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evaṃ hi sarvam eva jñānaṃ sarvaviṣayaṃ prasajyeta / tataśca pratiniyatārthavyavasthoccheda eva syāt // | if it were, then this would lead to incongruities; and in this way all Cognitions would come to have all things for their objects; and there would be an end to all ordered usage regarding things. |
bhavan mate hi nākāro buddher bāhyastu varṇyate / | Then again, under your view, the external form is not declared to belong to the cognition; |
na vivakṣitadeśe ca gajayaṣṭyādayaḥ sthitāḥ // | nor are the elephant, pole and other things actually existent at the place desired. |
kiṃ ca bhavato mīmāṃsakasya mate yo bhāsamānaḥ sa ākāro na buddheḥ; kintvasau bāhyārthasvabhāvo varṇyate / | Then again, under your Mīmāṃsaka’s view, the form that appears (in Cognition) does not belong to the Cognition; |
yadi nāmaivambhūtaṃ tataḥ kimityāha na vivakṣitetyādi / | as you assert that the Cognition is formless. “What if it is so?” At the place desired etc.; |
tataś ca yaddeśakālasambaddhaste gajādayas taddeśasambandhitvenaiva pratibhāseran / | i.e. at the place where the ‘imposition’ is made ,the Cognitions should appear as connected with that same time and place wherewith the said objects Elephant and the rest are connected; |
svavirahiṇi tu deśāntare kālāntare ca kimiti pratibhāsante / tasmānnirālambanā evaite pratyayāḥ paramārthato 'saṅkīrṇasvabhāvāścalātmānaś ca; kādācitkatvād iti siddham / | how is it then that they appear at a time and place which are not connected with themselves and which are yet different from those with which the objects are connected? From this it follows that these Cognitions have no real basis, and they are, in reality, unmixed in character and mobile; that they are so is due to the fact of their appearing only occasionally; |
tat svabhāvasya ca puṃso 'nityatvānekatve ca siddhe / | and it also becomes established that the Soul, which is of the nature of the said Cognition, must also be evanescent and many. |
syān matam pratyayas tasya puruṣasya dharmaḥ; tena tasya bhede 'pi na puṃso bhedo dharmitvāt tasyeti / | “Cognition is a property of the Soul; hence the diversity of the Cognition need not imply diversity of the Soul, the latter being only an object having that property.” This cannot be right; |
tadayuktam pratyayaścaitanyaṃ buddhir jñānamityanarthāntaratvāt / | ‘Pratyaya’ (Cognition), ‘Caitanya’ (Sentience), ‘Buddhi’ (Intelligence), ‘Jñāna’ (Knowledge) are all synonymous terms; |
na hi nāmabhedamātreṇa vastūnāṃ svabhāvo bhidyate / | nor does a mere difference in names make any difference in the nature of things. |
kiṃ ca nāmabhede 'pi teṣāṃ pratyayānāṃ caitanyātmakamekamanugāmirūpamiṣṭameva / tasya ca caitanyasyābhede pratyayānām api tat svabhāvānām avibhāga eva / | Further, even with a difference in their names, all these are actually accepted (by you) as being of the nature of Sentience (Caitanya); and as this Sentience is one and the same, there can be no distinction among the Cognitions that are of the same nature. |
anyathā hi viruddhadharmādhyāsādekāntiko bheda eva syāt / | If it were not so, then, on account of the attribution of contrary properties to them, the two (Sentience and Cognition) would become entirely different from one another. |
etenaiva nirālambanapratyayapratipādanenāpratyakṣatvaṃ buddheḥ pratyuktam / | This same argument in proof of Cognitions having no real basis serves also to prove the imperceptibility of Cognitions. |
tathā hi sa parisphurannākāro na bāhyo gajādir iti sādhitam tataś ca taṃtathā parisphurantamākāramātmabhūtam eva pratipadyamānā buddhayaḥ svayamprakāśarūpatvāt svasaṃvidrūpāḥ siddhyanti // | For instance, it has been proved that the form appearing in the Cognition cannot be the external Elephant, etc.; so that it becomes established that the Cognitions apprehending that form as their own are of themselves, because they are self-luminous in their character. |
sarvārthabodharūpā ca yadi buddhiḥ sadā sthitā / sarvadā sarvasaṃvittis tat kimarthaṃ na vidyate // | If cognition remains for ever in the form of the apprehension of all things, then how is it that the cognition of all things is not present at all times? (253) |
yadi sarvārthabodharūpā sadā buddhir avasthitā tadā sarvadā sarvārthavedanaprasaṅgaḥ // | If Cognition, which is of the nature of Apprehension, exists for ever, then all things should be cognised at all times. |
katham ity āha śabdopadhānetyādi / | The following Text proceeds to show how this is so: [see verse 254 next] |
śabdopadhānā yā buddhī rasarūpādigocarā / | That cognition on which sound has been imposed must be the same that apprehends taste, colour and other things. |
saiva hīti na cedbhedās tvayā caivopapāditāḥ // | if this is not admitted by you, then you have, by your own words, admitted that there is difference among cognitions. |
tathā hi yā śabdopadhānā śabdaviṣayā; buddhiḥ; saiva rasarūpādiviṣayā; nānyā; tataścaikārthānubhavavelāyām aśeṣārthānubhavaprasaṅgaḥ; tadupalambhātmikāyā buddheḥ sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt / | That Cognition on which Sound has been imposed, i.e. the Cognition of Sound, is the same that apprehends Taste, Colour and other things, and it cannot be different; so that at the time of the apprehension of one thing, there should be apprehension of all things, as the Cognition apprehending all these would be there always. |
ekayānekavijñāne buddheta sakṛdeva tat / | This has been thus declared: ‘Many things being apprehended by a single Cognition, all these would be apprehended once for alb without any distinction; |
aviśeṣāt krameṇāpi mā bhūt tadaviśeṣaḥ // | nor could it appear in any order of sequence, as no distinction is possible’. |
na cediti / | If this is not admitted; |
yadi yā śabdopadhānā buddhiḥ saiva rasādigocarā nāṅgīkriyate evaṃ sati bhedo buddhīnāṃ bhavatā svavācaivopapāditaḥ syāt // | if you do not admit that the Cognition of Sound is the same that apprehends Taste and other things, then you would be admitting that there is diversity among Cognitions. Even fire is not always a ‘burner’ of all combustible things; otherwise the whole (world) would be instantly reduced to ashes. |
yaścāyaṃ vahnidṛṣṭāntaḥ so 'pyasiddha iti darśayann āha samastetyādi / | The following Text is going to show that the instance of Fire that has been cited (in Text 243) is itself ‘unproven’ (not admitted by all parties): [see verse 255 above] |
samastadāhyarūpāṇāṃ na nityaṃ dahanātmakaḥ / | The Fire, in the form of the burner of all combustible things, is not always existent; |
kṛśānurapi niḥśeṣamanyathā bhasmasād bhavet // na hyaśedṣadāhyadahanasvabhāvo dahano nityamavasthito 'nyathā sakalam eva dāhyaṃ bhasmasādbhavet; dahanajvalānuṣaktadāhyavat sadāsannihitasvadāhakatvāt / | if it were, then all combustiblengs would be reduced to ashes, because they would always have their burner in contact with them, like that combustible thing which is in actual contact with the fixe-flame. |
na kevalaṃ buddhiḥ sarvārthabodhasvabhāvā na bhavatītyapiśabdena darśayati // | ‘Even’, ‘api’, is meant to indicate that it is not only Cognition that cannot be of the nature of the apprehension of all things. |
yadyevaṃ nityadahanātmakaḥ kṛśānur na bhavati; kathaṃ tarhyupanītamapyarthaṃ dahed ity āha dāhyārthasannidhāv ityādi / | Objection “If that is so, then Fire is not always of the nature of the Burner (possessed of the power to burn); how then could it burn even the thing that is presented to it?” The answer is provided in the following Text: [see verse 256 next] |
dāhyārthasannidhāveva tasya taddāhakātmatā / | In fact, it is only when it is in close proximity to the combustible thing that fire can be rightly regarded as the burner; |
yuktā sarvārthadāho hi sakṛdevaṃ na sajyate // | thus it is why there does not happen the contingency of all things being burnt all at once. |
evam iti / | Thus it is; |
samanantaroditārthābhyupagame sati; sarvārthadāho yugapan na sajyate na prasajyata ity arthaḥ / | it is because of our acceptance of the view just expressed that there is no simultaneous burning of all things; i.e. there is no likelihood of any such absurd contingency. |
nīlopalādisambandhād ityādi / nīlotpalādisambandhād darpaṇasphaṭikādayaḥ / tacchāyāvibhramotpādahetavaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ // | All such things as the mirror, the rock-crystal and the like are themselves in perpetual flux; and when they become connected with the blue lotus and such objects, they become causes of bringing about the illusion regarding their reflections. |
sopadhānetarāvastha eka eveti sarvadā / | If that were not so, everyone of those things would be always one and the same, when in contact with the said objects, as well as when not in contact with them; |
tacchāyas tadviyukto vā sa dṛśyetānyathā punaḥ // | and as such it should be seen either as always with its reflection or always without its reflection. |
sphaṭikadarpaṇādiḥ pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsī san nīlotpalādisamparkād viparyastajñānotpattāvādhipatyaṃ pratipadyate / | and when they come into contact with the Blue Lotus and such things, they become masters in the producing of illusions (regarding the reflections of these things, which have no real existence, and whose Cognition, therefore, must be illusory, wrong). |
anyathā yadyakṣaṇikaḥ san chāyāṃ pratipadyeta; tadā ya eva sopadhānāvasthaḥ sa evānupadhānavasthitir iti kṛtvā; nīlādyupadhānaviyukto 'pi nīlādicchāyaḥ samupalabhyeta; aparityaktapūrvarūpatvāt / yadvopadhānāvasthāyām api nīlādyākāraviyukto dṛśyeta; pūrvarūpāviśeṣād iti / | If that were not so, i.e. if it could reflect the image without being momentary, then it would have to be admitted that the Mirror in contact with the object is the same as that not in contact with it; so that, even in the absence of the Blue and other reflected things, the reflection of these would he perceptible, as the reflector will not have abandoned its previous character (when in contact with the object); or, conversely, even when in contact with the object, it would be seen without the said reflections; as its form would not be different from its previous state (when not in contact with the object). |
etena akṣaṇikapakṣe sāmānyena sarveṣām eva sphaṭikadarśapaṇādīnāṃ chāyāpratipattir apāstā //257- | This argument serves to set aside the possibility of all reflections in general in any such reflecting substances as the Mirror and the like, under the view that things are not-momentary. |
sthiratvānnirvibhāgatvān mūrtānām asahasthiteḥ / bibharti darpaṇatalaṃ naiva cchāyāṃ kadācana // | As a matter of fact, the mirror-surface can never contain the reflection (of anything), because it is lasting, because it is indivisible, and because several things with material shape cannot subsist together. |
sthiratvāt akṣaṇikatvāt; darpaṇatalaṃ pūrvacchāyāṃ bibhartīti sambandhaḥ / | Because it is lasting, i.e. not momentary, therefore the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection. |
kṣaṇikatve 'pi nirvibhāgatvān na bibharīti sambandhanīyam / | Even if it is momentary, it cannot contain the reflection because it is indivisible; |
tathā hi kūpāntargatodakavaddarpaṇatale pratibimbakamantargatamupalabhyate;na ca darpaṇatalasya vibhāgaḥ randhramasti; nibiḍatarāvayavasanniveśāt; tasmād bhrāntiriyam / | when the reflection is perceived it is perceived as if it were inside the mirror, just as the Water is perceived inside the well; and yet the Mirror-surface has no parts i.e. vacant space; because its component particles are closely packed. Hence the perception of the Reflection must be an illusion. |
athavā nirvibhāgatvaṃ pūrvottarāvasthāyām anānātvam / | Or the term ‘nīrvibhāgatva’, ‘indivisibility’, may stand for absence of difference between the previous and succeeding states; |
atra kāraṇaṃ sthiratvād iti / | and the reason for this absence is ‘because it is lasting’; |
tenāyamartho bhavati / sthiratvena nirvibhāgatvāt pūrvottarāvasthārahitatvād ity arthaḥ / | so that the meaning comes to be ‘because on account of its lasting character it is devoid of difference between its previous and succeeding states’; that is, because it has no previous or succeeding states. |
kiṃ ca mūrtānām asahasthiteḥ naiva darpaṇatalaṃ chāyāṃ bibhartīti sambadhyate / | Further, because several things with material shape cannot subsist together, ‘the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection’, this has to be construed here. |
tathā hi darpaṇatale taddeśānyeva parvatādipratibimbānyupalabhyante; na camūrtaḥ padārthāḥ kadācid ekadeśatām āpadyante; aikātmyaprasaṅgāt / | Because what are perceived in the Mirror-surface are only reflections occupying the same space; material things with forms can never occupy the same points in space; as if they did, they would become one and the same. |
etac ca kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatve sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam // | This objection is applicable under both views of things being momentary or non-momentary. |
pārśvadvitayasaṃsthāś ca suśuklaṃ sphaṭikopalam / | Persons standing on the two sides of it perceive only the purely white rock-crystal; |
samīkṣyante tad eṣo 'pi na chāyāṃ pratipannatvāt // | hence it follows that this also does not become transformed into the reflection. |
[p.104] tathā hi yadi vāgrataḥ sthitaḥ pratipattā japākusumasamparkād raktaṃ sphaṭikamupalabhate; tadaiva ye pārśvaddhitayāvasthitās te sakalam eva sphaṭikopalaṃsuśuklamupalabhante; na bhāgaśaḥ / tataś ca yadi chāyāpratipattis tasyābhaviṣyat tadā puro 'vasthitapuṃsa iva pārśvaddhitayāvasthitayor api pratipanno raktāvabhāsā pratipattir abhaviṣyat / | For instance, the man standing in front of the Rock-crystal placed in contact with the Hibiscus Flower, perceives it as red; while persons who may he standing on two sides of it would perceive it as purely white, not even as partly red and partly white. Now if the Rock-crystal had become transformed into the reflection (of the Flower), then, just like the man standing in front, the persons standing on the two sides of it also would perceive it as red. |
ayaṃ ca kṣaṇikākṣaṇikapakṣayorapi sādhāraṇo doṣaḥ // | This objection is applicable under both views of things being momentary and not-momentary. |
bhedaḥ pratyupadhānaṃ cetyādinā tv akṣaṇikatvapakṣa eva doṣam āha | With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out the objection that would be applicable only under the view that things are not-momentary: [see verse 261 above] |
yadi hi paramārthataḥ sphaṭikāder upadhānoparāgapratipattir bhavet tadā yathākramabhāvinīnām upadhānamupadhānaṃ chāyānāṃ svabhāvabhedānnaikātmyam / tadvattadātmanaḥ sphaṭikāder apyupadhānamupadhānaṃ prati pratyupadhānam ---bhedaḥ prasajyeta / | If the Rock-crystal and such things were really transformed into the reflection of the object placed before them, then, just as the reflections of the various things placed before the reflector appearing one after the other, are different in character, and hence there is no identity among them, in the same manner, in the Soul, and in the Rock-crystal and such things also, there would be differences due to the character of each thing presented to it (and reflected therein). |
yadi punar bhrāntiriyamityaṅgīkriyate tadāyam adoṣa iti jñāpanārthaṃ tātvikītyāha // | If the perception of the Reflection, however, be admitted to be an illusion, then there can be no objection to it, this is what is meant by the epithet ‘real (261) |
tasmādbhrāntir iyaṃ teṣu vicitrācintyaśaktiṣu / | From this it follows that the said perception of the reflection is an illusion, appearing in connection with things possessed of diverse unthinkable potencies. |
yataścaivaṃ pakṣadvaye 'pi chāyāpratipattir na yujyate tasmād bhrāntiriyam iti sthitam / yadyevaṃ kasmāt sphaṭikādāveva sā bhrāntir bhavati na kuḍyādāvityāha vicitrācintyaśaktiṣviti / | Inasmuch as, under both theories, it is not possible for the Reflector to become transformed into the Reflection, it becomes established that it is an Illusion. Question “If that is so, then such Illusion appears only in connection withngs like the Bock-crystal, and not with things like the Wall.” |
vicitrāḥ nānāprakārāḥ; acintyāḥ śaktyo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | The answer is supplied by the words ‘In connection with things possessed of diverse unthinkable potencies.’ Diverse, of various kinds; and ‘unthinkable’, are the potencies ofngs; |
na hi bhāvānāṃ śaktipratiniyamaḥ paryanuyogamarhati svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt tasya / | no objection can be raised against the particular potentialities of things, as these potentialities are the effects of the series of causes that have brought about each thing. |
bhavatām api cātrāṃśe nāsti vivādaḥ / | In fact, you also can have no dispute against this much; |
yathoktam agnirdahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyojyatām iti / | as you have yourself said ‘Who can take objection to the fact that it is Fire, not Ākāśa, that bums?’, (262a) |
yadyevaṃ buddhāvapi tarhi viṣayacchāyāpratipattir bhrāntirevāstu mābhūcchāyāpratipattir ity āha | “If that is so, then in the case of Cognition also, the idea of its being transformed into the reflection of its object may be mere Illusion; so that there is no transformation into the reflected form.” |
na buddhau bhrāntibhāvo 'pi yukto bhedaviyogataḥ // | In the case of cognition, there cannot be even illusion; as there is absence of difference. |
na buddhau bhrāntisadbhāvo yuktaḥ / | It is not right that there should be Illusion in the case of Cognition. |
na kevalaṃ chāyāpratipattir na yuktetyapiśabdaḥ / | What is implied by the term ‘even’ is that it is not only ‘transformation into Reflection’ that is not right; |
kasmāt/ bhedaviyogataḥ bhedābhāvāt / | why? as there is absence of difference; i.e. because there is no difference. |
sphaṭikādiṣu hi bhrāntiryuktā; tebhyo bhinnāyā buddher bhrāntāyāḥ sambhavāt; natvevaṃ buddhāvaparā bhrāntirūpā buddhir asti; yasmād ekaiva buddhir iṣṭā / | In the case of the Rock-Crystal and otherngs, it is right that there should be Illusion, as it is possible for the illusory cognition to he different from those things; in the case of Cognition, however, there cannot be another Cognition in the form of an Illusion; as all Cognition is held (by the Mīmāṃsaka) to be one. |
na ca svayam eva vibhramarūpā jāyate dhīriti yuktaṃ vaktum; buddher nityatvābhyupagamāt // | Nor can it be said that the Cognition itself appears in the form of an Illusion; as Cognition has been held to be eternal (which Illusion can never be). |
abodharūpabhedaṃ tu samānaṃ sarvabuddhiṣu / | The character of being different from non-cognition is one that is common to all cognitions; |
āropya pratyabhijñānaṃ nānātve 'pi pravartate // anaikāntikametat pratyabhijñānam; yasmād avabodharūpebhyo ghaṭādibhyo bhedam vyāvṛttiṃ samāropya pratyabhijñānaṃ sarvabuddhiṣu nānātve satyapi pravartamānamaviruddham eva / | and the said recognition could proceed on the basis of the imposition of that common character, even under the view of cognitions being many and diverse. It has been argued above (under Text 247), for the purpose of proving the one-ness and eternality of Cognition that ‘Cognition is always recognised as being of the nature of Intelligence, etc. etc? |
avaśyaṃ vaitadvijñeyam yannānātvaṃ eva sati vijātīyavyāvṛttinibandhanakṛtametat pratyabhijñānam na punar anānātva eveti / | The ‘Recognition’ that has been put forward is Inconclusive; because the said fact of ‘Recognition’ can be explained, in regard to all Cognitions, as being due to the imposition of the character of being different from what is not-cognition; |
tathā hi nirālambanāsu samāropabuddhiṣvarthabhede 'nupāśrite 'pyapratyabhijñānamastyeva; na hi tatraivaṃ bhavati; yaiva gajabuddhirāsīt saiva turaṅgasyandanabuddhir iti / | For instance, in the case of such superimposed (assumed) Cognitions as have no real background, even when a diversity among the objects is not admitted, there is no Recognition; e.g. there is no such recognition as that ‘this Cognition of the Horse and the Chariot is the same as what was the Cognition of the Elephant’; |
prasādhitaṃ cānālambanatvamāsāṃ buddhīnām iti na punar ucyate / | and it has been already proved that all these Cognitions are without any real background; hence we are not asserting that here again. |
tena yaduktam na cāstyapratyabhijñānamarthabhede 'nupāśrite" iti; tadasiddham iti grahītavyam // | Thus the assertion that “there is no nonrecognition of it as Cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects” (Text 248, above) should be regarded as ‘unproven’ (untrue). |
kiṃ ca yadi nityaikarūpa ātmeṣyate bhavadbhis tadā sukhādyavasthābhedo naprāpnoti / atha sukhādyavasthābhedo 'bhyupagamyate na tarhi nityaikarūpatvamasyābhyupetavyam / | Then again, if the Soul is held by you to be enternally of one and the same form, then such diverse states as ‘Happiness’ and the like are not possible. If you do admit these diverse states, then the Soul cannot be eternally of one and the same form. |
na hyekasya bhedābhedau parasparaviruddhau svabhāvau yuktāv iti / | As one and the same thing cannot have such contradictory characters as diversity and non-diversity. |
etaccodyaparihārārthaṃ yatkumārilenoktaṃ tattāvad dūṣayitum upakṣipannāha avasthābhedabhedenetyāha | This Objection has been sought to be answered by Kumārila; and what has been said by him is now introduced in the following Text, for the purpose of refuting it (below, under Text 268 et. |
atra kāraṇam āha sthirātmanīti / | seq.): [see verses 264-265 next] |
sthiraḥ nityaḥ, ātmā svabhāvo yasyātmanaḥ, sa tathoktaḥ / yadi vā avasthābhedaḥ avasthāviśeṣāḥ sukhādayaḥ, tebhya ekāntena bhedaḥ pṛthagbhāvaḥ, tena śūnyas tadavyatirikto 'pītyarthaḥ // kiṃ tadyatparikalpyata ity āha sukhetyādi / sukhaduḥkhādyavasthāś ca gacchannapi naro mama / ciatanyadravyasattvādirūpaṃ naiva vimuñcati // | “The permanent soul having been absolutely established as devoid of diversity due to the diversity of states, what people assume to be the states of happiness and unhappiness and the rest, even when undergoing all these states, my person (soul) does not renounce his character of being sentient, being a substance, being an entity and so forth.” [Ślokavārtika, page 695] (265) |
gacchannapīti / | ‘Undergoing’ passing through; |
nara iti / | ‘Person’ Soul. |
sattvādītyādiśabdena jñeyatvaprameyatvakartṛtvabhoktṛtvādisāmānyadharmaparigrahaḥ // | The term ‘and so forth’ includes such generic characters as being knowable, being rightly cognisable, being the active agent, and the like. |
na cāvasthāntarotpāde pūrvātyantaṃ vinaśyati / | “Even on the appearance of a new state, the preceding state is not entirely destroyed; |
uttarānuguṇārthaṃ tu sāmānyātmani līyate // pūrveti / | it becomes merged into the common character, in order to help the appearance of the next state.” [Ślokavārtika, page 596] (266) |
sukhādyāvasthā / | ‘Preceding state’, of happiness. |
yadyevaṃ sukhādyavasthāyām api duḥkhāvasthā kiṃ na saṃvedyata ity āha uttarānuguṇārtham ityādi / | “If that is so, then why is not Unhappiness also not felt during the state of Happiness?” The answer is It becomes merged, etc. etc. |
svarūpeṇaiva hi sthitāyāṃ sukhāvasthāyāṃ nottarā duḥkhāvasthā bhavatītyataḥ sā līyamānā sāmānyātmani sarvāvasthānugāmini caitanyadravyatvādilakṣaṇe uttaraduḥkhāvasthotpādānuguṇā bhavantīti tadarthaṃ sā tatra līyate // | While the state of ‘Happiness’ remains in its own form, the other state, of ‘Unhappiness’, does not appear; it remains merged in the common character, which permeates through all states, such as being sentient, being substance and so on; and thereby renders possible the appearance of the succeeding state of ‘Unhappiness’; it is for this purpose that it becomes merged in the common character. |
yady evam avasthāntaravat sāmānyātmanyapi layo 'vasthānamayukto virodhādityāśaṅkyāha svarūpeṇa hītyādi / | Objection If that be so, then the mergence of the states into the common character also should be as unreasonable as in the other states; as that also involves an incongruity. |
svarūpeṇa hy avasthānām anyonyasya virodhitā / | “The states, in their own forms, are mutually incompatible; |
aviruddhas tu sarvāsu sāmānyātmā pratīyate // | as is clear from the fact that ‘Sentience’ and the other common characters are found to be present in all the States. |
svena sukhādirūpeṇāvasthānāṃ parasparaṃ virodhādanyonyaṃ layo na yuktaḥ, avasthāntare tu sāmānyātmani laye ko virodho yenāsau tatra na bhavet, tathāhyasau sāmānyātmā sarvāvasthāsvaviruddho 'nuyāyī dṛśyate / sarvasyām avasthāyāṃ caitanyādīnām upalambhāt // | If the States are not held to be entirely different from the Soul, then, on the destruction and origination of the States, there should be destruction and origination of the Soul also. The term ‘entirely’ is meant to show that, if there were even the slightest degree of non-difference, the said ‘destraction and origination’ would be irrepressible. The argument is to be formulated as follows --When one thing is noil-different from another, its destruction and origination must follow on the destruction and origination of the latter, just like the specific forms of those same States of Happiness and the rest, and the Soul has been held to be non-different in nature from the States of Happiness and the rest; |
tatretyādinā pratividhatte / | hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things. |
tatra no cedavasthānām ekāntena vibhinnatā / puruṣāt tadvyatotpāde syātām asyāpi tau tathā // | If there be presence of contradictory properties, then there should be absolute difference; just as in the case of your souls which are absolutely different from each other, through the distinctive character belonging to each of them. |
yadi hi puruṣādavasthānām ekāntena bhedo neṣyate, tadā tadvyayotpāde tāsām avasthānāṃ vyayotpāde sati, asyāpi puṃsastau vyayotpādau syātām / ekānteneti vacanaṃ kathañcidapyavyatireke 'vasthāvadudayavyayaprasaṅgo durvāra iti jñāpanārtham / | If it be held that destruction and origination pertain to the States only, not to the Soul, so that the two (the States and the Soul) have two contradictory properties of ‘origination’ and ‘non-origination’, then there must be difference between them; just as in the case of Souls, which are many, each has its own character restricted to himself, and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference. |
sukhādyavyatiriktasvabhāvaśca puruṣa iti svabhāvahetuḥ // na cāyam anaikāntiko hetur ityādarśayann āha viruddhetyādi / | The qualification ‘distinctive character belonging to each’ has been added for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of the ‘absence of the Probandum’ in the Probans, due to the fact that in the case of the Souls also, there is no difference in their own pristine forms. |
viruddhadharmasaṅge tu bheda ekāntiko bhavet / | As a matter of fact, the form belonging to each of the individual Souls is entirely different from each other; |
yadi hyavasthānām evotpādavyayau na puruṣasyetyevam utpādānutpādalakṣaṇo viruddhadharmasa [p.107] ṅgo 'bhyupagamyate, tadā bhedaprasaṅgaḥ, yathā puṃsāṃ bahūnāmparasparaṃ pratisvaṃ niyateta pratyātmaniyatena svabhāvena parasparato bhedaḥ / | if that were not so, as there would be no restriction regarding the apprehensions and remembrances of different persons, there would be confusion in all matters. The argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them; e.g. among Souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes, the States of Happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes; |
etāvan mātranibandhanatvād bhedavyavahārasyeti bhāvaḥ / | hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they cannot be non-different). |
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