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na / | and to that extent, the said figurative attribution does become false But it is not so; |
ātmanyapi skhaladvṛttitvaprasaṅgāt / tatrāpi hi madīya ātmeti vyatireko dṛśyate / | as it might be possible to regard the notion of ‘Soul’ with regard to the Soul also as false; as in this connection also, we find such expressions as ‘My Soul’, where there is a distinction made between the two. |
kalpito 'tra bheda iti cet / itaratrāpi samānam astu / | If it be urged that “in this case the distinction is assumed”, then the same may be said in regard to the other case also. |
tarhi gauro 'ham ityādipratyayo mukhyatas tathāpi kasmād [p.91] ātmāsya viṣayo nabhavatītyāha tatsvabhāva iti / | “Even if the expression ‘I am fair’ is used in its direct sense, why should not the Soul be the object of this notion?” The answer is The Soul is not held to be of the nature, etc. |
gaurādisvabhāvaḥ / | i.e. of the nature of ‘fair-complexioned’, etc.; |
tasya rūpādiguṇāsambhavāt //213- | for the simple reason that it is not possible for the Soul to have any such qualities as Colour and the like. |
yadi pratyakṣagamyaś ca satyataḥ puruṣo bhavet / tatkimarthaṃ vivādo 'yaṃ tat sattvādau pravartate // | If the soul were really amenable to perception, then wherefore should this dispute arise regarding its existence and other things? (215) |
tasyātmanaḥ sattvanityatvavibhutvādau // | ‘Existence and other things’ i.e. regarding its Existence, Eternality, Omnipresence and so forth. |
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ pratyakṣīkṛte 'pi nīlādau tat svabhāvāvyati{rikte}kṣaṇikatvādau vivādaḥ pravartate / tathātmanyapi bhaviṣyatītyāha tathā hītyādi / | The following might be urged “Just as, for you, even though the Blue and other things are actually perceived, yet disputes arise in regard to their momentariness and other characters, which are held to be non-difîerent from the nature of those things in the same manner, there might be dispute regarding the Existence, etc. of the Soul also”. |
tathā hi niścayātmāyamahaṅkāraḥ pravartate / | The answer to this is provided in the following Text: [see verse 216 above] |
niścayāropabuddhyoś ca bādhyabādhakatā sthitā // yukto hi nīlādau pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte 'pi tadavyatirikte kṣaṇikatvādau vivādaḥtasya pratyakṣasya nirvikalpatvenāniścāyakatayā kṣaṇikatvāder aniścitatvāt / | In the case of Blue and the rest, it is only right that even though they are apprehended by Perception, there should be a dispute regarding their momentariness and other properties; because the Perception of these things is always indeterminate (vague, undefined) in character, and as such not conducive to any definitely certain cognition; and hence there can be no definitely certain cognition of their momentariness and such other properties. |
bhavatpakṣe tu na yukto 'hampratyayasya savikalpakatvena niścayātmakatayātmano niścitatvāt / | because the notion of ‘I’ is well-defined and definite (according to you) and hence of the nature of a definitely certain cognition, so that the notion of the Soul also would be definitely certain; |
na ca niścayena viṣayīkṛte vastuni tadviparītākāragrāhiṇaḥ samāropapratyayasya pravṛttir asti;yena vivādo bhavet / | and where a thing has been the object of a definitely certain cognition, there can be no room for any assumed conception to the contrary; by virtue of which any dispute could arise; |
tayoḥ sahāvasthāyitvena bādhyabādhakabhāvāt / | specially as when there are two contrary notions, one must annul the other. |
iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattanniścayanaṃ te cen na niścinvanti;na gṛhṇantyeveti prāptam // | In fact, it is in the very nature of definitely certain cognitions regarding their objects, that they bring about well-ascertained notions of their objects; so that, if they do not bring about these well-ascertained notions, it follows that they do not apprehend the objects at all. |
tasmādicchādayaḥ sarve naivātmasamavāyinaḥ / | Thus it follows that desire and all the rest cannot subsist in the ‘soul’; |
krameṇotpadyamānatvād bījāṅkuralatādivat // | because they appear successively, like the ‘seed sprout creeper’. |
atha vādhyātmikāḥ sarve nairātmyākrāntamūrtayaḥ / vastusattvādihetubhyo yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayaḥ // | Or, all psychical (subjective) concepts must be regarded as having their forms obsessed by ‘absence of soul’, because of such reasons as ‘being things’, ‘being existent’ and so forth, just like the jar and other external objects. |
prayogaḥ ye krameṇotpadyante te nātmasamavāyino yathā bījāṅkuralatādayaḥ; krameṇotpadyante ca sukhādaya iti viruddhavyāptopalabdheḥ / | The argument is to be formulated as follows: Things that are produced successively can not subsist in the Soul, e.g. Seed Sprout Creeper; Pleasure and the rest are produced successively; hence they are found to be beset by a concomitance to what is denied, (by the Opponent); |
ātmasamavāyitvaviruddhenānātmasamavāyitvena kramotpatter vyāptatvāt / | because ‘successive origination’ is invariably concomitant with ‘subsistence in what is not-Soul’, which is contrary to ‘subsistence in the Soul’ (which is what is desired by the other party). |
sannihitāvikalakāraṇatvādyugapadutpattiprasaṅgo viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | A reason annulling the desired conclusion is also available in the fact that the appearance of effects must be simultaneous when the cause is present in its perfect form. |
athavā ye vastutvakṛtakatvotpattimattvādidharmopetās te sarve nirātmāno yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayaḥ;vastutvādidharmopetāścādhyātmikā jīvaśarīramanobuddhiduḥkhasukhādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ //217- | Or, there is also a more direct reason: Things that are endowed with the character of being things, being products, having origin, and so forth, all these are devoid of the ‘Soul’, as is found in the case of such things as the Jar and the like; and all such subjective (psychical) concepts as the Mind, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain and the rest appearing in the Living Body, are endowed with the said character of being things and the rest; |
[p.92] | [hence they cannot have any connection with any such thing as the Soul], (217-218) |
sātmakatve hi nityatvaṃ taddhetūnāṃ prasajyate / nitvāścārthakriyāśaktā nātaḥ sattvādisambhavaḥ // | If the things in question were connected with the soul, then the things caused by that (soul) would have to be regarded as eternal; and being eternal, they would yet be powerless for effective action. |
yadi sātmakatvam ātmādhiṣṭhitatvaṃ dehādīnāṃ bhavet;tadaiṣām ātmā hetuḥ syāt / | If the things in question are connected with the Soul if the Body and the rest were controlled by the Sou’, then this Soul would be their ‘Cause’; |
na hyakāraṇamadhiṣṭhātā yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | as what is not a Cause cannot be a controller; as otherwise there would be an absurdity. |
tataś ca taddhetūnām ātmahetukānāṃ śarīrādīnām avikalakāraṇatayā nityatvam akramitvaṃ prasajyeta / | And the Body and other things caused (produced) by that Soul, having their Cause always present in its perfect form, would have to be regarded as eternal, i.e. not successive. |
syād etadyadi nāma nityatvam eṣāṃ prasaktam;tathāpi vastutvādikam anuvṛttam evetyāha nityāścetyādi / | The following might be urged: “If they are held to be eternal, even so they retain their character of being things and so forth”. The answer is given in the words ‘And being eternal, etc. etc.’; |
nityāś ca santaḥ śarīrādayor 'thakriyāyām aśaktāḥ prasajyanta iti prakṛtam arthād vacanapariṇāmena sambadhyate / | i.e. being eternal, the Body and the rest would have to be regarded as powerless in bringing about any effective action. The word ‘prasajyate’ (singular) of the first line being transformed, in this construction, to the plural form [‘Prasajyate’ as applied to the second line being construed as ‘Prasajyante’]. |
nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhād iti bhāvaḥ / | The sense is that in the case of an eternal thing, any effective action, either successive or simultaneous is incompatible. |
arthakriyāsāmarthyanivṛttau ca vastutvanivṛttir arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ / vastutvanivṛttau sattvādīnām api vastudharmāṇāṃ nivṛttir iti siddhā vyāptiḥ // | And on the cessation of the power for effective action, they cease to be ‘things’ (entities); because ‘capacity for effective action’ is the characteristic of all Entities (Things’, And when the character of being Entities has ceased, there is cessation of the other characteristics of Entities also, such as having existence and the like; |
uddyotakarastvāha atha nirātmakatvam iti ko 'rthaḥ sādhyatveneṣṭaḥ / yadi tāvad ātmano 'nupakārakam iti;na dṛṣṭānto 'sti / | Uddyotakara argues as follows; “What is it that is meant by [the Living Body] being not connected with the Soul? (a) If it means that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul, then, there can be no Corroborative Instance (such as would be accepted by both parties); |
na hi kiñcid ātmano 'nupakārakam asti / | as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul. |
athātmapratiṣedha ātmā śarīraṃ na bhavatīti / kasya cātmā śarīram uttarapadaviṣayatvāc ca nisaḥ kiṃ sātmakam iti vācyam / | (b) If again, what is meant is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the proposition being that ‘the Soul is not the Body’, then our answer is who is there that regards the Body as the Soul? Then again, the negative preposition ‘nis’, ‘not’ (in the term ‘nirātmakam’ ‘no-Soul’, signifies the negation of what is expressed by the following term ‘ātman’ (i.e. of something with Soul). |
na hyasatyuttarapade nisaḥ prayogaṃ paśyāmaḥ;yathā nirmakṣikam iti / | for in no case do we find the negative Preposition ‘nis’ prefixed to a term denoting a non-entity; for instance, in the expression ‘nirmakṣikam’, ‘without flies’, the preposition is added to ‘makṣihā’ (denoting the Fly, a positive entity). |
atha śarīra ātmā pratiṣidhyate siddhaṃ sādhayasi / | (c) Again, if the statement ‘the Body is not with Soul’ is meant to deny the Soul in the body, then the reasoning proves only what is already admitted by all; |
kasya vā śarīra ātmā vidyate / atha śarīramātmasambandhe{ndha}na bhavatīti / punar dṛṣṭānto nāsti / | for who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body? (d) If then the statement means that ‘the Body has no connection with the Soul’, then there can be no Corroborative Instance. |
sarve caite viśeṣapratiṣedhāḥ viśeṣapratiṣedhāc ca sāmānyaṃ gamyate / | Lastly, all the aforesaid four cases would mean the denial of a distinctive character in regard to the Soul; |
evaṃ sati yatpratiṣeddhavyaṃ tadabhyanujñātaṃ bhavati / | and this would imply the tacit admission of the Existence of the Soul itself, in a general way; so that what was sought to be denied becomes admitted. |
athātmaśabdaḥ śabdatvād anityaviṣaya iti sādhyate / tathāpi nityaśabdenānaikāntikaḥ / | If what is meant is that ‘the term Soul, being a verbal entity, is transient, it must denote something that is transient’, then, in the first place, in view of the term ‘eternal’, the premiss of the above reasoning is found to be ‘inconclusive’, doubtful; |
śarīrādīnāṃ copacārād ātmavācyatvāt siddhasādhanam / | and secondly, [the term ‘soul’ in your argument can stand either for the Body or for something other than the Body]; |
atha śarīrādivyatiriktānityapadārthaviṣayatvenānityaviṣaya ātmaśabdaḥ sādhyate / tathāpi rūpādivyatiriktaviṣayābhyupagamād virodha iti / | if it stands for the Body and such things, then the argument becomes superfluous; and if the term stands for something other than the Body, etc. and your proposition declares it as denoting something transient, then the existence of something other than the Body, etc. becomes admitted; |
tadetat pratividhatte ghaṭādiṣvityādi / | The above is answered by the Author in the following Text: [see verse 220 next] |
ghaṭādiṣu samānaṃ ca yavairātmā{yannairātṃyaṃ---}niṣidhyate / parairviccharīre 'smiṃs tadātmābhiḥ prasadhyate // | That ‘negation of the soul’ which other people seek to prove in regard to the jar and other things, that same we are going to prove in regard to the living body. |
tadetad bhavato 'pi tulyaṃ codyam / | The objection that has been urged above is equally applicable to your case also. |
tathā hi ghaṭādiṣu bāhyeṣu ātmānadhiṣṭhitatvena tadupabhogānāyatanatvenavā nairātmyaṃ bhavadbhir apīṣyata eva / | For instance, it is admitted by you that the Jar and other external things are ‘without Soul’, either on the ground of their being not occupied by a Soul, or on the ground of their being the receptacle of the Soul’s experiences. |
anyathā nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaśarīramaprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād ghaṭādivad iti prasaṅge dṛṣṭāntatvena teṣām upādānaṃ na syāt / [p.93] tataś ca tatrāpi ghaṭādiṣu tulyaṃ codyaṃ"kathameṣāṃ nairātmyaṃ yadi tāvad ātmānupakārakam"ityādi / | If it were not so, then you could not have mentioned these as the Corroborative Instance in your argument which is stated in the form ‘This Living Body is not without Soul, because, if it were, then it would be devoid of Breathing and such other functions, like the Jar and other things’, Now in reference to these Jar and other things, the question may be put ‘In what sense are these without Soul? Does it mean that ‘they serve no useful purpose for the Soul’ and so on (as has been urged by Uddyotakara, in the passage quoted above). |
tasmādyena prakāreṇātmānadhiṣṭhitatvena vā tadupabhogānāyatanatvena vā teṣu ghaṭādiṣu bāhyeṣu sarveṣu sādhāraṇaṃ nairātmyaṃ bhavatām api prasiddham / | If so, then (a) you affirm the fact of all external things, like the Jar, being equally without Soul, on the ground of their being not occupied by the Soul, or on account of their being the receptacle of the Soul’s experiences; |
yac ca jīvaccharīre bhavadbhir niṣidhyate nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram iti yasya niṣedhājjīvaccharīram eva sātmakamupagamyate na mṛtaśarīraghaṭādaya iti tadevāsmābhiḥ prasādhyate nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ vastutvādibhya iti / | and you deny the absence of Soul in regard to the Living Body, in the assertion ‘The Living Body is not without Soul’; and from this denial you deduce the conclusion that it is the Living Body alone that is with Soul, and not the dead body, or the Jar and other things. In the same manner, we also prove the fact that ‘the Living Body is without Soul, because it is a thing and so forth’ (as explained above). |
tasmād ātmano 'nupakārakam ityādivikalpo 'nāspada eva bhavatām api nairātmyasya prasiddhatvāt / | Thus the various alternatives put forward ‘Is it meant that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul’ and so forth, are entirely out of place; |
kiṃ ca yattāvaduktamātmānupakāritvasiddhau na dṛṣṭānto 'stīti tadasamyak / | Further, it has been alleged that “there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the assertion that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul”, This is not right. |
tathā hi śakyam evaṃ prasādhayitum yo yasya svabhāvātiśayaṃ nādhatte nāsau tasyopakārī yathā vindhyo himavataḥ nādhatte cātmano nityaikarūpasya svabhāvātiśayaṃ śarīrādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | Because it is possible to set up the following argument When one thing does not add any peculiar property to another thing, it cannot be regarded as serving any useful purpose for this latter, e.g. the Vindhya of the Himālaya; the Body and the rest do not add any peculiarity to the character of the Soul, which remains eternally of one uniform character; |
na cāsiddho hetuḥ / | hence the wider factor not being present (the less extensive factor cannot be admitted). |
svabhāvātiśayasyātmāvyatiriktatvāt / tadādhāne satyātmana evādhānaṃ syāt / | because the ‘additional property5 not being anything distinct from the Soul itself, any ‘adding’ to it would mean the ‘adding’ to the Soul itself; |
tataścānityatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | and this would imply the ‘transience’ of the Soul. |
vyatireke ca svabhāvātiśayasya sambandhanibandhanābhāvāt tadīyo 'sāviti sambandho na siddhyet / tasmānnityasya na kaścid upakārī sambhavati tasya tatrākiñcitkaratvāt / | If, on the other hand, the ‘additional property’ be held to be distinct from the Soul itself, as there would be no basis for any connection between that property and the Soul, there would be no such idea as that ‘this property belongs to the Soul’, From all this it follows that for an Eternal Entity, there is nothing that can serve a useful purpose; as, in regard to such an Entity, it could not do anything at all. |
yaccoktam kasya cātmā śarīram iti tadapyasamyak / | It has been further alleged ‘Who is there who regards the Soul as the Body?’ This again is not right; |
santi hi kecid evaṃvidhā ye śarīrādīnātmapariṇāmarūpān varṇayanti / yathopaniṣaddhādinaḥ / | there are actually some people who describe the Body, etc. as being transubstantiation of the ‘Soul’ (Spirit) e.g, the Followers of the Upaniṣads (Vedantins). |
atastān pratiṣidhyate / | So that the denial in question may well be regarded as urged against these people. |
yaccoktam uttarapadārthaviṣayatvānnisaḥ kiṃ sātmakam iti vācyam iti / tadapyasaṅgatam / na hyuttarapadārthaḥ sanneva niṣidhyate / kiṃ tarhi samāropitaḥ / | Then again, it has been argued that “the preposition ‘niṣ’ (in the term ‘nirātmakam’) must pertain to the term that follows after it; hence it behoves the other party to say what is it that is with Soul (which is denied by the negative Preposition)?” This also is entirely irrelevant. |
sataḥ pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt / | areal positive entity can never be denied. |
tataś ca yo 'sau pareṇa bhrāntyā samāropito 'rthaḥ sa evottarapadārtho bhavati / yatastamevānūdya parasya mithyājñānatvamākhyāpayituṃ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate / | Thus then, what is denoted by the negative compound (‘nirātmaka’, without Soul) is that particular entity which the other party has conceived through illusion; as it is only with reference to such an entity that the said denial is made, in order to proclaim that the other party entertains a wrong notion. |
anyathā hyakṣaṇikāḥ pradīpādaya ityādau bauddhaparikalpitakṣaṇikatvaniṣedhe bhavatā kriyamāṇe codyametadāpatatyeva na hyasatyuttarapade naṭaḥ prayogaṃ paśyāma iti / | If it were otherwise, then, when you proceed to put forward denials of the Buddhist’s assumption of ‘momentariness’ expressed in such words as ‘The Lamp and the rest are momentary’, you would be open to the same objection; because we never find any case where the negative is used without a term following it. |
yaccoktam kasya vā śarīre ātmā vidyata iti tadapyasamyak / | Then again, it has been asserted “Who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body?” This also is not right; |
tathā hi yeṣāṃ darśanamaṅguṣṭhaparvārddhaśyāmakādiphalapramāṇa ātmeti teṣāṃ matenātmano mūrttatvāccharīrasthitirastyeveti tān prati{prati}ṣedho yujyataeva / | as there are some people who regard the Soul to be of the size of the ‘half of the Thumb’ or of ‘a Śyāmāka grain’; and under their view, the Soul, being a corporeal material substance, must be subsisting in the Body; and it is only right that the denial in question should be made against these people. |
yaccoktam śarīrasyātmasambandhitvaniṣedhe dṛṣṭānto nāstīti tadasiddham / | It has been alleged that “there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the denial of the Body being related to the Soul”. This is not true; |
parasparamupakāryopakārakatvābhāvād vindhyahimavator iva nātmaśarīrayoḥ sambandho 'stīti pūrvavatprasādhayituṃ śakyatvāt / | as it is easy to prove, as shown above, that ‘there can be no relationship between the Body and the Soul, because one does not render any help to the other, as between the Vindhya and the Himālaya mountains. |
yaccoktam viśeṣapratiṣedhāc ca sāmānyaṃ gamyata iti tadanekāntam / | It has also been alleged that “The denial of the particular implies the acceptance of the general”. |
bhavadbhiḥ pradīpādīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvapratiṣedhe 'pi kasyacitkṣaṇikatvasāmānyenānabhyupagamāt / | e.g. even though you deny the momentariness of the Lamp and other particular things, you do not accept the momentariness of anyng in general. |
athāpi syād iṣyata evā [p.94] smābhiracirakālāvasthāyitvanibandhanā pradīpādau kṣaṇikaśabdapravṛttirataḥ sāmānyena kṣaṇikatvaṃ siddhameveti / yadyevamātmaśabdapravṛttirapyasmābhir ahaṅkārasaṃmiśrite cet asīṣṭaiveti siddhaḥ sāmānyenātmā / | It might be argued that “We do admit the applicability of the term ‘momentary’ to the Lamp and such things, on the basis of their not continuing to exist for a long time; so that in this way, momentariness in general may be regarded as admitted”. If it is so, the applicability of the term ‘Soul’ also to the Mind associated with ‘I-consciousness’ is admitted by us; and this may be regarded as the Soul in general being admitted. |
yaccoktam athātmaśabdo 'nityatvaviṣaya ityādipakṣadvayam tadapyasaṅgatam eva / | The assertion of the two alternative views regarding the term ‘Soul’ denoting something transient, etc. etc. |
anabhyupagamāt / | is not relevant; |
na hyātmaśabdasya kaścit paramārthena viṣayo 'bhyupagataḥ / nāpi rūpādivyatiriktaḥ / | nothing, in fact, has been held (by us) as to be really denoted by the term ‘Soul Nor has any such object been admitted by us as is ‘distinct from Colour, etc.’. |
na cāpi nityaśabdasya paramārthena kvacin nitye vastuni vṛttiḥ siddhā yena vyabhicāraḥ syāt / | Nor again is the denotation of the term ‘Soul’ admitted in regard to any eternal thing, which would falsify the said premiss. |
nāpi śarīrādiṣvātmaśabdasyopacārādvṛttiraskhaladvṛttitvādityuktam ato na prasiddhasādhanam // | Nor lastly can the use of the term ‘Soul’ in reference to the Body, etc. be regarded as ‘figurative’ (indirect); because such use is never found to fail, as explained above. |
itthamātmāprasiddhau ca prakriyā tatra yā kṛtā / nirāspadaiva sā sarvā vandhyāputra iva sthitā // | Thus the ‘soul’ being something ‘not-proyed’, the entire fabric (of conceptions) that has been adopted in regard to it, becomes baseless like ‘the son of the barren woman’. |
tadevamātmākhyasya dharmiṇaḥ pramāṇavyāhatatvenāprasiddhatvāt tatra yā kartṛtvabhoktṛtvādiprakriyā bhavadbhir upacaritā sā vandhyāputra iva nirāspadeti na pṛthagdūṣaṇamasyāḥ kriyate / | Thus, any such thing as the ‘Soul’ being found to be precluded by all means of Right Cognition, and hence ‘not proved’, ‘not admissible’ the ‘entire fabric (of Conceptions)’, such as its being the doer, the experiencer and the like, that has been set up by you, turns out to be like ‘the Son of the Barren Woman’, entirely baseless. Hence no criticism is made of all this fabric; |
āśrayanirākaraṇenaivāsyāḥ pratikṣiptatvāt / | as it becomes demolished by the demolition of its very basis (in the shape of the Soul). |
kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamadoṣaś ca yathā na bhavati tathā karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣāyāṃ pratipādayiṣyate // iti naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā // Mīmāṃsakaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā | In what manner our view is not open to the criticism that it involves ‘the destruction of what has been done and the appearance of what has not been done’ [i.e. the contingency of the Person not experiencing the effects of his own deeds, Karma, and experiencing those of the deeds not done by him] is going to be explained under the Chapter dealing with the ‘connection between Action and its Effects’ (i.e. Chapter 9). |
mīmāṃsakaparikalpitātmanirākaraṇam āha vyāvṛttyanugamātmānam ityādi / vyāvṛttyanugamātmānam ātmānamapare punaḥ / | End of the Examination of the ‘Nyāya’ Doctrine of the ‘Self’. Others again have declared the ‘soul’ to be of the nature of caitanya, sentience, exclusive and inclusive in character; |
caitanyarūpamicchanti caitanyaṃ buddhilakṣaṇam // | this caitanya (sentience) being the same as buddhi (intelligence). |
vyāvṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādyavasthānāṃ paramparato bhedāḥ;anugamaḥ caitanyadravyatvasattvādīnām anuvṛttiḥ;tāvetau vyāvṛttyanugamāvātmā svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Exclusive’ in character; the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc. (wherein the Soul is perceived) are mutually exclusive; ‘inclusive’ in character, such character as ‘Intelligence’, ‘Substance’, and ‘Being’ are ‘inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ (inasmuch as they serve the purpose of ‘comprehending’ or including, not excluding); |
etad uktaṃ bhavati sukhādirūpeṇa vyāvṛttaṃ sattvādirūpeṇānugatamātmānañcidrūpamapare jaiminīyā varṇayanti / | What is meant is that the followers of Jaimini declare the ‘Soul’ to be of the nature of ‘Sentience’ (Consciousness), and to be ‘exclusive’ in the form of the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc., and ‘inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ in the form of ‘Being’ and the rest. |
tac ca caitanyaṃ na buddhivyatirekāṇānyat;yathā sāṅkhyair iṣyate;kiṃ tarhibuddhireveti darśayati caitanyaṃ buddhilakṣaṇam iti / | This Caitanya, ‘Sentience’, is not anything different from Buddhi, ‘Intelligence’, as held by the Sāṃkhyas (according to whom Buddhi is Cosmic Intellect, a product of Primordial Matter, while Caitanya belongs to the Spirit]; |
buddhilakṣaṇam buddeḥ svarūpam ity arthaḥ / | it is in fact Buddhi, ‘Intelligence’, itself. |
buddhivyatirekeṇāparasya cidrūpatvāpratīter iti bhāvaḥ // | that is, it is only a form of Intelligence; the sense is that apart from Intelligence, no other form of ‘Sentience’ is recognised. |
yathāheḥ kuṇḍalāvasthā vyapaiti tadanantaram / sambhavatyārjavāvasthā sarpatvaṃ tvanuvartate // | “Just as, in the case of the serpent, the ‘coiled’ form disappears, and after that, appears the ‘straightened’ form; but the character of being ‘serpent’ continues through both states; |
tathaiva nityacaitanyasvabhāvasyātmano 'pi na / niḥśeṣarūpavigamaḥ sarvasyānugamo 'pi vā // | in the same manner, in the case of the soul, there is no complete disappearance of the character of ‘eternal sentience’; nor is there continuance of its whole character; |
kintvasya vinivartante sukhaduḥkhādilakṣaṇāḥ / | there is disappearance of such of its states as ‘pleasure’, ‘pain’ and the like, and these appear again; |
avasthāstāś ca jāyante caitanyaṃ tvanuvartate // | but through all these ‘sentience’ continues.” (223-225) |
yathā kilāheḥ sarpasyaikasyāpi sataḥ kuṇḍalāvasthānivṛttāvārjavāvasthāprādurbhāvaḥ;sarpatvaṃ punaravasthādvaye 'pyanuvartate;tathātmano 'pi nityacaitanyasvabhāvasyaikasyāpi sato nāśeṣasvabhāvavigamo nāpi naiyāyikādiparikalpitātmavadaśeṣasvabhāvānugamaḥ kiṃ tarhi sukhādyavasthā nivartante pravartante ca caitanyarūpaṃ tu sarvatrānuyāyītyato na virodha iti samudāyārthaḥ / | In the case of the Serpent, snake, though it remains one and the same, the coiled form disappears and the straightened form appears, and yet the character of the ‘Serpent’ continues in both forms; in the same manner, in the case of the Soul, though it is of the nature of eternal Intelligence, and one only, yet, there never is disappearance of its whole character, nor is there a continuance of its whole character, as postulated by the Naiyāyīka in regard to their ‘Soul’; what happens is that its states of Pleasure, etc. go on disappearing and appearing again, but the form of ‘Intelligence’ continues to permeate through all these states; hence there is no incompatibility between the ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’ character. |
avayavārthastūcyate nityacaitanyasvabhāvasyeti / nityaṃ caitanyaṃ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | The meaning of the words is as follows: The compound word ‘nityacaitanyasvabhāvasya’ is to be explained as ‘that which has eternal Intelligence for its form’; |
sarvasyeti / rūpasyeti śeṣaḥ / | ‘whole character’, i.e. of the entire form; |
neti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | ‘continuity’ ‘there is not’; such is the construction; |
tāśceti / sukhaduḥkhādyavasthāḥ //223- | ‘and these appear again’, i.e. the states of ‘Pleasure’ and the like. |
syātāṃ hyatyantanāśe hi kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau / | “If there were absolute destruction of the soul, there would be ‘destruction of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’; |
sukhaduḥkhādibhogaś ca naiva syād ekarūpiṇaḥ // | and if the soul always remained of the same form, then there could be no experiencing of pleasure, pain and the rest.” (226) |
yadi hi niranvayo vināśaḥ syāt;tadā kṛtasya karmaṇo nāśaḥ syāt;kartuḥ phalānabhisambandhāt / | If there were absolute destruction (of the Soul), then there would be destruction (ineffectiveness) of the act done; as the doer would not be there to come into contact with the effect of the act; |
akṛtābhyāgamaś ca syād akartuḥ phalābhisambandhanāt / | and there would be ‘befalling of what is not done’; as the Soul experiencing the effect of the act done would be experienced by a Soul who did not do the act. |
ekarūpatve cātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhādibhogo na syāt;ākāśavat / | Further? if the Soul remained of one and the same form, there could be no experiencing of Pleasure, Pain, etc. for it, just as there is none for Ākāśa; |
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