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ko hi niḥśeṣaśāstrārthatattvajñaṃ manyate jaḍaḥ / samānabhojanajñānān mātṛkāmātravedanāt // | What fool is there who will regard a person who knows the letters of the alphabet only, as conversant with the essence of all the sciences, merely on the ground of his possessing equal knowledge of food? (3349) |
tadyena hetunaikasya sarvajñatvaṃ prasādhyate / taddhetuvastuno 'sattvān na so 'nyasyopatiṣṭhate // | Thus then, that reason by which the omniscience of one person is established is not available in the case of another person; because the essence of that reason is absent in this latter case. |
taditi / tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Therefore; thus. |
taddhetuvastuna iti / | ‘The essence of that Reason’; |
yadi nāma śabdamātram asti syād vādādīnām aviparītārthānāṃ sarvārthavyāpinām upadeṣṭṛtvāditi, tathāpi tasya vastupratibaddhasya hetuvastuno hetvarthasyābhāvānnāsau hetur anyasya kapilāder upatiṣṭhate vastveva hi vastupratibaddhatvād vastu gamayati na śabdamātram // | though the mere verbal expression of the Reason may be applicable, in the form ‘Because they are Teachers of the Syādvāda and other doctrines which are true and all-pervading [therefore Jina and others should be regarded as Omniscient]’; yet the essential factor of that Reason which is concomitant with the reality of things, is absent in such reasonings, which therefore cannot be available for the case of Kapila and others. It is only when one real thing is concomitant with another real thing, and not merely a verbal expression that brings about the right apprehension of things. |
dūṣaṇānītyādāvāha taddūṣaṇānītyādi / taddūṣaṇānyasaṃrambhāḥ sarvajñajinaśāsane / | It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3152, that “The objections that the Buddhists forcibly urge against the arguments in support of the Omniscience of Jina, are also urged by the Jainas against the other party, etc. etc.”. |
śākyā yāni vadantyevaṃ tānyaśaktā digambarāḥ // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3351 above] |
asaṃrambhā iti / | ‘Without anger’ Free from anger. |
kṛpayaiva parānugrahāya teṣāṃ pravṛtter na bhavatām iva roṣamānādibhiḥ / | In fact the Buddhists proceed to put forward those arguments only through pity for you, not, through anger or arrogance, like yourselves. |
evam iti / tadupadiṣṭasya syādvādāder duṣṭatvapratipādanāt // | ‘This’ Because it has been shown that the Syādvāda and other teachings propounded by him are defective. |
yatsiddhapratibandhena pramāṇenopapāditam / tattvaṃ saugatasiddhānte siddhaṃ nānyamate tathā // [p.880] tena vyavasthitais teṣāṃ bhinnaiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇaiḥ / | Because the truth that has been found in the buddhist doctrine, through proofs with well-established premises, has not been so found in any other doctrine, therefore please draw as many definite conclusions as you can, through various reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are well-founded and not swallowed by their own reflections. |
pratibimbodayāgrastair nirṇayaḥ kriyatāmalam // | It has been argued under Text 3153, How can any definite conclusion be arrived at through such reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are uncertain and swallowed by their own reflections?” |
yaditi / yasmāt / | ‘Yat’ Because. |
vastubalapravṛtter na{rnaḥ---} siddhatādātmyatadupattilakṣaṇapratibandhenetyarthaḥ / | ‘Siddhapratibandhena’ By means of Premises asserting identity and the causal relations, on the strength of the real state of things. |
tasmāt // | ‘Tena’ Therefore. |
yasya jñeyetyādāvāha sarvākārajñatāyāstvityādi / sarvākārajñatāyāstu na kaścid api vidyate / | As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between the character of ‘knowing all things’ and that of ‘being cognisable, etc.’ in fact ‘cognisability’ is proved by the ‘absence of incognisability’, not by the ‘absence of omniscience’; |
sākṣāditarathā vāpi virodho jñeyatādibhiḥ // ajñeyatvādiviśleṣāt jñeyatvādi vyavasthitam / | It has been argued, under Text 3157, “Who can reasonably accept the existence of a Person who can be regarded by such reasons as ‘being cognisable’, etc. etc.?” |
arthāntaravidhānenārthāntarasya niṣedhaṃ pratipādayitum icchatā sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā viruddhasyaiva vidhānāt pratipādanīyo nāviruddhasya anyathā hi yasya kasyacid vidhānena sarvasya niṣedhaḥ syāt / | When one desires to establish the denial of one thing by the affirmation of another, he should affirm that which may be incompatible either directly or indirectly, with what is to be denied, and not that which is not so incompatible. If it were not so, then the affirmation of anything at random might lead to the denial of all things. |
naca sarvajñatvasya jñayatvādibhiḥ saha kaścit sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā virodho 'sti / | In the case in question, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between ‘Omniscience’ and ‘cognisability’. |
tathā hi dvividha eva bhāvānāṃ virodho nirūpyamāṇo 'vatiṣṭhate parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo vā yathā bhāvābhāvayoḥ kramākramayor vā / | For instance, incompatibility between any two things can be of only two kinds (1) in the form of mutual exclusion, the presence and absence of one implying the absence and presence, respectively, of the other, e.g. between Existence and Non-existence, or between Succession and Non-succession; |
sahānavasthānalakṣaṇo vā yathāgniśītasparśayoḥ / | and (2) in the form of impossibility of co-existence; e.g. between Fire and Coolness. |
tatrādyastāvajjñeyatvādibhiḥ saha sarvajñatvasya na sambhavatīti darśayati ajñeyatvād ityādi / yadvyavacchedanāntarīyako yasya paricchedas tayor eva parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo virodha iti pūrvam uktam / | That the former kind of ‘incompatibility’ is not there between ‘Omniscience’ and ‘cognisability’ is shown by the words ‘Cognisability is proved, etc. etc.’ It has been pointed out on a previous occasion that there is ‘incompatibility’ of the kind of mutual exclusiveness between those two things only of which the cognition of one means the non-cognition of the other; |
na ca jñeyatvādi sarvajñatvavyavacchedena sthitam, kiṃ tarhi ajñeyatvādivyavacchedena // | and ‘cognisability’ is there, as excluding, not ‘Omniscience’, but ‘incognisability’. |
nāpi dvitīyo virodhaḥ sambhavatīti darśayann āha sarvajñatvamityādi / | The following Text shows that the second kind of incompatibility also is not there in the case in question: [see verse 3356 next] |
sarvajñatvaṃ nacāpyetat kvacit pūrṇakāraṇam / sattvādisambhave paścāt prākpravṛttaṃ nivartate // | Omniscience has never before been seen to appear on the appearance of its complete cause, by virtue of which it could be said to cease on the appearance of the character of ‘being an entity’ and so forth. |
yasya hyavikalakāraṇasya bhavato yat sannidhānād abhāvas tayor eva sahānavasthānalakṣaṇo virodhaḥ, nacaitat sarvajñatvamavikalakāraṇaṃ prākpravṛttaṃ dṛṣṭam, yena paścāt sattvādisambhave sati nivartata iti syāt // | It is only when between two things, one does not appear even when its Cause is present in its perfect condition, by reason of the presence of the other, that the two are said to be ‘incompatible’, in the sense of never co-existing; as regards the case in question, Omniscience has never before been seen to appear on the appearance of its Cause in perfect condition, by virtue of which it could cease on the appearance of the character of ‘being an entity’. |
kasmān na pravṛttam ity āha naiḥsvābhāvya ityādi / | Question; “Why is it that Omniscience has not come into existence on the presence of a Cause?” |
nāviruddhavidhāne ca yuktam anyanivartanam / | The affirmation of what is not incompatible cannot be rightly regarded as setting aside the other. |
anyathā rūpasadbhāvād rasābhāvo 'pi gamyate // | otherwise the presence of colour might mean the absence of taste. |
yastu manyate yadyapi jñeyatvādayo na viruddhyante sarvajñatvena, vaktṛtvaṃ tu viruddhyata eva, pāramparyeṇaitat kāraṇena vikalpena sarvajñatvasya sahānavasthānāt / | Some people argue as follows Even though ‘Cognisability’, etc. are not incompatible with ‘Omniscience’, yet the character of ‘being a speaker’ is certainly incompatible with it; because Omniscience cannot co-exist along with ‘Speakership’, of which ‘Conceptual Content’ is the indirect Cause; |
tathā hi nāvitarkya nāvicārya vācaṃ bhāṣata iti nyāyād vacanasya vikalpo hetuḥ, vikalpānāṃ ca sarveṣām abhilāpasaṃsṛṣṭatayā na vastusvarūpagrahaṇam asti, tasya nirvikalpajñānagocaratvāt, ato vikalpāvasthāyāṃ vastusvarūpaparijñānābhāvān na sarvajñatvam astīti siddhāsya vaktṛtvasya vipakṣāt sarvajñatvalakṣaṇāt kāraṇānupalabdhyā vyatirekaniścitir iti nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | because on the principle that ‘one cannot utter words without previous cogitation and thinking’. Conceptual Content is the cause of Speaking; and as all Conceptual Content is associated with verbal expression, it cannot apprehend the forms of things, this latter being amenable to only such cognition as is free from Conceptual Content; thus during the conceptual stage, there being no apprehension of the form of things, there can be no Omniscience. Thus Omniscience being contrary to (incompatible with) Speakership, the presence of one would mean the absence of the other, due to the non-apprehension of its Cause. |
ayaṃ ca vaktṛtvākhyo hetuḥ yasya jñeyaprameyatvavastusattvādilakṣaṇā ityatrādiśabdenākṣipta eveti / | So that our Reason is not ‘Inconclusive This Reason, ‘Speakership’ is implied by the term ‘ādi’ in the sentence ‘one who has the characters of being knowable, cognisable, etc. etc.’ (under Text 3157).” |
tadetat tadatrādipadākṣipta ityādināśaṅkya atrāpi ye pravaktṛtvam ityādinā pariharati / tadatrādipadākṣipte vaktṛtve yo 'bhimanyate / | In this matter, the ‘speakership’ of the lord being implied by the first word uttered by him, a certain party thinks that there is an incompatibility between such ‘speakership’ and ‘omniscience’, and hence concludes that there can be no ‘omniscience’; |
vikalpe sti vatkṛtvaṃ sarvajñaścāvikalpataḥ / | because there can be ‘speakership’ only when there is ‘conceptual content’, while one could be ‘omniscient’ only if there were no ‘conceptual content’; |
na hyāviṣṭābhilāpena vastu jñānena gamyate // | as a matter of fact, (he urges) an entity is never apprehended by a cognition associated with verbal expression. |
atrāpi ye pravaktṛtvaṃ vitarkānuvidhānataḥ / sarvajñasyābhimanyante na tair vacanasambhave // | As regards this reasoning also, those who think that the ‘speakership’ of the omniscient person follows from cogitation and thinking, do not admit the omniscient person on the ground of his being a ‘speaker’; |
sarvajña iṣyate nāpi vikalpajñānavṛttitaḥ / | nor on the ground of his conceptual knowledge; |
tasmin kṣaṇe vikalpe tu vaktṛtvaṃ na prasiddhyati // | in case, however, there is no ‘conceptual content’, there can be no ‘speakership’. |
kecid bhagavato vaktṛtvaṃ vikalpasaṃmukhībhāvād eveti pratipannāḥ, anye tu pūrvāveva{śa}vaśādevāvikalpyato 'pi vacanapravṛttir bhagavata iti varṇayanti / | Some people hold that the ‘Speakership’ of the Lord is due to the appearance of the ‘Conceptual Content’; while others are of the opinion that, on account of previous impetus, the Lord proceeds to speak even without any conceptual idea. |
tatra prathame darśane yadi vikalpāvasthāyām asarvajñatvaṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā, iṣyata eva tais tasyāmavasthāyāṃ bhagavato 'sarvadarśitvam / athāvikalpāvasthāyām asarvajñatvaṃ bhāvayitum iṣṭam / | Under the former view, if what is meant to be proved is that ‘there can be no Omniscience during the conceptual state’, then the argument is superfluous; because these people themselves admit that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient. If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is the absence of Omniscience in the non-conceptual state, then, the Reason adduced is ‘inadmissible’; |
tadā hetor asiddhatā / | because in that state, there is no speaking at all; |
nahi tasyāmavasthāyāṃ vacanapravṛttir asti, samutthāpakasya vikalpasya tadānīmabhāvāt // | for the simple reason that in that state there is no Conceptual Content that could prompt the Speaking. Even so, it cannot be right to regard his words as those uttered by one who is not-omniscient; |
sarvajñatāsamākṣepādataḥ saṃvādanaṃ bhavet // | because his non-omniscience has been discarded by his omniscience; hence there should be agreement. |
anubhūya yathā kaścid auṣṇyaṃ paścāt prabhāṣate / | for instance, having experienced heat, one speaks of it [and this speech is reconciled, in agreement, with the previous experience or cognition]; |
tasmād vastvavisaṃvādas tadarthānubhavodbhavāt // tena sarvajñatākāle hetor asyāprasiddhatā / | from this there is no disagreement with the real state of things, because the speech is the outcome of the direct cognition of those things. thus then, at the time when the lord is omniscient, the reason adduced by the other party is not present; |
vyāhāravṛttikāle tu bhavet siddhaprasādhanam // | and as regards the time of ordinary usage, his argument would be superfluous. |
yadyapi tasyāmavasthāyām asarvajñas tathāpyasarvajñapraṇītatvam asya na bhavati, kutaḥ ---, sarvajñatayā samākṣiptatvāt tasya / | Though at that time the Lord is not omniscient, yet that does not mean that His words are such as have been uttered by one who is not-omniscient; why? because this non-omniscience has been set aside by Omniscience. |
ata eva sarvajñajñānabalotpannavikalpasamutthāpitatvāt tasya pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād anumānavikalpavat prāmāṇyam api bhavati / atraiva dṛṣṭāntapāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād anumānavikalpavat prāmāṇyam api bhavati / | It is on this account that the Words in question become reliable also, having been prompted by the Conceptual Content brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, and therefore connected, indirectly, with the real state of things; this reliability is just like the reliability of the Inferential Conception. |
atraiva dṛṣṭāntamāha anubhūyetyādi / | An example is cited in support of the said idea ‘For instance, etc. etc.’ |
tadarthānubhavodbhavād iti / | ‘Tasmāt’ from the speech coming after the experiencing of heat. |
tasyoṣṇārthasyānubhavāt pāramparyeṇa vikalpasyodbhavād ity arthaḥ / | ‘The speech is the outcome, etc. etc.’ i.e. because the Conceptual Content has been brought about, indirectly, by the direct cognition of the Heat. |
syād etat yadi sarvajñasya vikalpapratyayo 'sti tadā bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti, vikalpasya prakṛtyā svapratibhāsenā{ 'na---}rthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrāntatvād iti / | The following might be urged “If the Omniscient Person has Conceptual Cognitions, then there is likelihood of His being mistaken; because, by its very nature, Conception is mistaken, wrong, because it appears as the Cognition of a thing as what is not that thing”. |
naitad asti / | This is not so. |
yadyāropitasya tāttvikasya ca rūpasya vibhāgaṃ na jānīyāt tadā bhrānto bhavet, yāvatā vikalpāviṣayamāropitātmanaiva niścinvan bāhyaṃ ca vastu nirvikalpakajñānagocaraṃ pṛthageva tāttvikaṃ tāttvikātmanā paśyan kathaṃ viparyasto nāma / | The Lord could be mistaken, only if He did not know the distinction between the Real and the Imposed (Unreal). As a matter of fact, however, He recognises the object of the Conceptual Cognition as only imposed (unreal), while He looks upon the real external object, which is envisaged by the Non-conceptual Cognition, as something quite different, and real; how then can He be said to be ‘mistaken’? |
yadyaviparyastaḥ katham āropayati vikalpāvasthāyām iti cet / | “If He is not mistaken, why does He impose (fancy) things during the conceptual state?” |
na / | Not so; |
śabdapravṛttyupāyajñatvāt / | because He is cognisant all the time of the means whereby speech is prompted. |
yato nānyamāropakavikalpavya [p.883] tirekeṇa śabdasya samutthāpakaṃ paśyati, nāpi śabdārthamāropitād anyamupalabhate, ataḥ śabdapravṛttyupāyajño jagadanukampayāyathāvad adhigataṃ tattvam apratipādya parasmai nāsituṃ samarthaḥ saṃstat pratipipādayiṣayā śabdapravṛttyupāyam āropakaṃ vikalpamāropyaṃ ca śabdābhidheyamāracayati / | As a matter of fact, He does not perceive anything else, apart from the imposing conception as prompting the speech; nor does He apprehend any other connotation of the Words, apart from what is imposed; hence, knowing the means whereby speech is prompted, He takes pity on the world, and, without expounding to others the things as He has actually perceived them, He cannot sit idle; and being urged by the desire to expound them, He creates the imposing conception, as the means prompting speech, as also the imposed, in the shape of the connotation of Words. |
etac ca paścād āśaṅkya codyaṃ parihariṣyati / | All this objection the Author will bring up later on and answer it. |
asmābhis tv atra prastāvāgatatvād ity abhihitam / | We have introduced it in the present context, because it had some bearing upon it. |
ata eva vaktṛtvād rāgitvānumānamapyayuktamanyathāpi vacanapravṛttisambhavāt / nahi rāgādīnām eva kāryaṃ vacanaspandādayaḥ, vaktukāmatāsāmānyahetutvāt / | For the same reasons, it cannot be right to regard the Omniscient Person as affected by Love, on the ground of His speakership. Because speech can proceed from other causes also. Speaking, Movement and such actions are not always due to Love, etc.; they are due to the mere desire to speak; |
bhāva{sā ca---}vaktukāmatā vītarāgasya karuṇayāpi sambhavatīti vyabhicāraḥ / | and this Desire to speak is possible also in the Person devoid of Love, being due to His mercy. Hence the Reason adduced is not true. |
saiva karuṇā rāga iti cet/ | “Mercy itself is only a form of Love.” |
na / | Not so; |
{na}nāmakaruṇa{yā} kiñcidaniṣṭamāpadyate / | because Mercy does not bring about any undesirable effects; |
kiṃtu nityasukhātmātmīyadarśanākṣiptaṃ sāśravavastuviṣayaṃ cetaso 'bhiṣvaṅgaṃ rāgamāhuḥ / | while Love has been described as that attachment of the mind which appertains to things beset with impurities, and which is indicated by the notion of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ and of one’s ‘lasting happiness’; |
tat pūrvakaścātmātmīyoparodhini pratihatir dveṣaḥ / | while Hate is the desire to harm, against anything that injures the ‘me’ and ‘mine’; |
ātmātmīyagrahaś ca moho na caiva kṛpā / | and the notion of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ is sheer delusion; not so Mercy; |
tasyā asatyapyātmagrahe duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇābhyāsabalenaivotpādāt / | because Mercy appears, even without any notion of ‘I’, through the repeated perception of particular forms of Pain and Suffering. |
tathā hi vītarāgāṇāṃ dharmādyālambanā maitryādayaḥ śāstre varṇitāḥ // | It is on this ground that the Scriptures have asserted that Persons free from Love and Attachment are moved by Friendliness and other feelings that are based entirely upon Dharma, etc. |
syād etadyadi sarvaviṣayajñānāsaṃmukhībhāvamātraṃ sādhyate, tathāpi siddhasādhyatā bhavedyāvatā samastavastutattvavistarajñānāśaktatā sādhayitumiṣṭā, ato na siddhasādhyatā nāpi hetor asiddhatā vyāhārasāmarthyamātrasya hetutvena vivakṣitatvāt ityata āha samastetyādi / | The following might be urged “If we had wanted to prove only that the knowledge of all things is not always present before Him, then perhaps our argument might have been superfluous, seeking to prove what is already admitted. As a matter of fact however, what we mean to prove is the fact that He does not possess the capacity to know in detail the truth relating to all things; hence our reasoning is not superfluous; nor is our Reason ‘Inadmissible’; because what our Reason means is the capacity to use.” |
samastavastuvijñānaśaktyapākaraṇe 'pi te / | even against the wise men who hold this view, the argument of the other party is of no avail. |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvaṃ tadavasthaṃ prasajyate // vyāhāravṛttisāmarthye hetutvenāpi saṃmate / | The ‘speakership’ that is popularly conceived by men, if that is put forward as the reason, then it would be open to the charge of having its presence in the contrary of the probandum possible. |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvena naikāntikatā hetoḥ // | “When the doctrine in question has no reason in its support, what sort of ‘inadmissibility’ would there be in regard to it?” (3370b) |
atha yeṣām avikalpa{ya}to 'pi bhagavato vacanapravṛttir iti pakṣas tatrāha cakretyādi / | Other Buddhists have held that words proceed from the Blessed Lord, even without conceptual content; with reference to this view, the Author says [see verses 3368-3369 above] |
cakrabhramaṇayogena nirvikalpe 'pi tāyini / sambhārāvegasāmarthyād deśanā sampravartate // | In the case of the Potter’s wheel, even after the turning by the stick has ceased, its revolution continues under the force of the momentum imparted to it; |
[p.884] yathāhi cakrasyoparate 'pi daṇḍapreraṇavyāpāre pūrvāvegavaśād bhramaṇam evaṃ bhagavati pratyastamitasamastakalpanājāle 'pi sthite pravartata eva pūrvapuṇyajñānasambhārāvegavaśāddeśaneti sudhiyaḥ saugatāḥ kecana vijñānavādinaḥ pratipannāḥ, tān prati sphuṭataramasiddhatādoṣo hetoravasīyata eva / | similarly in the case of the Blessed Lord, even after the cessation of the entire web of conceptual content, His Teaching goes on under the force of the momentum originally imparted by His previous Piety. Such is the view that has been held by some ‘wise men’ i.e. the Idealist Buddhists. |
syād etadasmin darśane sarveṣām eva svapratibhāsānubhavamātratvāt paramārthato na kasyacid vaktṛtvam asti kiṃ tvadhyavasāyavaśād avadatyapi parasmiṃs tathā pratibhāsivijñānotpattāv adhipatipratyayabhāvena sthite vaktṛtvābhimāno loke, tadevādhyavasāyikaṃ lokapratītaṃ vaktṛtvaṃ hetutvenābhipretam / | As against these also, the Reason adduced by the opponent remains clearly ‘inadmissible (3368-3369a) The following might be urged “Under the view just referred to, every thing is a mere reflection of one’s own apprehension (Idea), hence there can be no real ‘speakership’ at all in the case of any man; in fact, even when he does not speak, the reflected ideation appears in another man; so that the person remains the dominating cause, and hence people come to regard him as the ‘speaker’; |
nahi siddhāntaprasiddho hetur dharmo vā kriyate, kiṃ tarhi lokapratīta evetyato nāsiddhatā hetor ityāśaṅkyāha vaktṛtvam ityādi / vaktṛtvaṃ yat tu lokena matamādhyavasāyikam // | and it is this popularly conceived ‘speakership’ that has been adduced by us as the Reason (for Buddha being not-omniscient); either the Reason or the ‘subject’ of our reasoning is not in accordance with our own doctrine, but in accordance with the popular notion of things. |
tatra tādṛśi hetoḥ syāt sandigdhavyatirekitā / | Consequently there can be no ‘Inadmissibility’ in the Reason adduced by us”. |
atrāpi pūrvavat sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvād anaikāntikatā hetoḥ / nanvityādinā paro yadasiddhatvam atra vijñānavādanaye proktaṃ tadvighaṭayati / | [verses 3369b-3370a]: Here also, its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful, the Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive (3369-3370a) The following Text clarifies that ‘Inadmissibility’ which the opponent has urged against the doctrine of the Idealist: [see verse 3370b next] |
evam manyate ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vā, nānyatara{rā}prasiddhaḥ sandigdhavācī, punaḥ sādhanāpekṣaṇād iti nyāyāt / | The opponent argues as follows: “Only those arguments in support of, or against, anything, are admissible which set forth ideas accepted with certainty of conviction by both parties, not what is not accepted by either party, or what is doubtful; because arguments of the latter sort would need further arguments in support of them. |
apramāṇopapanne 'smin vijñānavādamate katham asiddhatodbhāvyate, nahi svecchāmātreṇa siddhatvāsiddhatvaparikalpanāyāṃ dūṣaṇaṃ bhavati, kiṃ tarhi pramāṇabalopapāditāyāṃ siddhāvasiddhau vā, na ca pramāṇabalād vijñānanayaḥ siddhaḥ, asya vistareṇa nirastatvāt // | When, thus, the doctrine of the Idealist is one that is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition, how can Inadmissibility be urged (against any Reason urged against it)? A conclusion does not become vitiated by the arbitrary assumption of admissibility or inadmissibility; it is effective only when these are vouched for by proofs; and as a matter of fact the doctrine of Idealism has not been established by any Means of Right Cognition; in fact it has been rejected in detail”. (3370b) |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 3371-3373 next] |
ucyate yadi vaktṛtvaṃ svatantraṃ sādhanaṃ matam / tadānīm āśrayāsiddhaḥ sandigdhāsiddhatāthavā // asya cārthasya sandehāt sandigdhāsiddhatā sthirā / | Our answer is as follows: if ‘speakership’ by itself, is meant to be the reason, then it is one whose substratum is unknown, or its ‘inadmissibility’ is suspected. In fact, the exact connotation of the word being doubtful, the fact remains that it is one whose ‘inadmissibility’ is suspected. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ tasmāt tvayā vaktavyamīdṛśam // tatra cāgamamātreṇa siddho dharmaḥ prakāśyate / | Consequently, if you have to urge such an argument, you can do so only as a reductio ad absurdum. And in such an argument what has to be urged must be what is knowable only from the scriptures (of the other party); |
natu tadbhāvasiddhyarthaṃ jñāpakaṃ vidyate param // | and there can be no other means of proving its existence. |
[p.885] atra vikalpadvayaṃ kadācid vatkṛtvaṃ svātantryeṇa sādhanaṃ vābhipretaṃ bhavet, prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vā / | There are only two alternative views possible (1) ‘speakership’ may he a Reason, independently by itself or (2) it may be in the nature of a Reductio ad absurdum. |
tatrādye pakṣe viśeṣeṇāśrayo na siddha ityāśrayāsiddhatā hetoḥ / | Under the former view, the substratum of the qualification would be ‘unknown’; hence the Reason would be ‘unknown’, ‘inadmissible’. |
atha sāmānyenāśrayo vivakṣitas tathāpi yāvat prativādinaṃ prati pramāṇena vaktṛtvaṃ na sādhyate tāvat sandigdhāsiddhatā, ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācīsa eva sādhanam iti nyāyāt / | If the substratum is meant to be, not qualified, but in general, even so, until the ‘speakership’ has been proved to the satisfaction of the other party, its admissibility must remain doubtful; in accordance with the principle that a reason can prove a conclusion only when it is itself admitted by both parties. |
asyeti / vaktṛtvasya / | ‘Asya’ i.e. of ‘speakership’. |
tasmān mābhūdayaṃ doṣa iti prasaṅgasādhanam aṅgīkartavyaṃ tvayā / | Thus in order to avoid this difficulty, you have to admit that what you have urged is only a Reductio ad absurdum. |
tatrāpi prasaṅgasādhane ya evāvicāraramaṇīyāgamamātrāt parasya prasiddho dharmaḥ sa eva sādhanatvena prakāśanīyaḥ parasparavirodhodbhāvanāya natvasau pramāṇena sādhanīyo niṣprayojanatvāt / | But even as regards this Reductio ad Absurdum, what has to be put forward as the Reason is only that character which cannot bear any scrutiny and what is knowable only from the scriptures of the other party; as the putting forward of such a Reason would expose the self-contradiction on the part of the opponent; and no attempt should be made to prove such a character; |
naca vaktṛtvaṃ parasyāgamamātreṇa prasiddhamityubhayathāprasiddhatā hetoḥ // | ‘speakership’ is not a character knowable only from the scriptures of the other party. So that your Reason remains ‘Inadmissible’ under both alternatives. |
evaṃ yasya prameyatvavastusattādilakṣaṇāḥ / nihantu hetavo 'śaktāḥ ko na taṃ kalpayiṣyati // vedavādimukhasthaivaṃ yuktilaukikavaidikī / na kācid api śakyograsarpajñānaviṣāpahā // | When reasons such as ‘being known’, ‘being an entity’, ‘being’ and so forth are incapable of setting aside the omniscient person, who is there who will not admit his existence? Thus no reason, either temporal or scriptural, that the upholder of the Veda can have in his mouth, is capable of removing the poison of the awful serpent in the shape of the knowledge of the Śākya. |
dṛgviṣair iha dṛṣṭo 'pi khalpaśaktir dvijo jaḍaḥ / ucchvāsam api no kartuṃ śaknoti kimuvāsitum // | In fact, the feeble and dull-witted Brāhmaṇa, even when merely glanced at by the poison from the eyes (of that serpent), becomes unable even to breathe, what to say of setting it aside! |
vedavādimukhasthā tu yuktiḥ sādhvyapi durbhagā / | Any reasoning, even when sound, becomes ugly in the mouth of the Vedic scholar, on account of its abundance in a lowly substratum; |
kaṇṭhikā carastheva jaghanyāśrayasaṃsthiteḥ // | just like the string of beads placed at the feet. |
ko na taṃ kalpayiṣyatīti sambhavitveneti śeṣaḥ / | ‘Who will not admit His existence?’ i.e. as a possibility. |
yato bādhakānupalambhād eva tasya sambhāvanā siddhyatīti bhāvaḥ / | That is to say, when the mere absence of proofs to the contrary establishes that possibility. |
Subsets and Splits