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anyathā hi ya eva śītasambaddhaḥ sa eva yadi paścād uṣṇasambaddhaḥ syāt tadāvasthādvaye 'pi śītoṣṇayor upalambhaḥ syāt / | If it were not so, then, if the same mountain that was cold subsequently became hot, then under both conditions both cold and heat would be perceptible there; |
tat sambaddhasvabhāvasya bhāve tayor api bhāvasya prasaṅgāpatteḥ / | because the said qualified conditions being related to the thing, the qualities would have to be regarded as present there; |
nigaḍabaddhapuruṣākarṣaṇe nigaḍākarṣaṇavad ityuktaprāyam etat / | for instance, when a man tied to a chain is pulled, the chain also becomes pulled. This has been nearly all explained before. |
ataḥ saviśeṣaṇo 'pi hetur asiddhaḥ // | Thus even with the said qualification, the Reason is ‘unproven’, ‘not admitted’, (472) |
anumānabādhāmapyāha vivādapadam ityādi / | The annulment of the Opponent’s argument by Inference also is next shown: [see verses 473-474 next] |
vivādapadamārūḍhā naikārthaviṣayā dhiyaḥ / krameṇotpadyamānatvād vidyuddīpādibuddhivat // | The cognitions under dispute cannot pertain to one and the same thing, because they appear in succession, like the cognitions pertaining to lightning, lamp and such things. |
kramabhāvavirodho hi jñāneṣvekārthabhāviṣu / | In all cognitions pertaining to one and the same thing, the presence of succession is incompatible. |
anyair akāryabhedasya tadapekṣāvirodhataḥ // | and when the effect is the same, even the dependence of other things would be incongruous. |
prayogaḥ yat kramabhāvi tat sadā sannihitāvikalakāraṇaṃ na bhavati yathā vidyuddīpādibuddhayaḥ kramabhāvinyaś ca vivādāspadībhūtā buddhaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The argument may be formulated thus: What appears in succession can never have its complete cause always in close proximity to it, as the cognitions of Lightning, Lamp and such things; the Cognitions under dispute all appear in succession hence there is found something which is contrary to that with which the desired character is invariably concomitant. |
nacānaikāntikatvaṃ hetoḥ, ekavastuviṣayatve satyavikalakāraṇasya kramabhāvānupapatteḥ / | This Reason cannot be said to be ‘inconclusive’; because succession is not possible in the Cognition of any single object, the complete cause of which Cognition is present. |
nāpi kāraṇāntarāpekṣā nityasya tenānupakāryatvāt / | because what is permanent cannot be helped by such aids; |
nacānupakāriṇyapekṣā yuktātiprasaṅgāt / | and no dependence can rightly be held to lie on what is not helpful; |
upakāre vā nityatvahāniprasaṅga iti śataśaścarcitam etat // | If there were help actually rendered, then the thing would lose its permanence, This has been explained hundreds of times. |
[p.166] sarveṣveva ca prayogeṣu hetūnām anaikāntikatvaṃ vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvād iti darśayati sandigdhetyādi / | All these reasons are free from doubt and denial; as no proofs have been adduced in annulment of these. The following Text shows that all our arguments are free from the defect of ‘Inconclusiveness’, as there is no proof in support of a conclusion contrary to ours: [see verse 475 above] |
sandigdhavyatirekitvaṃ sarveṣveteṣu hetuṣu / | End of the Chapter on the Permanence of Things. All these reasons are free from doubt and denial; |
vipakṣe vartamānānāṃ bādhakānupadarśanāt // | as no proofs have been adduced in annulment of these. |
subodham // | This is easily intelligible. |
iti sthirabhāvaparīkṣā // | End of the Chapter on the Permanence of Things. |
KAPITEL KARMAPHALASAMBANDHAPARIIK.SAA idānīṃ karmatatphalasambandhavyavasthādisamāśrayamityetat samarthanārthaṃ codyopakramapūrvakam āha kṣaṇiketyādi / | The Author now proceeds to examine the doctrine of Relation between Actions and their Results, the Law of Action and Reaction, mentioned in the Introductory verses; and starts off with an objection from the standpoint of that doctrine, against the Doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’: [see verse 476 above] |
kṣaṇikānityatālīḍhaṃ sarvaṃ cedvastu tatkatham / | hence the Doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ is open to the objection that it is annulled by universally accepted notions. |
karmatatphalasambandhakāryakāraṇatādayaḥ // | The Author now proceeds to examine the doctrine of Relation between Actions and their Results, the Law of Action and Reaction, mentioned in the Introductory verses; |
kṣaṇikānityatāgrahaṇaṃ kālāntarasthāyyanityatāvyavacchedārtham / | The Text speaks of ‘non-permanence in the form of momentariness’, with a view to exclude that ‘non-permanence’ which does not consist in momentariness; |
kṣaṇikānāṃ satāmanityatā kṣaṇikānityatā tayā līḍham samākrāntaṃ yadisarvam eva vastujātaṃ pratijñāyate bhavadbhis tadā ye 'mī karmaphalasambandhādayo lokaśāstrayoḥ pratītās te kathaṃ siddhyeyuḥ / ādigrahaṇāddhetuphalādhigantṛ pramāṇam anubhave pratyabhijñānam anyasminnarthe dṛṣṭe 'rthāntare 'bhilāṣaḥ, bandhamokṣau, smaraṇam saṃśayapūrvako nirṇayaḥ, svayaṃ nihitapratyanumārgaṇam dṛṣṭārthakutūhalaviramaṇamityevamprakārāḥ kumatiparikalpitāścodyārāśayo gṛhyante / | the meaning being ‘ifngs are held by you to be obsessed by that non-permanence which belongs to momentary things’ then, how could there be any such relations as the one subsisting between Actions and their Results and so forth, which are recognised among men and in the scriptures? The expression ‘and so forth’ is meant to include the means of cognising the cause and its effect, the Recognition following after Apprehension, the longing for one thing aroused by the seeing of another thing, the notion of Bondage and Liberation, Remembrance, Decision following after Doubt, seeking for something kept by oneself, the cessation of curiosity for things already seen and such other hosts of grounds for objection raised by the evil-minded. |
na hi lokaśāstrapratītārthavirodhena pratijñāyamāno 'rthaḥ siddhimāsādayatītyabhyupetapratītabādhā doṣaḥ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ / | What is meant is that if a doctrine is contrary to notions current among people and recognised by the scriptures, it can never secure acceptance; hence the Doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ is open to the objection that it is annulled by universally accepted notions. |
tathā hi yenaiva kṛtaṃ karma śubhādikaṃ tenaiva tatphalamupabhujyata iti lokepratītam / | For instance, it is well known among people that the result of the good or bad action is experienced by that same man who did the act; |
na hi devadattena kṛte karmaṇi śubhādike yajñadattas tatphalam iṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ copabhuṅkta iti prasiddham / | when a good or bad act has been done by Devadatta, the result of that act agreeable or disagreeable, is not experienced by Yajñadatta. |
nāpi śāstre, yathoktam ---"anenaiva kṛtaṃ karma ko 'nyaḥ pratyanubhaviṣyati"iti / taccaitat kṣaṇikapakṣe virudhyate / | Nor is such an idea countenanced in the scriptures, where we read ‘When the action has been done by this person, who else will experience its results?’ Such a notion is contrary to the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ of things; |
karmaphalaparigrāhakasyaikasya karturabhāvena kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamadoṣaprasaṅgāt // | so that the said doctrine is clearly open to the criticism that it involves the anomaly of ‘the disappearance of the action done by the Person himself and the befalling upon him of the effect of what was not done by him’, (476) |
katham ity āha ya ityādi / | The following Text explains how the doctrine is open to this criticism: [see verse 477 next] |
yaḥ kṣaṇaḥ kuśalādīnāṃ kartṛtvenāvakalpyate / phalaprasavakāle tu naivāsāvanuvartate // | “In the case of active people, that ‘moment’ (momentary thing) which is believed to be the doer of the act, does not continue to exist at the time of the appearance of the result of that act; |
[p.167] | as it did not exist at that time. |
tena naiṣa kṛtaṃ karma tasya pūrvamasambhavāt // karmatatphalayor evam ekakartraparigrahāt / kṛtanāśākṛtaprāptirāsaktātivirodhinī // | Thus, inasmuch as no single entity is admitted as being the doer of the act and the experiencer of its results, the position thus clearly is that the act is lost for the man who did it and its results befall one who did not do it, which is extremely anomalous.” (477-479) |
naivāsāvanuvartata iti / | ‘Does not continue to exist’; |
tasyotpādānantaram eva niruddhatvāt / | as it is destroyed immediately on its coming into existence. |
ekakartraparigrahād iti / | ‘Inasmuch as no single entity, etc.’; |
ekena kartrā tayoḥ karmaphalayor aparigṛhītatvād ity arthaḥ / kartuḥ phalenānabhisambandhāt kṛtanāśaḥ akartuś ca phalena yogādakṛtābhyāgamaḥ / | i.e. since the Act and its Result have not been taken up by one and the same entity. There is ‘loss of the Act’ for the 'doer of the act, as he does not come by the result; and there is ‘befalling of what he did not do’ on the man who did not do the act. |
ativirodhinīti / | ‘Extremely anomalous’; |
lokaśāstrayor evam adarśanād iti bhāvaḥ // | i.e. no such situation is found either among people or mentioned in the scriptures. |
nairātmyavādapakṣe tu pūrvamevāvabudhyate / madvināśātphalaṃ na syān mattonyasyāpi vā bhavet // | “As a matter of fact, under the doctrine of ‘no-soul’, the doer of an act would know, beforehand, that, ‘as i am going to perish immediately, there would be no result from this act, or it would come to some one other than myself’; |
iti naiva pravarteta prekṣāvān phalalipsayā / śubhāśubhakriyārambhe dūratas tu phalaṃ sthitam // | and knowing this, the intelligent man would not undertake the performance of any act, good or bad, for the purpose of securing its result; as for the result, it would be still further removed.” (480-481) |
kṣaṇikatvābhyupagame hi sarvabhāvānāṃ nairātmyamevābhyupagataṃ syāt / hetuparatantratayā sarvasyāsvatantratvāt / | Under the Doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’, it would be held that all things are devoid of ‘Soul’; as all things being dependent upon their cause (in the ‘Causal Chain’), nothing can be independent (self-sufficient). |
tasmin sati prekṣāvān kriyāpravṛtteḥ pūrvamevāvabudhyate avadhārayati / kiṃ tadityāha madvināśād ityādi / mama vināśād ūrdhvaṃ phalaṃ mama na syāt, phalaprasavakāle mamābhāvāt / | Under the circumstances, the intelligent agent must know, be conscious of the fact, “what?” that ‘after my destruction, the result could not accrue to me, as I would not be there at the time that the Result comes about; even if the Result comes about, it would come to a Moment other than myself’, Knowing this, the intelligent person would not undertake the act at all; |
athāpi phalaṃ bhavet, tadā matto 'nyasya kṣaṇāntarasya syād iti jñātvā pravṛttir eva prekṣāvato na sambhavati, kiṃ punaḥ pravṛttipūrvakakarmajanitaṃ phalaṃ bhaviṣyati / | how then could there be any result which can follow only from an act preceded by the activity (of an active agent)? Such Result would be ‘still further removed’, as absolutely impossible. “Neither the future nor the past entity can be capable of producing the effect; |
tasya dūrata evāsambhāvhyamānatvenāvasthitatvāt // | as for the present one, that also does not continue to exist till that time.” (482) |
evaṃ karmaphalasambandho nopapadyata iti pratipāditam / | It has thus been proved that there can be no relation between Action and its Result; |
nānāgato na vātīto bhāvaḥ kāryakriyākṣamaḥ / vartamāno 'pi tāvantaṃ kālaṃ naivāvatiṣṭhate // | the Author next proceeds to show, again from Kumārila’s standpoint, that the Relation of Cause and Effect is not possible under the doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’: [see verse 482 above] |
tāvantam iti / | ‘Till that time’; |
utpadya yāvatā kālena kāryaṃ nivartayati tāvantaṃ kālaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate kṣaṇikatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | i.e. during the time that it would come into existence and produce the effect, it does not continue to exist, being momentary (482) |
na hyalabdhātmakaṃ vastu parāṅgatvāya kalpate / | “An entity that has itself not secured its existence can never re the cause of something else; |
na vinaṣṭaṃ naca sthānaṃ tasya kāryakṛtikṣamam // | nor can the destroyed entity (be a cause); nor can the presence (of the present entity) be capable of producing the effect. |
pūrvakṣaṇavināśe ca kalpyamāne niranvaye / paścāt tasyānimittatvād utpattir nopapadyate // | Further, if the destruction of the previous ‘moment’ be held to be absolute, then there could be no production of any subsequent ‘moment’, as its cause would not be there.” (483-484) |
anāgataṃ hi nāmocyate yadalabdhātmatattvam, yaccālabdhātmatattvaṃ tadasat, yaccāsas tadaśeṣasāmarthyaśūnyam, yaccāśeṣasāmarthyarahitaṃ tat kathaṃ parāṅgatvāya kalpate paraṃ prati hetubhāvaṃ pratipadyata ity arthaḥ / | Thatng is called ‘future’ which has not yet secured its existence; what has not secured its existence must be ‘non-existent’; what is nonexistent must be devoid of all potentiality; what is devoid of all potentiality cannot serve as the cause of anything else, i.e. cannot serve as the cause of bringing about any otherng; |
samarthasyaiva hetubhāvasampratipatteḥ / | because it is agreed on all sides that it is only a potential thing that can serve as a cause. |
evaṃ vinaṣṭam api sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvān na parāṅgatvāya kalpata iti sambandhaḥ / | Similarly what has perished cannot serve as the cause of anything else, as it is devoid of all potentiality. |
na cāpi vartamānasya sthānam asti, yat kāryakṛtau kāryakaraṇe kṣamaṃ bhavet / | As for the Present thing, that has no continued existence, by virtue of which it could be capable of producing any effect. |
kiṃ ca yadi pūrvakakṣaṇo niranvayaṃ vinaśyatīti kalpyate tadā pāścātyasyakṣaṇasya nimittābhāvād utpattir na prāpnoti // | Then again, if it is held that the preceding ‘Moment’ perishes absolutely, then there could be no producing of the subsequent ‘Moment’, as there would be no cause for such production. |
syād etad yathā tulāntayor nāmonnāmau samaṃ bhavatas taddhetuphalayor nāśotpādāviṣṭāvato vartamānād avinaṣṭād eva kāryotpatter iṣṭatvānnānimittātasyotpattir bhaviṣyatītyāha nāśotpādasamatve 'pītyādi / | so that there could not be the relation of ‘cause and effect’, as there would be no help rendered by it.” (485) The following argument might be urged (by the Buddhist): Just as the rising and falling of the weighing scales come about simultaneously, so also would be the destruction of the Present Moment and the appearance of its effect; so that what is meant is that the subsequent Moment is brought about by the preceding Moment before the latter has been destroyed; |
nāśotpādasamatve 'pi naivāpekṣā parasparam / | and that the appearance of the later moment would not fail to have its cause. |
na kāryakāraṇatve stastadvyāpārānanugrahāt // nāśotpādayoḥ samatve 'pi kalpyamāne na nāśotpādayos tadvator vā kāryakāraṇatve staḥ sambhavataḥ, tayḥ parasparānapekṣatvāt / | Even if the Destruction (of the first Moment) and the Production (of the second Moment) be assumed to be simultaneous, there would not be the relation of ‘Cause and Effect’ between the said Destruction and Production, or between the Moments undergoing the said Destruction and Production; because the two would be independent of one another. |
katham anapekṣatvam ity āha tadvyāpārānanugrahād iti / | “How would they be independent of one another?” Because there would be no help rendered by it; |
tasya nāśasya tadvato vā vyāpāreṇa kāryasyānanugrahāt ananugṛhītatvād ity arthaḥ / nāśasya hi nīrūpatvād vyāpārābhāvaḥ, hetvabhimatasyāpi vastunaḥ kāryasaktākāle sannidhānābhāvād vyāpārābhāvaḥ // | that is, the Destruction, being featureless, would have no action; and as for the entity that is regarded as the Cause, it is not present at the time that the Effect comes into existence so that it could not have any action bearing upon the latter. “The odour and other qualities that appear after the destruction of the colour of the jar are not held to be the effect of this latter; |
syādetad antareṇāpi vyāpāramānantaryamātreṇa hetuphalabhāvo bhaviṣyatītyāha jāyamānaścetyādi / | The following might be urged (by the Buddhist) Even without any operation, the relation of ‘Cause and effect’ would be there on the basis of mere proximity. |
jāyamānaś ca gandhādir ghaṭarūpe vinaśyati / tat kāryaṃ neṣyate yadvat tathā rūpāntarāṇyapi // yadi yadanantaraṃ uajjāyate tat tasya kāryam iti syāt tadā ghaṭādisanniveśino rūpa [p.169] kṣaṇasyānantaraṃ samānajātīyarūpakṣaṇavat tatkalāpāntargata eva gandhādir jāyata iti so 'pi tat kāryaṃ syāt / | If the idea is that when one thing comes into existence after another, it must be the effect of this latter, then just as, after the ‘Colour-Moment’ subsisting in the Jar has ceased, the homogeneous Colour-moments that appear in it are regarded as the effects of the preceding Colour-moment, so also the Odour and other properties that are produced in the same Jar would have to be regarded as the Effects of that same preceding Colour-moment And, yet, even though this immediate sequence is there, the Odour-moment is not held to be the effect of the preceding Colour-moment; |
na hi bhautikānām anyonyaṃ hetuphalabhāvo 'sti, yathā bhūtānām, bhinnasantānatvād iti paro manyate tathā rūpāntarāṇyapīti, samānajātīyarūpakṣaṇāntarāṇi naiva rūpasyānantaryamātreṇa tatkāryatayā gṛhītavyāni, mā bhūd atiprasaṅga iti bhāvaḥ // | because between material properties, there cannot be the same causal relation that there is between material substances themselves, because they appear in different ‘chains’ (or series). This is the opinion that our opponent himself holds. ‘In the same way the subsequent Colours also’; that is to say, the homogeneous Colour-moments cannot be regarded as the effects of the previous Colour-moment, entirely on the ground of immediate sequence; as otherwise there would be an absurdity. |
tasmāt prākkāryaniṣpatter vyāpāro yasya dṛśyate / tadeva kāraṇaṃ tasya na tvānantaryamātrakam // | “Thus that alone can be regarded as the cause of an effect whose action is found to be there before the production of that effect; |
na tvānantaryamātrakam iti / | and not mere immediate sequence.” (487) |
kāryakāraṇavyavasthānibandhanam iti śeṣaḥ // yathoktamevārthaṃ saṃkṣipya darśayann āha saṃkṣepo 'yam ityādi / | Having thus shown that mere immediate sequence cannot be the basis of the causal relation, the Opponent sums up his own view by way of recapitulation: [see verse 487 above] ‘Not mere immediate sequence’, ‘can be the basis of the notion of Cause-effect’ this has to be regarded as understood. |
saṃkṣepo 'yaṃ vinaṣṭāccetkāraṇāt kāryasambhavaḥ / pradhvastasyānupākhyatvān niṣkāraṇam idaṃ bhavet // | “The upshot briefly is this: If the effect were produced from a cause that has perished, then such an effect would be without cause, as what has perished can have no character (or potentiality). |
avinaṣṭāc ca tajjātāvanekakṣaṇasambhavāt / kṣaṇikatvaṃ na bhāvānāṃ vyāhanyeta tadā katham // | If the effect be held to be produced from a cause that has not perished, then, as the cause in that case would continue to exist during several moments, wherefore could the ‘momentary character’ of things not become discarded (on that account)?” (488-489) |
atra dvayī kalpanā / vinaṣṭād vā kāraṇāt kāryaṃ bhaved avinaṣṭād vā / naṣṭānaṣṭavinirmuktasya vastuno 'bhāvāt / | Only two views are possible in this connection: (1) The Effect is produced out of the Cause which is itself destroyed, and (2) that it is produced out of the Cause which is not destroyed; things cannot be other than either destroyed or not destroyed. |
tatra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, naṣṭasyāsattvena tata utpādābhyupagame kāryasyanirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt / | The first view cannot be right; because what has been destroyed is non-existent, and if production from that were admitted, the effect would have to be regarded as without Cause; |
tataś ca nityaṃ sattvādir yujyate / | which would mean that it is eternally existent. |
nāpi dvitīyo 'nekakṣaṇāvasthāyitvena bhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | Nor can the second view be right; as, in that case, things would continue to exist during several moments, which would deprive them of the character of momentariness. |
na kathaṃ vyāhanyeteti / vyāhanyata evetyarthaḥ / | ‘Wherefore could it not be discarded?’ i.e. it would certainly become discarded. |
tathā hi bhāvaḥ prathamaṃ tāvad utpadyate, tato vyāpriyate, tataḥ kāryamutpādya paścād vinaśyatītyevam ekasyaiva vastuno 'naikasmin kṣaṇe sannidhānam iti kṣaṇikatvavyāhatiḥ syāt // | For instance, it would mean that (a) the Thing comes into existence, then (b) it acts, then (c) it produces the Effect, then (d) it perishes; so that it is there during all these several moments; which rejects the idea of its being ‘momentary’. |
kṣaṇasthāyī ghaṭādiścennopalabhyeta cakṣuṣā / | “If the jar and such things existed only for one moment, then they could not be perceived by the eye; |
na hi naṣṭāḥ pratīyante cirātītapadārthavat // | as things that have been destroyed are never cognised, as is found in the case op things long past. |
kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ / te pūrtti(naivaiti---)siddhiṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvānupalambhanāt // | The relation op ‘cause and effect’ cannot be apprehended by means op ‘perception and non-apprehension’, because the nature of things is not apprehended at all”. |
[p.170] pratyakṣānupalambhasādhano hi kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ kṣaṇikatve ca bhāvānāṃ svajñānakāle 'navasthānād apratyakṣataiva / | The Relation of Cause and Effect is sought to be proved through Perception (of Effect only when the Cause is present) and Non-apprehension (of the Effect when the Cause is absent). Under the circumstances, if Things were momentary, as they could not be in existence at the moment of their cognition, they could not be perceptible; |
samānakālaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatteḥ / | as the relation of Cause and Effect is not possible between things existing at the same moment. |
tataś ca pratyakṣānupalambhayor abhāva eva / | Thus there is no possibility of Perception or Non-apprehension (in support of the momentariness of things); |
ananyasaṃsṛṣṭavastūpalambhātmarūpatvenānupalambhasyāpi pratyakṣaviśeṣātmakatvāt / | specially because ‘Non-apprehension’ also is only a form of ‘Perception’, being, as it is, of the nature of the apprehension of a Thing as not related to anything else; |
ataḥ padārthopalambhābhāve tasyāpyayoga eveti kathaṃ pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ syāt // | and hence there being no use for it when there is no apprehension of any thing. Such being the case, how could the relation of Cause and Effect be proved through Perception and Non-apprehension? (490-491) |
bhavatu nāmopalambho vastunas tathāpi pūrvottarayoḥ kṣaṇayoḥ pratisandhāturekasya kasyacid abhāvāt sambandho na siddhyatīti darśayann āha ko vetyādi / ko vā vyavasthitaḥ kartā saṃdhatte kramavad gatim / | “What permanent doer (agent) is there who would correlate the cognitions appearing in succession? If any such were seen, then alone what is desired could be admitted; and if any such is not seen, then this latter cannot be understood.” (492) Even though there be an apprehension of the Thing, as there can be no one entity who would comprehend the preceding and succeeding Moments, there can be no relation between these two. |
asya dṛṣṭāvidaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ nāsyādṛṣṭau tu lakṣyate // | This is what is shown in the following [see verse 492 above] |
gatirupalabdhiḥ / | The term ‘gati’ stands for apprehension. |
kramavatī cāsau gatiśceti kramavadgatiḥ / | ‘Kramamdgatim’, the ‘gati’, apprehension, which is ‘kramavati’, successive. |
tāṃ kaḥ pratisaṃdhatte ghaṭayati / | ‘Who would correlate’ have a comprehensive notion of. |
naiva kaścit / yadi hi kaścid asyāgner upalambhādidaṃ dhūmādyupalabdhamasyānupalabdhau nopalabhyata ityevaṃ kramavatīṃ gatimekakartṛtvena pratisaṃdadhīta, tadā syāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ, sa ca nāsti pratisandhātā tvan mateneti na kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddhyed ity arthaḥ // | That is, no one.' If there were any one who would conceive of such a comprehensive notion as ‘The smoke has become cognised through the cognition of the Fire, and without the cognition of the latter the former is not cognised’ which appears in succession, as apprehended by a single Perceiver, then it might be possible to establish the relation of ‘Cause and Effect’. There can however be no such correlator, under your view, hence the relation of Cause and Effect cannot he established. |
kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu bhāveṣu pratyabhijñā ca durghaṭā / | Things are in ‘perpetual flux then recognition also is impossible; |
na hyanyanaradṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ pratyabhijñāyate paraiḥ // | because what has been seen by one person cannot be ‘recognised’ by others.” (493) |
ya eva mayā pūrvaṃ dṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ sa evāyam etarhi dṛśyata ityevaṃ pūrvottarayor darśanayor ekaviṣayatayā ekajñātṛtayā ca yadghaṭanaṃ tat pratyabhijñānam / | ‘Recognition’ consists of the notion that ‘that same object which was seen by me previously is seen by me now’ which includes within itself the two perceptions as pertaining to the same object and the same perceiver and such ‘Recognition’ cannot be possible if all things were in a ‘perpetual flux’; |
tac ca sarvabhāvānāṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgitve sati nopapadyate / | as under that view, neither one ‘perceiver’ nor one ‘object’ would be there (to be related to both perceptions); |
na hi devadattena dṛṣṭam arthaṃ viṣṇumitraḥ pratyabhijānīte / | for instance, Viṣṇumitra does not ‘recognise’ what has been seen by Devadatta. |
anyataragrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam / | The mention of ‘one person’ is only by way of illustration; |
nāpyanyo 'rthaḥ pratyabhijñāyata ityapi draṣṭavyam // | it is also to be understood that the object also which has been seen by one person cannot be ‘recognised’ by another person. |
nanu lūnapunar jātakeśanakhādiṣviva bhede 'pi sādṛśyāt pratyabhijñānaṃ bhaviṣyatītyetad āśaṅkyāha sādṛśyād ityādi / | “In the case of the hairs and other things, where there is difference, recognition may be due to similarity, because the perceiver is one and the same. |
jñātur ekasya sadbhāvād dvibhede tvanibandhanam // | when however there is difference of both, there would be no basis for recognition. |
pratisandhānakārī ca yadyeko 'rtho na vidyate / rūpe dṛṣṭe 'bhilāṣādis tat kathaṃ syād rasādiṣu // | if there is no single entity who could have the comprehensive notion, then how is it that, on seeing colour, there appears a longing for the taste and other qualities (of the thing seen)?”. |
[p.171] yadi hyeko jñātā bhavet tadā syāt pratisandhātṛvaśājjñeyasya bhede 'pi sādṛśyakṛtaṃ pratyabhijñānam / | If there were a single cogniser, then there could be Recognition based upon similarity, even when there is difference between the two things concorned, such Recognition being due to the common Cogniser. |
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