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pudgalastu tathā neti tato vispaṣṭamanyatā // | while the pudgala is not so; so that there is a clear difference between the two. |
anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti vacanād rūpādayo hyanityatvena vācyāḥ pudgalastu tathā nānityatvena vācya iṣṭaḥ sarvaprakāreṇa tasyāvācyatvāt / | The assertion that ‘all impressions are non-eternal’ shows that Colour and the rest are quite ‘capable of being spoken of’ as ‘non-eternal while the Pudgala is not held to be so ‘capable of being spoken of’ as ‘non-eternal on the ground that it is entirely ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (as anything at all). |
na cāpyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ etāvanmātranibandhanatvād bhedavyavahārasya anyathā hi sakalam eva viśvam ekaṃ vastu syāt tataś ca sahotpādavināśaprasaṅgaḥ // | Nor is our Reason ‘inconclusive because all idea of ‘difference’ is based upon the said fact (of the presence of contradictory properties); if it were not so, then the whole Universe would be a single Entity; which would mean the possibility of all things being produced and destroyed simultaneously. |
arthakriyāsu śaktiś ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam / | Capacity for effective action is the differentia of the existence (of a thing); |
kṣaṇikeṣveva niyatā tathāvācye na vastutā // | hence if anything is ‘incapable of being spoken of (as momentary)’, it cannot be an existent entity. |
idam eva hi vidyamānatvalakṣaṇaṃ vastusvabhāvo yadutārthakriyāsu śaktiḥ sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti sāmarthyād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇame va vastutvamavatiṣṭhate / | this is what is explained in the following: [see verse 347 above] What characterises ‘Existence’, the nature of an ‘Entity,’ is Capacity for effective action; as a matter of fact, a non-entity is characterised by the absence of all Capacity; which implies that Capacity for effective action is the only characteristic of an Entity. |
sā cārthakriyā kṣaṇikeṣveva niyatā / | This Capacity is restricted to momentary Entities only; |
kṣaṇikatvenaiva vyāpteti yāvat / nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt / | that is, it is invariably concomitant with momentariness; specially as any effective action would be impossible for an Eternal Entity, whose activities could not be either successive or simultaneous. |
atas tathā kṣaṇikatvenāvācye pudgale vastutā nāsti / tatra tadvyāpakasya kṣaṇikatvaya nivṛtteḥ vṛkṣatvanivṛttau śiṃśapātvādinivṛttivad iti / | So that, if the Pudgala is ‘incapable of being spoken of as momentary’, then it cannot have the nature of an ‘Entity as the more extensive character of ‘momentariness’ is absent in it; just as the absence of the character of ‘Tree’ means the absence of the character of the ‘Śiṃśapā’ (a particular tree). |
yathoktam anityatvena yo 'vācyaḥ sa hetur nahi kasyacid iti / | This is what has been thus declared: ‘That which is incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal cannot be the cause of anything.’ |
syād etadyadi pudgalo nityaḥ syāt tadā tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt yāvatā yathāsāvanityatvenāvācyaḥ tathā nityatvenāpītiato 'rthakriyāsāmarthyamasyāviruddhameveti / | The following might be urged: “If the Pudgala were eternal, then Effective Activity would be incompatible as, being neither successive nor simultaneous; but as a matter of fact, it is as ‘incapable of being spoken of’ as non-eternal as it is of being spoken of as eternal; so that effective action cannot be incompatible with it.” |
tadasamyak na hyubhayākāravinirmuktaṃ vastu svalakṣaṇaṃ yuktam nityānityayor anyonyavṛttiparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt / | This is not right; there can be no entity with a specific individuality which is devoid of both these characters (of eternality and non-eternality); as ‘eternal’ and ‘non-eternal’ are mutually exclusive (and contradictory) terms; |
vastunyekākāratyāgaparigrahayos tadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntarīyakatvāt / | so that in any entity, the absence or presence of one of these must mean the presence or absence (respectively) of the other. |
na hyasmābhir avācyaśabdaniveśanaṃ pudgale pratiṣidhyate svatantrecchā [p.129] mātrānītasya kenacit pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt kiṃtvidamiha vasturūpaṃ nirūpyate / | We are not objecting to the application of the term ‘incapable of being spoken of’, to the Pudgala; because the applying of names to things depends entirely upon the wish of the speaker, and as such, cannot be objected to by anyone. |
kimasau pudgalākhyasya vastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadāstyāhosvinnāstīti yadyasti tadā nitya evāsau na hi nityo nāmānya eva kaścit api tu yaḥ svabhāvaḥ sadāvasthāyī na vinaśyati sa nitya ucyate / yathoktam nityaṃ tamāhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati iti / | What we are doing however is to examine the nature of the ‘Entity’, is tins nature always present in the thing called ‘Pudgala’, or not? If it is present, then theng must be eternal, because ‘eternality’ consists in nothing else except that character which is always present and is never destroyed; and it is only a thing having this character that is called ‘Eternal as has been declared in the words ‘The learned call that thing Eternal which, in its own form, is never destroyed’. |
atha nāstīti pakṣas tadāpyanitya evāsāvanavasthāyisvabhāvalakṣaṇatvād anityasya / | If, on the other hand, the other view be held, that the said nature is not always present in the Pudgala, then the Pudgala must be non-eternal; as the only characteristic of the non-eternal thing is that it should not be lasting (permanent). |
ataḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikavyatirekeṇa gatyantarābhāvād akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt kṣaṇikatvenārthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃvyāptamiti pudgale kṣaṇikatvanivṛttau sattvanivṛttiḥ siddhā // | Thus then there being no other alternative apart from being ‘momentary’ (non-eternal) or ‘non-momentary’ (eternal), and effective activity either successive or simultaneous being incompatible for the non-momentary (Eternal) Entity, the Existence of a thing must be invariably concomitant with ‘momentariness so that if ‘momentariness’ is absent in the Pudgala, ‘Existence’ also must be absent, and it becomes established that it is non-existent. |
yadyevaṃ yadi pudgalo nāstyeva kasmād bhagavatā sa jīvas taccharīramanyo jīvo 'nyaccharīram iti pṛṣṭe noktam avyākṛtametad iti yāvatā nāstyeveti kasmānnoktam ity āha āgamārthavirodhe tvityādi /. | Says the Jaina: “If it is so, and if the Pudgala dbes not exist at all, then how is it that the Blessed Lord (Buddha) when asked as to whether the Living Entity is this and the Body is that, the Living Entity being different from the Body, said ‘this has not been explained’? Why did he not say straight away that there is no stick thing as the Living Entity (Soul)?” |
nāstikyapratiṣedhāya citrā vāco dayāvataḥ // | This is answered in the following [see verse 348 above] |
yadi hi pudgalo dharmī siddho bhavet tadā tasya tattvānyatvādidharmo 'vyākṛtamarhet / | If there were such an object as the ‘Pudgala’, then alone could it have deserved an explanation as to whether it is different or non-different (like other things); |
yāvatā sa eva dharmī na siddhas tatkatham asatas tasya dharmo nirdiśyeta / | as a matter of fact, however, the object itself has not been proved; |
na hyasataḥ kharaviṣāṇādes tīkṣṇatādi sambhavati yenāsau vyākriyate / | how then could its character be explained î An absolute non-entity, as the ‘Hare’s horn’ can have no sharpness or other properties, which could be explained. |
ataḥ prajñaptisattvameva khyāpayan pudgalasyāvyākṛtam etad iti bhagavānuvāca / | Hence while propounding the notion that the Pudgala has only an ideal (imaginary) existence, the Blessed Lord said ‘it has not been ex“plained’. |
nāstītyevaṃ tu noktam pareṇa dharmisvarūpasyāpṛṣṭatvāt / athavā prajñaptisato 'pyabhāvābhiniveśaparihārārthaṃ śūnyatādeśanāyāmabhavyavineyajanāśayāpekṣayā nāstītyeva noktam / | He did not declare straight away that ‘it does not exist’, because the question had not been asked about the nature of the object itself [the question having been only about its difference or non-difference from the Body]. Or it may be that, even though the tiring had a merely ‘ideal’ existence, He wished to avoid the extreme view that ‘it does not exist’; |
dṛṣṭidaṃṣṭrāvabhedaṃ ca bhraṃśaṃ cāvekṣya karmaṇām / deśayanti jinā dharmaṃ vyāghripotāpahāravat // iti evamācāyavasubandhaprabhṛtibhiḥ kośaparamārthasaptatikādiṣvabhiprāyaprakāśanāt parākrāntam atas tata evāvagantavyam / | in consideration of the welfare of such disciples as were not yet ñt for receving the extreme Doctrine of the ‘Void’ (Nihilism), He did not say that ‘the Soul or Pudgala does not exist.’ It has been thus declared: ‘Noting the difference between the Tusker and the Tusk, and the destruction of Actions, the Jinas propound the Dharma, on the analogy of the Tigress’ Cub (?).’ In this way have Vasubandhu and other teachers succeeded in disclosing the real import of the teachings in such works as the Kośaparamārthasaptati and the rest; hence it should be learnt from those works. |
iha tvatigranthavistarabhiyā na likhyata iti bhāvaḥ / | In the present context the details are not written down for fear of becoming too prolix. |
yadyevam asti sattva upapādaka ityetat kathaṃ nīyata ity āha nāstikyetyādi / | “If that is so” says the opponent “how do you construe the assertion that ‘there is existence which proves it’?” |
sattvāstitvābhidhāyinyo hi deśanāścitrā dayāvataḥ na virudhyanta iti vākyaśeṣaḥ / | The answer is ‘For the purpose of rebutting unbelief etc, etc.’ There are divine teachings of the Merciful One which speak of ‘sattva’ and ‘astitva’ (Existence), which are not incompatible (with the Buddhist doctrine); |
yatra hi cittasantāne sattvaprajñaptis tasyāṃ satyām anucchedamabhisandhāyāsti sattva ityuktaṃ bhagavatā / anyathā hyanuparatakāryakāraṇakṣaṇaparamparāṇām api saṃskārāṇām abhāvāvagamāt / | The ‘mental series’ in which the ‘idea of existence’ appears, it is with reference to the non-cessation (continuity) of that series, that the Blessed Lord has said ‘there is existence’, If he had not done so, then there would be an idea that even those ‘Impressions’ do not exist in the cause-effect-chain of whose ‘moments’ there has been no break, which would mean that things of the ‘other world’ do not exist, and this would demolish the whole idea of the ‘other world’, and the disciples would become inclined to ‘unbelief’, [The form ‘Nāstikya’ here is used in the old sense of the idea that there is no such thing as the ‘Soul’ or the ‘other world.’] (348) |
paralokino 'sattvāt paralokāsiddhir iti nāstikyadṛṣṭayo bhaveyur vineyāḥ // | The mention of the ‘bearer of the burden’ and so forth is made with the aggregates, etc. in mind; as regards the particular denial, that is of use against those who hold those views. |
[p.130] yat tarhīdam uktam bhāraṃ vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārādānaṃ bhāranikṣepaṃ bhārahāraṃ ca / | The following argument has been urged by the opponent: “It has been declared by the Blessed Lord as follows ‘O Bhikkhus, I am describing to you the Burden, the Taking up of the Burden, the Throwing up of the Burden and the Bearer of the Burden; |
tatra bhāraḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ bhārādānaṃ tṛptiḥ bhāranikṣepo mokṣaḥ bhārahāraḥ pudgalā iti tadetat kathaṃ nīyate na hi bhāra eva bhārahāro yukta ity āha samudāyādītyādi / | the term ‘burden’ stands for the five constituent thought-phases, the ‘taking up of the Burden’ for satisfaction (pleasure), the ‘throwing up of the Burden’ for Liberation, and the ‘Bearer of the Burden’ for the Pudgalas Now, how do you explain this? Certainly the ‘Bearer of the Burden’ cannot be the same as the ‘Burden’ itself.” |
samudāyādicittena bhārahārādideśanā / | and it was with these ‘aggregates’ in mind that the Teacher spoke of the ‘Bearer of the Burden’; |
viśeṣapratiṣedhaś ca taddṛṣṭīn prati rājate // | as regards the particular denial, that is of use against those who hold those views. |
tatra samānakālāḥ skandhā eva sāmastyena vivakṣitāḥ samudāyavyapadeśabhājaḥ ta eva hetuphalabhūtāś ca yugapat kālabhāvinaḥ santāna iti vyapadiśyanteekākāraparāmarśahetavaś ca sambhavantaḥ saṃtānisamudāyiśabdābhyāṃ nirdiśyanta ityataḥ samudāyādicittena samudāyādyabhiprāyeṇa bhārahārādideśanā na virudhyata iti śeṣaḥ / | The answer to this is supplied by the following: [see verse 349 above] The Thought-phases that appear at the same time, when meant to be spoken of collectively, come to be called ‘aggregates’; when these appear at the same time, in the form of Cause and Effect, they come to be called a ‘series’ or ‘Chain’; and when they are used as the basis of conception as a single concept, they come to be called by such names as ‘members of the Series’ and ‘Components of the aggregate’; and it was with these ‘aggregates’ in mind that the Teacher spoke of the ‘Bearer of the Burden’; |
prathamenādiśabdena santānādiparigrahaḥ dvitīyena bhārādeḥ / | The term ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘aggregates, etc.’ includes the Series and the term ‘and so forth’ in the phrase ‘Bearer of the Burden and so forth’ stands for the Burden and the rest. |
tatra ta eva skandhāḥ samudāyasantānādirūpeṇa vivakṣitāḥ pudgalo bhārahāra iti vyapadiśyante / tatraiva loke pudgalābhidhānāt / | Thus then, those same Thought-phases which are spoken of as ‘aggregate,’ ‘series’ and the like, are spoken of as ‘the Pudgala, the Bearer of the Burden’, as in common parlance it is this to which the name ‘Pudgala ' is applied. |
ata eva bhagavatā bhārahāraḥ katamaḥ pudgala ityuktvā yo 'sāvāyuṣmannevaṃnāmā evaṃjātiḥ evaṃgotra evam āhāra evaṃ sukhaduḥkhaṃ prati saṃvedī evaṃ dīrghāyur ityādinā pudgalo vyākhyātaḥ / sa evaṃ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiḥ sannanyathā vijñāyeta nānyo nityo dravyaṃ san paraparikalpito vijñāyeteti pradarśārthaṃ{pradeśanārthaḥ---} avaśyaṃ caivaṃ vijñeyam anyathā bhārādīnām api skandhebhyaḥ pṛthagdeśitatvāt pudgalavat skandhānantargataṃ tat syāt / | It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has described the Pudgala in the following words: ‘What is Pudgala, the Bearer of the Burden’? having asked thus, He goes on ‘It is that which, O Long-lived one, bears such and such a name, belongs to such and such a caste, to such and such a clan, takes such and such food, feels such and such pleasures and pains, and lives so long’, Thus being of the nature of the ‘aggregate of thought-phases’, the Pudgala should be understood to be only ideally existent, and not as an Eternal Substance, as postulated by others it was with a view to show this that the Lord used the above words. It has to be accepted as true; otherwise, as the ‘Burden’, etc. also have been spoken of as something different from the Thought-phases, (in the passage under reference), these also, like the Pudgala, would have to be regarded as not included among the Thought-phases. |
tasmāt ta eva skandhā ye skandhāntarasyotpādāya vartante pūrvakās te bhāra iti kṛtvoktāḥ / ye tūpeṣyante phalabhūtās te bhārahārā ityuktāḥ ityajñāpakametat / | Thus it is clear that those preceding Thought-phases themselves which operate towards the bringing about of another succeeding Thought-phase have been spoken of as ‘Burden’, those that are going to appear as the result have been spoken of as the ‘Bearer of the Burden’, So that the passage quoted does not warrant the conclusion desired by the Opponent. |
udyotakaratvāha ātmānam anabhyupagacchatā nedaṃ tathāgatavacanamarthavattāyāṃ śakyaṃ vyavasthāpayitum yasmādidam uktam / rūpaṃ bhadanta nāham vedanā saṃjñā saṃskāro vijñānaṃ bhadanta nāham evam etadbhikṣo rūpaṃ na tvam vedanā saṃjñā saṃskāro vijñānaṃ na tvam iti / | Uddyotakara has argued as follows: [This is a clear reference to Nyāyavārtika 3-1.1, page 341, but the passage found extends only up to the words ‘naiva tvamasi’, in line 26, of the present text] “One who does not admit the ‘Soul’ cannot make sense out of the words of the Buddha who has declared ‘O Bhadanta, I am not Colour, I am not Feeling, Name, Impression or Cognition, O Bhadanta; |
etena hi rūpādayaḥ skandhā ahaṅkāraviṣayatvena pratiṣiddhāḥ / viśeṣapratiṣedhaścāyaṃ na sāmānyapratiṣedhaḥ / | similarly O Bhikṣu, you are not Colour, or Feeling, Name, Impression, or Cognition, you are not, O Bhadanta’ here Colour and the other Thought-phases have been denied to be the object of ‘I-consciousness’, this denial is particular, not Universal; |
ātmānaṃ cānabhyupagacchatā sāmānyenaiva pratiṣeddhavyam / naiva tvamasīti / | while one who denies the ‘Soul’ should assert the denial in the Universal form ‘I am not you are not’, A particular denial always implies a corresponding particular affirmation; |
yathā vāmenākṣṇā na paśyāmītyukte gamyata eva dakṣiṇena [p.131] paśyāmīti / tenāpyadarśanena vāmagrahaṇamanarthakam na paśyāmītyeva vācyaṃ syāt / tathehāpi na rūpamātmā yāvannahi vijñānamātmetyukte tadvilakṣaṇo 'styātmeti sūcitaṃ bhavati / | e.g. when it is said ‘I do not see with my left eye’, it is clearly implied that ‘I do see with my right Eye’; if the man did not see with the right Eye also, then the mention of the qualification ‘left9 in the former assertion would be useless; the assertion should have been in the general form ‘I do not see’, Similarly in the case in question when it is said ‘Colour is not the Soul, Cognition is not the Soul’, it becomes implied that the Soul is and it is something different from these (Colour, Cognition, and the rest). |
sa cāvācyo 'nyo vā bhavatu sarvathāstyātmeti / | It may be ‘incapable of being spoken of’ or anything else, but in any case the Soul is there.” |
atrāha viśeṣapratiṣedhaścetyādi / | It is in answer to this that the Text adds ‘As regards the particular denial, etc.’. |
etaduktaṃ bhavati viṃśatiśikharasamugato 'yaṃ satkāyadṛṣṭiśailaḥ kumatīnāṃ pravartate / yaduta rūpamātmā yāvad vijñānamātmā rūpavānātmā yāvad vijñānavānātmā ātmani rūpaṃ yāvad vijñānamātmanīti / | That is to say, the mountain of the doctrine of the extant Soul propounded by evil-minded persons has risen up with twenty peaks, such as ‘Colour is Soul, Cognition is Soul, the Soul has Colour, the Soul has Cognition, Colour subsists in the Soul, Cognition subsists in the Soul’ and so forth. |
tatrādyadṛṣṭipañcakapratiṣedhāya taddṛṣṭikān prativiśeṣarūpeṇa pratiṣedhaḥ śobhate / | It is as against the first five of these views that the denial has its use as against persons who hold those views. |
sārūpamātmetyādikā dṛṣṭir yeṣāṃ te taddṛṣṭikāḥ / | The term ‘Taddṛṣṭīn’ means those who hold the view that ‘Colour is Soul’ and so forth. |
yadeva hi mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadevānūdya nivartyate / | What is denied in the assertion (made by our Teacher) is exactly those points where the foolish-minded persons might have their doubts; |
na tvatra kasyacidvidhirabhipretaḥ / | and it is not intended to affirm anything. |
anyathā hyaśrotṛsaṃskārakaṃ vākyaṃ bruvāṇo 'prekṣāvāneva pratipādakaḥ syād iti // | Otherwise, by saying what could not benefit His hearers, the Expounder would prove himself to be lacking in intelligence. |
iti vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā // | End of the section on the Vātsīputrīyas doctrine of ‘Soul’. |
KAPITEL STHIRABHAAVAPARIIK.SAA | The following Texts proceed with the proof in support of this: [see verse 350-351 above] |
calam ity etad viśeṣaṇasamarthanārtham āha athavetyādi / | What is meant by this is that in reality, the whole purpose of our philosophy reaches its culminating point in this examination of the ‘Permanent Character’ of things. |
athavāsthāna evāyamāyāsaḥ kriyate yataḥ / | Or, all this effort (to refute the various doctrines regarding the origin of the world) is made needlessly; |
kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiva prakṛtyādi nirākṛtam // | as all such doctrines are really set aside by the well-established doctrine of the ‘perfetual flux’ of things. |
uktasya vakṣyamāṇasya jātyādeścāviśeṣataḥ / | The Author has spoken of his doctrine (in the opening lines of his Introduction) as ‘mobile’, ‘impermanent’. |
niṣedhāya tataḥ spaṣṭaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate // | The following Texts proceed with the proof in support of this: [see verse 350-351 above] |
niravaśeṣapadārthavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanād eva prakṛtīśvarādeḥparaparikalpitasya sakalapadārtharāśer ekaprahāreṇaiva nirastyamānasyāpi sato yadidamasmākam atigranthavistarasaṃdarbheṇa pratipadamuccārya dūṣaṇopakramaṇaṃ tat kevalamāyāsaphalameva svalpopāyenaiva tasya dūṣitatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | As a matter of fact, by establishing the Perpetual Flux of things, all the various entities postulated by others, such as those of ‘Primordial Matter’ ‘God’ and the like become discarded at a single stroke; under the circumstances, all the effort that we have put forth in the above extensive portions of our work, towards the setting forth in detail of the several doctrines and refuting them, is practically useless; |
tathā hi sarvam eva prakṛtyādi parairudayānantarāpavargi niranvayanirodhadharmakaṃ vā kaiścinneṣyate / | that is to say, all these are refuted by the much simpler method (of establishing the Perpetual Flux), That is to say, ‘Primordial Matter’ and the rest are not held by others to be undergoing destruction immediately on appearance, or to be liable to absolute destruction; |
tataścaitat samastavastuvyāpakakṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanenaiva nirastaṃ bhavatītimanyamānair asmābhiruktasya prakṛtyādeḥ pudgalaparyantasya vakṣyamāṇasya ca jātiguṇadravyādeḥ śabdārthayoḥ pramāṇaprameyayor mecakādimaṇiprakhyacitrasya vastunastrikālānuyāyino bhāvasya cārvākādyupagatasya ca bhūtacatuṣṭayasya jaiminīyeṣṭasya ca vaidikaśabdarāśer nirāsāya viśeṣeṇa kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate / | hence by the establishing of the doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ which includes all things, all those postulated entities become set aside; holding this opinion as we do, we proceed to establish this ‘Perpetual Flux’ with special care, for the purpose of discarding (a) all those doctrines that have been discussed so far, beginning with ‘Primordial Matter’ and ending with ‘Pudgala’, and (b) all those that are going to be discussed later on, such as the ‘Universal’, ‘Quality’, ‘Substance’, etc., Words and their denotation, the Means and the Objects of Right Cognition, the Thing of Variegated Character coloured with the various tints of the Emerald, etc., an Entity continuing during all these points of time, the four Elemental Substances postulated by the Cārvāka and the Materialists, and the Mass of Words (Veda) posited by the followers of Jaimini. |
spaṣṭam iti / tat sādhakasya hetos trirūpasya pradarśanāt / | ‘Clearly’, because for the proof set forth, there is a Reason that satisfies all the tine© conditions of the valid Probans. |
ato 'syām eva sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ sakalaśāstrārthaparisamāptir bhavatītyuktaṃ bhavati // | What is meant by this is that in reality, the whole purpose of our philosophy reaches its culminating point in this examination of the ‘Permanent Character’ of things. |
[p.132] katham asau prasādhyata ity āha kṛtakākṛtakatvenetyādi / | The Author proceeds to show how this Perpetual Flux is established: [see verse 352 next] |
kṛtakākṛtakatvena dvairāśyaṃ kaiścidiṣyate / | Some people hold that there are two classes of things cheated and uncreated; |
kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvena bhāvānām aparair matam // | others have held that the two classes op things are momentary and non-momentary. |
iha hi naiyāyikādayaḥ kṣaṇikamekam api vastu nāstīti manyamānāḥ kṛtakākṛtakatvena bhāvānāṃ dvairāśyamavasthāpayanti / tatra kecit kṛtakā yathā ghaṭādayaḥ kecidakṛtakā yathā paramāṇvākāśādayaḥ / aparais tu vātsīputrīyādibhiḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvenāpi bhāvānāṃ dvairāśyam iṣyate / | In this connection, the followers of Nyāya and others do not regard anything as ‘momentary’, and they hold that there are two classes of things in the shape of ‘Created’ and ‘Uncreated among things some are ‘created’, as the jar and the rest, while some are ‘uncreated’ as the Atom, Ākāśa, etc. Others however, like Vātsīputrīyas hold that there is a further classification of things under the two heads of ‘momentary’ and ‘non-momentary’; |
tathā hi buddhiśabdārciḥprabhṛtayas tanmatena kṣaṇikāḥ kṣitivyomādayastvakṣaṇikā iti // | that is, according to these people, suchngs as Cognition, Sound, Light-rays, are ‘momentary’, while such things as Earth and Ākāśa are ‘non-momentary (352) |
tadevaṃ darśanavibhāge 'vasthite ye kṛtakatvenābhīṣṭās tāṃstāvatpakṣīkṛtyapramāṇam abhidhīyata iti darśayannāha tatretyādi / | Such being the diversity among the various views, the Author first of all proceeds to set forth reasonings in support of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ of those things that are held to be ‘Created which thus form the ‘Subject’ of the Reasoning set forth: [see verse 353 next] |
tatra ye kṛtakā bhāvās te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ / vināśaṃ prati sarveṣām anapekṣatayā sthiteḥ // | Among these, all those things that are ‘created’ are in ‘perpetual flux’, because, as regards their destruction, all of them are entirely independent. |
vināśaṃ prati sarveṣāṃ hetvantarānapekṣatayā sthitvādityanena hi trilakṣaṇohetuḥ sūcitas tameva spaṣṭayann āha yadbhāvaṃ pratītyādi / | As regards their destruction, things are independent of other Causes. This briefly indicates the Reason which fulfills all the three conditions of the Valid Probans. This reason is more clearly stated in the following [see verse 354-355 next] |
yadbhāvaṃ prati yannaiva hetvantaramapekṣate / tat tatra niyataṃ jñeyaṃ svahetubhyas tathodayāt // | When a certain thing does not need any other cause for the bringing about op a certain condition, that condition should be regarded as attaching to it permanently, because, out op its own causes, that thing appears in that condition; |
nirnibandhā hi sāmagrī svakāryotpādane yathā / | just as the causal conditions are independently, by themselves, capable of producing their effect; |
vināśaṃ prati sarve 'pi nirapekṣāś ca janminaḥ // | and all the things that are produced are independent op all else in the matter op their destruction. |
prayogaḥ ye yadbhāvaṃ pratyanapekṣās te tadbhāvaniyatāḥ / yathā samantanantaraphalā sāmagrī svakāryotpādane niyatā / | The argument is to be formulated as follows: When certain things are independent in regard to a certain condition, they should be regarded as permanently attached to that condition: as for example, the causal conditions that produce their effect immediately, are permanently restricted to those effects; |
vināśaṃ pratyanapekṣāś ca sarve janminaḥ kṛtakā bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | all things that are produced, i.e. all created things are independent in regard to their destruction; |
niyatam ityatra kāraṇamāha svahetubhya iti / | hence this is a natural reason (for concluding that they are permanently attached to this destruction). |
tathā tena niyatena rūpeṇotpannatvād ity arthaḥ / | The reason for this statement is added because out of its own causes, it appears in that form; |
nanu cānaikāntiko hetus tathā hi yadi nāma vināśaṃ prati hetvantarānapekṣā bhāvās tathāpi sthitvā deśāntare kālāntare ca bhāvasya vināśasambhavād udayānantarāpavargitvam abhīṣṭam eṣāṃ sādhayituṃ na sidhyatītyāha anapekṣo 'pītyādi / | i.e. because it is produced in a form so permanently attached to the said condition.' When certain things are not permanently attached to a certain condition, they are not independent in regard to that condition; as for instance, the unbaked jar in reference to the Baking. This forms the corroborative instance per dissimilarity. Even though independent, if the destruction were to come at another place and time, then, on account op its being dependent upon those, the thing could not be regarded as ‘independent’. |
[p.133] | Says the Opponent: “The Reason put forward is Inconclusive; |
anapekṣo 'pi yadyeṣa deśakālāntare bhavet / tadapekṣatayā naiṣa nirapekṣaḥ prasajyate // | Even thoughngs are independent regarding their destruction, yet it is quite possible that the destruction of ang may come about at some other time and at some other place; |
eṣa iti / vināśaḥ / | ‘Eṣa’ i.e. the Destruction. |
tadapekṣatayeti / deśakālāntarāpekṣatayā / | ‘On account of its being dependent upon those’ i.e. dependent upon the other time and place. |
yo hi yatrānapekṣaḥ sa yadi kvacid bhavet kadācid vā tadā taddeśakālāpekṣatvād anapekṣa eva na syāditi kuto vyabhicāraḥ / tathā hi ekadeśakālāparihāreṇānyatra deśakālādau vartamānaḥ katham anapekṣo nāma yatas tathāvṛttir eva tasyāpekṣā na tu samīhā tasyābhiprāyaśūnyatvāt // | If a certain thing being independent in regard to a certain condition, were to be in this condition only at a certain time and place, then, as dependent upon that time and place, it would not be ‘independent’ at all. How then is there any ‘inconclusiveness’ in our Reason? For instance, if a certain condition were to be present only at a certain time and place, and never apart from these, then, how could it be regarded as ‘independent’? As such existence itself would constitute its ‘dependence which term cannot stand for ‘desire’, for the simple reason that the thing is devoid of all ‘intention’, (356) |
yadi tarhi sarvathā nirapekṣatvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ na tarhi hetuḥ siddhaḥ / | “If then what is meant to be the reason is the fact of its being entirely independent, then such a Reason is ‘not proven’, ‘not admitted’; |
tathā hi kecid vināśaṃ prati mudgarādikamapekṣamāṇā dṛśyante / yathā ghaṭādayaḥ / | for instance, some things are dependent, for their destruction, upon such causes as the stroke of a Bludgeon as in the case of things like the Jar. |
ye 'pi buddhiśabdādayo 'napekṣatvena prasiddhās te 'pi yadi nāma mudgrādikaṃ nāpekṣante tathāpi deśakālāvapekṣanta ityato 'siddhatā hetor ityāśaṅkhya pariharann āha sarvatraivetyādi / | Even thosengs which, like Cognition, Words, and the like, are known to be ‘independent’, though they do not depend, for their destruction, on any such cause as the stroke of a Bludgeon, yet they do depend upon the peculiarities of time and place. Thus the Reason, as put forward by the Buddhist, is entirely ‘unproven The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 357 next] |
sarvatraivānapekṣāś ca vināśe janmino 'khilāḥ / | All produced things are always and everywhere independent in regard to their destruction; |
sarvatraiveti / sarvasmin deśakālādike vināśahetau nirapekṣā janmina ity arthaḥ / | as in this matter, all causes of destruction are entirely inefficacious. ‘Always and everywhere’, i.e. at all times and places, the produced things are independent of the cause of their destruction; |
nāśahetutvenābhyupetānām akiñcitkaratvād anupakāritvāt na cānupakāryapekṣo yukto 'prasaṅgāt // | because those that are not accepted as the cause of the destruction are inefficacious, i.e. of no use; and there can be no ‘dependence’ upon what is of no use, it renders no help; |
katham akiñcitkaratvam ity āha tathāhītyādi / | The following Text shows why they are inefficacious: [see verse 358 next] |
tathā hi nāśako hetur na bhāvāvyatirekiṇaḥ / nāśasya kārako yuktaḥ svahetor bhāvajanmataḥ // | For instance, the ‘destructive cause’ cannot be rightly regarded as the bringer about op a ‘destruction’ which is not-different prom the thing itself; as the positive thing is produced from its own cause. |
vināśo hi kriyamāṇaḥ kadācid vastu vā syād avastu vā tatra yadi vastu tadāsau vināśahetunā tato vināśahetor bhāvād anarthāntarabhūto vā kriyeta arthāntarabhūto vā / vastusato vikalpadvayānativṛtter ubhayānubhayapakṣastvayukta eva / | When the destruction is brought about is it an entity or a non-entity? if it is an entity, then it must be brought about by the ‘Cause of Destruction’: now, would the destruction, as an entity, be brought about as something nob-different from the thing that was the ‘cause of the destruction’? or as something different from that thing? In regard to any existing entity, there can be only these two alternatives; and only one of these two can be right; |
vastunyekākāratyāgaparigrahayostadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntarīyakatvāt / | as the denial of one character of a thing must always imply the affirmation of the contrary of that character, and the affirmation of the former must imply the denial of the latter; |
ekasya vidhipratiṣedhoyogādi ityuktam / | and one and the same character cannot be both denied and affirmed, as has been explained above. |
tatra na tāvad anarthāntarabhūta iti pakṣaḥ bhāvasvabhāvasya svahetor eva janmata utpatteḥ / | Of the two alternatives shown above, it cannot be right to hold that ‘the Destruction, as an entity, is brought about as something not-different from the cause of that destruction’; because that which is of the nature of a positive thing is always produced bom from its own cause; |
tasyāpi bhāvavat tadavyatirekiṇo niṣpannatvāt / | as that also, like the thing itself, is produced out of what is not-different from it; |
na ca niṣpannasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam kāraṇāvirāmaprasaṅgāt // syād etannāsau bhāvaḥ svahetoḥ sarvātmanā niṣpanno 'taḥ kāranāntarato nāśākhyaṃ svabhāvāntaraṃ labhata ity āha na cānaṃśa ityādi / | and what has been already brought about cannot have another Cause; as if it did have one, then there would be no end to the series of such causes. When a certain thing that comes out of its cause is without parts, the ‘destruction’ that would be imposed upon it by other causes must be of the same nature. |
na cānaṃśe samudbhūte bhavātmanyātmahetutaḥ / | The following might be urged: “When the thing is born out of its cause, it is not in its complete form; |
tadātmaiva vināśo 'nyair ādhātuṃ pāryate punaḥ // | hence what it obtains from another cause is another character in the shape of ‘Destruction’,” |
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