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gṛhītvā janayatyetad yaugapadyaṃ yato bhavet // nāpi gāḍhaṃ samāliṅgya prakṛtiṃ jāyate phalam / | and as such it would be highly incongruous if the two factors appeared at different times. For instance, between the Potter and the Jar, the relation of ‘Agent and Object’ is perceived only when the two are there at the same time |
kāmīva dayitā yena sakṛdbhāvas tayor bhavet // | The answer to this is provided in the following [see verses 516-517 above] |
yadi hi saṃdaṃśagrahaṇanyāyena kāraṇaṃ kāryotpattau vyāpriyeta, kāryaṃ vā vanitopagūhanavatsvakāraṇa ' 'śleṣāt svajanmani vyāpāraṃ pratipadyeta, tadā saha bhāvitā niyamena syāt / | If, in the producing of the Effect, the Cause operated in the manner of the Pair of Tongs, or if the Effect, in the process of coming into existence were to do so by embracing its Cause in the manner in which a woman is embraced, then there might be simultaneity and co-existence of the two always. |
yāvatā nirvyāpāramevedaṃ viśvaṃ na hi paramārthataḥ kaścit kartā karma vāstyanyatra dharmasaṅketād iti samudāyārthaḥ / | As a matter of fact, however, the whole of this universe is entirely devoid of activity, there is, in reality, no ‘active agent’ or ‘objective’ at all, apart from ‘Convention Such is the sense of the whole answer. |
prakṛtim iti / kāraṇam // | ‘Prakṛti’ is cause. |
yadyevaṃ yadi nirvyāpāram eva kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vā / tat kathaṃ bhavanti vaktāro dhūmamagnir janayati dhūmo 'gnimāśrityotpadyata ity āha niyamād ityādi / | Opponent “If that is so, and everything, the Cause as well as the Effect, is inactive, how is it that people are found to make use of such verbal expressions as ‘the Fire produces Smoke’, ‘the smoke comes into existence on the basis of Fire,’ and so forth?” |
niyamād ātmahetūtthāt prathamakṣaṇabhāvinaḥ / yadyato 'nantaraṃ jātaṃ dvitīyakṣaṇasannidhiḥ // | Though the thing is really inactive, yet on account of the restriction imposed by the nature of its cause which came into existence at the first moment, there appears, immediately afterwards, something coming into contact with the second moment; |
tat tajjanayatītyāhur avyāpāre 'pi vastuni / | it is under these circumstances that the former is said to produce the latter; |
vivakṣāmātrasambhūtasaṅketānuvidhāyinaḥ // | such assertion being in accordance with a convention which is purely arbitrary, based upon the whim of the speaker. |
svahetupratyayasamutthāpitāt kāraṇasya śaktipratiniyamāddhetor yat kāryaṃ yataḥ kṣaṇaprathamabhāvinaḥ kāraṇāj jātaṃ kiñcidviśiṣṭam, dvitīye kṣaṇe sannidhiḥ sadbhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ, tat kāraṇaṃ tat kāryaṃ janayatītyucyate / | On account of the restriction imposed upon the potency of the Cause, arising from the Idea that gave rise to that Cause, a particular Effect is produced from the Cause which has appeared at the first moment, this Effect being in contact with, i.e. appearing at the second moment; it is then that the said ‘Cause’ is said to produce the said ‘Effect The mention of ‘producing’ is only by way of illustration; |
tat tadāśrityotpadyata ityapi vijñeyam / | it should be understood to mean also that the Effect comes into existence on the basis of the Cause. |
ke punas ta evam āhuḥityādi / | “Who are the people who speak of it as such?” |
bahirarthanirapekṣavivakṣābhāvisaṅketānurūpavyavahārakāriṇo vyavahartāraevam āhur ity arthaḥ // | ‘Such assertion, etc. etc.’ that is, thus say those persons who act in accordance with conventions based entirely upon the speaker’s wish, irrespectively of external realities. |
nanu ya utpadya vyāpāraṃ nāviśet viśeṣotpādārthaṃ sa kathaṃ hetuḥ syād ity āha janmātiriktetyādi / | Question “If ang, on coming into existence, did not become operative, how could it become the Cause in the bringing about of a particular effect?” |
[p.177] | Answer: [see verse 520 above] |
janmātiriktakālena vyāpāreṇātra kiṃ phalam / sattaiva vyāpṛtis tasyāṃ satyāṃ kāryodayo yataḥ // kāraṇasattāsamanantaram eva kāryasya niṣpannatvād akiñcitkara eva kāryasya janmottarakālabhāvī vyāpāraḥ kārye / | Inasmuch as the Effect is produced immediately after the Cause has come into existence, any operation of that Cause on this Effect, after the latter has come about, would be absolutely useless. Because, what is it that is called the ‘operation’ of the Cause? It is that immediately after which the Effect secures its appearance; and as a matter of fact, the Effect appears immediately after the existence of the Cause; |
tathā hi vyāpāro nāma kāraṇasya ka ucyate / yadanantaram eva kāryamudayamāsādayati kāraṇasattānantaram eva ca kāryam udbhavatīti sattaiva vyāpāraśabdavācyāstu kiṃ janmātirekiṇā vyāpāreṇa kalpitena // yadyevam asati bhāvānāṃ vyāpāro katham idam adhīyate kāryasya kāraṇe 'pekṣā kāraṇasya ca kārye vyāpāra ity āha ya ānantaryetyādi / | hence it is this existence itself which may be called the ‘operation What is the need of assuming any ‘operation’ other than this ‘birth’ (coming into existence) of the Cause? (520) “If this is so, then, how is it that people speak of ‘the Effect has need of the Cause’, ‘the Cause operates on the Effect’?” |
ya ānantaryaniyamaḥ saivāpekṣābhidhīyate / | It is the necessary condition of ‘immediate sequence’ that is called ‘need’; |
kāryodaye sadā bhāvo vyāpāraḥ kāraṇasya ca // idam eva hi kāryasya kāraṇe 'pekṣā yattadanantarabhāvitvam kāraṇasyāpi kārye 'yam eva vyāpāro yat kāryodayakāle sadā sannihitatvam // | and in the appearance of the effect, the only operation of the cause in all cases is its ‘existence’. The ‘need’ that the Effect has of the Cause consists only in the fact of its coming into existence immediately after the latter; and of the Came also, the only ‘operation’ towards the bringing about of the Effect is that it is always in existence at the time of the appearance of the Effect. |
api ca vyāpārasya vyāpāravato vā bhāvasya kāryaṃ prati hetubhāvastadbhāvabhāvitvādeva bhavatā grahītavyaḥ, na hyanvayavyatirekābhyām anyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvādhigame 'bhyupāyo 'sti, tataścaivaṃ sati vastumātrasyāpi kimiti kāraṇabhāvo na gṛhyate, nahi kāryasya vastumātragatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvaṃ na prasiddham, atas tadeva vastumātraṃ varaṃ kāraṇam astu yadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvaṃ kāryasya siddham ityetad darśayati tadbhāvetyādi / | Further, you have to admit that the ‘causal character’ of an ‘operation’ or of a Thing with that operation, towards a particular Effect consists entirely in the fact of the latter coming into existence only when the former is in existence; in fact, for the determining of the causal relation between a Cause and its Effect there is no ground except positive and negative concomitance. Such being the case, why is not the causal character attributed to the Thing itself (and not to its action or operation)? specially as it cannot be said that the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect with the Thing itself is not well known. Hence it is far better to regard the Thing itself as the Cause, with which the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect is well recognised. |
tadbhāvabhāvitāmātrād vyāpāropyavakalpitaḥ / hetutvam eti tadvān vā tadevāstu tato varam // | ‘The Thing itself’, i.e. the Thing by itself, without any peculiar form of activity or operation, may be regarded as the ‘Cause’, (522) Question “What is the peculiarity in this latter view that it is said to be ‘far better’?” |
avakalpita iti / | Answer: [see verse 523 next] |
bhāve sati hi dṛśyante bījādevāṅkurodayāḥ / | As a matter of fact, it is on the existence of the seed itself that the sprout is seen to appear; |
na tu vyāpārasadbhāve bhavatkiñcit samīkṣyate // | on the other hand, nothing is seen as coming into existence on the existence of an ‘operation’. |
bhāve bhāvamātre, bījādau vyāpārāntarasamāveśaśūnye satītyarthaḥ / | ‘On the existence’, i.e. on mere existence; i.e. on the existence of the Thing the seed itself, devoid of any other operation (or activity). |
etena bhāva [p.178] mātragatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvam eva kāryāṇāṃ siddhaṃ na tu vyāpāragatānvayādyanuvidhāyitvam iti darśitaṃ bhavati // | This establishes the fact of the Effect being positively and negatively concomitant with the Thing itself, and not with the Operation. |
syād etadyadyapi vyāpāragatānvayādyanuvidhānaṃ kāryasya na siddham, tathāpi tasya kāraṇabhāvo bhaviṣyatītyāha adṛṣṭaśakter ityādi / adṛṣṭaśakter hetutve kalpyamāne 'pi neṣyate / kimanyasyāpi hetutvaṃ viśeṣo vāsya kastataḥ // | If you assume the ‘causal character’ of the operation when its potency (towards the effect) has not been perceived, then why do you not assume the same of something else also? Or, what distinguishing feature do you find in the ‘operation’ which is not found in that other thing? (524) Says the Opponent: “Even though the concomitance of the Effect with an Operation is not admitted, yet the Operation can have the causal character”. |
evaṃ hi vyāpāramapi hetuṃ prakalpyāparo 'pi kalpanīyaḥ syāt / | Having assumed the Operation to be the Cause, you will have to assume some other thing also as the Cause; |
adṛṣṭaśaktitvena viśeṣābhāvāt, tataścānavasthā syāt / athānyo na kalpate nibandhanābhāvāt tadā vyāpārasyāpi kalpanā mābhūt tatrāpi nibandhanābhāvasya tulyatvāt / | because this latter would not be different from the ‘Operation’, as both would be equally such as having their potency not perceived and so on there would be an infinite regress (of assumed Causes). If no other Cause (than the Operation) is assumed, on the ground of there being no basis for it, then, the assumption of the ‘Operation’ also may not be there; |
kiñca yo 'pyasau vyāpāraḥ kāryaṃ janayati sa kiṃ vyāpārāntarasamāveśādāhosvit sattāmātreṇa, yadi vyāpārāntarasamāveśāt tadā vyāpārāntarasyaivakāraṇatvaṃ syān na vyāpārasya, tasyāpi vyāpārāntarasya kāraṇatve tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ / | Then again, this ‘Operation’ that is said to produce the Effect, does it produce it through the medium of another Operation? Or by its mere existence? It could not be the former, as, in that case, the causal character should belong to that other Operation, not to the previous Operation; and for this later Operation also, there would be the need for another Operation, etc, all which would be open to the same objection. |
tasyāpi hi yadi vyāpārāntarasamāveśāt kāraṇabhāvaḥ kalpyeta tadānavasthā syāt // atha sattāmātreṇeti pakṣas tadā padārtho 'pi vyāpāravat sattāmātreṇaiva kāryaṃ janayiṣyatīti vyarthā vyāpārakalpaneti darśayati anyena cetyādi / | And if that other Operation also would need a further Operation, then there would be an infinite regress. If then, it be held that the Operation produces the Effect by its mere existence, then, like this Operation, the Thing itself might produce the Effect by its mere existence; and the assuming of the ‘Operation’ would be entirely futile. |
anyena ca vinā hetur yathā vyāpāra iṣyate / kāryasya vā bhavet tadvat kimanye 'pi na hetavaḥ // | Just as the ‘operation’, without any other (operation), is held to be the cause of the effect, in the same way, why cannot others, like it, be causes? (525) |
yathaiva hi vyāpāro 'nyena vyāpārāntareṇa vināpi kārye 'ṅkurādike hetur iṣyate, tadvad anye 'pi bhāvā vilakṣaṇavyāpāraśūnyā eva hetavaḥ kiṃ neṣyante // | Just as the Operation, without further Operation, is regarded as the Cause of the Effect, in the shape of the Sprout, in the same manner, why cannot other things also, without any particular Operations, be regarded as ‘Causes’? (525) [526 is missing in the printed text; |
kiṃ tarhi bhāvam eva vyāpāravantamityāha athavā bhāva ityādi / | the commentary upon it however is available, as follows]: |
heturiṣyata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | The phrase ‘held to be the Cause’ (of Text 525) is to be construed here also. |
tavāpi hi vyāpāravati heturasau bhavanvyāpārāntarasamāveśarahita eva bhavatīti sa eva dṛṣṭānto bhaviṣyatīti bhāvaḥ // | What is meant is that for you also, when the causal character would belong to the Thing as equipped with the Operation, it would be so without the intervention of a further Operation; |
nacāpi sattāvyatirekeṇa vyāpāraḥ padārthasyāsti / upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti darśayati dṛśyatvābhimatam ityādi / | so that there would be no Corroborative Instance available for you. Then again, apart from its existence, there can be no other ‘Operation’ of the Thing, for the simple reason that if it were there, it would be perceived, and yet it is not perceived. |
[p.179] | This is explained in the following [see verse 527 next] |
dṛśyatvābhimataṃ naivaṃ vayaṃ copalabhāmahe / | Though it has been regarded as perceptible, yet we do not perceive it; |
tat kathaṃ tasya sambandham aṅgīkurmo nibandhanam // | how then can we accept the connection op that as the basis (op the causal character)? (527) |
dṛśyatvena hi bhavatāṃ vyāpāro 'bhimataḥ, yathoktaṃ kumārilena ---"prākkāryaniṣpatter vyāpāro yasya dṛśyate" ityādi / api ca sa vyāpārātmā padārthastasmād vyāpāravato bhāvād arthāntarabhūto vā syād anarthāntarabhūto vā, vastusataḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt, ubhayānubhayavikalpasyāsambhava eva / | ‘Operation’ has been held by you to be something perceptible; as asserted by Kumārila (Ślokavārtika: Śabdanityatā 433) ‘When the Operation of a Thing is perceived before the Effect, thatng is regarded as the Cause of that Effect, etc. etc.’ And further, that particular entity which is of the nature of the ‘Operation’ is it something different from the Thing to which it belongs? Or is it non-different from it? In the case of all entities, no third alternative is possible; and no such alternatives are possible as ‘it is both different and non-different’, or that ‘it is neither different nor non-different’. |
saca yadyarthāntarabhūtas tadā padārthasya kāraṇatvaṃ na prāpnoti / tadvyatirekiṇo vyāpārasyaiva kāraṇabhāvāt / | If then, it is something different, then the Thing itself cannot be the ‘Cause’, as the ‘causal character’ belongs to the Operation which is someng different from the Thing. |
vyāpāreṇa sambandhāt tasyāpi kāraṇabhāvo 'stīti cet na / | It might be argued that “by virtue of its connection with the Operation, the Thing also would have the causal character”. That however is not possible; |
parasparānupakāriṇoḥ sambandhāsiddheḥ / | because there can be no connection betweenngs which do not help one another. |
athopakriyata eva vyapāraḥ padārtheneti syāt / | It might be answered that “the Operation is helped by the Thing”. |
tadapyayuktam / | That also is not right; |
na hi tasyāparo vyāpāro 'sti yena vyāpāram upakuryād anyathā hyanavasthāyāṃ vyāpārāṇām eva parasparaṃ ghaṭanāt padārthena saha vyāpārasya na kadāpi sambandhaḥ siddhyet / | as a matter of fact, the Thing has no other Operation by which it could help the previous Operation; if it were otherwise, then there would be an infinite regress (of Operations), whereby the successive Operations themselves would accomplish each other, and there would be no connection between the Operation and the Thing. |
atha vyāpārāntaramantareṇaiva padārtho vyāpāramupakarotīti syāt tadā kāryam api vyāpāravadvyāpārarahita eva sattāmātreṇa kiṃ nopakurvīta yena vyāpāro 'rthāntarabhūtaḥ kalpyate / | If it be assumed that the Thing helps the Operation, without any further Operation, then, why should not the Thing by its mere existence, without any Operation, help the Effect (to come into existence), for which purpose a different thing in the shape of the Operation is assumed? In fact, there is nothing to prevent its usefulness towards the Effect, by its mere existence. |
tasmānnārthāntarabhūto vyāpāro yuktaḥ / | From all this it follows that it is not right to assume a distinct thing in the shape of the ‘Operation |
athānarthāntarabhūta iti pakṣas tadā siddhaṃ sattaiva vyāpṛtir iti / | If then the other alternative be accepted that the ‘Operation’ is non-different from the ‘Thing’ (to which it belongs), then it becomes admitted that ‘existence’ is the only Operation; |
padārthasvabhāvasyaiva sattāśabdavācyatvāt / | because the term ‘existence’ connotes only the nature of theng concerned. |
tataśca na siddhyati janmātirekitvaṃ vyāpārasya // | Thus the view that the ‘Operation’ (of the Cause) is something different from its own coming into existence cannot be accepted. |
api ca yathā buddhir arthapraticchittau jāyamānaiva vyāpārarahitāpi sattāmātreṇa vyāpriyate tathā sarveṣām api bhāvānāṃ hetutvam uttarakālabhāvivyāpāramantareṇa bhaviṣyatītyetad darśayati buddher ityādi / | Further, in the case of Cognition, it is found that as soon as it appears in the form of the apprehension of its object, it operates by its mere existence; and hence in the case of all Things, the causal character must belong to themselves, without any subsequent operation. This is what is explained in the following [see verse 528 next] |
buddher yathā ca janmaiva pramāṇatvaṃ nirudhyate / | In the case of cognition, its coming into existence itself has been described as constituting its character of ‘means of right cognition’; |
tathaiva sarvabhāveṣu taddhetutvaṃ na kiṃ matam // | why then should not the causal character in the case of all things be held to be the same? (528) |
na hi buddher janmtātirekī vyāpāro 'sti / | In the case of Cognition there is no other operation apart from its being born, coming into existence; |
tathā hi ---"satasamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyak"ṣam ityatra sūtre janmagrahaṇasya prayojanaṃ varṇayatā kumārilenoktam" "buddhijanmeti ca prāha jāyamānapramāṇatām / | for instance under Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1. 1.4, defining ‘Sense-perception’, while explaining the purpose served by the term ‘janma’, ‘birth’, in the Sūtra, Kumārila has declared as follows “What the term ‘birth of Cognition’ connotes is the fact of the Cognition being a Means of Right Cognition as soon as it is born; |
vyāpāraḥ kāraṇānāṃ hi dṛṣṭo janmātirekataḥ // | in the case of other agencies, a certain Operation is found, which is something distinct from their birth; |
pramāṇe 'pi tathā mābhūd iti janma vivakṣyata" / | in order to preclude the same in the case of the Means of Right Cognition, it is necessary to use the term ‘birth’,” (Ślokavārtika; |
iti / | Sūtra 1. |
taddhetutvam iti / tat kāraṇajanma hetur yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / tadbhāvas tattvam // | ‘The causal character, etc.’; i.e. why cannot all things be regarded as produced by the ‘birth ‘coming into existence’, of the Cause? (528) |
kṣaṇikā hi yathā buddhis tathaivānye 'pi janminaḥ / | Just as cognition is momentary, so are all things that are born, as they have been proved to be. |
sādhitās tadvadevāto nirvyāpāram idaṃ jagat // | Hence the whole universe must be devoid of ‘operation’. |
sādhitā iti / | This is answered in the following [see verse 529 above] |
sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ sakalavastuvyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya sādhitatvāt / | Under the chapter on the ‘Permanence of Things’ it has been proved that all things are in ‘perpetual flux’, |
tadvadeveti / buddhivadeva / | ‘So are, etc.’ i.e. like Cognition. |
ata iti / kṣaṇikatvāt / | ‘Hence’, i.e. because of their momentary character. |
prayogaḥ ye kṣaṇikās te janmātiriktavyāpāraśūnyāḥ, yathā buddhiḥ, kṣaṇikāś ca bījādayaḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: Things that are momentary can have no action (or operation), like the Cognition, Seed and other things have already been proved to be momentary; this therefore is a reason based on the nature of things (for regarding them as devoid of action). |
paścād avasthityabhāvena nirādhāravyāpārāyogo bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ tasmād ānantaryakamātram eva kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavasthānibandhanaṃ na vyāpāra iti sthitam etat // | As a matter of fact, things have no subsequent existence, and there could be no action without a substratum; this supplies the argument annulling the possibility of action or operation inngs. From all this it follows that the only basis for the relation of Cause and Effect consists in immediate sequence, and not in any action (or operation, on the part of the Cause). |
prabandhavṛttyā gandhāder iṣṭaivānyonyahetutā / | As regards odour and other qualities (appearing in the jar), the fact of their being causes of each other, as forming factors of the same ‘chain’, is actually admitted (by us); |
tadabādhakamevedaṃ taddhetutvaprasañjanam // | and this idea is not annulled by the alleged anomaly of their being such causes. |
rūparasādīnāṃ hi parasparaṃ prabandhāpekṣayā sahakārikāraṇabhāvo 'bhīṣṭa eva / | As regards Colour, Taste and other qualities, it is already admitted by us that as forming part of the same ‘chain’ they are auxiliary causes of each other; |
yathoktam "śaktipravṛttyā na vinā rasasyaivānyakāraṇam / | as has been thus declared ‘Without the action of Potency, there is no Cause of Taste; |
ityatītaikakālānāṃ gatis tatkāryaliṅgajee" // | this is the only explanation of all past qualities that have existed at the same time, which is derived from the indications of their Effects’, (530) |
iti // | this is what is accepted, in view of such being the real state of things; |
nanu cāgneriva gavāśvāder apyanantaraṃ kadācid būmau bhavati tat katham ānantaryaṃ na vyabhicārītyāha anyānantarabhāve 'pītyādi / anyānantarabhāve 'pi kiñcid eva ca kāraṇam / | the same is the case under the view that things are permanent. Says the Opponent: “Just as Smoke appears in immediate sequence to Fire, so sometimes it may appear in immediate sequence to such things also as the Cow, the Horse and the like; then why cannot mere immediate sequence be regarded as ‘inconclusive’ (in the proving of the Causal Relation)?” |
na hi vayam ānantaryamātraṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvādhigatinibandhanaṃ brūmaḥ kiṃtarhiyanniyatam / | We do not say that mere immediate sequence is the basis of ‘Causal Relation’); what we do assert is that one thing is to be regarded as the Cause of another when the latter is always found to appear, in immediate sequence to the former; |
tathā hi yasyaivānantaraṃ yadbhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iṣyate / | that is, oneng is regarded as the Cause of another when the latter is found to appear only in immediate sequence to the former. |
na ca dhūmo gavāder evānantaraṃ bhavati, asatyapi gavādau tasya bhāvāt / | Smoke is not found always to appear in sequence to the Cow, the Horse and so forth; because it actually appears even in the absence of these animals. |
kiṃ ca bhavato 'pyatra sthiravādinaścodyametad avatarati, kasmād gavāder anantaraṃ dhūmo bhavannapi tat kāryaṃ na bhavatīti // | Then again, to you also, who hold Things to be permanent, the said criticism would be applicable why the smoke, appearing after the Cow, etc. is not regarded as the Effect of these? (531) |
atra para āha yo yatretyādi / | The Opponent urges an objection (in the first half, which is answered in the second half) [see verse 532 next] |
yo yatra vyāpṛtaḥ kārye na hetus tasya cenmataḥ / yasminniyatasadbhāvo yaḥ sa hetur itīṣyatām // | “If a thing that is active towards the producing of an effect is not to be regarded as the cause of this latter, [what then?]” Then let that be accepted as the ‘cause’ of a thing whose presence is always essential for the appearance of this latter. |
yasminnityādinā svapakṣe 'pi parihāram āha // | ‘Then let, etc.’ This sentence supplies the Buddhist’s answer to the other’s objection. |
evaṃ tāvat kṣaṇikatve 'pi bhāvānāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāva upapāditaḥ / | Thus it has been shown that even under the doctrine of things being momentary, the Relation of Cause and Effect is quite possible. |
idānīṃ tadadhigantṛpramāṇopapādanārtham āha bhāvābhāvāvityādi / | The Author next proceeds to show the possibility of the ‘Means of the Cognition’ of the said Relation: [see verses 533-535 above] |
bhāvābhāvāvimau siddhau pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ / yadi sākāravijñānavijñeyaṃ vastu cenmatam // yadānākāradhīvedyaṃ vastu yuṣmābhiriṣyate / | For instance, when the apprehension of a Thing appears, it comes about either through a Cognition with a form, or through a formless Cognition. If it comes through the Cognition with a form, then the apprehension of the form of the Cognition would be the same as the apprehension of the Thing concerned; |
tat kṣaṇatvādipakṣe 'pi samānamupalabhyate // | and this would be equally possible under both views ofngs being permanent or momentary. |
tathā hi padārthasyopalambho bhavan sākāreṇaiva vijñānena bhavedanākāreṇa vā / | If on the other hand, it is through formless Cognition, that also makes no difference in the two views. |
tathā hi pūrvakebhya eva svahetubhyas tathā tat jñānam upajāyate yena sa samānakālabhāvirūpādyevāvabudhyate nānyat / | Because, as a matter of fact, the Cognition is produced in such a form by antecedent Causes that what it apprehends is the same Colour, etc. that happen to be present at the same time, and no other Colour, etc.; |
tadbodhātmakasyaiva tasyotpannatvāt / | because it is produced in the form of the apprehension of these same. |
ataḥ samānakālabhāvirūpādibodhasvabhāve jñāne 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe na kaścid arthasya sthirāsthiratve viśeṣaḥ / avaśyaṃ ca bhavatā pūrvahetukṛta eva samānakālabhāvipratiniyatarūpādigrahaṇe jñānasya svabhāvo 'ṅgīkartavyo yena tulye 'pi samānakālabhāvitve rūpādyeva jñānaṃ paricchinatti nendriyam iti syāt / | Thus then, it being admitted that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the Colour, etc. appearing at the same time, there is no difference in the character of the Thing itself as concerned under the two views of Permanence and Momentariness. You will have to admit the presence of the character of ‘Cognition’ in the apprehension of each particular Colour, etc. appearing at the same time; by virtue of which, even though the character of appearing at the same time is equally present in all, yet what distinguishes the Cognition is the Colour, etc., and not the Sense-organ concerned. |
tac ca kṣaṇikatve 'pi bhāvānāṃ tulyam eveti yatkiñcid etat // | And this explanation holds good under the doctrine of the Momentariness of things also. So it is of no significance at all. |
sākāre nanu vijñāne vaicitryaṃ cetaso bhavet / | “If cognition has a form, then consciousness would be of variegated form. |
nākārānaṅkitatve 'sti pratyāsattinibandhanam // | if, on the other hand, it is not marked by any form, there can be no basis in the form of proximity (for specifying the cognition).” (536) |
yadi sākāraṃ jñānaṃ tadā citrāstaraṇādiṣu jñānasya citratvaṃ bhavet / | If the Cognition has a form, then in the Cognition of such things as the sheet of variegated Colour, this variegated Colour would be present in the Consciousness (Cognition) also; |
na caikasya citratvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | while it is not possible for a single Cognition to have various Colours. |
athānākāraṃ tadā nīlāspadaṃ saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti vyavasthānaṃ na siddhyet / | If on the other hand, the Cognition is formless, there could be no such differentiation as that ‘this is the Cognition of the Blue Colour, not of the Yellow Colour’; |
sarvatra bodharūpatayā viśeṣābhāvena pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvāt // | as in all cases, the mere Cognition itself would be of the nature of Consciousness, and hence there being no distinction, there would be no basis for the said differentiation (in the Cognition). |
bhavadbhir apītyādinā pratividhatte / bhavadbhir api vaktavye tadasmin kiñciduttare / | The following Text supplies the answer to this criticism: [see verse 537 next] You also have to supply some explanation in answer to the above; |
yaccātra vaḥ samādhānam asmākam api tadbhavet // | and whatever answer you put forward would also be our answer to it. |
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