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aviddhakarṇastvaṇūnāṃ nityatvaprasādhanāya pramāṇam āha paramāṇūnām utpādakābhimataṃ saddharmopagataṃ na bhavati / | Aviddhakarṇa has put forward the following proof of the Permanence of Atoms. “What is held to be the producer of Atoms cannot be endowed with the property of existence, because it is not cognised by any Means of Right Cognition indicating existence; |
sattvapratipādakapramāṇāviṣayatvāt kharaviṣāṇavad iti / | like the ‘Hare’s Horns’. |
sato vidyamānasya dharmaḥ saddharmo 'stitvaṃ tenopagataṃ prāptam astītyarthaḥ / | The ‘property of existence’ means the property that should he present in the existing thing; |
tasya pratiṣedho 'yam / | and the denial of this in the said Cause is what is meant. |
aṇūtpādakaṃ kāraṇaṃ nāstītyarthaḥ / | It means simply that ‘there is no Cause productive of the Atom’.” |
tadetat pramāṇamaśaṅkāpūrvamupadarśayann āha saddharmopagatam ityādi / | This is the argument which is anticipated in the following: [see verse 553 above] |
vidyamānopalambhārthapramāṇāviṣayatvataḥ // aṇūtpādakaṃ saddharmopagataṃ nocediṣyata iti sambandhaḥ / vidyamānasyopalambho 'dhigamaḥ so 'rthaḥ prayojanaṃ yasya pramāṇasya tat tathoktaṃ / | The construction of the sentence is ‘If the Producer of Atoms is not held to he endowed with the property of existence’. The term ‘vidyamānopālambha, etc.’ means that ‘it is not the objective of any such Means of Right Cognition as serves to apprehend the existent thing’, The rest is easily intelligible. |
etenāṇūnām anityatvapratijñāyā anumānabādhitatvamudbhāvitam, sadakāraṇavannityam iti vacanāt / akāraṇavattvenāṇūnāṃ nityatvasya siddhatvāt // | What is indicated by this is the argument that the assertion of the impermanence of Atoms is contrary to, and annulled by, Inference; because of the declaration that ‘the existing thing which has no Cause must be permanent’, which proves the permanence of Atoms on the ground of there being no cause productive of them. |
nāsiddher ityādinā hetor asiddhatām āha | The following Text explains that the Reason put forward here is not admissible: [see verse 554 next] |
nāsiddher dṛśyate yena kuvindādyaṇukāraṇam / | as the cause of atoms is actually perceived in the shape of the weaver and the like; |
paramāṇvātmakā eva yena sarve paṭādayaḥ // | inasmuch as the cloth and other things are all constituted of atoms. |
nanu kuvindādayaḥ paṭādīnām eva kāraṇatvena siddhā nāṇūnāṃ tat katham aṇukāraṇaṃ kuvindādi dṛśyata ity āha paramāṇvātmakā ityādi / | The question being “The Weaver, etc. are known to be the cause of such things as the Cloth and the like, then how can it be said that they are found to be the cause of Atoms?” the answer is ‘They are constituted of Atoms’; |
etac ca paścāt pratipādayiṣyāma iti bhāvaḥ // | what is meant is that this is going to be shown later on. |
api ca deśakālasvabhāvaiprakṛṣṭānām arthānām upalambhakapraṃānanivṛttāv api sadbhāvā virodhāt tato 'naikāntikatā ca hetor iti darśayati sadgrāhaketyādi / | Then again, in the case of things that are far removed in space, time and character, even though no Means of Right Cognition is found to be operative, yet their being existent is not regarded as incompatible; so that the Reason cited [‘Because it is not the objective of any Means of Right Cognition’] is ‘not-conclusive’ (in proving the non-existence, of the Cause of Atoms). |
sadgrāhakapramābhāvān na vā sattā prasidhyati / pramāṇavinivṛttau hi nārthābhāve 'sti niścayaḥ // nārthābhāve 'sti niścaya iti / | It may be that the existence of a thing cannot be known in the absence of a means of the right cognition of the existing thing. But the mere absence of the means of right cognition cannot bring about certainty regarding its being actually nonexistent. |
piśācādivad iti bhāvaḥ // | ‘Cannot bring about certainty, etc.’, as is found in the case of such things as the Ghost (which is not seen, and yet one cannot be sure that it does not exist). |
tadārabdhastvavayavī guṇāvayavabhedavān / | The composite substance made up of atoms, as distinct from qualities and components, is never apprehended; |
naivopalabhyate tena na sidhyatyapramāṇakaḥ // | hence, there being no evidence for it, it cannot be admitted. |
[p.188] guṇā rūpadayaḥ avayavās tantvādayaḥ teṣāṃ bhedo vyatirekaḥ so 'syāstīti tathoktaḥ / | Having thus denied the Substance in the form of Cause (Atoms), the Author next proceeds to deny it in the form of Products (Things composed of Atoms): [see verse 556 above] ‘Qualities’ Colour, etc.; |
sa tathābhūto guṇāvayavavytirikto 'vayavī nopalabhyate / | that which is something different from these; such a Composite, distinct from Qualities and Components, is never apprehended. |
nahi paṭādilakṣaṇamavayavi dravyam avikalaṃ śuklādiguṇebhyo 'vayavebhyaś ca tantvādibhyo 'rthāntarabhūtaṃ kvacic cakṣurādijñāne ca bhāsate / | As a matter of fact, any such composite substance as the ‘Cloth’, complete in itself, and entirely different from qualities like Whiteness, and from components, in the shape of the Yarns (composing it) never appears in any visual or other kinds of Cognition. |
tadatra guṇebhyo 'rthāntarabhūtadravyānupalambhena guṇaguṇivādo nirastaḥ / | From this non-perception of the Substance as distinct from Qualities, it also follows that there is no basis for the idea that Substance and Quality are distinct categories; |
avayavavyatiriktāvayavavyanupalambhena tvavayavāvayavivādaḥ / | and from the non-perception of the Composite as distinct from the Components, it follows that the idea of Component and Composite (Part and Whole) is groundless. |
prayogaḥ yadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sadyatra nopalabhyate tat tatra nāsti, yathā kvacit pradeśaviśeṣe ghaṭādiranupalabhyamānaḥ, nopalabhyate ca guṇāvayavebhyo 'rthāntarabhūtas tatraiva deśe guṇī dṛśyatvenāmimato 'vayavī ceti svabhāvānupalabdheḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follow: When a perceptible thing is not perceived, it does not exist, just as the Jar, not being perceived at a certain place, is regarded as non-existent; and no ‘Qualified Substance’, apart from the Qualities and Components, which is held to be perceptible, is ever perceived as occupying the same place; nor is any ‘Composite’ ever perceived apart from the Components; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding such Composite Substance as non-existent). |
na cāsiddho hetuḥ, mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāccopalabdhir iti vacanāt tayor dṛśyatvenābhimatatvāt // nanvityādinā udyotakarabhāviviktādayo hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayanti / | The Reason adduced here cannot be said to be ‘not admitted’; because there is the distinct declaration of Kaṇāda to the effect that ‘In a gross substance, there is perception due to its containing several substances and to qualities’ (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra), which clearly shows that the. Quality and the Components are regarded as perceptible. |
nanūpadhānasamparke dṛśyate sphaṭikopalaḥ / tadrūpāgrahaṇepyevaṃ balākādiś ca dṛśyate // | “As a matter of fact, the rock-crystal is actually perceived when in contact with another thing, even though its quality is not perceived; similarly the line of cranes and such things are also seen; |
kañcukāntarite puṃsi tadrūpādyagatāv api / puruṣapratyayo dṛṣṭo rakte vāsasi vastradhīḥ // | when the man is covered by a long cloak, even though his complexion, etc. are not perceived, there is perception of him as a ‘man’; in the case of the red cloth, there is perception of it as ‘cloth’.” (557-558) |
ta evam āhur guṇavyatirikto guṇī samupalabhyata eva / | The said writers argue as follows: “The Substance is really apprehended as apart from its Qualities; |
tadrūpādiguṇāgrahaṇe 'pi tasya grahaṇāt / | in fact, even when its Colour and other Qualities are not perceived, the Substance itself is perceived. |
tathā hi sphaṭikopalaḥ sannihitopadhānāvasthāyāṃ svagataśuklaguṇānupalambhe 'pi dṛśyata eva / balākādiś ca rātrau mandamandaprakāśāyāṃ tadgatasitādirūpādarśane 'pi gṛhyata eva / tathāprapadīnakañcukāvacchannaśarīre puṃsi tadā śyāmādirūpādyagrahaṇe 'pi pumān pumāniti pratyayaḥ prasūyata eva / | For instance, (a) when the Rock-crystal is placed near another thing, even though the colour of the white Rock-crystal itself is not perceived, the Crystal itself is perceived. (b) Similarly things like the Line of Cranes flying in the sky at night when the light is dim, are actually perceived, even though their white colour is not perceived. (c) Similarly when a man is covered by a long cloak reaching to his feet, even though his dark complexion and other details are not seen, the perception that it is a ‘man’ is there all right. |
kaṣāyakuṅkumādirakte vāsasi tadrūpasya saṃsarpirūpeṇābhibhūtasyānupalambhe 'pi vastradhīr bhavatyeva // | (d) In the case of pieces of cloth coloured with saffron, etc., even though the natural colour of the cloth itself is suppressed, yet the Cognition of the ‘Cloth’ itself is there.” (557-558) |
tadevaṃ tāvat pratyakṣata eva guṇaguṇinor bhedaḥ siddha iti pratipāditam / | It has been explained above that the distinction between the Substance and its Quality is vouched for by Perception itself; |
idānīm anumānato 'pi siddha iti pratipādayann āha rūpādītyādi / | in the following Texts, they proceed to show that it is proved by Inference also: [see verses 559-560 above] |
indīvarādibhyo guṇo bhinna indīvarasya rūpādaya ityevaṃ tenendīvarādinā tasya rūpāder vyavacchedāt / | The Quality is different from the Lotus, because they are spoken of as ‘the Qualities of the Lotus’, where the Qualities are distinguished by the Lotus; |
yathā caitrasya turaṅgama iti caitreṇa svāmyantarebhyo vyavacchidya [p.189] mānasturaṅgamas tato bhidyate tathāparaḥ prayogaḥ / | just as in the expression ‘Caitra’s horse’, the Horse is distinguished i.e. differentiated from other riders, by Caitra, and is therefore different from him. |
pratyekaṃ pṛthivyaptejovāyavo dravyāṇi rūparasagandhasparśebhyo bhinnānyekavacanabahuvacanaviṣayatvāt, yathā candro nakṣatrāṇīti / yathaiva hi candra ityekavacanaṃ nakṣatrāṇīti bahuvacanaṃ candranakṣatrāṇāṃ bhedanibandhanamupalabhyate, tathātrāpi pṛthivītyekavacanaṃ rūparasagandhasparśā iti bahuvacanaṃ / | Each of the Substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air, are different from (the Qualities) Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch, because they are spoken of by means of words in the Singular and Plural numbers (respectively), just as the Moon and the Stars; just as ‘Moon’ being in the Singular number and the ‘Stars’ in the Plural number form the basis of difference between them, so also ‘Earth’ is in the Singular number, and the compound ‘Colour-Taste-Odour-Touch’ is in the Plural number; |
evaṃ jalādiṣvapi yojyam / | similarly ‘Water’, - Air’ and ‘Fire’ also. |
nakṣatrabhedās tu puṣyādayaḥ // | The several ‘Stars’ meant are Puṣya and the rest. |
evaṃ guṇaguṇinor bhedaṃ prasādhyāvayavāvayavinor bhedaprasādhanāyāha vibhinnetyādi / | Having thus proved the difference between the Quality and the Substance possessing the Quality, the Opponents proceed to prove the difference between the Composite and its Components: [see verse 561 above] |
vibhinnakartṛśaktyāder bhinnau tantupaṭau tathā / | the things under discussion do have different makers, different effects, different times and different sizes. |
nāsiddho hetur nāpyanaikāntikaḥ / viruddhadharmādhyāsamātranibandhano hi bhāvānāṃ parasparato bhedaḥ, yathā stambhādīnāṃ sacāvayavāvayavinorapyasti / | This Reason cannot be said to be ‘unproven’ (‘not admitted’), or ‘inconclusive’, In fact, the difference among things is always based upon the presence of contradictory properties, as is found in the case of the Pillar, the Jar and so forth such contradictory properties are found in the Composite and the Component; |
tathā hi tantūnāṃ yoṣitkartrī, paṭasya kuvindaḥ, śītāpanodādikāryasamarthaḥ paṭo na tantavaḥ, prāgapi tantūnām upalabdheḥ pūrvakālabhāvitvaṃ, paṭasyatu paścāt kuvindādivyāpārottarakālabhāvitvam, paṭasyāyām avistarābhyāṃ yāvat pramāṇaṃ na tāvat pratyekaṃ tantūnām astīti bhinnaparimāṇatvamato nānaikāntikatā hetūnām iti bhāvaḥ // | for instance, of the Yarn, the maker is the (spinning) woman, while of the Cloth, the maker is the Weaver; the Cloth and not the Yam, has the capacity to remove cold; the Yarns are found there before the Cloth; hence it is prior in time, while the Cloth appears later, after the operation of the Weaver; the length and breadth of the Cloth are different from those of each of the Yarns; |
evaṃ tāvad anumānato 'vayavāvayavinor bhedaṃ prasādhya pratyakṣato 'pi sādhayann āha sthūlārthetyādi / | thus the sizes of the two are different. Thus the Reasons adduced are not ‘inconclusive’, Such is the sense of the argument. |
sthūlārthāsambhave tu syānnaiva vṛkṣādidarśanam / | “If there were no gross substances, then the perception of the tree and such things would not be possible; |
atīndriyatayāṇūnāṃ nacāṇuvacanaṃ bhavet // | because the atoms are beyond the reach of the senses; nor would the term ‘atom’ (small) be possible; |
sthūlavastuvyapekṣo hi susūkṣmo 'rthas tathocyate / | because it is the extremely subtle thing that is so spoken of in relation to a gross substance; |
sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kimapekṣāsya sūkṣmatā // | hence in the absence of the gross substance, in relation to what would its ‘subtlety’ be?” (562-563) |
yadi hyavayavī na syāt sarvāgrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, paramāṇūnām atīndriyatvāt / | If there were no Composite Substance, there would be the anomaly that there would be no Perception at all; as the Atoms themselves are beyond the reach of the Senses. |
sthūlābhāve 'ṇur iti vyapadeśa eva na syāt / kasmād ity āha sthūlavastuvyapekṣo hītyādi / | In the absence of the ‘gross’ thing again, the name ‘Atom’ (Small) itself would not be possible. Why? ‘Because it is the extremely, etc.’ This is easy to understand. |
nanu raktādirūpeṇa gṛhyante sphaṭikādayaḥ / | In the case op the rock-crystal (cited above), the rock-crystal is perceived as red in colour; |
naca tadrūpatā teṣāṃ svapakṣakṣayasaṅgateḥ // | and yet, in reality, it cannot be red; as that would demolish your own theory. |
[p.190] nanvityādinā pratividhatte yaduktaṃ sphaṭikādayaḥ svagataguṇānupalambhe 'pikevalāḥ samupalabhyanta iti tadasiddham / | With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the Realists): [see verse 564 above] It has been asserted that “the Rock-crystal and such things are perceived even when their Qualities are not perceived”; |
tajjñānasyāyathārthatayā bhrāntatvenāviṣayatvāt / | because the said perception, being not in accordance with the reality, must be wrong, and hence baseless. |
tathā hi japākusumādyupadhāne raktādirūpeṇāsaneeva{na---}sphaṭika upalabhyate / | For instance, when the red Hibiscus flower is placed adjacent to the Rock-crystal, the latter is perceived as Red, which it is not; |
balākādayo 'pi dhavalāḥ santaḥ śyāmarūpā vīkṣyante / | similarly when the Line of Cranes are perceived as Dark (in the dark) when they are really White. |
na ca teṣāṃ tāttvikī tadrūpatā raktādirūpatāsti / | Neither of these two things Rock-crystal and the Cranes are really of the Colour as perceived; i.e. of the Red or the Dark colour. |
kasmātsvapakṣakṣayasaṃgateḥ yadi hi teṣāṃ tadrūpatā tāttvikī syāt tadā tadrūpāgrahaṇe 'pi teṣāṃ grahaṇam astīti yo 'yaṃ bhavatāmanantaroditaḥ pakṣas tasya kṣatiḥ syāt // | “Why?” Became that would demolish your own theory; |
syād etallohitādirūpavyatiriktaḥ sphaṭikādirapyupalabhyata evetyāha tadrūpetyādi / | i.e. if they were really of the Colour that is perceived, then your theory, just mentioned, that things are perceived even when their Colour is not perceived, would become demolished. |
tadrūpavyatiriktaś ca nāparātmopalabhyate / | Apart prom the colour, nothing else is perceived op the nature op something different; |
nacānyākāradhīvedyā yuktāste 'tiprasaṅgataḥ // | and it cannot be right, even for you that things should be apprehended by the cognition op something different; |
nahi tasmāllohitādirūpādvyatirikto 'parātmā svabhāvaḥ sphaṭikādilakṣaṇodṛśyate, raktādirūpasyaivopalambhāt / | As a matter of fact, apart from the Red Colour, nothing else of the nature of something different, i.e. in the shape of the ‘Rock-crystal’ is perceived; as all that is actually perceived is the Red Colour. |
atadrūpā api sphaṭikādayo raktādirūpeṇopalabhyanta iti cedāha nacetyādi / | If it be urged that “what is perceived as Red-coloured is the Rock-crystal itself which is not really red”, then our answer is that ‘it cannot be right, etc. etc.’; |
ākāravaśena hi pratiniyatārthaviṣayatā jñānasyāvasthāpyate / | i.e. when a Cognition is regarded as appertaining to a particular thing, it is on the basis of the form cognised; |
yadi cānyākārasyāpi jñānasyānyo viṣayaḥ syāt / evaṃ sati rūpajñānamapi śabdādiviṣayaṃ syād viśeṣābhāvāt // | if then, the object of the Cognition had a form other than that of the Cognition, then Sound and other things might be the object of the Cognition of Colour, there being no difference between the two cases. |
śuklādayas tathā vedyā ityevaṃ cāpi sambhavet / | It might be possible too in that case, that it is the white colour (of the rock-crystal) itself that is actually cognised; |
tasmād bhrāntam idaṃ jñānaṃ kambupītādibuddhivat // | but such a cognition would be clearly wrong, like the cognition of the conch being yellow. |
tathā hi śuklādaya eva tadvyatiriktaguṇipadārtharahitas tathā raktādirūpeṇa vidyanta ityevam api sambhāvyate / tataś ca na guṇisiddhiḥ / | That is, (under the view of the other party) it might be possible that in the case cited, what actually exists apart from the White Substance (Rock-crystal) is the White Colour, which is cognised as ‘red But even so, that does not prove the existence of the Substance with the Quality. |
cakāro 'vadhāraṇe, bhinnakramaś ca, śuklādaya ityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ / | The ‘ca’ should be construed as after ‘śuklādayaḥ’. |
bhrāntamidam iti / ayathārthatvād iti śeṣaḥ // | ‘The Cognition would he wrong’, i.e. not in strict accordance with the real state of things. |
yaccoktaṃ kañcukāntargate puṃsītyādi / tadapi na pratyakṣaṃ sābhijalpatvād asphuṭākāratvāc ca / | The cognition that appears in the case of the man covered by the cloak is inferential, and does not appertain to the man at all; |
kiṃ tarhyanumānikam etajjñānaṃ rūpādisaṃhatimātralakṣaṇapuruṣaviṣayam ityato nāvayavisiddhir iti darśayati kañceketyādi / kañcukāntargate puṃsi na jñānaṃ tvānumānikam / | Another instance cited by the Opponent was that of ‘the man covered by a cloak’, That also cannot be regarded as ‘Perception’; because it is accompanied by a verbal expression (‘this is a man’), and also because it is indistinct It can at best be regarded only as an ‘Inferential Cognition’, as pertaining to the ‘man’ in the shape of the aggregate of Colour and other Qualities. |
taddhetusanniveśasya kañcukasyopalambhanāt // | So that this also does not serve to prove the existence of the Composite Substance. |
[p.191] sa puruṣo rūpādipracayamātrātmako hetur yasya sanniveśasya sa tathoktaḥ taddhetuḥ sanniveśaḥ saṃsthānaviśeṣo yasya kañcukasya tat tathoktam / | The compound ‘taddhetusanniveśasya’ is to be expounded as ‘the cloak which has the shape of which the Man, who is only an aggregate of Colour, etc. is the Cause’, This shows that the inferential Cognition is brought about by the particular indicative mark called the ‘Effect’. |
yac coktaṃ rakte vāsasi vastradhīr iti tatrāha kaṣāyetyādi / kaṣāyakuṅkumādibhyo vastre rūpāntarodayaḥ / pūrvarūpavināśe hi vāsasaḥ kṣaṇikatvataḥ // | As a matter of fact, such things as the red dye and the saffron produce a new colour in the cloth, on the destruction of the previous colour; because the cloth itself is momentary (and its previous colour has perished along with it). Another example cited (by the Opponent) is the notion of the ‘cloth’ in reference to the Bed Cloth. |
tatra hi kṣaṇikatvād vāsasaḥ pūrvaśuklādirūpavināśe satyapūrvame va rūpādi sāmagryantarabalādupajāyate tasmiṃś ca gṛhīte paścād yathā samayāditabhedaṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ vāso vāsa iti pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvi sāṃvṛtaṃ paramārthato nirviṣayam eva pratyavamarśajñānamutpadyata ityasiddham asya pratyakṣatvam / | What happens in the case cited is that the Cloth itself being momentary, its previous White Colour is destroyed, and a new Colour comes into existence through other causal conditions; and when this new Colour is perceived, there appears, on the wake of that Perception, the reflective notion pertaining to the aggregate as ‘the Cloth, the Cloth’ with appropriate distinction; and this notion (of the ‘Cloth’) is purely illusory, without a real object. Thus the Cognition cited is not of the nature of Perception at all. |
nāpyetad anumānaṃ pūrvapratyakṣagṛhītaviṣayatvād alaiṅgikatvāc ca / | Nor is it Inference; as its object is one that has been already apprehended by a previous Perception, and also because it is not a Cognition brought about by means of an Inferential Indicative. |
tasmān na kiñcid abhibhūtaṃ rūpam asti // | Thus in the case cited there is no Colour that has been suppressed. |
syād etat yadyadṛṣṭaṃ śuklādirūpaṃ vāsaso nāstyeva tat kathaṃ dhautādyavasthāyāṃ punar upalabhyata ity āha punar ityādi / punarjalādisāpekṣāt tasmād evopajāyate / | What happens is that out of one colour (red) another white colour is produced through the intervention of water and such other things; just like the black colour of metals. The following might be urged: “If the original White Colour does not lie hidden in the Cloth, then how is it that when the Cloth is washed, the White Colour reappears?” |
yathāgnisamparkāt samupajātabhāsurādirūpasya lohādeḥ punaḥ śyāmādirūpotpattis tadvadrūpāntaramevopajāyate śuklādītyavirodhaḥ // | Just as, in the case of Metals which have become bright white by the contact of Fire, the Dark Colour is again subsequently produced, so in the case in question also, another White Colour is produced in the Cloth. |
tādavasthye tu rūpasya nānyenābhibhavo bhavet / | If the colour had remained in the same condition, then there could be no suppression of it; |
prāktanānabhibhūtasya svarūpasyānuvartanāt // | as the previous unsuppressed colour would continue to exist. |
prayogaḥ yadaparityaktānabhibhūtasvabhāvaṃ na tasya pareṇābhibhavo 'sti / yathā tasyaiva prāktanāvasthāyām aparityaktānabhibhūtasvabhāvaṃ ca rūpam abhibhavāvasthāyām iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: That which has not abandoned its unsuppressed character cannot be suppressed by anything else, just as the same in its previous condition; and under the suppressed condition also, the original Colour has not abandoned its unsuppressed character; hence this would be a proposition which is contrary to a larger proposition. |
parityaktānabhibhūtasvabhāvatve 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe siddham asyānyatvam // rūpādīndīvarādibhya ityādāvāha ṣaṣṭhītyādi / | On the other hand, if it be held that, the Colour has abandoned its unsuppressed character, then it becomes established that the Colour subsequently produced is different from the original Colour. |
ṣaṣṭhīvacanabhedādi vivakṣāmātrasambhavi / | The diverse ways of verbal expression wherein the genitive and different numbers are used proceed entirely from the speaker’s whim; |
tato na yuktā vastūnāṃ tat svarūpavyavasthitiḥ // | hence it is not right to determine the real state of things on the basis of such expressions. |
[p.192] yadi hi yathāvastu ṣaṣṭhyādīnāṃ pravṛttiḥ siddhā syāt tadā bhavet tato vastusiddhiḥ / | If it were admitted that the use of the Genitive and other forms of verbal expression proceed precisely on the basis of the real state of things, then the existence of such things could be admitted on the basis of those expressions; |
yāvatā svatantrecchāmātrabhāvina ete, na bāhyavastugatabhedādyapekṣiṇaḥ, tat katham etebhyo vastusiddhiḥ / | as a matter of fact, however, verbal expressions proceed entirely from the whim of the speakers, and they do not depend upon the real state of things; how then can they prove the real existence of anything? |
tatra ṣaṣṭhī paṭasya rūpādaya iti paṭo rūpādaya iti, vacanabhedaḥ / | The use of the ‘Genitive’ referred to is in such expressions as ‘Paṭasya rūpaḥ’, ‘Colour of the Cloth’ [which, according to the other party proves the difference of the Cloth from the Colour]; |
ādigrahaṇādiha paṭe rūpādaya iti saptamī, paṭasya bhāvaḥ paṭatvam iti taddhitotpattir ityādiparigrahaḥ // tathāhītyādinānaikāntikameva samarthayate / | The phrase ‘diverse ways’ is meant to include the use of the Locative, as in the expression ‘Paṭe rūpādayaḥ’, ‘Colour, etc. in the Cloth’, and such use of Nominal Affixes as in the expression ‘Paṭasya bhāvaḥ paṭatvam’, [where the Universal character of ‘Cloth’ is spoken of as different from the particular Cloth]. |
tathā hi bhinnaṃ naivānyaiḥ ṣaṇṇāmastitvam iṣyate / | Further, the other party do not regard the ‘existence’ of the six categories as anything different; |
teṣāṃ vargaś ca naivaikaḥ kaścid artho 'yupeyate // | nor is any single ‘group’ of them admitted. |
tathā hi ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānām astitvaṃ teṣāṃ ca ṣaṇṇāṃ varga ityādāvasatyapi vāstave bhede ṣaṣṭhyādi bhavatyeva / | There are such expressions used as ‘ṣaṇṇām padārthānām astitvam’, ‘the existence of the Six Categories’, ‘ṣaṇṇām vargaḥ’, ‘the group of six’, where the Genitive forms are used, even though there is no real difference between the two factors (the Categories and their existence, or the Categories and their group). |
nahi bhavadbhiḥ ṣaṭpadārthavyatiriktamastitvādiṣyate / | You do not admit any such thing as ‘existence’, apart from the Six ‘Categories’ themselves. |
upalakṣaṇam etat / | This is only by way of illustration. |
tathā dārāḥ sikatā ityādau satyapi bahuvacane nārthabhedaṃ paśyāmaḥ / | In fact, in such words as ‘dārāḥ’, ‘sikatāḥ’ and the like, even though the Plural number is used, we do not perceive a multiplicity of the things (wife or sand). |
svasya bhāvaḥ svatvam iti na bhāvo 'nya iṣyate // | As a matter of fact, the ‘svatva’, ‘self-hood’, of a thing is not regarded as a distinct category. |
saṃjñāpakapramāṇasya viṣaye tattvam iṣyate / ṣaṇṇāmastitvam iti cetsaḍbhyo 'nyas te prasajyate // | If it be said that “the existence of the six categories is held to be the property subsisting in what is an object made known by a means of right cognition”, then, in that case, this would have to be distinct from the six that you postulate. |
saṃjñāpakapramāṇaviṣasya bhāvatattvaṃ sadupalambhakapramāṇaviṣayatvaṃ nāma dharmāntaraṃ ṣaṇṇām astitvam iṣyata ity arthaḥ / | “What is meant is that the ‘existence’ of the Six Categories is a distinct property consisting in their being cognisable of such Means of Right Cognition as apprehend existing things: so that there is no discrepancy in our Premiss”; this is the sense of the Opponent’s answer. |
ato nāsti vyabhicāra iti bhāvaḥ / | The answer to this is ‘In that case, etc., etc.’; ‘Distinct’ i.e. a distinct Category; |
saptamaḥ padārthaḥ prāpnoti / | i.e. it becomes a seventh ‘Category’; |
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