sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
---|---|
sa hyāha saṅkhyāpratyayo gajaturaṅgasyandanādivyatiriktanibandhano gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvān nīlapaṭapratyayavad iti / | He argues as follows: “The notion of Number must have a basis other than such things like the Elephant, Horse, Chariot and the like, because it is different from the notions of the Elephant, etc., like the notion of the ‘Blue Cloth’, ‘Must arise from things, etc., etc.’, i.e. it should arise from a thing other than the said elephant, etc.” (644) |
tadanyottheti / | The Author answers this argument in the following [see verse 645 next] |
[p.214] icchetyādinā pratividhatte icchāracitasaṅketamanaskārādyupāyataḥ / | What is desired to be proved could be proved as being due to such causes as an imaginary convention arising from mere whim and so forth. |
tatreṣṭasiddhir buddhyādau saṅkhyaitenaiva vā bhavet // | The existence of ‘number’ in cognition and other things also may be due to the same cause. |
gajādivyatiriktasya saṅketamanaskārāder āntarasya nimittatveneṣṭatvāt siddhasādhyataiva / | Causes apart from the ‘Elephant, etc.’ are already admitted (by us also) in the shape of imaginary Convention and the like; so that the argument adduced is entirely futile (the conclusion being admitted by us). |
ādiśabdena saṅketamaraṇādiparigrahaḥ / | The term ‘and so forth’ is meant to include the Remembrance of Convention and such other things. |
atha saṅketābhogādivyatiriktapadārthanibandhanaṃ sādhayitum abhipretaṃ tadānaikāntikateti prasaṅgodbhāvanavyājena darśayati buddhyādau saṅkhyaitenaiva vā bhaved iti / | If however what you intend to prove is the fact of the notions in question having causes other than the said Imaginary Convention and the like, then the reason adduced is inconclusive. This is shown by means of a Reductio ad Absurdum ‘The existence of Number in Cognition, etc., etc.’; |
etenaiva tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvād ityanena / | ‘The same cause’, i.e. the fact of being different from the notions (of Elephant, etc.). |
ekā buddhir dve buddhī pañca karmāṇītyādāvapi saṅkhyā bhavet prāpnoti / | What is meant is that the ‘Number’ involved in such notions as ‘One Cognition’, ‘Two Cognitions’, ‘Five Actions’, would be due to the same Cause; |
tatrāpyekādibuddhes tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt na ca bhavati, tasmād anaikāntika iti bhāvaḥ // | as here too ‘the difference from the said notions’ is present: As a matter of fact the said Number is not due to this circumstance; hence the Reason is Inconclusive. |
kiṃ ca yānekadravyā dvitvādisaṅkhyā tasyā ye 'yam ekatvebhyo 'nekabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattir varṇyate bhavadbhiḥ sā nirnibandhaneti darśayati buddhyapekṣā cetyādi / | If the accomplishment of the number be explained as dependent upon cognitions, then, why cannot the notion be accepted as due to mere convention? (646) Further, you have explained that the number ‘Two’ which subsists in more than one substance is brought about by several ‘unities’ associated with the several Cognitions. |
saṅketābhogamātreṇa tadbuddhiḥ kiṃ na saṃmatā // | But as a matter of fact, there can be no basis for such an assertion. |
mātragrahaṇamekatva dvitvāditat sāmānyatat sambandhajñānavyavacchedārtham / | The term ‘mere’ is meant to exclude such notions as ‘one’, ‘two’ and the rest, the genus constituted by these, and the relationship of these. |
tadbuddhir iti / | ‘Why cannot the notion, etc., etc.’; |
saṅkhyeyeṣu dve trīṇi catvārītyādikā buddhiḥ saṅketādbhogamātreṇa kim ---na saṃmatā / evaṃ hyadṛṣṭasāmarthyasya hetutvaṃ na kalpitaṃ syād anyathā hi hetūnām anavasthā bhavet / | i.e. the notion of ‘two’, ‘three ‘four’ and so forth, that appear in connection with the numbered things, why cannot this be accepted as brought about by mere Convention? The advantage in this would be that it would not involve the assuming of the causality of anything whose potency is not perceived; |
tathāhyapekṣā buddhisadbhāve tadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt saiva kalpayituṃ yuktā / | for if such causality were assumed, then there would be an infinite number of such ‘Causes It is far more reasonable therefore to postulate the ‘unitary conception’ itself as the requisite cause, on the strength of positive and negative concomitance. |
anyathā hi harītakīṃ prāpya devatā virecayantītyapi kalpanīyaṃ bhavet / nāpi samuccayādivyāvṛttapadārthavyatirekeṇopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptābhimatādvitvādayo dṛśyante saṃgacchante vā, ekasyānekasmin vṛtteḥ pratiṣiddhatvāt / | Otherwise, it might be assumed that ‘deities, getting at the Harītakī, bring about the movement of the bowels’ [not the Harītakī itself], As a matter of fact too, ‘duality’ and the rest, which have been held to be perceptible apart from things excluded from the ‘aggregate’ and such entities, are never perceived; nor are they compatible; |
sāmānyasamavāyayoś ca niṣetsyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | because the existence of ‘one’ in ‘many’ has been denied, and ‘genus’ and ‘subsistence’ are going to be denied. |
mahaddīrghādibhedena parimāṇaṃ yaducyate / | ‘Dimension’ has been classed as ‘large ‘long’ and the like; |
tadapyarthe tathā rūpabhdeād eva na kiṃ matam // | why cannot it be regarded as due to diversity of forms in the thing itself? (647) |
parimāṇavyavahārakāraṇaṃ parimāṇaṃ taccaturvidhaṃ mahadaṇu dīrghaṃ hrasvam iti / | The theory of the other Party is as follows: “Dimension is the basis of all notions of size; it is of four kinds (1) Large, (2) Small, (3) Long, (4) Short. |
tatra mahaddvividhaṃ nityam anityaṃ ca / | The ‘Large’ Dimension again is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal; |
nityamākāśakāladigātmasu paramamahattvaṃ / | the eternal, as also the Largest, Dimension subsists in Ākāśa, Time, Space and Soul; |
anityaṃ tryaṇukādidravyeṣu / | the ‘non-eternal’ Dimension subsists in the Triad and other substances. |
tathāvapi dvividhaṃ nityam anityaṃ ca / | Similarly the ‘Small’ Dimension also is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal; |
nityaṃ paramāṇu manaḥ suparima [p.215] ṇḍalalakṣaṇam / | the eternal and also the smallest, Dimension, subsists in the Atom and the Mind, in the shape of the ‘atomic globule’; |
anityaṃ dvyaṇuka eva / | and the non-eternal Dimension subsists in the Diad only; |
kuvalāmalabilvādiṣu ca mahatsvapi tat prakarṣābhāvamapekṣya bhāktoyaṃ vyavahāraḥ / yādṛśaṃ hyāmalake mahatparimāṇaṃ na tādṛśaṃ kuvala iti / | it is also used in connection with such things as the Pearl, the Āmalaka-Fruit, the Bilva-fruit and the like, which are really ‘large’, but only figuratively, on account of the absence of much ‘largeness’ in their ‘large dimension’; e.g. the ‘Large Dimension’ of the Pearl is not of the same degree as that of the Āmalaka; |
evam anyatrāpi yojyam / | and so on in regard to all things. |
atra tryaṇukādiṣu vartamānayor mahattvadīrghatvayor dvyaṇuke cāṇutvahrasvatvayoḥ ko viśeṣaḥ/ | Question: ‘What is the difference between the Largeness and Length as subsisting in the Triad and the Smallness and Shortness subsisting in the Diad?’ Answer: As regards Largeness and Length, there is mutual distinction; |
ucyate tatrāsti mahattvadīrghatvayoḥ parasparato viśeṣaḥ / mahatsu dīrghamānīyatāṃ dīrgheṣu ca mahadānīyatām iti vyavahārabhedadarśanāt / | for instance, we come across such varied expressions as ‘from among the Largengs, bring the Longer one’, ‘from among the Longngs, bring the larger one’, As regards the distinction between ‘smallness’ and ‘shortness’, it is perceptible only to Mystics who alone see them.” |
etac ca mahadādi rūpādibhyo 'rthāntaratvena siddhaṃ tat pratyayavilakṣaṇabuddhigrāhyatvāt sukhādivad iti paro manyate / | In this scheme the ‘Large’ and the rest are held to be something different from Colour and the rest, on the ground that they are apprehended by Cognitions other than cognitions of these latter, like Pleasure, etc. |
tatra yadi tāvad rūpādiviṣayendriyabuddhivilakṣaṇapratyakṣapratyayagrāhyatvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretas tadā hetor asiddhatā / | In this Reasoning, if the Reason adduced is meant to consist in the fact that “Largeness, etc. are the objects of Sense-perception different from the Sense-perception of Colour and such things”, then, such a Reason is one that is ‘unproven’, not admitted; |
nahi tathātathāsthitarūpādipadārthavyatirekeṇa mahadādiparimāṇam indriyabuddhau pratibhāsamānam upalakṣyate / | because as a matter of fact any such thing as the ‘Large and other Dimension’ is never found to appear in any Sense-perception, apart from the Colour and other things as they exist. |
atha aṇu mahadādītyevaṃ yā vikalpikā buddhiḥ sā tat pratyayavilakṣaṇā buddhir abhipretā / | If then, it be held that the notion of ‘small’, ‘large’ and the like is a cognition that is entirely different from the cognition of Colour, etc., then the Reason becomes ‘fallible’, ‘Inconclusive’; |
evam apyanaikāntikatā hetor vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt / | as there is nothing to invalidate a contrary conclusion. |
nahyasyāḥ paramārthataḥ kiñcidapi grāhyam asti sābhijalpatvāt / | As a matter of fact there is nothing that really forms the object of the notion in question; |
kevalaṃ teṣvevaṃ rūpādiṣvekadiṅmukhādipravṛtteṣu dṛṣṭeṣu tadvilakṣaṇebhyo rūpādibhyo bhedapratipādanāya kṛtasamayānurodhān mahadityadhyavasyantī jāyata iti nāto vastvantarasiddhiḥ / | as what is held to be such is a mere verbal figment. All that happens is that when the same Colour is seen turning towards the same direction, and it is desired to bring out the difference between that Colour and other Colours, there appears the notion, based upon preconceived convention, that it is ‘large’, And this does not justify the conviction that it is something altogether different. |
ata eva cāsyā na rūpādivyatiriktamavaseyam astītyasiddhatāpi hetoḥ / | Consequently there is nothing apart from Colour, etc.’, that could be regarded as the object of that notion; and hence the Reason is one that is ‘unproven’, |
pratijñāyāś ca pratyakṣabādhā pratyakṣatveneṣṭasya mahadāde rūpatvādivyatirekeṇānupalambhāt / | The Proposition (or Conclusion) also is contrary to Perception; inasmuch as the ‘large’ and other dimensions, which are meant to be perceptible, are never perceived apart from Colour and other things. |
tasmāt tadapi parimāṇam arthe rūpādāvekadiṅmukhādipravṛtte tasyārthasyātathodbhūtādbhedamāśritya kiṃ na tādātmyeneṣṭam / | Thus then, why cannot the ‘Dimension’ of things be regarded as of the same nature as Colour and the rest, but based on this difference, turning towards a direction different from that towards which other things turn? In so doing, the assumption of -unseen and unreasonable things is avoided. |
evaṃ hyadṛṣṭāyuktapadārthakalpanā na kṛtā syād ityevakāreṇa darśayati / | This is what is implied by the particle ‘eva’ in the Text. |
tathāhyekadiṅmukhapravṛtte bhūyasi rūpādike dṛṣṭe spṛṣṭe vā dīrgham iti ---vyavaharanti / tadapekṣayā cālpīyasi samutpanne hrasvam iti / | Thus when several Colour, etc. are seen or touched, as turning towards the same direction, people come to speak of it as ‘long’; and when the Colour, etc. seen or touched are fewer as compared to the former, they speak of it as ‘short’, The same explanation may be applied to the notion of ‘Large’, etc. also. |
evaṃ mahadādiṣvapi yojyam / rūpādiniṣedhavaccaikānekavikalpābhyāṃ mahadādiniṣedho vācyaḥ // | As in the case of the denial of Colour and other qualities, so here also, the denial of the ‘Large’ and other dimensions may be set forth, on the basis of the alternatives is it one or many? (647) |
api ca sādhyābhāve 'pi hetor vṛttidarśanād anaikāntikā sphuṭatareti darśayann āha dīrghetyādi / | Further, inasmuch as the Reason adduced is found even where the Probandum (character to be proved) is absent, its ‘inconclusiveness’ becomes all the more pronounced. This is shown in the following [see verses 648-649 next] |
dīrghā prāsādamāleti mahatī vedyate yathā / | A line of mansions is conceived of as ‘large’; |
nahi tatra yathārūpaṃ parimāṇaṃ prakalpitam // | and yet no ‘dimension’ commensurate with the form of the line is assumed. |
ekārthasamavāyena tathā cedvyapadiśyate / na mahattvaṃ na dairghyaṃ ca dhāmasvasti vivakṣitam // | If it be said that it is spoken of as such on the basis of the quality subsisting in the same object (mansion), then the answer is that neither ‘largeness’ nor ‘length’ is ever meant to belong to mansions. |
[p.216] tathāhyasatyapi bhavatparikalpite mahattvādau prāsādamālādiṣu mahadādipratyayaprasūtiranubhūyate / | Further, inasmuch as the Reason adduced is found even where the Probandum (character to be proved) is absent, its ‘inconclusiveness’ becomes all the more pronounced. |
nacetthaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum / | This is shown in the following [see verses 648-649 above] |
yatraiva prāsādādiṣu mālākhyo guṇaḥ samavetas tatra mahattvādikam api tenaikārthasamavāyāvalāt tathā mahatītyevaṃ tanmālādi vyapadiśyata iti / tadetad api svasamayaviruddham iti darśayann āha na mahattvam ityādi / | Even where the ‘Largeness’ as conceived by you is not present, in such things, for instance, as the Line of Mansions the notion of ‘largeness’ is found to appear. It will not be right to assert that “The largeness subsists in the same Houses wherein the quality of ‘line’ (being in a line) is present, and on the strength of this inherence in the same thing, the Line comes to be spoken of as Large”; |
dhāmasviti prāsādeṣu / | ‘Dhāmasu’ in the Mansions, Palaces; |
krośārdhakrośādi parimāṇam // kasmān nāstītyāha prāsādaśceṣyata iti / | the Dimension extending to a mile and so forth, is not meant (by the Opponent) to be present in the Palaces. Question: “Why cannot such Dimension subsist in the Houses?” |
prāsādaśceṣyate yogo guṇaḥ so 'parimāṇavān / | The ‘palace’ is held by you to be a ‘conglomeration’, which is a quality; |
na tasyāstyaparā mālā nopacārasya cāśrayaḥ // | nor can there be another ‘line’ of it. Nor can recourse be had to figurative expression. |
tathā hi bhavadbhiḥ prāsādaḥ saṃyogātmako guṇa iṣyate nāvayavidravyaṃ vijātīyadravyānarambhāt / | That is to say, you regard the ‘Palace’ to be of the nature of Conjunction, Conglomeration, and hence a Quality; and not a composite substance, as it is not productive of heterogeneous substances. |
sa ca guṇaḥ parimāṇavān na bhavati nirguṇā guṇā iti samayāt / | The said Quality cannot have Dimension; because your doctrine is that Qualities cannot reside in Qualities. |
tataś ca guṇānāṃ prāsādādīnāṃ mālākhyasyāparasya guṇasyābhāvāt prāsādamāletyetadeva na syāt / | For the same reason the Palace, which is one quality, cannot have a ‘line’ (or series), winch is another quality; the expression ‘line of Palaces’ itself would be an absurdity; |
kuto mahatī hrasvetyādi bhaviṣyati / tathā hi mālā samkhyāsvabhāveṣṭā saṃkhyā ca guṇatvād dravyam evāśritāna guṇam / | whence then could it be ‘large’ or ‘small’? To explain further ‘Line’ (series) is held to be of the nature of ‘Number’; |
yadāpyavayavisvabhāvā māleṣyate tathāpi dravyasya dravyamevāśrayo na guṇā iti na mālāyāḥ prāsādāśrayatvaṃ yuktam / | and Number, as a Quality, can subsist only in a Substance, never in a Quality. Even if ‘line’ or ‘series’ be regarded as of the nature of a ‘Composite’, even so, the substratum of a Substance must be a Substance, not a Quality; |
atha jātisvabhāvā mālāṅgīkriyate / | so that the Line (a Substance) cannot subsist in the Palace (a Quality). |
evam api jātessarvātmanā pratyāśrayaparisamāptatvād eko 'pi prāsādo māletyucyeta vṛkṣavat / yathoktam | If ‘Line’ be held to be of the nature of Genus, even so, as the Genus subsists in its complete form in every one of its component Individuals, even a single Palace could be called a ‘Line’, like the Tree. |
"geho yadyapi saṃyogas tanmālā kinnu tadbhavet / jātiścedgeha eko 'pi māletyucyeta vṛkṣavat" // iti / ekā dīrghā mahatītyādivyapadeśānupapattiś ca tadavasthaiva mālāyām tadāśraye ca prāsādādāvekatvādiguṇābhāvāt / | This has been thus asserted ‘Though the House is a Conglomeration (Conjunction), how can there be a line of it? If it were a genus, then even a single Palace might be called a Line With regard to the Line (series) also, the notion of ‘Long’, ‘Large’ and so forth is equally impossible; as in the Palace, of which it is a substratum, the quality of ‘one-ness’ and the like is not present; |
kāṣṭhādiṣu ca vivakṣitadairghyādyasadbhāvāt / | and as regards the Wood and other materials (that go to make up the Palace), the intended Length, etc. are absent in them. |
bahvīṣu ca prāsādamālāsu mālāmāletyanugāmī vyapadeśo na syāt / | Then again, when there are several ‘Lines of Palaces’, it would not be possible to have the notion of ‘Line’ and ‘Line’ extending over all; |
jāter ajātitaḥ / | as one genus cannot have another genus. |
yadāha ---" mālā bahutve tacchabdaḥ kathaṃ jāter ajātitaḥ" iti / | This has been thus asserted ‘Where there are several Lines, how can that term be applied? The genus cannot have another genus |
ata upacārasyāśrayaḥ parigraho yadvāśrayo 'dhiṣṭhānaṃ na yuktam ity arthaḥ / | Nor can it be right to seek shelter under ‘figurative expression’; |
na cāpyayaṃ skhaladgatir mālādiṣu mahattvādipratyayaḥ / | as the notion of ‘largeness’ is not found to be fallible in reference to things like the Line; |
tasmānnaupacāriko yuktaḥ / | and hence it cannot be regarded as figurative. |
nahi mukhyapratyayāviśiṣṭo gauṇo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | What is not different from the direct connotation cannot be regarded as ‘figurative’; |
yadāha | otherwise it would lead to absurdities. |
"mālādau ca mahattvādiriṣṭo yaścaupacārikaḥ / mukhyāviśiṣṭavijñānagrāhyatvānnaupacārikaḥ" // | This has been thus declared ‘The notion of Largeness in regard to the Line, which has been held to be figurative, cannot be figurative, as it is the object of a Cognition which is in no way different from the direct connotation of the term’, (650) |
iti // | “There is the notion that ‘this is separate from that’; |
tatra idam asmāt pṛthag iti yadvaśāt saṃyuktam api dravyamapoddhriyate, tadapoddhārakāraṇaṃ pṛthaktvaṃ nāma tacca ghaṭādibhyo 'rthāntaraṃ tat pratyayavilakṣaṇabuddhigrāhyatvād iti pūrvavat pa [p.217] rasyābhiprāyaḥ / | and on the strength of this notion even a thing that is in contact with another thing is differentiated from it; and that which is the cause or basis of this differentiation is called ‘Separateness’ (a distinct Quality according to the Naiyāyikas). This ‘Separateness’ is something different from the Jar and other things, because it forms the object of a cognition different from the cognition of these latter, as in the case dealt with before.” |
tadatrāpi parimāṇavadasiddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ca hetor iti hṛdi kṛtvāha ---apoddhāretyādi / | Here also, as in the case of ‘Dimension’, the Reason is open to the charge of being ‘Unproven’ and ‘Inconclusive With this idea in his mind, the Author adds the following [see verse 651 above] |
tathāhyatrāpi rūpādibhyo vivekena nāparam arthāntaraṃ pṛthaktvaṃ nāma pratyakṣabuddhau pratibhāsata iti na siddham asya tat pratyayavilakṣaṇabuddhigrāhyatvam / | That is to say, as a matter of fact, no such thing as ‘Separateness’ as distinct from Colour, etc. ever appears in Perception; so that the fact of its being cognised by a cognition different from the cognition of Colour, etc. cannot he admitted. |
ata eva ca tasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvenābhimatasyānulambhād asattvam eva / | Hence inasmuch as, while being perceptible, the intended quality is not perceived, it must be taken to be non-existent. |
na cāpi pṛthag iti vikalpapratyayavaśāt tasya siddhiḥ / ta eva hi rūpādayo bhāvāḥ svasvabhāvasthiteḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttātmatayāpekṣyamāṇāḥ pṛthag iti vyavahāranibandhanaṃ bhaviṣyantīti nāto vastvantarasiddhiḥ / | Nor can it be regarded as proved by the definite cognition ‘this is separate’, Because those same things, Colour and the rest, existing in their own character when conceived of in relation to other things, from which they are found to be differentiated, become the basis of the notion of the things being ‘separate’; and hence the said notion cannot prove the existence of any other thing (apart from those things themselves). |
tasmādyeyam apoddhāravyavahṛtiḥ vyavahāraḥ pṛthaktvātkāraṇādvarṇyate sākimiti samānāsamānajātīyavibhinnasvabhāvaniṣṭhā na matā / | Hence the notion of ‘being apart’, which is described as proceeding from the quality of ‘separateness’, why cannot that notion be held to rest in heterogeneous and homogeneous characters? That is, it is best to regard it as resting upon that. |
etenānaikāntikatvaṃ hetor darśitam / | This shows the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason adduced by the other party. |
vibhinna ātmā svabhāvo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | The compound ‘vibhinna, etcis to be expounded accordingly. |
sādhyavipakṣe 'pi hetor vṛttir dṛśyeteti darśayann āha parasparavibhinnā hītyādi / | The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason cited is present in the contrary of the Probandum also: [see verse 652 next] |
parasparavibhinnā hi yathā buddhisukhādayaḥ / pṛthagvācyās tadaṅgaṃ ca vinānyena tathāpare // | Just as cognition, pleasure and the rest, being different from one another, are spoken of as ‘separate’, and hence become the basis of that notion (of separateness), independently of anything else, so would other things also. |
nahi sukhādiṣu guṇeṣu pṛthaktvaṃ guṇo 'sti, nirguṇatvād guṇānām / | In Pleasure and other Qualities, the Quality of ‘separateness’ cannot subsist; because Qualities are devoid of Qualities (under the Opponent’s doctrine); |
atha ca parasparavyāvṛttātmatayā te pṛthag iti vācyā bhavanti / | and yet they are spoken of as ‘separate’, in the sense that they are mutually exclusive; |
tasyāścāpoddhāravyavahṛteraṅgaṃ nimittatāṃ pratipadyante / | and as such they become the ‘basis’ cause of that notion of ‘being separate’. |
tathāpare 'pi ghaṭādayo dravyābhimatā vinānyena svavyatiriktena pṛthaktvanāmnā guṇena bhaviṣyantīti / | In the same manner-, the Jar and other things also, which have been regarded as ‘substance’, should be devoid of any such quality as ‘Separateness’, distinct from themselves. |
nacāpi teṣu bhākto 'yaṃ pratyayo mukhyapratyayāviśiṣṭatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Nor can the said notion be said to be ‘figurative’; as it does not differ in any way from the ‘direct’ notion. |
yadvā apoddhāravyavahṛtiṃ vibhinnātmapadārthanibandhanāṃ darśayan pratijñāyā anumānabādhāmāha parasparetyādi / | Or, the Text may be taken as showing the notion of ‘being separate’ to be not based upon anything apart from thengs concerned, and thereby points out the annulment of the Opponent’s Conclusion by Inference. |
prayogaḥ ye parasparavyāvṛttātmānas te na svavyatiriktapṛthaktvasamāśrayāḥ, yathā sukhādayaḥ / | This Inference may be formulated as follows: Things that are mutually exclusive are not the substrata of any such quality as ‘separateness’, apart from themselves, like Pleasure, etc., Jar and otherngs are mutually exclusive; |
parasparavyāvṛttātmānaś ca ghaṭādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | hence this is a natural Reason (for believing that the Jar, etc. cannot be the substratum of any such quality as ‘Separateness’). |
ekasyānekavṛttyasambhavaḥ, samavāyasya niṣetsyamānatvāt sambandhānupapattiḥsukhādiṣu tadvyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaś ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // tatra saṃyogavibhāgayor dūṣaṇārtham āha yāvityādi / | and hence there can be no such relation as ‘Subsistence’, An argument annulling the said notion is also available in the shape of the possibility of such relation being not present in Pleasure and the rest. Conjunction and disjunction as restricted to substances have been postulated by others as causes of the notions of ‘being joined’ and the like; |
[p.218] | these are entirely useless. |
yau saṃyogavibhāgau ca dravyeṣu niyatau paraiḥ / saṃyuktādidhiyo hetū kalpitau tāvanarthakau // | The Author next proceeds to criticise the qualities of Conjunction and Disjunction: [see verse 653 above] The Opponent’s scheme is that “Conjunction and Disjunction are the bases, respectively, of the notions of ‘being joined’ and ‘being disjoined’; |
yathākramaṃ dravyeṣu saṃyuktavibhaktapratyayahetū aprāptaprāptānāṃ prāptyaprāptisvabhāvāvanyatarobhayakarmajau ca saṃyogavibhāgajau ca saṃyogavibhāgāviti paraprakriyā / | they consist in the contact of what has not been in contact, and the ceasing of contact of what has been in contact; and that they are brought about by the action of either one or of both, as also by Conjunction and Disjunction”. |
etac ca prakriyāmātram eva / | All this is a mere scheme; |
na tv anayor vastusattvasiddhau kiñcana pramāṇamastītyato 'narthakāvetau kalpitau paraiḥ / | and there is no proof for the idea that these are real entities; hence they have been needlessly postulated by the other philosophers. |
prayogaḥ yasya na kiñcit sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti na tat prekṣāvatāṃ sadvyavahāraviṣayo yathā vandhyāsutādi nāsti ca saṃyogavibhāgayoḥ sādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ pareṣām iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ // bījodaketyādinodyotakaramatopadarśanāddhetor asiddhatāmāśaṅkate --- | This argument may be formulated as follows: That in support of which there is no proof (no means of Cognition) can never be regarded by intelligent persons as ‘existing e.g. ‘the Son of the Barren Woman’ the other party have no proof in support of ‘Conjunction’ and ‘Disjunction’; hence there is non-perception of the wider condition (which makes the less extensive conclusion impossible). |
bījodakapṛthivyādi sarvadā kāryakārakam / | “If there were no conjunction, then the soil, the seed, the water and the earth and such things should be always producing their effects; |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.