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nāpi sāśravasukhopabhogavadvairasyopadravaḥ praśamasukharasasyaikāntatayānudvegakaratvāt / | Nor is there any discrepancy in the shape of insipidity, as appears in the case of worldly pleasures; because the pleasures of calm and peace are never galling. |
api tu yadi bhaved aparihāṇāyaiva bhavet / | In fact, if there is any effort, it should be towards not losing hold of the said knowledge; |
buddheḥ prakṛtyā guṇapakṣapātāt / | specially because the Intelligence of man is by its nature partial to what is good. |
nāpi doṣopādānāya prayatnaḥ, teṣāṃ sarvopadravāspadatvena duṣṭatvāt / | Nor should there be an effort for the acquiring of the Defects; because they are all evū, being the abode of all troubles. |
tasmāt sambhavinī nairātmyābhāvanā / | Thus the conception of ‘No-soul’ is quite possible; |
tasyāś ca prakarṣaṇaparyantagamanāt sphuṭapratibhāsajñānaphalatvaṃ dṛṣṭam / | and when this reaches its highest stage, it has been found to bring about the clear Cognition of things; |
yathā kāminīṃ bhāvayataḥ kāmāturasya / | just as in the case of the love-lorn young man thinking of his beloved; |
tathā hi tasya savibhramāḥ paśyābhyupagūha ityevaṃ vācaḥ kāyavyāpārāścābhiprāyānurūpāḥ sākṣātkārinibandhanāḥ pravartante / | in the case of such a man, there appear such illusory words as ‘I see her’, ‘I embrace her’ and so forth, and there are corresponding bodily reactions also. |
tasmānnāsiddho hetuḥ / | Thus then our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’. |
nāpyanaikāntikaḥ, yato nairātmyadarśanasya bhūtārthaviṣayatvena balavattvamātmadarśanasya tu viparyayād viparyaya iti bhavati vipakṣapratipakṣabhāvaḥ / | Nor is our Reason ‘Inconclusive’; because the idea of ‘No-soul’ envisages a well-established fact, and is consequently more powerful than the idea of the ‘Soul’, which is the reverse of it and hence not strong. Thus there is hostility between these two ideas. |
rāgadveṣayor apyabhūtātmagrahāsaṃsparśena pravṛtter na tayor viruddharūpagrahaṇanimitto vipakṣapratipakṣābhāvaḥ / | Love and Hatred also proceed on the basis of the notion of ‘Soul’ which is not well-established; and they are not hostile to one another on account of their envisaging contrary forms. It is not due to mistake; |
nāpi viparyāsāt aviparyāsakṛtor dvayārapi viparyastatvāt / | because the two are not brought about by mistakes, and yet they are themselves mistaken, wrong. |
nāpyanayor virodhaḥ siddhaḥ, dvayorapyātmagrahaikayonitvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvāc ca / | Nor is the hostility of these two well recognised; specially because both have their source in the notion of the Soul. |
tathā hi satyātmātmīyābhiṣvaṅge taduparodhini dveṣo jāyate nānyathā / | For instance, it is only when one has the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ that there appears Hatred against what hampers those, not otherwise; |
nacābhinnakāraṇayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhūtayor bādhyabādhakabhāvo yuktaḥ, yathā vahnidhūmayor ekendhanaprabhavayoḥ, yathā vātmagrahasnehayoḥ, atiprasaṅgāt / | and when both proceed from one and the same cause, and are themselves of the nature of cause and effect, they cannot be destructive of one another; just as there is none in the case of Smoke and Fire, both emanating from the same fuel; or just as in the case of the notion of ‘I’ and affection. |
yugapad anutpattis tu tadupādānacittasya yugapat sajātīyacittadvayākṣepāsāma [p.875] rthyāt / | As regards their not appearing simultaneously, that is due to the Mind not having the capacity to project two similar mental images at one and the same time. |
nāpi sukhaduḥkhayoḥ parasparaṃ virodhaḥ, tathā hi dvividhe sukhaduḥkhe mānaseviṣayaje ca / | Nor is there any hostility between Pleasure and Pain. Because Pleasure and Pain are of two kinds subjective and objective; |
tatra ye tāvanmānase tayor dveṣānunayasamprayogitvād rāgadveṣābhyām ekayogakṣematayā tadviparyastatvam abhinnātmarūpagrāhitvamātmagrahaikayonitvaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāavaśceti na parasparaṃ virodhaḥ sambhavati / | those that are subjective are associated with Hatred and Apologetic Spirit, and hence stand on the same footing as Love and Hatred, and hence are the reverse of one another; they envisage the same form of the Soul, and have their source in the idea of the same ‘Soul’, and they bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; hence there can be no hostility between them. |
ye ca viṣayaje tayor api parasparaṃ kāraṇabhedāpratiniyamān na virodhaḥ / | As regards the objective Pleasure and Pain, they are not restricted to different causes; hence there can be no hostility between them. |
tathā hi yata eva sukhamutpadyate tata evātisevyamānād duḥkhamapīti na tayoḥ kāraṇabhedapratiniyamo 'sti / | Because when Pleasure proceeds from a certain thing, Pain also proceeds from the same thing when one becomes too much addicted to it; hence their causes are not necessarily different. |
natvevaṃ nairātmyadarśanasyetareṇa / | It is not so in the case of the ideas of the ‘No-soul’ and ‘Soul’. |
kiñca dvayorapyanayor viṣayabalabhāvitvena tulyabalatvam natu mārgadoṣayoḥ mārgasyaiva bhūtārthaviṣayatvena balavattvāt na doṣāṇām / | Further, in the case of Pleasure and Pain, they are of equal strength, because both proceed under the influence of their objective, not so between the ‘Path’ and the ‘Defects’; of which latter the ‘Path’ is the stronger, because it envisages an accomplished fact; |
api{ca} khalu sukhaduḥkhe 'cirasthitike na tu punar evaṃ nairātmyadarśanam tasyasātmatvena sadānapāyād iti pūrvam uktam ato na vyabhicāraḥ / | not so the ‘Defects Then again, Pleasure and Pain do not continue for a long time; not so the idea of ‘No-soul’; because having become absorbed, it never ceases; as has been explained above. Hence there is no falsity in our Premiss. |
yugapad anutpattes tu kāraṇam uktam / | As for the two not appearing at the same time, the reason for this has been already explained. |
yatpunar utkam anumānabalāvadhāritanairātmyānām api samutpadyante rāgādaya iti tadayuktam / | It has been argued that even for those who have cognised the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ through Inference, Love and Hatred, etc. do appear. |
yasmād bhāvanāmayaṃ sphuṭapratibhāsatayā nirātmakavastusākṣātkārijñānamavikalpakaṃ pramāṇaprasiddhārthaviṣayatayā cābhrāntaṃ tannairātmyadarśanamātmadarśanasyātyantonmūlanena pratipakṣo varṇito na śrutacintāmayam / | because the idea of ‘No-soul’ consists of a mere Idea, clear and distinct, directly envisaging soul-less things, non-conceptual; and as envisaging well-ascertained things, it is not mistaken; it serves to uproot the idea of the ‘Soul’ and has, on that account, been described as ‘hostile’ to it; and it does not consist of the pondering of what has been ‘heard’ (learnt). |
yasmād anādikālābhyāsādatyantopārūḍhamūlatvān malānāṃ krameṇaiva vipakṣavṛddhyāvahrasatāṃ kṣayaḥ natu sakṛcchravaṇena / | Because the Impurities, which have become firmly rooted through repeated experience from time without beginning, go on being reduced gradually by the rise of their opposites, and hence come to be destroyed only gradually; |
yathā śītasparśasya vahnirūpasamparkamātrān na kṣayaḥ / | as there is destruction of cold by the mere touch of Fire. |
nacāpi śrutacittāmayanairātmyajñānasaṃmukhībhāve sati rāgādisamudayaḥ siddho yena vyabhicāraḥ syāt / | When too the idea of ‘No-soul’, consisting of the cogitation of what has been heard, appears before one, the whole lot of Love and the rest do not remain there at all; in view of which our Premiss could be false. |
tathā hi samutpannaṃ rāgādiparyavasthānamaśubhādimanaskārabalena vinodayantyeva saugatāḥ / | Because the Buddhists always set aside the presence of Love etc. by thinking of them as evil. |
ata evākhaṇḍitamahimanvameṣām asiddham / | It is for this reason that these people become recognised as having their greatness unbesmirched. |
virodho 'pi nairātmyadarśanenaiṣām ata eva vyavasthāpyate / | The hostility too of the Idea of ‘No-soul’ towards love, etc. is affirmed for this same reason; |
tatsaṃmukhībhāve satyapakarṣāt / | because they become set aside as soon as the idea of ‘No-soul’ presents itself. |
ye hi yadupadhānād apakarṣadharmāṇas te tadatyantavṛddhau niranvayasamucchittidharmāṇo bhavanti, yathā salilāvṛddhāvagnijvālā, nairātmyajñānopadhānāccāpakarṣadharmāṇo doṣā iti tadatyantavṛddhau katham avasthāṃ labheran / | When between two sets of things, one becomes set aside at the presence of the other, then, on the rise of thé latter to its very height, the former becomes absolutely and entirely destroyed; e.g. the Fire-flame on the appearance of the rise of water; and the Defects are liable to destruction in the presence of the idea of ‘No-soul’; hence when this idea reaches its height, how could the Defects continue to exist? |
ato nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / sapakṣe bhāvāc ca na viruddhatā // | Thus our Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’, And because it is present whenever the Probandum is present, it is not ‘contradictory’ either. |
evaṃ kleśāvaraṇaprahāṇaṃ prasādhya jñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇaṃ pratipādayann āha sākṣāt kṛtiviśeṣād iti / | Thus the ‘removal of the Hindrance of Afflictions’ having been established, the Author proceeds to describe the ‘removal of the Hindrance of Cognisable things’ [see verse 3339 next] |
sākṣāt kṛtiviśeṣāc ca doṣo nāsti savāsanaḥ / | Also, on account of the peculiar character of the direct perception, the defect along with the dispositions ceases forthwith; |
sarvajñatvam ataḥ siddhaṃ sarvāvaraṇamuktitaḥ // | and thus through freedom from all ‘obstacles’, omniscience becomes accomplished. |
[p.876] sākṣātkaraṇaṃ kasya nairātmyasyeti prakṛtatvād gamyate / | ‘Direct perception’ of what? of the idea of ‘no-soul’; this is to be understood from the context. |
tasyāviśeṣaḥ bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ{yai---} kālena bahunā sarvākāreṇa tatra tadvipakṣe ca guṇadoṣāṇām atyantaprakaśībhāvaḥ / | ‘The peculiar character’ of this Direct Perception consists in the complete realisation of the good and bad points of the said idea and its contrary (respectively), by a long-continued process. |
ata eva śrāvakāder anirātmyadarśane 'pi na sarvajñatvam / | It is because this complete realisation is wanting in those who are still in the stage of pupilage, that these are not omniscient. |
tathāvidhāntarābhyām aviśeṣābhāvena jñeyāvaraṇasyāprahāṇāt / | And the reason for this lies in the fact that, on account of the absence of the said long-continued practice, the ‘Hindrance of Cognisable things’ has not been removed; |
prayogaḥ yā sādaranairantaryadīrghakālaviśeṣaṇā bhāvanā sā karatalāyamānagrāhyāvabhāsamānajñānaphalā, tadyathā kāmāturasya kāminībhāvanā, svabhāvahetuḥ / | The argument may be formulated thus: That Contemplation which is carried on uninterruptedly with due faith for a long time brings about its fruit in the shape of the direct perception of things as if they were in one’s palms, as for example, the contemplation by the lover of the loved one; |
nacāsiddho hetuḥ, kāruṇikasyārthitvena tathā pravṛttisambhavasya pratipāditatvāt / | thus there is a reason based on the nature of things. The Reason here adduced cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’; |
nāpyanaikāntikatvam, yataḥ sarvadharmagatanairātmyālambanasya manovijñānasya dharmiṇo yathoktaviśeṣaṇatrayayuktabhāvanāsaṃspṛṣṭatvena hetutā sphuṭapratibhāsitvaṃ sādhyam / | Nor can the Reason be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; because the thing under discussion, which is the mental perception of the ‘soul-lessness’ of all things, is what is sought to be proved as rendered manifest by the aforesaid contemplation with the three qualifications. And the invariable concomitance of the character of the Probans with the character of the Probandum is well-known; |
kāraṇāntarānapekṣitvāt sphuṭapratibhāsitvasya / | specially because the clear manifestation of it does not need any other cause to bring it about; |
tataś ca sāmarthyāt sarvajñatvenāpi vyāptiḥ siddhā / | and from this there follows by implication, its invariable concomitance with omniscience also; |
yasyātsarvavastugatanairātmyādyālambanāya manaso yatsphuṭapratibhāsitvaṃ tadevāsya sarvajñatvaṃ nānyat / | because ‘omniscience’ is nothing other than the said clear manifestation of the Cognition envisaging the ‘Soul-less-ness’ of all things. |
tathā hi bhāvyamānavastusphuṭapratibhāsitvena bhāvanāyāḥ sāmānyena vyāptau siddhāyāṃ sāmarthyāt sarvajñatvenāpi siddhaiva / | Thus then the invariable concomitance of the contemplation with the expected clear manifestation in general being established, that with ‘omniscience’ also becomes established by implication. |
yathoktadharmiṇyasya sphuṭapratibhāsitvasyāsambhavāt / | Specially because in connection with the subject in question no other clear manifestation is possible. |
etena ye sattāsādhane doṣāḥ proktās te pratyuktāḥ / | By this same argument all those arguments become answered which the other party had brought forward against the existence of the Omniscient Person; |
sarvajñasattāyā asādhyatvāt / | because the existence of the Omniscient Person is not something to be proved; |
prasiddhe manasi dharmiṇaḥ sphuṭapratibhāsitvasya sādhyatvāt / | what is meant to be proved is the clear manifestation of the thing in question in the well-known mind (of that Person). |
evam anena prakāreṇa prasiddhatvāt sākṣāt kṛtiviśeṣāt kāyavānuvāgbuddhivaiguṇyalakṣaṇāyā doṣavāsanāyāḥ prahāṇāt siddhamāvaraṇadvayaprahāṇam / | In this way, on account of the peculiar character of the direct perception, the entire effects of the Defects, in the shape of the deficiencies of Body, Speech and Mind, become dispelled; and thus both kinds of ‘Hindrance’ become set aside; |
ataḥ sarvāvaraṇavimuktyā siddhaṃ sarvajñatvam // | and all hindrances having been set aside, Omniscience becomes an accomplished fact. |
etacca sugatasyeṣṭamādau nairātmyakīrtanāt / sarvatīrthakṛtāṃ tasmātsthitāṃ mūrdhni tathāgataḥ // | In fact, this (omniscience) that has been proved is that of Buddha himself, as it is he who, at the very outset, expounded the doctrine of ‘no-soul’. That is why he stands at the head of all philosophers. |
etad yathoktaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ sugatasyaiveṣṭam siddham / na kapilādeḥ / | The following might be urged “It may be that Omniscience in general has been proved; yet the Omniscience of Buddha has not been proved”. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3340 above] |
yenedaṃ sarvapadārthānāṃ skandhapañcakatvādideśanayā sarvākāramādau prathamato nairātmyaṃ kīrtitam, sa evādau sarvadharmāṇāṃ vicitrāprabhedanairātmyakīrtanāt kāryaliṅgāt siddhaḥ puruṣaviśeṣo 'smābhiḥ sugata ity ucyate / | The said omniscience has been proved really as belonging to Buddha, not to Kapila and others. “Why”? Because at the very outset, it was He who expounded the doctrine of ‘No-soul’. What is meant is as follows: By pointing out that all things are included among the five ‘Thought Phases’, Buddha taught, at the very outset, that there is ‘No-soul’. |
tasyānayā deśanayā sābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvasthirāśeṣajñānaṃ sādhyate / | It is this same Teacher whose existence is proved by the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the teaching of ‘Soul-less-ness’; |
{te}na jñāna [p.877] yogādevāsau sarvajñaḥ pramāṇabhūtaśceti taduktapratipattikāmaiḥ sādhayituṃ yuktaḥ, natu kīṭasaṅkhyādijñānāt / | Through this teaching of His, complete knowledge of all things, obtainable and discardable, along with the means of obtaining and discarding them, becomes secured. Hence it is through His connection with this complete knowledge that He becomes recognised as omniscient and reliable; |
kiṃtu kīṭasāṅkhyādāvapi tasya jñānasambhavaḥ sādhyate / | though it is proved that the knowledge of such things also is possible for Him; |
tattvasthirāśeṣajñānaṃ tvāhatya / | as His knowledge relates to the Truth relating to all things and is lasting. |
tathā hi pramāṇasaṃvādinairātmyadeśanayā tattvajñānaṃ yasya siddham, tasyaiva nairātmyasya pūrvāparāvyāhatadeśanayā sthirajñānam, navāṅge 'pi śāstrapravacane priyāna{nu---}viṣayāyām api deśanāyāṃ duḥkhādilakṣaṇasatyadeśanāyā ekavākyatvāt / vicitraiścopāyaiścatuḥsatyaprakāśanād aśeṣajñānamasyānumīyate / | For instance, by the teaching of the doctrine of ‘No-soul’, which is in full accordance with Reason and proofs His knowledge becomes established by the teaching that this ‘Soul-less-ness’ has always been there and will always be there. He has shown that His knowledge of things is lasting; specially because His teachings relating to the three kinds of Pain and allied things are in agreement with all the nine sections of the scriptures and with the teaching of the ‘Three Paths As He has made known the ‘Four Truths’ by various means, it is inferred from this that He knows all things; |
śeṣasya sarvākārajñānapratipādanāsamarthyalakṣaṇasya prahāṇāt / | specially as any incapacity there might have been there to comprehend all things has been dispelled. |
nahyaviditasarvākāraguṇadoṣastat pratipādanākuśalaś ca tathā pratipādayati / nāpi vedād vijñāya pratipādayatīti yuktam / | In fact, no one could expound such teachings, who did not know all the good and bad points of things and was not able to expound them. Nor can it be right to assert that “He has expounded these teachings after having learnt it from the Veda; |
tasya pauruṣeyatvapratipādanād iti bhāvaḥ / | as it has been shown that the Veda is the work of a human being. |
ato 'śeṣatīrthakaramūrdhni bhagavān jñānātiśayayogāt sthita iti siddham // ata eva yathoktajñānātiśayayoginā bhagavatā sahānyeṣāṃ na tulyatvam astīti darśayann āha tenetyādi / | From all this we conclude that the Blessed Lord stands at the head of all Philosophers, because of the superiority of His knowledge of things. For this same reason there can be no equality between the Blessed Lord of the superior knowledge and any one else. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3341-3342 next] |
na tulyahetu{yoga---}tānyeṣāṃ viruddhārthopadeśinām // pramāṇagocarā yeṣāṃ pramābādhākulaṃ vacaḥ / | There can be no equality between this teacher endowed with the true knowledge of truth, and other teachers who have expounded false doctrines. The knowledge of these latter is not vouched for by any means of right cognition, and their word is beset with annulment; |
teṣām atyakṣavijñānaśaktiyogo hi dūrataḥ // | therefore the capacity to know supersensuous things must be very far away from them. |
nahyeṣāṃ jñānātiśayayogitāprasādhakaḥ kaściddhetur asti / | There is no reason to prove that these other Teachers possess superior knowledge. |
tathā hi heturbhavat vacanākhyam eva liṅgaṃ bhavet / | If there were such reason at all, it could only be in the form of the Inferential Indicative in the form of their own Word; |
taccaiṣāṃ pramāṇaviruddhārthapratipādakam iti kathaṃ tato jñānātiśayayogitāmīṣāṃ pratīyeta // | and their Word has been found to be asserting things contrary to all forms of valid Cognition; how then could such Word prove the presence, in them, of superior knowledge? (3341-3342) |
sambaddhānuguṇopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam / | [The words of Buddha are] well-knit, they propound a compatible method, and set forth what is useful for men; |
dṛṣṭe 'pyarthe pramāṇābhyām īṣadapyaprabodhitam // | even in regard to perceptible things, they are not, in the least degree, annulled by the two means (and forms) of cognition. |
sambaddham vākyānām ekārthopasaṃhāreṇa parasparaṃ saṅgatam natu daśadāḍimādivākyavat parasparasaṅgatam / | ‘Well-knit’, the various sentences form one composite whole comprehending one and the same purpose; they are not disconnected, like such stray sentences as ‘ten pomegranates’, ‘six cakes’ and so forth. |
anuguṇaḥ śakyānuṣṭhānatayā nairātmyabhāvanādilakṣaṇa upāyo yasminnupadiṣṭas tat tathoktam, natu viṣapraśamanāya takṣakacūḍāratnālaṅkāropadeśavad aśakyopāyam / | A ‘compatible’ i.e. practicable ‘method’ in the shape of meditating upon soul-less-ness is taught in them; and they do not lay down such impracticable methods as the securing of the crest-jewel of the king of serpents. |
puruṣārthaḥ abhyudayaniḥśreyasalakṣaṇaḥ, tasyābhidhāyakam, natu kākadantaparīkṣāvad apuruṣārthaphalam / | ‘They set forth what is useful for men’ in the shape of Prosperity and the Highest good; they do not set forth such useless things as the investigation of the subject of the teeth of crows. |
nanu caitat sarvaṃ kapilādivākyeṣvapyastītyāha dṛṣṭe [p.878] 'pītyādi / | Says the Opponent “All this is applicable to the words of Kapila and other teachers also”. |
dṛṣṭe pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvenābhiprete / pramāṇābhyām pratyakṣānumānābhyām / | Answer; ‘Even in regard to, etc., etc.’ ‘Perceptible’ i.e. regarded as amenable to Perception and Inference; ‘not annulled by the two means of Cognition’ Perception and Inference; |
abādhitaṃ yathā nirdiṣṭasyārthasya tathābhāvāt / | because the real state of things is exactly as spoken of in the words. |
tathā hi nīlādisukhaduḥkhādinimittod grahaṇarāgādibuddhilakṣaṇasya skandhapañcakasya pratyakṣatvenābhimatasya nānyathātvaṃ sambhavati, apratyakṣatvenacābhimatānām apratyakṣateva / | That is to say, what is regarded as amenable to Perception is the fivefold group of Thought-phases in the shape of the conceptions of (a) the Blue and other objects, (b) Pleasure, Pain and other Feelings, (c) the causes of these, (d) the Apprehension, (e) Love and Hate, etc,, and it cannot be otherwise than what is asserted by Buddha; just like the imperceptibility of things regarded as imperceptible; |
yathā paraiḥ pratyakṣābhimatānāṃ rūpaśabdādisanniveśenāṃ sukhādīnāṃ dravyakarmasāmānyasaṃyogādīnāṃ ca / | so also of what other parties have regarded as perceptible, such as the various varieties of Colour, Sound and the rest, Pleasure, etc., and Substances, Actions, Universals and Conjunctions; |
tathā vastubalapravṛttānumānaviṣayatvenābhipretānāṃ tathā bhāva eva / | also such things as functioning through the potencies of things, and the rest are regarded as amenable to Inference, all these are exactly as asserted (by the words of Buddha). |
yathā caturṇāmāryasatyānām atadviṣayatveneṣṭānāṃ cātadviṣayatvam eva / | Similarly too, the four ‘Noble Paths’, which are not regarded as amenable to Inference, are actually found to be not so amenable; |
yathā parair vastubalānumānaviṣayatvenābhimatānām ātmādīnām / | just as the Soul and other things which are regarded by other parties as amenable to Inference functioning through the potency of things. |
apiśabdādadṛṣṭe 'pi na vikriyeti darśitam / | The particle ‘api’, also’, indicates that the words are not otherwise, even in regard to things that are not perceptible. |
tathāhyatra rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ vā dharmamuddiśya tatprahāṇāya tannidānātmadarśanavirodhena nairātmyadarśanam eva pratipakṣo deśito natu kapilādiśāstravat tannidānāviruddhaḥ snānāgnihotrādirupadiṣṭaḥ // | For instance, what the words of Buddha have taught, for the removal of Love, etc., is the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ as contrary to and counteracting the doctrine of ‘Soul’ which is at the root of that Love and Hate, etc. and the things emanating therefrom; and they have not taught like the words of Kapila and others such means as Bathing, performance of the Agnihotra and so forth, which are not incompatible with the root cause of Love, Hate, etc. |
ata eva viśuddhasuvarṇavat parīkṣya grāhyametad vicakṣaṇair iti bhagavatoktamityetat sūcayann āha tāpādityādi / | The following Text points out that it was for this reason that the Blessed Lord declared that ‘This is to be accepted by the wise, after proper testing, as in the case of gold [see verse 3344 above] |
yathā kaladhautaṃ suvarṇamamalaṃ sarvadoṣarahitaṃ parīkṣyamāṇaṃ tāpādibhir na vikriyāṃ pratipadyate tathā bhagavad vacoratnaṃ pratyakṣeṇa tāpasadṛśena vastubalapravṛttānumānena nikaṣaprakhyeṇāgamāpekṣānumānenāpi chedadṛṣṭāntasūcitena na vikriyate / | Just as gold, which is free from all impurities, pure, when tested by ‘Heating’, etc., does not undergo any change, so also the jewel-like words of the Blessed Lord, when tested (a) by ‘Perception’, which is like ‘Heating’ (b) by ‘Inference’ based on the capacity of things, which is like ‘Touching and (c) by Inference based on the Reliable Word, which is like ‘cutting’, do not undergo any change. |
ataḥ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇa evambhūtādevāgamāt pravṛttir yuktā nānyata ityabhiprāyaḥ // | It is thus only right that the activity of intelligent men should proceed on the basis of such Reliable Word only, not of any other. This is the purport of the Test. |
samastakumatadhvāntavidhvaṃsānuguṇodayam / tathāgatavacoratnamalabdhaṃ bahukalmaṣaiḥ // | The jewel-like word of Buddha, whose appearance is conducive to the destruction of the entire mass of the darkness of wrong notions, is never got at by men beset with sins. |
tataḥ sugatamevāhuḥ sarvajñamatiśālinaḥ / | That is why wise men declared Buddha alone to be omniscient, cognisant of all such things as primordial matter and spirits; |
sugatastena sarvajñaḥ kapilo neti tu pramā / | he has been called the ‘great physician thus there is the definitely certain cognition that Buddha is omniscient, not Kapila. |
anantaroditā vyaktāpyeṣā mūḍhair na lakṣitā // | Though this cognition has been clearly spoken of, it has not been understood by dull-witted men. |
kumatam eva dhvāntamandhakāram, tasya vidhvaṃso vināśaḥ, tasminnanuguṇa udayo [p.879] yasya tat tathoktam / | ‘Wrong ideas’ are the ‘darkness’; conducive to the destruction of that is the appearance of the Lord’s Word. |
bahukalmaṣair iti / apuṇyavadbhiḥ / | ‘By men beset with sins’ i.e. by men who have no piety. |
anantaroditeti / yathoktavacanākhyakāryaliṅgajā // | ‘Spoken of’ as brought about by the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the True Word. |
gaṇitādyekadeśeṣvityādāvāha yathoditāntarādityādi / yathoditāntarādeva viśeṣo 'pyavadhāryate / | It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3150, that “In regard to one matter, of Arithmetic for instance, all beings are found to be truthful and no distinction is found among them, etc. etc.”. |
yathoktajñānātiśayayogād bhagavato mārajito ṛṣabhavarddhamānādibhyo viśeṣe siddhe sati na yuktaṃ satyavacasā bhavatā vaktum na viśeṣo 'vadhāryata iti{iti} samudāyārthaḥ // | The above described ‘Superiority of Knowledge’ of the Blessed Lord, the ‘Suppressor of Māra’ (Desire) having established His ‘Distinction’ (superiority) over Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna and others it is not open to you, if you are truthful, to assert that ‘no Distinction is perceived’. |
Subsets and Splits