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anyopalambhata ityādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate | The following Text sets forth the Opponent’s answer to the above and rejects it: [see verse 3284 next] |
anyopalambhatas tasya nāsattā gamyate yadi / nanu cānyopalambhaste siddhastadviṣayaḥ katham // | If it is said that “the non-existence of the marriage is not cognised, because other people know of it then (the answer is) how do you know that other people know of it? (3284) |
anyeṣāṃ puruṣāṇām upalambho 'nyopalambhaḥ / | ‘Anyopālambha’ The knowledge that other people have. |
mātṛvivāhādeḥ / | ‘Tasya’ of the mother’s marriage. |
nāsattā gamyate, kiṃ tarhi sattaiva / atrānyopalambhāsiddhiḥ, tadbhāvayann āha nanu cetyādi // | ‘Non-existence’ i.e. what is cognised is not non-existence, but existence. The answer to this is that it cannot be known what the knowledge of other people is. |
katham iti pṛṣṭaḥ sanpara āha upadeśād iti / | The Opponent having been asked ‘How do you know?’ supplies the answer, which is then refuted: [see verses 3285-3286 next] |
upadeśān na sarvajñe 'pyayaṃ kiṃ vidyate tathā / idaṃ ca svoktamaparaṃ kimatra na samīkṣyate // sarvadā caiva puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtavādinaḥ / yathādyatve na visrambhas tathātītārthakīrtane // | Then (the answer is) is there not such assertion in regard to the omniscient person also? Then again, how is it that you do not recall another assertion of yours to the effect that “men are always found to be liars”? And just as there can be no confidence in the words of men regarding present things, so also there can be none in the words speaking of past things. |
siddha iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | The word ‘Upadeśāt’ has to be construed with ‘siddha’ of the preceding text. |
atiprasaṅgāpādanāmu{du---}padeśasyānaikāntikatāmādarśayann āha na sarvajñe 'pīti / | By showing the incongruity involved, the author points out the inconclusive character of what has been urged ‘Is there not, etc. etc.’ ‘Ayam’ the assertion; |
sarvajñe kiṃ na vidyate, apitu vidyata eva, tatra yadi mātṛvivāhādyupadeśaḥ pramāṇīkriyate, sarvajño 'stītyayam asmadīyo 'pyupadeśaḥ kiṃ na pramāṇīkriyeta, viśeṣābhāvāt / | is it not present in regard to the Omniscient Person? It is certainly present. Under the circumstances, if the assertion regarding the marriage of one’s mother is accepted as reliable, then why should you not regard our assertion, that ‘the Omniscient Person does exist’, as reliable? There is no difference between the two cases. |
kiñca svavācaivopadeśasyāprāmāṇyam uktaṃ bhavateti darśayati idaṃ cetyādi // | Further, in your words, you have declared that assertions are unreliable; this is pointed out in the words ‘How is it that you do not recall, etc. etc.’. |
mā vābhūd upadeśo 'sya prāmāṇyam vā tathāpi vaḥ / kṛto 'yaṃ niścayaḥ sarvaiḥ sarvavinnopalabhyate // | Or, there may be no such assertion (regarding the existence of the omniscient person); nor may such assertion be reliable; even so, you have come to the certainty that “the omniscient person is not apprehended by any man”; |
evaṃ hi niścayo hi syāt sarvasattvātmadarśane / taddṛṣṭau sarvavidbhūto bhavān iti ca varṇitam // | and such certainty could be possible only if the souls of all men were known to you; and if all these were known to you, then you yourself would be omniscient, as has been pointed out above. |
sarvavido 'stitvapratipādakam iti śeṣaḥ / | ‘Assertion’ i.e. the one declaring the existence of the Omniscient Person. |
asya prāmāṇyaṃ vetyupa [p.858] deśasya / | ‘Asya’ reliability of the said assertion. |
sarvasattvātmadarśana iti / sarvasattvasvabhāvadarśane / | ‘If the Souls of all men were known’ i.e. if you knew the nature of all men. |
astyevāsmākaṃ sarvasattvātmadarśanam iti cedāha taddṛṣṭavityādi / taddṛṣṭau sarvasattvātmadṛṣṭau // | It might be said “We do have the knowledge of the nature of all men”. The answer to this is ‘If all these were, etc. etc.’ i.e. if the souls of all men were known to you. |
anyathā saṃśayo yukto 'nupalambhe 'pi sattvavat / | If it were not so, then, even on non-apprehension, there would be doubt only (regarding the existence of the omniscient person), just as there is regarding the existence of certain things. |
kecit sarvavidaḥ santo vidantīti hi śaṅkyate // svayam evātmanātmānam ātmajyotiḥ sa paśyati / | There are some saintly persons too who are believed to have knowledge of the omniscient person it is also conceivable that the omniscient person, being self-luminous, perceives himself by himself. |
ityapyāśaṅkyate 'taś ca sarvādṛṣṭiraniścitā // | For these reasons there can be no certainty regarding the non-apprehension of the omniscient person by all men. |
anyatheti / sarvasattvātmadarśanābhāve / | ‘If it were not so’, if there is no knowledge of the Souls of all men. |
deśādiviprakṛṣṭasya vastunaḥ sattāyām iva sattvavat / | ‘Like the existence of certain things’; i.e. as in the case of the existence of things far removed in place or time. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā deśādiviprakṛṣṭasya vastunaḥ satyapyanupalambhe tatsattāyāṃ bhavati, satyapi vastunyanupalambhāt, evam anyapuruṣavartini sarvajñāviṣayopalambhe 'pi saṃśayo yuktaḥ / | What is meant is as follows In the case of things far removed in space and time, even when the thing is not apprehended, there is always a suspicion regarding its existence, even.though there is non-apprehension of the thing; in the same manner, it is only right that there should be suspicion regarding the existence of the Omniscient Person who has been apprehended (known) by other men. |
athavā ayam arthaḥ yathā sarvajñasattāyām anupalambhe 'pi saṃśayas tathā sarvajñatvaviṣayopalambhe 'pi saṃśayaḥ, dvayor api svabhāvaviprakarṣeṇānupalambhasambhavāt / | Or, the meaning may be as follows: Just as in regard to the Existence of the Omniscient Person, there is doubt, even though He has not been apprehended, in the same manner there would be doubt, even when His omniscience is apprehended; because both are equally liable to nonapprehension due to remoteness. |
nanu vastusattve saṃśayo yukto yataḥ satyapi vastuni tadanupalambhasya darśanātkadācit syād iti sambhāvyamānatvāt / | Bays the Opponent: “It is only right that there should be suspicion regarding the existence of things; because even when the thing is present, there is found to be non-apprehension of it; hence there is a probability that it may be there; |
natu sarvajñadarśanaṃ kasyacid arvāgdarśanasya sambhāvyate, nacāsambhāvyamāne vastuni prekṣāvataḥ saṃśayo yukta ityata āha kecid ityādi / | in the case of the Omniscient Person, on the other hand, it is not possible for any man with limited vision to perceive Him; and no sane person can have any suspicion regarding the existence of an impossible thing”. The answer to this is ‘There are some persons, etc. etc.’ |
svayam eveti / parasiddhāntābhyupagamād uktam / | ‘Himself’ This has been asserted on the basis of the doctrines of other people. |
svayam evetyasyaiva nirdeśa ātmaneti / | This same idea is reiterated by the phrase ‘by himself’. |
ātmeti puruṣaḥ / | ‘Ātmā’ the Man. |
jyotir iti cidrūpatvena prakāśātmakatvād ātmanaḥ // | ‘Luminous’ the Soul being of the nature of Consciousness and hence being like Light. |
tathāhītyādinā idam eva samarthayate / | The same idea is further supported: [see verse 3291 next] |
tathā hi sarvaśabdena sarve prāṇabhṛto matāḥ / sa ca sarvābahirbhūta ityadṛṣṭiraniścitā // | Because the term ‘all’ stands for all living beings; and the person himself must be included in ‘all’; hence there can be no certainty regarding the non-apprehension (of the omniscient person). |
sa ceti / sarvajñaḥ // | ‘The Person himself’ i.e. the Omniscient Person. |
tadekaparihāreṇa pratibandho 'tra ko bhavet / na hyanyair aparijñānāt svarāgādi nivartate // | By the exclusion of that one person alone, what connection could there be (of this with the non-existence of the omniscient person)? One’s own illness does not cease merely because other people do not know of it. |
yadi hi tasya sarvajñasya parihāreṇānyeṣām arvāgdarśināmanupalambho hetutvenopādīyate [p.859] tadānaikāntikatā, tasya svānupalambhatvasarvajñābhāvena sahāvinābhāvalakṣaṇasya prativacanasyābhāvāt / | If what is meant by the exclusion of the Omniscient Person is that the Reason for the non-existence of the Omniscient Person consists in the fact of his not being apprehended by other people who have limited vision, then this Reason is Inconclusive; because, like your own ‘Non-apprehension’, the said Non-apprehension by other men of limited vision would have no ‘connection’, in the shape of invariable concomitance with ‘the nonexistence of the Omniscient Person’. |
nahītyādinā tameva pratibandhābhāvaṃ samarthayate // | The second sentence ‘One’s own illness, etc. etc.’ is meant to support the said absence of connection. |
kecid arvāgdṛśo vāpi prapaśyante 'numānataḥ / | Even some men with limited vision do apprehend the omniscient person through inference; |
kāścid eva hi keṣāñcin nipuṇā mataḥ kvacit // | and it is only a few notions of some people that are perfectly correct. |
tathā hi vedabhūmyādeḥ kṣaṇikatvādisādhanam / puraḥ proktaṃ suvispaṣṭam api no lakṣitaṃ jaḍaiḥ // | For instance, the proof of the momentary character of the veda, the earth and other things though clearly stated by us, has not been understood by dull-witted men. |
tadevaṃ śaṅkayā nāsya jñānābhāvo 'pi niścitaḥ / yato 'sattvaṃ prapaśyante nirviśaṅkā hi jātayaḥ // | Consequently, the matter is open to doubt and the absence of apprehension cannot be certain, simply because some people are sure that they! perceive his non-existence. |
kecinnupaṇamataya arvāgdarśino 'pi santaḥ kadācid anumiteḥ sarvajñaṃ pratipadyante iti sambhāvyamānatvāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatvam abhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtatvād ityasya hetoḥ / | So far it has been proved that ‘Non-apprehension’ as the proof (for the non-existence of the Omniscient Person) is ‘Inconclusive’ as well as ‘Inadmissible’, Now the author proceeds to show that the other Reason ‘Because His body is envisaged by the only means of Cognition, Negation’ is ‘doubtful hence inadmissible’: [see verses 3293-3295 above] There are some clever men, even among men with limited vision, who do apprehend the Omniscient Person by means of Inference; |
tathā hi vedadhvanidharaṇigiritanuvajrādīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvānātmatvādi sphuṭataram api bhavadbhir mīmāṃsakapaśubhir anupalakṣitam api sat, asmābhir dṛḍhatarasādhanopadarśanena prasādhitam, tathā sarvajñe yadi nāma sādhanam idānīṃ nopalabhyate tathāpi sambhāvyamānatvāt sandigdhamityataḥ pramāṇapañcakavirahasvabhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvamasiddham / | hence the probability of His existence being there, the Reason ‘because He forms the object of Negation as the Means of knowledge’ is open to the charge of being ‘Doubtful hence Inadmissible For instance, the fact of such things as the Vedic Word, the Earth, Mountains, Body, Diamond and the rest, being momentary and Soul-less though it is not apprehended by the beastly Mīmāṃsakas, is true, as proved by us through strong reasons. So that if, in regard to the Omniscient Person, proof is not found at the present moment, yet as His existence is probable, the matter may be in doubt; hence it cannot be admitted that the said Person is subject only to Negation, which consists in the absence of all the other five Means of Cognition; |
sandihyamānatvāt / | such a Reason being open to doubt. |
yata iti / mānābhāvāt // | ‘Became’ there being no proof of it. |
kiñca mābhūnāmārvāgdarśināṃ sarveṣām eva sarvajñasiddhāvanumānam / | Then again, it may be that all men with limited vision are not capable of inferring the existence of the Omniscient Person; |
tathāpyanaikāntikatā hetor iti darśayann āha abhāve 'pyanumānasyetyādi / | even so, the Reason of the other party remains Inconclusive. This is pointed out in the following. [see verse 3296 next] |
abhāve 'pyanumānasya nāto 'sattāviniścayaḥ / | Even if there be no inference, that alone cannot bring, about certainty regarding non-existence (of the omniscient person); |
asamārabdhadhūmādikāryavahnyādisattvavat // | as in the case of the existence of the fire which has not yet begun to emit its effect in the shape of smoke. |
pratipāditaṃ hi pūrvaṃ yathā na pramāṇaṃ vastuno hetur nāpi vyāpakaṃ tat katham asya nivṛttāvapi vastu nivartate / tathā hyayogolakavahnyāder anārabdhadhūmādikāryasyāpavarakakuharāntargatasya liṅgābhāvān nānumānam utpadyate / | It has been explained before that Proof (Means of Cognition) cannot be the cause of things; nor can it be their Pervader; how then can the absence of Proof mean the absence of the Thing? For instance, in the case of the Fire in the heated Iron-ball, while its effect in the shape of Smoke has not begun to appear, and it is still hidden inside a hut, there is no Inference of it, because the Inferential Indicative (in the shape of Smoke) is not there; |
atha ca tasya sattvamanivṛttam iti nāsattāniścayas tadvat sarvajñābhāvasādhane anumānābhāve saṃśayaḥ / | and yet its existence does not cease (on that account), and there can be no certainty regarding its non-existence; in the same manner, in the proving of the Existence of the Omniscient Person, if there is no Inference, that makes the matter only doubtful. |
ata iti anumānābhāvāt / | ‘That alone’ that is, mere absence of Inference. |
asamārabdhaṃ dhūmādikāryaṃ yena vahnyādinā sa tathoktaḥ asamārabdhadhūmādikāryaścāsau vahnyādiśceti vigrahaḥ tasya sattāyām iva sattvavat // | ‘Asamārabdha, etc. etc.’ That Fire which has not begun to bring about its effect in the shape of smoke; in regard to the existence of this fire, there can be no certainty. |
kadācidupalabdhe 'rthe sandeho nanu yujyate / | “In the case of a thing that has been apprehended at some time or the other, it is possible that there may be doubt; |
yathā sthāṇau tathā hyeṣa ubhayāṃśāvalambakaḥ // | as for instance, in the case of the post, which partakes of the nature of both factors (of the doubt); |
yataḥ sthāṇunarau dṛṣṭau kadācid iti tadgatiḥ / | because the post and the man have both been seen somewhere, therefore it is possible that there should be doubt as to its being this or that. |
saṃśayo yujyate tatra dṛṣṭastvevaṃ na sarvavit // | The omniscient person, however, has never been thus perceived.” (3297-3298) |
yo hyarthaḥ kadācid upalabdhapūrvas tatraiva saṃśayo yujyate, yathā sthāṇau nānyatra, tatho{syo---}bhayāṃśāvalambitvāt / | When a certain thing has been seen somewhere previously, in regard to that alone, there may be doubtr e.g. in regard to the. Post, and not in regard to anything else; because it is the Post which partakes of the nature of both (Man and Post). |
anyathā hi yatkiñcid adṛṣṭaṃ tat sarvamālambeta saṃśayaḥ / tataścobhayāṃśāvacambitvaniyamo na syāt / | If it were not so, then Doubts may arise in regard to even those things that have never been seen; so that the condition necessary for all Doubt viz, the partaking of the nature of both factors, would not be present. |
tenāyogolakavahnyādau yuktaḥ saṃśayo natu sarvajñe tasya kadācid apyanupalambhāt // | Thus it is only right that there should be doubt in regard to the existence of Fire in the Iron-ball; not so in regard to the Omniscient Person; as such a person has never been perceived. |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte / | The Author’s answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 3299 next] |
nanu mātṛvivāhāder asattvaṃ muktasaṃśayam / etenaiva prakāreṇa tava dhīman prasajyate // | In this manner, o clever man, the non-existence of your mother’s marriage becomes established ‘free from all doubt’. |
yadi kadācid upalabdhe 'rthe saṃśayo 'nyatrābhāvaniścayastadāmunā nyāyena bhavato mātṛvivāhādessa{rasa}ttvamasaṃśayitaṃ prāpnoti / | If the idea is that there can be Doubt only in regard to a thing that has been perceived some time or the other, and in regard to all other things there should be certainty of non-existence, then under that principle, the non-existence of your mother’s marriage becomes established, beyond all doubt; |
nahi bhavatā kadācin mātṛvivāha upalabdhapūrvaḥ / | because you have never before perceived that marriage; |
yenātrāpi nābhāvāniścayo bhavedbhavataḥ / | by virtue of which there could be no certainty regarding its non-existence. |
atra ca śeṣaṃ codyamuttarapūrvavad vācyam / | The rest of the objection is to be answered as before. ‘Clever man’ is said in derision. |
yadyevaṃ nirnibandhana eva tarhi saṃśayaḥ prāpta ity āha asmābhir ityādi / | Says the Opponent “If such be the case, then there can be no basis for Doubt at all”. Answer: [see verse 3300 next] |
asmābhiḥ saṃśayastvatra pramābhāve 'pi varṇyate / | We hold that there is doubt also when there is no valid cognition; |
bhāve 'bhāve ca vastūnāṃ pramāṇavinivṛttitaḥ // pramāṇābhāvamātrasya hi vastubhāvābhāvayor api pradarśanād avyavasthitatvamataḥ sadasattāniścayānutpatter evaṃ saṃśayo varṇyate / | it arises in regard to existence as well as non-existence, from the absence of the operation of any of the means of right cognition. The ‘absence of the operation of any Means of Right Cognition’ can always be shown in regard to both existence and non-existence of things; hence there can bè no restriction in this matter. |
yathoktam upalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthāto viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṃśaya iti // syād etannaiva vastusadasattayor ubhayatrāpi pramāṇanivṛttir dṛśyata ity āha netrādīnām ityādi / | Hence our explanation is that Doubt arises whenever there is no certainty (regarding either existence or non-existence). This has been thus declared ‘Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and it is due to the uncertainty attaching to Perceptions and Non-perceptions’ (Nyāyasutra 1. |
netrādīnāṃ hi vaikalye vastusattve 'pi na pramā / | When there is a defect in the eye, there is no cognition, even though the thing is there; |
teṣām avikalatve 'pi vastvabhāvād ghaṭādivat // | and even when the eye is free from defects, there is no cognition, because the thing is not there; as in the case of things like the jar. |
tataścānupalambhasya kevalasya dvidhekṣaṇāt / tat pramābhāvato 'pyastu sarvajñe saṃśayo varam // | Thus, inasmuch as mere non-apprehension (absence of cognition) is found in both cases, it is far better to hold that it is doubt that arises from the non-apprehension of the omniscient person. |
[p.861] tathā hi satyapi ghaṭādike vastuni netravikalasya na pramāṇaṃ pravartate / | The following might be urged “In no case is it found that the Means of Cognition are not applicable to both existence and non-existence of a thing”. |
teṣāṃ ca netrādīnām avaikalye 'pi viṣayākhyasya vastuno 'sannihitatvenāsattve 'pi na pravartata iti prakṛtena saha sambandhaḥ / | Even when the object, Jar for instance, is there, if the man is without the Eye, he has no cognition of it; so also, even when the Eye is perfect, if the object is not there, in the sense that it is not close by, there is no cognition of it; this clause has to be construed here also; |
yathā ghaṭādau yogyadeśāsannihite / | this is just what happens in the case of the Jar which is not there in a suitable place. |
kevalasyeti / dṛśyatāviśeṣaṇarahitasya / | ‘Mere Non-apprehension’ i.e. non-apprehension without the qualification of ‘perceptibility’ of the thing concerned. |
dvidhekṣaṇād iti bhāve 'bhāve ca / taditi / | ‘Found in both cases’ i.e. in the case of existence and in the case of non-existence. |
tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Therefore. |
varam iti / kuśalamūlapratisandhānakāraṇāt / | ‘It is far belter, etc. etc.’ better than searching for a perfect source. |
tathā hi mithyādṛṣṭyā samucchinnakuśalamūlānāṃ kuśalamūlapratisandhānaṃ{ne---} kāṅkṣāsti, dṛṣṭibhyāṃ varṇyate sandhiḥ kāṅkṣāsti dṛṣṭibhyām iti vacanāt / ata eva tatra tatrācāryāḥ saṃśayaṃ vidadhate bhāve kiṃ pramāṇam iti cedata eva saṃśayostviti // | For instance, when things have had the idea of their being due to a perfect source cut off by wrong cognition, there may be a desire to look out for the perfect source; as has been declared in the words ‘Two perceptions describe the junction, and two perceptions give rise to the desire’ (?) It is for this reason that our Teachers affirm the presence of Doubt in such cases, in the words ‘If it is asked what is the proof for His existence? the answer is that, for this same reason, let the matter remain in Doubt’, (3301-3302) |
syād etat yadi sarvajño 'sti kimiti kadācit kenacinnopalabhyate / | Though existent, he would not be seen directly by dull-witted persons; just like the conceptions of other people. |
sa hi sannapi nekṣyeta jaḍairanyavikalpavat / sākṣād ayoguḍāṅgārā{ra}vahnivan na ca kāryakṛt // | Nor is he constantly active, just as the fire in the iron-ball is not active. Even when there, his activity would not be perceptible, like the feeling of love arising in others out of their fancies. |
kārye dṛśye 'pi vā tena nānvayo 'sya pratīyate // sarvārthajño yato 'dṛśyaḥ sadaiva jaḍadhīdṛśām / | Even if his activity would be perceptible, his connection with such action would not be cognised because the person knowing all things is always imperceptible for people whose eye of cognition is dull. |
nāto 'numānatas tasya sattā siddhiṃ prayāsyati // | It is for this reason that his existence cannot be proved by means of inference. |
ahetvavyāpakaṃ coktaṃ pramāṇaṃ vastuno 'sya ca / nivṛttāvasya bhāvo 'pi dṛṣṭastenāpi saṃśayaḥ // | It has been already explained that there can be no ‘cause’ or ‘pervader’ in his case. And yet it has been seen that even when the inference of the thing is not possible, the thing does exist. |
nekṣyeta sākṣād iti sambandhanīyam / | ‘Sākṣāt’, ‘Directly’, Is to be construed with ‘Nekṣyeta’, ‘would not be seen’. |
nahi yāvāt kiñcit sakṛtsarvamupalabhyam, yenopalambhābhāvāt sarvajñābhāvaḥ syāt, sato 'pyanyapuruṣagatasya vikalpasya parair anupalambhāt / | As a matter of fact, there is nothing that must be cognised once, on the basis of which it could be argued that “because there is no Cognition of the Omniscient Person, He cannot exist”; because the conception of one man, though existent, is not cognised by other men. |
nāpyavaśyaṃ kāraṇāni sadaiva samārabdhakāryāṇi bhavanti, yena sarvajñasya kāryānupalambhād asattvaṃ syāt, anārabdhadhūmakāryasyāpyayogolakavahnyāder darśanāt / | Nor is it necessary that causes should always be bringing about their effects, on the ground whereof it could be argued that “as the action of the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, He cannot exist”; because it is found that even when the Fire in the Red Hot Iron has not begun to produce Smoke, it is still seen there. |
bhavatu nāma sadaiva kāraṇānāṃ kāryavattvaṃ tathāpi na tat kāryābhāvaniścayaḥ, nahi [p.862] sarvakāryamutpannam iti dṛśyatvena vyāptam, yena kāryānupalabdhyā tadabhāvaḥ siddhyet / | Granting (for the sake of argument) that Causes are constantly active in bringing about their Effects; even so, there can be no certainty regarding the absence of those Effects; because all the Effects that are produced are not always perceived; and it is only if it were so, that the non-perception of the Effect could prove the non-existence of the Cause; |
utpannasyāpi kāryasyādarśanāt / | because, even when produced, the Effect is not always perceived; |
anyakalpajrāgavat yathānyasya puruṣasya kalpādayonisaumanaskārājjāto 'pirāgo nopalabhyate, na cāsyābhāvaḥ / | in the case of another person, it is found that though Love has been produced in his mind by fancies regarding the agreeable character of things, such Love is not perceived by other men; and yet it is not regarded as non-existent. |
satyapi vā kāryadarśane tat kāraṇasyātīndriyatvād agṛhītatadanvayavyatirekasya puṃsas tadanumānānutpattisambhavāt, tathā satyapi sarve{sarvajñe---} nānumānāt siddhir bhaved iti sambhāvyate / | Or, even in cases where the effect is perceived, if its cause is something imperceptible, and the observer is unable to perceive its affirmative and negative concomitances, no inference of that cause is possible. Similarly even when the Omniscient Person is there, it is quite possible that His existence cannot be proved by Inference. |
dhīreva dṛk dhīdṛg, jaḍā dhīdṛg yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | ‘People whose eye of Cognition is dull.’ The Cognition is the Eye; and those whose this eye is dull. |
apica pūrvam uktam yathā na pramāṇaṃ vastuno hetuḥ, nāpi vyāpakaṃ, tat katham asyānumānasyāhetu{tva}vyāpakabhūtasya nivṛttāvapi vastu nivarteteti bhāvaḥ / ahetuś ca tadavyāpakaṃ ceti tathoktam nacāpyetacchakyaṃ vaktum, akāraṇāvyāpakabhūtasyāpyanumānākhyasya pramāṇasya nivṛttau vastu nivartamānaṃ dṛṣṭam eva{mati---} / | Then again, it has been pointed out before that the Means of Cognition cannot be the ‘cause’ or the ‘pervader’ of things; how then, can the absence of Inference which is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’ of the thing in question (the Omniscient Person), lead to the absence of that thing? The compound ‘ahetvavyāpakam’ is Copulative what is ‘not cause nor pervader’. Nor can it be asserted that “when the Means of Cognition called ‘Inference’ is inoperative, even though it is neither the ‘Cause’ nor the ‘Pervader’ of the thing concerned, the thing is actually found to be nonexistent; |
nahi dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ nāmetyāśaṅkyāha nivṛttāvasya bhāvo 'pi dṛṣṭa iti / | and there can be nothing incongruous in what is actually seen”. In view of such an assertion, the Text adds ‘Even when the Inference is not possible, etc. etc.’. |
asyānumānasya nivṛttāvapi satyām asya vastuno bhāvo 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ, yathā ayogolakavahnyāder iti pūrvam uktam // | Even when the Inference is not there, the thing in question has been found to exist; as in the case of the Red-hot Iron-Ball; as has been pointed out already. |
tasmāt sarvajñasadbhāvabādhakaṃ nāsti kiñcana / | Thus, then, there is nothing that can set aside the existence of the omniscient person; |
pramāṇaṃ sādhakaṃ tvasya vistareṇābhidhāsyate // | the proof in support of his existence is going to be adduced later on. |
syād etat yathāsmākaṃ na kiñcit tadbādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti, tathā bhavatāṃ {na} tat sādhanam apītyatrāha sādhakaṃ tvasyeti // yaduktam samastāvayavavyaktivistarajñānasādhanam ityādi, atrāha niḥśeṣārthetyādi / | Having thus shown in detail that there is no possibility of any proof in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, the author sums up his view; [see verse 3307 above] It might be argued that “as there is no proof for setting aside the Person, so you have none in support of His existence”. The answer to this is that ‘The proof in support, etc. etc.’ (3307) |
niḥśeṣārthaparijñānasādhane viphale 'pi ca / sudhiyaḥ saugatā yatnaṃ kurvantyanyena cetasā // | It is with a totally different motive that the wise Buddhists make an attempt to establish the knowledge of all things, even though such attempt prove futile. |
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