sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
kiñca sāmānyenāpi sarvajñasambhave sādhyamāne bhagavatyevāvatiṣṭhate sāmarthyād iti darśayati tat sambhavyapītyādi / | Further, even if what is proved is omniscience in general, by implication it becomes recognised as belonging to the Blessed Lord only. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3336 next] |
tatsambhavyapi sarvajñaḥ sāmānyena prasādhitaḥ / | as it is only he in whom all the characteristics of the omniscient person are present. |
taditi tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Thus, therefore ‘As it is, etc. etc.’; |
sarvajñalakṣaṇāvinābhāvāt // | because it is only He in whom all the characteristics of the Omniscient Person are present. |
nanu viśeṣanirdeśamantareṇa katham asau labhyata ity āha anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo 'pītyādi / | Question: “Without such specification, how can this idea be got at?” Answer: [see verse 3337 next] |
anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo 'pi sarvajñaḥ ko 'pi sambhavet / yo yathāvat jagatsarvaṃ vettyanātmādirūpataḥ // | Even when one is specifically singled out, that person alone could be omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of ‘being without soul’ and the rest. |
yo hi sarvaṃ jagadanātmādirūpeṇa yathāvad avagacchati sa sarvajña ityevaṃ sāmānyena kṛte 'pi sarvajñalakṣaṇe yatra tadupalabhyate sa sāmarthyād viśeṣo 'vagamyata eveti viśeṣopādānam anarthakam etacca sarvajñalakṣaṇaṃ bhagavatyevopalabhyate nānyatra vicitrairupāyair avikalacatuḥsatyalakṣaṇasābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvaprakāśanād iti bhāvaḥ / | Though the definition of the Omniscient Person is stated in the general form that ‘That Person is Omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of being without Soul and the rest’, it follows by implication that the particular person who fulfills the conditions of this definition is meant to be Omniscient; and hence it is not necessary to specify that Person. As a matter of fact, it is only our Blessed Lord and none else who fulfills all the conditions of the said definition of the ‘Omniscient Person’; as it is only He who has expounded in various ways the truth regarding what should be sought for and what rejected, along with the means of the same, in the shape of the ‘Four Truths’ in their perfect form. |
nahyaviditaṃ vastu tathābhāvais tathāvattadaviparītamavikalam upadeṣṭuṃ śakyate / | If a man does not know a thing, he cannot expound teachings that are perfect and true as regards the real state of that thing. |
yathoktam "parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram" iti // | This has been thus declared ‘The expounding of the imperceptible to be secured and the means thereof is an extremely difficult task’, (3337) |
pratyakṣīkṛtanairātmye na doṣo labhate sthitim / | When one has perceived the fact of there being no soul, no defect can obtain a footing in him; |
tadviruddhatayā dīpe pradīpe timiraṃ yathā // | Just as when the bright lamp is there, there can be no darkness. |
kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam, tatra kleśā eva rāgādayo bhūtadarśanaprati [p.870] bandhā{ndha---}bhāvāt kleśāvaraṇam ucyante, dṛṣṭasyāpi heyopādeyatattvasya yat sarvākārāparijñānaṃ pratipādanāsāmarthyaṃ ca jñeyāvaraṇam / | As a matter of fact, Omniscience follows from the removal of Hindrance of Afflictions and the Hindrance of cognisable things; it is the Afflictions themselves, in the form of Love, Hate, etc. which obstruct the perception of the real nature of things, which are called ‘the cover of the Afflictions’; and ‘the cover of cognisable things’ consists in the want of capacity to discern all about things to be secured and to be rejected, and also the inability to describe them. |
tatra kleśāvaraṇasya nairātmyapratyakṣīkaraṇāt prahāṇiḥ / | Of these two, ‘the cover of the Afflictions’ is removed by the direct perception of the fact of there being no-Soul; |
jñeyāvaraṇasya tu tasyaiva nairātmyadarśanasya sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsāt / tathāhyamī rāgādayaḥ kleśā vitathātmadarśanamūlakā anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitāḥ na bāhyārthabalabhāvinaḥ / | and ‘the cover of cognisable things’ is removed by the faithful and intense and long-continued meditation upon the said Soul-less-ness* All these Afflictions Love, Hate and the rest have their root in wrong notions of the Soul, as has been found through positive and negative concomitance; and they do not proceed from the external things; because, even when the external thing is there, the said Afflictions do not appear without feelings of agreeableness, etc. (?); |
yataḥ satyapi bāhyārthe nāyonisaumanacchā{skā---}ramantareṇotpadyante / | and conversely, even when the external thing is not there, they appear, when the man is face to face with agreeableness, etc. (?); |
naca sa{ya---}tsadasattānuvidhāyi yan na bhavati tat tatkāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | and when the presence and absence of one thing do not follow the presence and absence of another thing, this latter cannot be the cause of the former; |
nāpyete paraparikalpitātmasamavāyinaḥ, tasyātmano nirastatvāt / | Nor can these Afflictions subsist in the Soul postulated by other philosophers; because such a Soul has been already rejected. |
satyapi vā tasminnityaṃ rāgādīnām utpattyanapāyaprasaṅgāt / | But even if such a Soul existed, there would be constant appearance of the Afflictions of Love, etc.; |
utpattisthitikāraṇasyāvikalasyātmanaḥ sarvadā sannihitatvāt / | because the Soul, which ex-hypothesi, is the cause of the appearance and continuance of the Afflictions, would be always present in its perfect form; |
parair anādheyātiśayasya tadapekṣānupatteśceti bahudhā carcitam etat / | specially as the Eternal Cause cannot have any potencies imposed upon it by anything else, it could not stand in need of the help of anything else. All this has been discussed in several places. |
sadasatoścāśrayaṇaniṣedhād ayuktam eṣāṃ kvacit samavāyitvam ityato na nityahetupratibaddhātmasthitayaḥ / | Further, as one and the same thing has been denied to be the substratum of both the existent and the non-existent, it cannot be right to hold that these Afflictions subsist in anything. From all this it follows that these Afflictions cannot be related to any Eternal Cause. |
nāpi bāhyārthabalabhāvinaḥ / | Nor can they proceed from the external things. |
kiṃtvabhūtātmadarśanabalasamudbhāvinaḥ, tathāhyaham ityapaśyato nātmasnehaujāyate, nāpi mametyagṛhṇata ātmamukhotpādānukūlatvenāgṛḥīte vastunyātmīyatvenābhiṣvaṅgaḥ samudbhavati / | They really proceed from the wrong notion of the ‘Soul For instance, unless one has the notion of ‘I’, he cannot have self-love; and unless he has the notion of ‘mine’, he cannot have the idea of anything being conducive to bringing pleasure to himself, and he cannot be attached to it as his ‘own’; |
dveṣo 'pi nahi kvacid asaktasyātmātmīyapratikūlatvenāgṛhīte vastuni prādurbhāvamāsādayati / | Hatred also towards anything does not appear unless one recognises that it is conducive to |
ātmīyānuparodhini taduparodhapratighātini ca tasyāsambhavāt / | bringing pain to himself; because there can be hatred against what is not harmful to what is his own, or against what removes that harm. |
evaṃ nāmādayo 'pi prasūte tau cātmīyasneham so 'pi dveṣādikam ityanvayavyatirekābhyām ātmagrahād ātmātmīyagrahamūlatvam eṣāṃ sphuṭataramāgopālāṅganamavasitam eva / | Similarly with regard to Name, etc. also. From all this it is clear that the notion of ‘Soul’, which has persisted from time without beginning, having been brought about, the repeated notion of similar ‘Souls’ is what produces the notion of ‘one’s own’; these two produce Love for ‘one’s own’; this produces Hatred and the rest; |
ātmadarśanaviruddhaṃ ca nairātmyadarśanam tadviparītākārālambanatvāt / | have their root in the notion of ‘one’s own’, which proceeds from the notion of one’s self or soul. Contrary to this idea of ‘Soul’ is the idea of ‘No-Soul’; |
anayor hi yugapad ekasmin santāne rajjusarpatajjñānayor iva sahāvasthānamaikyaṃ ca viruddham / | because this rests upon a form quite the reverse of the former. It is incompatible too that both these Soul and No-Soul should be identical or co-exist in any one ‘Chain’; |
ato nairātmyadarśanasyātmadarśanavirodhāt tanmūlair api rāgādibhiḥ saha virodho bhavati dahanaviśeṣeṇeva śītakṛtaromaharṣādiviśeṣasya / | because these are as contrary to each other as the notions of ‘serpent’ and ‘rope’ with regard to the same object. Thus the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ being contrary to the doctrine of ‘Soul’, it becomes contrary to incompatible with Love, Hatred and other Afflictions also; |
tena sarvadoṣavirodhinairātmyadarśane pratyakṣīkṛte sati na tadviruddho rāgādidoṣagaṇo 'vasthānaṃ labhate timiravad ālokaparigate deśa ityato nairātmyadarśanāt kleśāvaraṇagrahaṇaṃ bhavati / | just as Fire is contrary to the shivering caused by cold.: Consequently, when one has directly realised the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ which is incompatible with all Defects and Aberrations, its contrary in the shape of the whole host Love and other defects ceases to exist; just as Darkness ceases in a place flooded with light. It is in this way that the ‘cover of Afflictions’ becomes set aside by the realisation of the doctrine of ‘No-soul’. |
prayogaḥ yatra yadviruddhavastusamavadhānaṃ na tatra tadaparamavasthitimāsādayati yathā dīprapradīpaprabhāvaprasarasaṃsargiṇi dharaṇitalaṃ timiram astica doṣagaṇaviruddhanairātmyadarśanasamavadhānaṃ pratyakṣīkṛtanairātmyadarśane puṃsīti viruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The argument may be formulated thus: When the contrary of a certain thing obtains a footing at a certain place, then that thing itself cannot secure a footing, e.g. Darkness does not secure a footing at a place flooded with lamp-light; there is perception of ‘No-soul’, which is contrary to the whole host of defects, in the Person who has realised the doctrine of ‘No-soul’; |
syād etat yathā nairātmyadarśanasamākrānte cetasi viruddhatayātmadarśanasyotpa [p.871] ttumanavakāśas tathā vairātmyadarśanasyāpyātmadarśanasamākrānte manasi, virodhasya tulyatvāt, tataś ca kasyacinnairātmyadarśanasyāsambhavād asiddho hetuḥ / | hence there is apprehension of the contrary. The following might be urged “When the mind is obsessed with the idea of ‘No-Soul’, there is no room for the appearance of its contrary, the idea of the ‘Soul’; similarly there is no room for the appearance of the idea of ‘No-soul’ when the Mind is obsessed with the idea of the ‘Soul’; because the incompatibility rests equally in both. |
sambhavatu vā na vā nairātmyadarśanam, tathāpyanayor virodha satyapi nātyantaṃ bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ siddhyati, yathā rāgadveṣayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor vā / | There may or may not be the idea of ‘No-soul’; even as these two ‘Soul’ and ‘No-soul’ are not absolutely destructive of one another, as is the case with Love and Hate, or Pleasure and Pain. |
yato 'tyantaprahāṇam iha sādhayitum iṣṭam / natu tāvatkālāsamudācāramātramityato 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ / | Then again, what you have sought to prove is the absolute destruction (removal) of one by the other, and not mere absence of, co-existence; |
dṛśyate 'pi satāmakhaṇḍitamahimāno rāgādayaḥ samudayamāsādayanta ityato 'pi hetor naikāntikateti / | hence your Reason is also ‘Inconclusive As a matter of fact, too, we find Love, Hate and the rest appearing in their full force even in good men. For this reason also, your Reason is ‘Inconclusive’.” |
naitad asti / | It is not so, we reply. |
yadi nairātmyavikalpasyotpādo 'grahaṇakleśasya santāne na sambhavet tadā na sambhavennairatmyadarśanodayāvakāśaḥ, yāvatānubhavasiddhas tāvannairātmyavikalpasaṃmukhībhāvaḥ sarveṣām eva / | If it were absolutely impossible for the conception of the doctrine of ‘No-soul’ to appear in the ‘chain’ of a man whose Afflictions have not been destroyed, then there would be no room for the appearance of the notion of ‘No-soul’; |
api ca yathāndhakāraparigate deśe kālāntareṇa prakāśodayāvakāśasambhavas tathehāpi kiṃ na sambhāvyate / nacāpyevaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum saiva tādṛśī bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yātathābhūtapratyakṣajñānakāle sarveṣām evānarthitvaṃ vā kāraṇaṃ bhavetprekṣāvataḥ pravṛtter arthitayā vyāptatvāt / | as a matter of fact, however, it is a fact of common experience that the notion of ‘No-soul’ presents itself before all men; and when this same notion is pondered over, it reaches to high stages, just like the conception of a young woman, and subsequently becomes quite clearly perceptible, and ultimately reaches the stage of direct perception, as envisaging a directly perceived thing; how then can it be impossible for the notion of ‘no-soul’ to appear in the mind of men? Then again, in a place wrapped in darkness, there is possibility of light appearing after some time; |
satyapi tatsvarūpajñāne nityatvaṃ vā doṣāṇāṃ paśyaṃstat prahāṇāya na yatnamārabhate ---, svatantrasyāsambhavaducchedatvāt / | so here also why should not there be the possibility of the appearance of the notion of ‘No-soul’? It cannot be said that “the said conception of ‘No-soul’ cannot appear in any man; |
satyapi vā kāraṇavattve tat kāraṇasvarūpaniścayād api nādriyate bhāvanāyām api{vi} jñātanidānasya vyādhiriva prahātumaśakyatvāt / bhavatu vā tat kāraṇaparijñānaṃ kiṃ tatkāraṇaṃ nityamavagamya notsahate tatprahāṇāya prekṣāpūrvakārī avikalakāraṇasya pratibaddhum aśakteḥ / | which could lead to the appearance of the perceptional Cognition -Because, the reason has to be pointed out why this is not possible. For instance, what would be the reason for no use being made of the said conception? Would it lie in the fact of no one wanting it, and all activity of sane men being accompanied by some desire? Or, even if they desire it, the sane man does not have recourse to activity, because he has no knowledge of what has got to be avoided, and unless a Defect is known, it cannot be avoided. Or, even though he knows the Defect, the man knows that the Defect is permanent and hence does not put forth any effort to remove it, because what is permanent cannot be removed. |
anityatve 'pi vā tatkāraṇasya doṣāṇāṃ prāṇidharmatāmavetya na prayatate svabhāvasya hātumaśakyatvāt / | Or, even if the Defects are not permanent, one recognises the fact of their having no cause and desists from any activity towards their removal, because what is self-sufficient can never be set aside. |
asvabhāvatve vā doṣāṇāṃ kṣayopāyāsambhavannivartate na hy upāyavikalasyopeyasamprāptir asti / | Or, if the Defects do not form part of the nature of the beings, the man desists because there are no means of removing them, because unless the means is there, the end cannot be attained; |
sattve 'pi copāyasya tadaparijñānād asambhavattadanuṣṭhāno bhavet / | or, even if the means are there, its use would be impossible, because the man does not know them, because what is not known cannot be used. |
aparijñātasvarūpasyānuṣṭhānāsambhavāt parijñāne 'pi vā laṅghanād iva vyavasthitotkarṣatayā janmāntarāsambhavena vā bhāvanāyā atyantaprakarṣamasambhāvayannābhiyogavān bhavati bhavatu vātyantaprakarṣagamanasambhavāt pratipakṣodayena doṣāṇāṃ kṣayaḥ, tathāpi tāmrādikāṭhinyavat punar api doṣādayaṃ sambhā [p.872] vayannābhiyogamārabhata iti tatra na tāvad anarthitvaṃ siddham / | Or even though he knows the means, he does not employ them because he considers it impossible for the conception to reach by jumping as it were, the highest stage, on account of there being no re-birth, and hence the conception would continue to remain at the same stage at which it has already reached, Or even granting that the conception does reach the highest stage, and by this appearance of their contrary, the Defects become destroyed; but even so, he thinks that, like the solidity of Copper and other metals, it may be that the Defects are bound to appear again and hence he does not try to remove them? |
tathā hi ye tāvajjātyādiduḥkhotpīḍitamānasāḥ saṃsārād unnastamanasas tadupaśamamātmanaḥ prārthayante, teṣāṃ śrāvakādibodhaniyatānāṃ saṃsārād bhayam eva nairātmyabhāvanārthitvanimittam / ye tu gotraviśeṣāt prakṛtyaiva parahitakaraṇaikābhirāmāḥ saṃskārādiduḥkhatritayapīḍitaṃ jagadavekṣya kṛpāparatantratayā tadduḥkhaduḥkhinaḥ svātmani vyapekṣām apāsya sakalāneva saṃsāriṇa ātmatvenābhyupagatās tatparitrāṇāya praṇidadhate teṣāṃ karuṇaiva bhāvanāpravṛttinimittam parokṣopeyataddhtos tadākhyānasya duṣkaratvāt / | Because those persons whose minds are beset with sufferings due to Birth and other causes, and frightened at the prospect of Births and Rebirths, do certainly want to have peace of mind; and when these people have acquired the true understanding of Disciples, this fear of Birth and Rebirth itself becomes the cause of their desire to seek for the conception of ‘Nosoul’, Those people who, by reason of belonging to a particular family, are by their nature bent upon doing good to others, when they find the world suffering from the three kinds of Pain beginning with Tendencies and Dispositions, they are moved to compassion and begin to suffer for the sufferings of others; and giving up all idea of benefiting themselves, they come to look upon all living beings as their own ‘self’, and then concentrate themselves upon removing their sufferings; and in the case of these men, the said compassion itself is the cause of the appearance of the conception in question, Because it is extremely difficult to know and speak of what is imperceptible and its cause. |
parahitakaraṇena prekṣāvataḥ kiṃ prayojanam iti cen na / | If it is asked “What is the use in any sane man doing what is good for others?” the answer is that the same doing good is the use or purpose; |
tadeva prayojanamiṣṭalakṣaṇatvāt tasya / | as this is highly desirable in itself. |
nacāpekṣāvattvaprasaṅgaḥ / | Nor will this mean dependence upon others. |
parikalpitātmagrahanibandhanatvād ātmahitakaraṇābhiniveśasya sakalasādhujanasaṃmatatvāt / | Because the wish to do good to one’s self is based upon the assumed knowledge of the Soul; |
svaphalānubandhitvāc ca parahitakaraṇasya / | and doing good to others has been regarded by all good men as leading to desirable results. |
api ca bhāvanāpravṛttārthitvāsambhavo 'tra pratipādayitum ārabdhaḥ, tadyadi nāmāprekṣāvattvaṃ tasya bhavet kimiyatā pravṛttāvanarthitvaṃ tasya syāt / tasmād idameva vaktavyam parahitakaraṇāya naiva kaścit pravartate prayojanābhāvād, iti tatra coktam / | Then again, what the other party began to prove was the impossibility of any one wishing to proceed with the conception; well, even if he were an unintelligent person, why should he not wish to undertake even this much of activity? Hence he should have to say that “no one ever acts towards helping others, because it does not serve any useful purpose for himself”. And the impossibility of such a view has been already explained. |
api ca yathā kecidupalabhyante 'titarāmabhyastanairghṛṇyā akāraṇam eva paravyasanābhirāmāḥ paraduḥkhamukhinas tathā kecid abhyastakāruṇyāḥ parasukhābhirāmāḥ paraduḥkhaduḥkhinaḥ prayojanāntaramantareṇāpi bhavantīti kiṃ na sambhāvyam / | Further, while there are some people who are found to be past masters in the art of cruelty, taking delight in injuring others, without rhyme or reason, and pleased at the suffering of others, there are yet others who are past masters in the art of mercy, taking delight in the happiness of others, pained at the suffering of others, without any other cause; why should this not be possible? |
nāpi doṣasvarūpāparijñānam yato 'bhiṣvaṅgaparighātātmātmīyonnatyādyākāreṇa rāgadveṣamohamānamaderṣyāmātsaryādayaḥ kleśopakleśagaṇā viditasvarūpā evodayante vyayante ca / | Nor is there no knowledge of the nature of the Defects (to be removed). Because all such Afflictions and Defects as Love, Hatred, Delusion, Pride, Arrogance, Jealousy, Envy, etc. following upon Calamities, Disappointments, the prosperity of one’s own self and that of persons related to him, are such as have their nature fully known, as they continue to appear and disappear. |
nāpi ca te nityāḥ kādācitkatayā saṃvedyamānatvāt / | Nor are these Defects eternal; because they are always found to appear occasionally. |
ata eva nāhetukatvam eṣām ahotoranapekṣitatvena deśakālasvabhāvaniyamāyogāt / | For the same reason, they cannot be without cause; because what has no cause does not depend upon anything else and hence cannot suffer any restrictions of time, place and character. |
ato 'pi nityahetutvam eṣāṃ pratikṣiptam tat kāraṇasyātmādeḥ sadā sannihitatvād anādheyātiśayasya paraiḥ sahakārinirapekṣatvāt / | This same reason also sets aside the idea that their causes are eternal. Because the cause, in the shape of the Soul, etc., would be always there, and they would be independent of other things, as being eternal, they could not have any peculiar potency added to them; |
tanmātrabhāvināṃ sarvadā yugapanno{cco---}tpattiprasaṅgāt / | and under the circumstances, all the effects emanating from those causes themselves would be liable to be appearing simultaneously. |
ataḥ sāmarthyād anityahetava evaite / | From all this it follows, by implication, that their causes must be non-eternal. |
anityo 'pi hetureṣāṃ viditasvarūpa eva, ātmātmīyaviparyāsahetukatvād rāgāder doṣagaṇasya tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānād iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditatvāt / | Because the host of Defects like Love, Hatred and the like have their cause in the reverses experienced by one’s own self and also by people related to himself; as they always appear in accordance with the positive and negative concomitance of these latter. |
nāpi prāṇidharmatvam eṣāṃ dharmo bhaveyuḥ / | Nor can the Defects be regarded as inherent in all living beings; |
kevalam idampratyayatāmātram idaṃ vikalpasamāropitatvād dharmadharmivyavahārasya / | It is only something set up by Conception as something spoken of as ‘this’, as the whole idea of quality and qualified is purely conceptual, (fanciful). |
atha cittasvabhāvatvena tatrotpattyā vā prāṇidharmatvam eṣām tathāpyasiddhiranaikāntikaś ca / | If it be held that the Defects are to be regarded as the properties of living beings, because they are subjective in character or because they are produced in the mind, then also there is ‘inadmissibility’ and ‘inconclusiveness’. |
tathāpi viṣayaviṣayibhāvamicchatā cittaṃ viṣayagrahaṇasvabhāvam abhyupeyam, anyathā viṣayajñānayor na viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ / | For instance, if the other party wishes to regard the Defects as objects and the Mind as the subject, then he has to admit that the Mind is of the nature of the apprehension of things; as otherwise the Mind and the Thing could not be related as object and subject. |
artha [p.873] grahaṇasvabhāvatvenāṅgīkriyamāṇe yas tasya svabhāvas tenaivātmanoṃśorthastena gṛhyata iti vaktavyam / | And when the Mind is admitted to be of the nature of the apprehension of things, it will have to be asserted that it is apprehended by a part of that same nature of itself; |
anyathā katham asau gṛhītaḥ syāt / yadyasatākāreṇa gṛhyeta tataś ca viṣayaviṣayibhāvo na syāt / | how else could it be apprehended? If it were apprehended by a form that did not exist, then there could not be the relation of object and subject. |
tathā hi yathā jñānaṃ viṣayīkarotyarthaṃ na tathā so 'rthaḥ yathā so 'rthona tathā taṃ viṣayīkarotīti nirviṣayānyeva jñānāni syuḥ / | For instance, the Object does not exist in the form in which it is envisaged by the Cognition; and the Thing is not envisaged by the Cognition in the form in which it exists; so Cognitions would become objectless, and this would lead to the absurdity of all things being unknown. |
tasmād bhūtaviṣayākāragrāhitāsya svabhāvo nija iti sthitam / | From all this it follows that the character of apprehending things in their well-known forms constitutes its very nature; |
bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣaṇikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat / | and it has been explained that the well -known form of things consists in being momentary, soul-less and so forth. |
tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eveti tannātmagrahaṇasvabhāvam / | Thus Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of soul-lessness, not of the nature of the apprehension of the Soul. |
yat punar anyathāsvabhāvo 'sya khyātimūḍhānāśa{mūḍānāṃsa---} sāmarthyādāgantukapratyayabalādevetyavatiṣṭhate, na svabhāvatvena yathā rajvāṃ sarpapratyayasya / | As regards any other character of it, that can be postulated only by deluded people; and can proceed only from some adventitious circumstances; and not because that is its very nature; in fact it is like the notion of ‘serpent’ in regard to the Rope. |
ata eva kleśagaṇo 'tyantasamuddhato 'pi nairātmyadarśanasāmarthyamasyonmūlayitum asamarthaḥ / āgantukapratyayakṛtatvenādṛḍhatvāt / | It is for this reason that the host of Afflictions, even in their most blatant forms, are unable to shake the strength of the doctrine of ‘No-soul Because being due to adventitious causes, the Afflictions are never very firm. |
nairātmyajñānaṃ tu svabhāvatvāt pramāṇasahāyatvāc ca balavad iti tulye 'pi virodhitve ātmadarśane pratipakḍo vyavasthāpyate / na cātmadarśanaṃ tasya tadviparītatvāt / | As regards the idea of ‘No-soul’, on the other hand, it forms the very nature of things and is also helped by Means of Cognition; hence it is strong and firm. Hence even though the hostility rests equally in both, yet it is the idea of the ‘Soul’ on which its contrary fastens itself, not so the idea of the ‘Soul’ upon the other, because it is contrary to that. |
yasyāpi na bāhyo 'rtho 'stīti pakṣas tasyāpi mate nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva jñānaṃ nātmadarśanātmakam tasyātmano 'sattvāt / | Even for the man who holds the view that the external world does not exist, Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of ‘No-soul’, not of the nature of the apprehension of the ‘Soul’; because this Soul does not exist. |
tathā hi yadi nāma tena viṣayasyābhāvāt tadgrahaṇātmakaṃ jñānaṃ neṣṭam svasaṃvedanātmakaṃ tu tadavaśyamaṅgīkartavyam / | For instance, if, on the ground of the object (No-soul) not being existent, the Cognition be not regarded as of the nature of the apprehension of that, then it must be admitted that the Cognition is of the nature of its own apprehension. |
anyathā jñānasyāpi vyavasthā na syāt / | Otherwise there would be no fixity regarding the Cognition either. |
sa cātmā vidyamānenaivānātmādvayādirūpeṇa saṃvedyo nānyathā pūrvavaddoṣaprasaṅgāt / | The Soul too can be cognised only in the form of ‘No-soul’, ‘without a second’ and so forth, not in any other form; as there would be incongruities as before. |
tasmāt prāṇidharmatvam eṣāmasiddham / | From all this it follows that the Defects and Afflictions are not properties of living beings. |
nāpi tatrotpadyata ityetāvatā svabhāvatve parikalpite prahāṇāsambhavo 'nekāntāt / | If the mere fact of the Afflictions being produced in the living beings leads to the assumption that they constitute the nature of these beings, then there could be no possibility of getting rid of them, because there would be nothing definite and absolute regarding them. |
tathā hi rajjvāṃ sarpajñānamutpadyate atha ca tat samyagjñānotpādānnivartate / | For instance, the notion of ‘Serpent’ is produced in the Rope, and yet it is set aside by the true Cognition when it appears. |
nāpi kṣayopāyāsambhavaḥ / | Nor is the means of destroying the Afflictions impossible; |
svahetuviruddhasvabhāvapadārthābhyāsasya kṣayopāyatvena sambhavāt / | because the means is always possible in the shape of the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to the cause of the Afflictions. |
tathā hi ye sambhavatsvahetuviruddhasvabhāvābhyāsās te sambhavad atyantasantānavicchedāḥ tadyathā vrīhyādayaḥ tathā cāmī rāgādaya iti sambhavatyevaiṣāṃ kṣayopāyaḥ / | For instance, those Afflictions, the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to which is quite possible, are capable of having their ‘Chain’ entirely cut off; as in the case of the Vñhi and other corns; to this same category belong Love, Hatred and the rest; hence the means of their destruction is quite possible. |
nāpi tadaparijñānam yato hetusvarūpajñānād eva yat tadviparītālambanākāraṃ vastu sa tasya pratipakṣa iti sphuṭamavasīyata eva / | Nor is it right that there can be no knowledge of these Means; because the knowledge of the cause of the Afflictions themselves provides the clear idea of what is hostile to them, in the form of the thing having a form contrary to those. |
nairātmyadarśanaṃ ca tatra viparītālambanākāratvāt pratipakṣa iti pradarśitam etat / | And it has been already shown that it is the idea of ‘No-soul’ that envisages a form hostile to the Afflictions and destroys them. |
nāpi laṅghanādivad vyavasthitotkarṣatā / pūrvapūrvābhyāsāhitasya svabhāvatvenānapāyād uttarottaraprayatnasyāpūrvaviśeṣādhānaikāniṣṭhatvāt / | Nor again is the upward trend rigidly fixed, as in jumping, because what is generated by each preceding repetition becomes observed in its very nature and hence indestructible, and as such it goes on producing fresh peculiarities in the subsequent efforts; |
sthirāśrayatvāt / | and the reason for this lies in the fact that the substratum is a fixed one. |
pūrvasajātīyabījaprabhavatvāc ca prajñāder natvevaṃ laṅghanādir iti paścāt pratipādayiṣyate / | Wisdom and the rest also are produced out of previous homogeneous seeds; not so jumping, etc. (?) as is going to be explained later on. |
nāpi janmāntarāsambhavaḥ pūrvajanmaprasarasya prasādhitatvāt / | Nor is another birth impossible; because it has been proved that the present life is an effect of the previous birth. |
nāpi tāmrādikāṭhinyādivat punar utpattisambhavo doṣāṇām, [p.874] tadvirodhinairātmyadarśanasyātyantasātmyamupagatasya sadānapāyāt / | Nor is it possible for the Defects to come up again, like the solidity of Copper and other metals. Because when their contrary, in the shape of the idea of ‘No-soul’, has become totally absorbed, it can never cease. |
tāmrādikāṭhinyasya hi yo virodhī vahnis tasya kādācitkasannihitatvāt kāṭhinyādes tadabhāva eva bhavataḥ punas tadapāyād utpattir yuktā / | In the case of the solidity of Copper and other metals on the other hand, its contrary consists in Fire; and as this can be there only occasionally, the solidity is there only when the Fire is not there; so that when the Fire disappears, it is only natural that the solidity should re-appear. |
natvevaṃ malānām / | The same cannot be the case with Impurities (Defects); |
apāye 'pi vā mārgasya bhasmādibhir anaikāntānnāvaśyaṃ punar utpattisambhavo doṣāṇām, tathā hi kāṣṭhāder agnisambandhād bhasmasādbhūtasya tadapāye 'pi na prāktanarūpānuvṛttiḥ, tadvaddoṣāṇām apītyanaikāntaḥ / | even on the ceasing of the ‘Path’, the reappearance of the Defects does not always follow; as such a possibility would be annulled by the instance of Ashes, That is to say, after the Wood has been reduced to ashes by contact with Fire, even if the Fire is removed, there is no reappearance of the Wood; |
kiṃ cāgantukatayā prāg apy asamarthānāṃ malānāṃ paścāt sātmībhūtaṃ tannairātmyaṃ bādhituṃ kutaḥ śaktiḥ nahi svabhāvo yatnamantareṇa nivartayituṃ śakyate / | Then again, being adventitious, the Defects, from the very outset, are inefficient; how then could they have the capacity to set aside the ‘Soul-lessness’ that has become entirely absorbed? Certainly the nature of things cannot be set aside without special effort; |
naca prāpyaparihartavyayor vastunor guṇadoṣadarśanamantareṇa prekṣāvatāṃ hātum upādātuṃ vā prayatno yuktaḥ / | and no effort of intelligent men is possible towards the rejecting or acquiring of anything until the good and bad points of the things to be acquired and rejected have been duly perceived. |
naca vipakṣasā{nacāviparyastā}tmanaḥ puruṣasya doṣeṣu guṇadarśanaṃ pratipakṣe vā doṣadarśanaṃ sambhavati aviparyastatvāt / nahi nirdoṣaṃ vastvaviparyastadhiyo duṣṭatvenopādadate nāpi duṣṭaṃ guṇavattvena / | And until the man has become very much upset, he cannot perceive good points in Defects and bad points in their contrary; for the simple reason that he has not been upset. People whose minds have not become perverted do not acquire things free from Defects as defective; |
naca nairātmyadarśanasya kadācid duṣṭatā / | The idea of ‘No-soul’, however, can never be defective; |
sarvopadravarahitatvena guṇavattvāt / | because it is always free from all discrepancies and hence always good. |
tathā hi niḥśeṣarāgādimalasyāpagamān na bhūtārthadarśananibandhopadravaḥ / | For instance, when all impurities have totally disappeared, there cannot come in any discrepancies on the basis of the past perception of things; |
nāpi rāgādiparyavasthākṛtaḥ kāyacittaparidāhopadravo 'sti / | nor can the presence of Love, Hatred and the rest bring about discrepancies in the shape of the burning of the Body and the Mind (?); |
nāpi janmapratibaddho vyādhijādyupadravaḥ janmahetoḥ kleśasyābhāvāt / | nor any discrepancies relating to Birth, in the shape of Disease, etc. Because there are no Afflictions which alone bring about Birth. |
Subsets and Splits