaśabdādicittānāṃ śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ // | If many things such as the cognitions of colour, sound and the rest, were the effects of a single continuous (permanent) cause, then any order of sequence among such effects would be incongruous; |
yadi hyekasya pūrvottarakālānuyāyina ātmāder nityasya kāryatvam eṣāṃ nīlādipratyayānāṃ syāt tadā kramabhāvitvam eṣāṃ virudhyeta / | The answer is provided in the following Text: [see verse 197 above] If the cognitions of the Blue and the rest were the effect of a single such Cause as the ‘Soul’, which is eternal, continues for all time, past and future, then any order of sequence among such cognitions would be incongruous; |
avikalakāraṇatvena yugapad evotpādaprasaṅgāt / | as the efficient Cause being present, all the effects should appear simultaneously; |
na cāpi nityasya parāpekṣāsti / | specially as the eternal Cause cannot need the help of anything else; |
tasya kenacidanupakāryatvāt // [p.86] | for the simple reason that it cannot be helped by anything else. |
kiṃ ca sāmānyena kāraṇapūrvakatvamātraṃ prasādhyate tadā siddhasādhyateti darśayati ekānantaretyādi / ekānantaravijñānāt ṣaḍvijñānasamudbhavaḥ / | Inasmuch as the appearance of six cognitions out of a single preceding cognition is clearly recognised simultaneously, what your argument proves is admitted (by us). Further, if what is meant to prove is merely the fact of the cognitions being ‘preceded by a Cause’, then the effort is futile; |
yugapad vedyate vyaktam atra iṣṭaprasādhanam // | this is what is shown in the following Text: [see verse 198 above] |
yata ekasmād anantaravijñānātsamanantarapratyayāt ṣaṇṇāṃ cakṣurādivijñānām utpādaḥ spaṣṭaṃ saṃvedyate / | From a single preceding Cognition, out of a single Cognition immediately preceding them, there is an appearance of Six Cognitions, through the Eye and other organs, which ‘appearance’ is clearly recognised. |
tathā hi yadaiva nartakīrūpaṃ paśyati tadaiva murajādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti kuvalayādigandhaṃ ca jighrati karpūrādirasamāsvādayati vyajanānīlādisparśaṃ cānubhavati vastrādi ca manasādātuṃ cintayati / | For instance, at the time that a man sees the complexion of the dancing girl, he also hears the Sound of the drum and other musical accompaniments, smells the odour of the Lotus and other fragrant things, tastes the Camphor and other things, feels also the wind emanating from the fans, and thinks of taking up his clothes. |
na cālātacakradarśanavat taddṛṣṭirāśusañcārād iti yuktaṃ vaktum / | It cannot be right to say that his vision appears to be such because it moves quickly, like the whirling fire-brand. |
aspaṣṭapratibhāsitatvaprasaṅgāt / tathā hi darśanānāṃ prasisandhānādayaṃ sakṛdgrahābhimāno bhavatā varṇyate / | For if it were so, then the appearances would be vague and dim. To explain; it is on the basis of the ‘recalling’ of all these perceptions (through the several Sense-organs) that you explain the feeling that the whole lot of the perceptions appears in a single Cognition; |
pratisandhānaṃ ca smṛtyā kriyate / | the Recalling too is done through Remembrance; |
sā cātītaviṣayatvād aspaṣṭā / | and Remembrance, appertaining, as it does, to the past, is always indistinct; |
spaṣṭaścāyaṃ sakṛdrūpādipratibhāsaḥ saṃvedyate / | while the single Cognition of Colour and the rest is found to be quite distinct. |
kiñca saro rasa ityādau sutarāmāśu sakārādivarṇagrāhiṇāṃ jñānānām udayo 'stīti / | Further, in the case of such expressions as ‘saro-rasa’, there is an appearance of the cognitions quickly apprehending the ‘sa’ and other letter-sounds; |
atrāpi sakṛdgrahābhimānaḥ syāt / | so that in this case also there might be the notion of a single Cognition; |
tataś ca na kvacit kramo vyavasīyeta / | and there would, therefore, be no idea of any order of sequence among them. |
etac ca paścādvistareṇa pratipādayiṣyate / iha tu vyaktam iti vacanāt parihāradik pradarśitaiva // | All this is going to be explained later on; in the present context the Text has merely indicated the lines of the refutation (of the Opponent’s doctrine). |
kramiṇāṃ tvekahetutvaṃ naivetyuktamanantaram / | That things appearing consecutively, one after the other, cannot have one and the same cause, has just been pointed out. |
ato 'numānabādhāsmin vyāpter vyaktaṃ samīkṣyate // anantaram iti / | for this reason, herein the (opponent’s) premiss asserting the invariable concomitance is found to be clearly annulled by inference. |
ekānugāmītyādinā / | ‘Just been pointed out,’ in Text 197. |
tatredaṃ bādhanam; ye sannihitā apratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇās te yugapadeva bhavanti / | The ‘annulment’ is in the following manner: Things whose causes efficient and untrammelled, are present, must he produced simultaneously; |
yathā samagrasāmagrīkāḥ sakṛdbhāvino 'ṅkurādayaḥ / | e.g. Sprouts and such other effects, whose causal paraphernalia is complete, appear at one and the same time; |
sannihitāpratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇāś ca devadattasya rūpādiviṣayāḥ pratyayā iti svabhāvehetuḥ / | Devadatta’s cognitions of Colour and such objects have their Causes efficient and untrammelled, present; this is a reason based upon the nature of things. |
na caivaṃ sambhavati / | As a matter of fact however they never appear simultaneously; |
tasmād viparyayaḥ // | hence the conclusion is wrong. |
nartakībhrūlatābhaṅgo naivaikaḥ paramārthataḥ / | As for the ‘glance of the dancing girl’, it is not really a single entity; |
anekāṇusamūhatvād ekatvaṃ tasya kalpitam // | in fact it is made up of several minute particles; and its ‘one-ness’ is only assumed. |
na hi nartakībhrūlatādireko 'sti tasyānekaṇusamūhatvāt / | Such things as the ‘glance of the Dancing Girl’ are not single entities; they are, in reality, an aggregate of several minute particles. |
yadyevaṃ katham ekaśabdaviṣayatvaṃ tasya bhavatītyāha ekatvaṃ tasya kalpitamiti // | Question “If that is so, then how do they come to be spoken of as one?” Answer Its one-ness is only assumed. |
buddhicittādiśabdānāṃ vyatiriktābhidhāyitā / naivaikapadabhāve 'pi paryāyāṇāṃ samasti naḥ // | In the case of synonyms, such as ‘buddhi’, ‘citta’ and the rest, we find that though each of them is a single term, yet it does not express a thing different (from that expressed by others); |
ato 'naikāntiko hetur nanūktaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam / ucyate naiva siddhaṃ taccetaḥparyāyatāsthiteḥ // ahaṅkārāśrayatvena cittamātmeti gīyate / | hence your reason is ‘inconclusive’. “but a qualification (in the form ‘as apart from recognised synonyms’) has been added.” our answer to that is that the qualification is not ‘admitted’, as the fact remains that the ‘soul’ is synonymous with ‘consciousness’; |
saṃvṛttyā vastuvṛttyā tu viṣayo 'sya na vidyate // | in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term in question (‘soul’). |
ekapadatvādityanaikāntiko hetuḥ / tathā hi buddhiścittaṃ jñānam indriyamakṣaṃ vedanā cittanuḥ kāyaḥ śarīramityādīnāṃ buddhīndriyavedanāśarīraparyāyāṇām ekapadatve 'pi nāsmante 'sti tadvyatiriktapadārthābhidhāyiteti tato vipakṣādvyāvṛttyasiddher anaikāntikatvam / | The reason ‘because it is a single term’ is ‘inconclusive’, Because in the case of such synonyms as (a) ‘buddhi’, ‘citta’, ‘jñāna’, as (b) ‘indriya’, ‘akṣa’, as (c) ‘vedanā’ and ‘citta’, as (d) ‘kāya’ and ‘śarīra’, which are denotative of (a) Intellect, (b) Sense-organs, (c) Cognition, and (d) Body, according to our view, the character of denoting distinct things is not present, though each term is ‘one’; |
nanu cedamevāśaṅkya siddhaparyāyabhinnatve satīti tasya hetor viśeṣaṇam uktaṃ tat katham anaikāntikatā bhavati tadatrābhidhīyate / asiddhametaddhetuviśeṣaṇam kasmāt/ | hence no preclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being possible, the Reason must be ‘inconclusive Says the Opponent: “It is because we suspected this that in our argument we added the qualification, ‘apart from well-recognised synonyms’, to our Reason; how then can it be Inconclusive?” |
cetaḥparyayatāsthiteḥ / ātmetyetasya cittaparyāyatvavyavasthānāt / yathoktam; cittamevāhaṅkārasaṃśrayatvād ātmetyupacaryate; iti / | The answer to this is as follows: This qualification of the Reason is one that is ‘not admitted “How?” Because the fact remains that the ‘Soul’ is the synonym of ‘Consciousness’, As it has been declared (by the other party) that “It is Consciousness itself which, as the substratum of I-consciousness, is spoken of as ‘Soul’”; |
ātmetyupacaryate vyavahriyata ity arthaḥ / | in this quotation ‘upacaryate’ stands for the phrase is spoken of in common parlance. |
tena yaduktamuddyotakārena mukhyasambhavād upacāro na yukta iti tadabhiprāyāparijñānād iti grahītavyam / | It is for this reason that what Uddyotakara has said, regarding the ‘figurative use’ not being right where the ‘direct use’ is possible, should be taken as being due to his ignorance of what is meant. |
etadeva gīyata ityanena spaṣṭayati / | This is what is made clear by the term ‘gīyate’ (is spoken of). |
tasmād asiddhaviśeṣaṇaṃ hetuḥ / | Hence the Reason has a qualification that is ‘unproven’, inadmissible. |
etac ca saṃvṛttyā saviṣayatvam upagamyāsya hetor anaikāntikatvam uktam / yadi tu paramārthena tu buddhyādivyatiriktārthābhidhāyitvaṃ prasādhyate tadā vyāpter anumānabādhitatvādayukta evāyaṃ hetur iti darśayann āha vastuvṛttyetyādi / | Whatever we have said regarding the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason so far is on the basis of ‘Illusory Conception’ admitting, for the sake of argument, the fact of there being something denoted (by the term ‘Soul’); if what is sought to be proved is the fact of the term ‘Soul’ being really denotative of something distinct from Intelligence and the rest, then the Reason put forward is a highly improper one, the premiss (invariable concomitance) on which it is based being annulled by Inference. |
adhyāropitārthaviṣayatvāt sarvasyaiva śābdasya/ | that is, as a matter of fact, all verbal usage is based upon a conceptual imposition of its connection with things; |
[p.88] vyavahārasyeti paścātpratipādayiṣyate / | this is going to be explained later on. |
tenāsyātmaśabdasya viṣayo nāstyeveti kathaṃ hetoḥ sādhyena vyāptir bhaved iti bhāvaḥ //202- | Thus then, in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term ‘Soul’; and under the circumstances, how could there be any invariable concomitance between the said Reason and the Probandum (the character sought to be proved)? (202-204) |
nabhastalāravindādau yadekaṃ viniveśyate / kārakādipadaṃ tena vyabhicāro 'pi dṛśyate // | The reason is found to be false also; when, for instance, names, such as ‘kāraka’ (active agent), and the like, are applied to things like the ‘sky-lotus (205) |
yathā hi gaganakusumādāvatyantābhāvena kenacitkārakādipadaṃ niveśyate tadā tasyobhayaprasiddheḥ śarīrādivācakavyatiriktatve satyekapadatvam asti na ca śarīrādivyatiriktavastuviṣayatvamapītyanaikāntiko hetuḥ // | When a name, such as ‘Kāraka’, is applied to such non-entities as the ‘Sky-lotus’ (in such expressions as ‘the Skylotus is a non-entity’, where the ‘Sky-lotus’ may be spoken of as the ‘Nominative’,, then, according to both parties, the term is one only and also distinct from terms denoting the Body, etc.; and yet the denotation of the term does not consist of a thing distinct from the Body, etc. Hence the Reason, as urged, is ‘Inconclusive’, (205) |
kathaṃ punaḥ kārakādipadaṃ nirupākhye śakyaṃ niyoktumityāha saṅketamātrabhāvinya ityādi / saṅketamātrabhavinyo vācaḥ kutra na saṅgatāḥ / naivātmādipadānāṃ ca prakṛtya .ārthaprakāśanam // | [The use of] terms being based entirely on convention, what is there to which they cannot be applied? In the case of terms like ‘soul’ also, there is nothing in their very nature which is expressive of anything. Question “How can the declensional names we applied to nonentities, which are absolutely characterless?” The answer is supplied in the following Text: [see verse 206 above] |
svatantrecchāmātrabhāvī hi saṅketaḥ; tanmātravācinyaś ca vācaḥ tatkathamāsāṃ kvacid api pravṛttiprasararodho bhavet / | ‘Convention’ proceeds from the independent desire of men (to give a certain name to a certain thing); and Terms also are expressive of that alone; wherefore then could there be any restriction of their use? |
athāpi syād asāmayikaikapadatvādityayaṃ hetvartho vivakṣitas tena vyabhicāro na bhaviṣyatītyāha naivetyādi / | If the meaning of the Opponent’s Reason be that “because it is an unconventional single term”, and by that means its Inclusiveness be sought to be avoided, then the answer is In the case of terms like ‘Soul’, etc. |
na hi saṅketamantareṇa śabdānāṃ prakṛtyārthaprakāśanam asti avyutpannasyāpi tato 'rthapratītiprasaṅgāt / svecchayā ca niyogābhāvaprasaṅgāt / | that is, apart from Convention, terms, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; for, if it were so, then even unlearned persons (not conversant with Convention) could understand the meaning of words; there would also be no independent instruction as to the meaning of words; |
saṅketavaiyarthyaprasaṅgāc ca / | also because all Convention would, in that case, be useless. |
tasmād ātmādipadānāṃ naiva prakṛtyārthaprakāśanaṃ siddham ityasiddho hetuḥ / | From all this it follows that such terms as ‘Soul’ and the like, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; so that the Reason put forward is ‘unproven’, ‘Inadmissible |
athāviśeṣāspadapadārthāntarbhūtajñeyaviṣayatve satītyaparaṃ viśeṣaṇamupādīyate / yathoktaṃ bhāviviktena / evam api yathoktaviśeṣaṇāsiddher asiddho hetur vyāptyabhāvāccānaikāntikaḥ // | If (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be sought to add a further qualification to the effect that ‘it has for its objective a cognisableng which is included under a category which cannot be specified’, as has been asserted by Bhāviveka, even so, inasmuch as such a qualification would be ‘unproven’, the Reason itself would be ‘Inadmissible’, as also ‘Inconclusive’, on account of the absence of the necessary invariable concomitance. |
prāṇādīnāṃ ca sambanho yadi siddhaḥ sahātmanā / bhavet tadā prasaṅgo 'yaṃ yujyate saṅgato 'nyathā // | The contingency that has been urged would be right if the connection between the functions of breathing, etc. and the soul were well-established; otherwise, it would be absurd. |
na vandhyāsutaśūnyatve jīvaddehaḥ prasajyate / | It has been argued above (under Text 184) that “The living body would be devoid of Breathing, etc., if there were no Soul”. |
prāṇādivirahe hyevaṃ tavāpyetatprasañjanam // | The answer to that is provided in the following Text: [see verses 207-208 above] |
yadi hi prāṇādīnām ātmanā saha tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā kaścit sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tadātmanivṛttau śarīre prāṇādinivṛttiprasaṅgo yuktimān bhavet / anyathā [p.89] hyapratibaddhasya nivṛttāvanyanivṛttiprasaṅgo 'saṅgata eva syād atiprasaṅgāt / | If between Breathing, etc. and the Soul, there were some connection, as that of being produced from it, or being of the same nature, known as established, then there would be some reason for urging the contingency that the absence of the Soul would involve the absence of Breathing, etc. Otherwise, the urging of the absence of one thing on the absence of another thing not connected with it at all, would be absurd. |
na hi vandhyāputranivṛttau tadasambaddhānāṃ prāṇādīnāṃ nivṛttir bhavati / tasmād yathā vandhyāsūnunivṛttau tadasambaddhānām pi prāṇādīnāṃ nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti ghaṭādivad iti kenacit prasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyamāṇamanaikāntikaṃ bhavati evaṃ tavāpyetadātmanivṛttau prāṇādinivṛttiprasañjanam anaikāntikameva sambandhāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ //207- | Certainly the absence of ‘the Son of the Barren Woman’ does not entail the absence of Breathing etc. Hence, if someone were to put forward the contingency of absence of Breathing, etc. as due to the absence of the ‘Son of the Barren Woman’, like that of the Jar, this would be entirely ‘inconclusive’; in the same way your argument putting forward the contingency of Breathing, etc. being absent on account of the absence of the Soul is purely ‘inconclusive’, for the simple reason that no connection is known (to subsist between Breathing, etc. and the Soul). |
kathaṃ punaḥ sambandhāsiddhir ity āha na tāvad ity āha | Question “How do you know that the connection is not known?” Answer: [see verses 209-210 next] |
tathā hi anityā avyāpino mūrtāś ca prāṇādayaḥ tadviparītastvātmā / | Thus the existence of the ‘soul’ not being proved by any of the proofs (put forward), the instances that have been cited of ‘eternality’ and ‘omnipresence’ become ‘devoid of the probandum’. |
etenecchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānādīni yānyātmaliṅgatvena parair uktāni tāni pratiṣiddhāni draṣṭavyāni sambandhāsiddheḥ / | It has been argued (in Text 185) that “all subsequent cognitions are apprehended by that same Cogniser who apprehended the first Cognition immediately on birth, etc. etc.”. |
na cāsiddho hetuḥ / | This is answered in the following: [see verse 211 above] |
pūrvaṃ dvividhasyāpi sambandhasya nirastatvāt / | The Opponent has cited the instances of ‘the first cognition’ and ‘my body’; |
na cāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvagamakatvaprasaṅgāt / na cāpi viruddhaḥ; sapakṣe bhāvād iti / | all these instances are ‘devoid of the Probandum’, as the existence of the ‘Soul’ has not been proved. Consequently the Probans is clearly ‘inconclusive (211) |
yaścāpyāha ---"kartuḥ prasiddhiḥ karaṇaprasiddher"iti;tadasiddham / | Others have assumed that the ‘soul’ is proved by perception; |
vijñānotpattau sarveṣāṃ hetubhāvasya tulyatvāt / | because ‘i-consciousness’ is self-cognisable, and the soul forms the object of that consciousness. |
svechāmātraparikalpitatvāc ca kartṛkaraṇavyavahārasyeti / | With the following Text, the Author again introduces the view of Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta and others: [see verse 212 above] |
evaṃ ca sādhanaiḥ sarvair ātmasattvāprasiddhitaḥ / | These people argue as follows: “Soul is proved by Perception itself; |
[p.90] ādyajñānavat; madīyaśarīravat; iti yadetannidarśanamuktaṃ tadyathoktasādhyadharmavikalamātmano 'siddhatvāt / | for instance, the notion of ‘I’, which is independent of any remembrance of the connection between an Inferential Indicative and that which has that Indicative, is of the nature of ‘Perception’, like the cognition of Colour and other things. |
ato 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ // | Of this notion of ‘I’, Colour, etc. do not form the object; |
asya ca na rūpādir viṣayaḥ;tadvijñānabhinnapratibhāsattvāt / | as what appears in that notion is different from the cognition of Colour, etc.; |
tasmād anya eva viṣaya iti // | hence the object of that notion must be totally different [and that is the Soul]”. |
tadayuktamityādinā pravidhatte / | This view is answered in the following texts: [see verses 213-214 next] |
tadayuktamahaṅkāre tadrūpānavabhāsanāt / | because as a matter of fact, the form of the ‘soul’ does hot become manifest in ‘I-consciousness’; |
na hi nityavibhutvādinirbhāsas tatra lakṣyate // | therein is not perceived any manifestation of eternality, omnipresence and such properties (postulated of the soul); |
gauravarṇādinirbhāso vyaktaṃ tatra tu vidyate / | what is clearly present therein, on the other hand, is the ‘fair complexion’, etc.; |
tatsvabhāvo na cātmeṣṭo nāyaṃ tadviṣayastataḥ // | and the ‘soul’ is not held to be of the nature of these latter; hence the ‘soul’ cannot be an object of ‘I-consciousness’. |
asiddhamahaṅkārasyātmaviṣayatvaṃ tadākāraśūnyatvāt / prayogaḥ yadyadākāraśūnyaṃ na tadviṣayam / | as the form of the ‘Soul’ is not present in it. This argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing is devoid of the form of another, it cannot have this latter for its object; |
yathā cakṣur jñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayam / | e.g. Sound is not an object of visual perception; |
ātmākāraśūnyaṃ cāham iti jñānam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | the notion of ‘I’ is devoid of the form of the Soul; |
na cāyamasiddho hetur iti darśayati na hītyādi / | That the Probans of this argument is not ‘unproven’ is shown by the Text in the words ‘There is not perceived any manifestation of Eterrmlity and Omnipresence, etc. etc.’; |
tathā hi nityavibhutvacetanatvādiguṇopeta ātmeṣyate / | that is to say, the Soul is held to be eternal, omnipresent, intelligent and so forth; |
na cātrāhampratyaye nityatvādipratibhāso lakṣyate / | not the slightest manifestation of these characters is perceived in ‘I-consciousness’; |
kiṃ tu gauro 'haṃ mandalocanaḥ parikṛśastīvravedanābhinna ityādidehāvasthāsaṃsparśenotpatter gauravarṇādilakṣaṇaḥ pratibhāsaḥ pratīyate / | the manifestation that is perceived in ‘I-consciousness’ is all in connection with ‘fair-complexion’ and other conditions of the body, as is apparent in such expressions as ‘I am fair, with weak powers of vision, lean, beset with acute pain’ and so forth. |
tasmāddehādyavasthāsaṃsparśenotpadyamāno 'haṅkāro dehādyālambana eveti jñāyate / | From this it is deduced that I-consciousness, which is thus found to appear as connected with the conditions of the Body, envisages the Body. |
vyaktam iti / | ‘Clearly present’; |
spaṣṭamaskhaladvṛttitvāt / | it is said to be clear, because it is never found to fail. |
tataś ca yaduktamuddyotakaraprabhṛtibhiḥ upabhogāyatane śarīre 'yamātmopacāraḥ yathānukūle bhṛtye rājā brūte ya evāhaṃ sa evāyaṃ me bhṛtya iti / | This argument serves to reject the following statement made by Uddyotakara and others: “The character of ‘Soul’ is figuratively (indirectly) attributed to the Body which is only the locus of experience, just as when speaking of a satisfactory servant, the King says ‘He is what I am’”. |
tadapāstaṃ bhavati / | This assertion becomes rejected; |
tathā hi yadyayaṃ gauṇaḥ syāt tadā skhaladvṛttir bhavet / | because if such an attribution (notion) were figurative and indirect, then it would be liable to be false; |
na hi loke siṃhamāṇavakayor mukhyāropitayor dvayor api siṃha ityaskhalitā buddhir bhavati / | because in the case of the Lion and the Boy, when the Boy is figuratively spoken of as the ‘Lion’, the notion of ‘Lion’ can never be true in ref erence to both the Boy and the Lion. |
madīyāḥ śarīrādaya iti vyatirekadarśanāt skhaladvṛttirahaṅkāraḥ śarīrādiṣviti cet / | It might be urged that “the Body and the Soul are actually spoken of as distinct, in such expressions as ‘My body, etc.’; |
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