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satyametad anupalambhaḥ pramāṇam / | It is true that Non-apprehension is a proof, a Means of Cognition. |
kiṃ svopalambhanivṛttis tvayā sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye 'nupalambho 'bhipretaḥ āhosvit sarvapuruṣopalambhanivṛttir vā / anupalambho 'pi kiṃ nirviśeṣaṇo 'bhīṣṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyetyetasya viśeṣaṇasyānāśrayaṇāt āhosvit savi [p.851] śeṣaṇa iti / tatra na tāvannirviśeṣaṇaścā{ssvā---}nupalambhaḥ pramāṇaṃ sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye yukta iti darśayann āha nacāpyadṛṣṭimātreṇetyādi / | But the following has to be borne in mind, in this connection: When you put forward ‘Non-apprehension’ as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, do you mean the absence of your own apprehension? Or the absence of the apprehension of all men? The Non-apprehension also, is it meant to be without any qualification, as is shown by the absence of any such qualifying phrase as ‘of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility’? Or is it meant to be qualified in some way? The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by unqualified Non-apprehension by yourself. |
mātragrahaṇamupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyetyetad viśeṣaṇanirāsārtham / | The term ‘mere’ has been added with a view to exclude the qualification ‘fulfilling the conditions of apprehensibility |
tadasattāviniścaya iti / sarvajñāsattāviniścayaḥ / | ‘Cannot prove His non-existence’ i.e. cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. |
kasmāt vastuṣu vastuviṣaye upalambhasya hetutvavyāpakatvāyogāt / nahyarvāg darśanasyopalambho vastūnāṃ vyāpako vṛkṣatvam iva śiṃśapātvasya, satyapi vastuni deśādiviprakarṣeṇānupalambhasambhavāt / | “Why?” Because, in regard to things, Apprehension is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader As a matter of fact, Apprehension by people of limited vision is not the ‘pervader’ of things, in the sense in which the ‘Tree’ is the ‘pervader’ of the ‘Śiṃśapā’ (a particular Tree). |
nāpi kāraṇamagnir iva dhūmasya, vastūnām evopalambhaṃ prati kāraṇatvābhāvāt / | Nor is ‘apprehension’ the ‘cause’ of things, in the sense in which Fire is the cause of Smoke; because it is the things that are the cause of apprehension. |
nacākāraṇāvyāpakabhūtasyānyasya nivṛttāvanyasya nivṛttir yuktā, atiprasaṅgāt / yā ca kāryānupalabdhisattā{ttā---} na sā kāraṇamātrasyābhāvaṃ gamayati / kiṃ tarhi apratibaddhasāmarthyasyaiva / | When one thing is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’ of another thing, the absence of one cannot mean the absence of the other; for, if it did, there would be incongruities. As regards the presence of the ‘Non-apprehension’ of the effect, it does not imply the absence of all Causes, but implies the absence of only that Cause whose capacity is untrammelled; |
na cārvāg darśino{naḥ u}palambhaṃ prati vastūnām apratibaddhasāmarthyam asti / | and in the case in question, for men of limited vision, the capacity of things to bring about Apprehension is not untrammelled; |
yena sa nivartamāno vastūnām abhāvaṃ sādhayet // | by virtue of which the absence of Apprehension could prove the non-existence of the things. |
kāraṇavyāpakayor nivṛttāvapi katham anyasya nivṛttir iti cedatrāha kāraṇetyādi / kāraṇavyāpakābhāve nivṛttiś ceha yujyate / | When there is absence of (a) the ‘cause’ and (b) the ‘pervader’, it is only right and proper that there should be absence of (a) the ‘caused’ and (b) the ‘pervaded’; |
hetumadvyāptayos tasmād utpatter ekabhāvataḥ // | (a) because the birth of the one proceeds from the other, and (b) because one is of the same nature as the other; |
kṛśānupādapābhāve dhūmāmrādinivṛttivat / anyathāhetutaiva syān nānātvaṃ ca prasajyate // | for example, when there is absence of (a) the fire and (b) the tree, there is absence of (a) the smoke and (b) the ‘mango-tree, etc.’ If it were not so, (a) the one could not be the cause of the other, and (b) there would be diversity. |
hetur vidyate yasya taddhetumat, kāryam ity arthaḥ / | ‘Caused’ that which has a cause; i.e. the effect; |
hetumacca vyāptaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / | the Dvandva compound is between ‘caused’ and ‘pervaded’; |
tayor hetumad vyāptayor nivṛttir yujyata iti pūrveṇa sambandhaḥ / | these two are construed with the foregoing ‘nivṛttiryujyate’, the meaning being that ‘it is only right and proper that there should be absence of the Caused and the Pervaded. |
atra kāraṇaṃ tasmād utpatter ikabhāvata iti / hetunivṛttau hi satyāṃ hetumānnivartate, tato hetor utpatter ātmabhāvapratilambhāddhetumataḥ, yathā kṛśānunivṛttau dhūmasya nivṛttiḥ, tathā vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyaṃ nivartate, tena vyāpakena saha tasyaikabhāvataḥ ekasvabhāvatvāt / | The reason for this is supplied ‘Because the birth of the one, etc. etc.’ (a) When there is absence of, Cause, there is absence of Effect, because the Effect derives its existence from the Cause; e.g. when there is absence of Fire, there is absence of Smoke. (b) Similarly when there is absence of the Pervader, there is absence of the Pervaded; because the Pervaded is of the same essence as the Pervader, both being of the same nature; |
yathā vṛkṣanivṛttau āmrakhadirādinivṛttiḥ, vṛkṣaviśeṣasyaiva āmrāditvena pratīteḥ / | e.g. when there is absence of the Tree, there is absence of the Mango, Khadira and other particular Trees; because it is only a particular Tree that is known as the ‘mango’. |
anyathā hi yadi kāraṇanivṛttāvapi na nivarteta tat kāraṇam eva na syāt / nahi yadyasmin sa{nnasa---}tyapi bhavati tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | If it were not so, i.e. if on the absence of the Cause, the Effect were not absent, then the Cause would not be a true cause at all. Because when one thing can be present even when the other is absent, the latter cannot be the cause of the former; otherwise, there would be absurdities. |
nāpi yannivṛttau yan na nivartate sa tasya svabhāvo yukto gauriva gavayasya / | Similarly when one thing is not absent when the other is absent, they cannot be of the same nature, e.g. the Cow and the Gavaya. |
tasmād vyāpaka eva svabhāvo vyāpyaṃ kāraṇam eva ca [p.852] kāryaṃ nivartamānaṃ nivartayet, nānyad atiprasaṅgāt / | Hence it follows that when the Pervader is absent, the Pervaded must be absent, and where the Cause is absent, the Effect must be absent; it would not imply the absence of anything else; |
yathoktam tasmāt tanmātrasambaddhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva tu / | This has been thus declared ‘Thus when a certain nature is related to a thing, its absence would imply the absence of that thing; |
nivartayet kāraṇaṃ vā kāryam avyabhicārataḥ // | and the absence of the cause would imply the absence of the effect; because of the infallibility of their relationship. |
anyathaikanivṛttyānyavinivṛttiḥ kathaṃ bhavet / nāsta{śva---}vāniti martyena na bhāvyaṃ gomatāpi kim // | If it were not so, why should the absence of the one mean the absence of the other? Because a man has no horse, does it mean that he should have no Cow either?’ (3271-3272) |
athāpi svopalambhasya sarvārthāt prati hetutvaṃ vyāpakatvaṃ cāṅgīkriyate tadā svavacanavirodhaḥ pratijñāyām āpadyata iti darśayann āha svopalambhasyetyādi / | If your own apprehension is recognised through some means of cognition, as being the ‘cause’ and the ‘pervader’, of all things, then your own omniscience becomes established, without any effort. |
kutaścid bhavato jñānāddhetutvavyāpakatvayoḥ // | why then should you yourself be hostile to your own omniscience? (3273-3274) |
bhavān eva tadā siddhaḥ sarvarthajño 'prayatnataḥ / tataś ca svātmani dveṣaḥ kaste sarvavidi svataḥ // | If it is insisted upon by the other party that one’s own Apprehension is the Cause and Pervader of all things then his Proposition involves self-contradiction. |
hetutvavyāpakatvayor iti niścayāpekṣayā ṣaṣṭhī / upalambhasya cārtheṣviti ṣaṣṭhīsaptamyau hetutvavyāpakatvayor ityetad apekṣya yathākramaṃ sambandhe viṣayabhāve ca yojye / | ‘Hetutvavyāpakatvayoḥ’ The Genitive Ending is in relation to ‘niścaya’. ‘Upalambhasya cārtheṣu’ The Genitive Ending in ‘Upalambhasya’, and the Locative Ending in ‘artheṣu’ is in reference to the ‘Cause’ and the ‘Pervader’; the former connoting the relationship of these, and the latter the fact of their being envisaged. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi bhavatā kutaścit pramāṇāt svopalambhasya sarvārtheṣu hetutve vyāpakatvaṃ niścitaṃ tadātmani sphuṭatarameva tvayā sarvajñatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ bhavati / | What is meant is as follows If, through some Means of Cognition, you have recognised the fact of your own Apprehension being the ‘Cause’ and ‘Pervader’ of all things, then, your own omniscience becomes clearly asserted; because unless one is omniscient, his Apprehension can never comprehend all things, And yet you are putting forward proofs in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. |
nahyasarvavido jñānamaśeṣajñeyavyāpakaṃ bhavati / | For these reasons, the omniscient person cannot be one ‘capable of being perceived’; |
sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye ca sādhanopādānāt tadeva niṣidhyata iti svavacanavyāghātaḥ // | if he were capable of being perceived, then that alone would establish his omniscience, without any effort on our part. |
evaṃ tāvannirviśeṣaṇaḥ svānupalambho na sarvavido 'sattvaprasiddhaye nirdeśamarhati nāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya sato 'nupalambhād iti viśeṣaṇāt saviśeṣaṇaḥ / tathā hi sa nirdiśyamānaḥ svaśabdena vā nirdiśyate, yathā nāsti kvacit pradeśaviśeṣe ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhād iti nirdeśās tathā sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye 'pi syāt / | Thus it has been shown that mere Non-apprehension, without a qualification, does not deserve to be put forward as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Nor will it be right to put forward ‘Non-apprehension’ as qualified by the phrase ‘of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility’, as the reason for denying the existence of that Person. Because when such ‘Non-apprehension’ is put forward, it could be put forward, (a) either directly by itself, for instance, as the argument ‘the Jar does not exist, because while conditions of being apprehended are present, it is not apprehended’, so also would be the argument proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; |
ya{a---}thārthāntarasya tat kāraṇavyāpakātmana upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyābhāvopadarśanād asvaśabdena / | or (b) indirectly, by other words, by pointing out the absence of something which is the Pervader of its cause and which is apprehensible; |
[p.853] yathā nāstyatra dhūmo vahnyabhāvāt, nāstyatra śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvād iti / nahyapratibaddhasyāhetvavyāpakabhūtasyānyasya vinivṛttāvāthā nāstyatra śītasparśo vahner iti sākṣād viruddhasya vahner vidhānācchītasparśaniṣedhaḥ, tadvat sarvajñaniṣedhe 'pi syāt / | e.g. when it is said ‘There can be no Smoke here because there is no Fire’, or ‘The particular tree Śiṃśapā cannot be here, as there is no Tree at all It has been already explained that the absence of one thing does not necessarily mean the absence of another, except when they are invariable concomitants or when one is the ‘Cause’ or the ‘Pervader’ of the other. For if it did, there would be incongruities. |
tat kāraṇaviruddhavidhānād vā, yathā romaharṣādikāraṇaśītaviruddhadahanaviśeṣavidhānācchītakāryaromaharṣādiniṣedhaḥ / | Nor does mere absence of the ‘Cause’ and the ‘Pervader’ prove the absence of the thing the absence of whose ‘Cause’ and ‘Pervader’ has not been definitely ascertained. |
eṣā copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhabhedatvād ityetad darśayati ata evetyādi / | So here also it would be necessary to add the qualifying phrase that ‘it should fulfill the conditions of apprehensibility’. |
ata eva na dṛśyo 'yaṃ sarvajñas te prasiddhyati / | This same principle would apply to the case of the Omniscient Person also. |
taddṛśyatve hi sārvajñaṃ tavaiva syād ayatnataḥ // | as in the latter case, it would, be possible for both to co-exist. |
sarvārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tavāpi yadi no bhavet // | the same should be the case with the negation of the Omniscient Person also. |
ata eva svavacanavirodhaprasaṅgān na bhavatā sarvajñaḥ svayam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ / | Similarly, the negation of the Omniscient Person could follow only from the affirmation of something indirectly contrary to Him, or of something contrary to its Pervader; |
anyathā hi svasmin sarvajñatvam abhyupetaṃ syāt / | Or, the negation of a thing would follow also from the affirmation of an effect contrary to that thing; |
yadi hi sarvārthagocaraṃ tatrā{vā---}pi jñānaṃ bhaved evaṃ te sarvajña upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto bhavennānyathā, nahyasarvavidāṃ sarvavidupalambhagocaro bhavati // | Or the negation of a thing can follow from the apprehension of an effect contrary to the cause of that thing; e.g. when there is perception of Smoke which is the effect of Fire which is contrary to coolness which is the cause of thrilling chill, there follows the negation of this chill; |
syād etat mābhūd upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto 'smākaṃ sarvajñastathāpi kimityete 'nupalabdhiprayogās tadabhāvasiddhaye na sambhavantītyāha tenetyādi / | How none of these arguments for negation is applicable to the proving of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person is always inapprehensible, while ail the conditions described are cases of negation of things that are apprehensible. |
tenādṛṣṭiviśeṣotthaṃ kāraṇavyāpakātmanām / | This is what is pointed out in the following [see verses 3275-3276 above] |
prakṛtyā dṛśyarūpatvāt sarvajñasya na siddhyati // | knowledge comprehended all things, then alone could the Omniscient Person be apprehensible to yourself, not otherwise; |
yasmād upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptas tava na bhavati sarvajñastena kāraṇena sarvajñakāraṇavyāpa [p.854] kasvabhāvānām adṛṣṭiviśeṣa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambho na siddhyati / | because the Omniscient Person can never foe apprehended by one who is not himself omniscient. As a matter of fact, any ‘non-apprehension’ in the case of things of the nature of the ‘pervader’, the ‘cause’ and the ‘nature’ of the omniscient person would not be operative, because by his very nature, he is imperceptible. |
yadyevam anye tarhi śeṣāḥ siddhyantu, tathāpi siddha eva sarvajñābhāva, iti cedāha iyaṃ cetyādi / | The following might be urged “The Omniscient Person may not be apprehensible by us; even so, why should the said negative arguments not be urged in proof of his non-existence?” |
iyaṃ ca trividhā dṛṣṭir viśva{nava---}rūpā pravartate / tat tadviruddhādyagatigatibhedaprayogataḥ // | This ‘non-apprehension’ proceeds in nine ways: due to its being put forward in diverse ways consisting of the non-cognition and cognition of the said three and their contraries (respectively). |
mūlaprabhedarūpāyā asyāḥ sarvavidaṃ prati / sādhite śaktivaikalye vyastā anyā ayatnataḥ // | And when in its very basic form, the ‘non-apprehension’ has been shown to be inapplicable to the omniscient person, the others become set aside without much effort. |
iyam evānantaroktā svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇānām adṛṣṭistredhā prapañcyamānā navadhā bhidyate / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3278-3279 above] This the aforesaid non-apprehension of (1) the nature, (2) the Pervader and (3) the Cause with its ramifications becomes ninefold. |
katham ity āha tat tadviruddhādyagatītyādi / tacchabdena prakrāntaṃ svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇākhyaṃ trayam abhisambadhyate, tena svabhāvādinā viruddhaṃ tadviruddham, tac ca trividham eva bhavati, svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇaviruddhabhedāt, tadviruddhamādir yasya tat tadviruddhādi / | “How?” Answer: ‘Due to, etc., etc.’ The term ‘tat’ stands for the aforesaid three, called: (1) ‘Nature’, (2) ‘Pervader’, and (3) ‘Cause’; ‘tadviruddha’ is that which is contrary to these; this also is three-fold (1) contrary to ‘Nature’, (2) contrary to ‘Pervader’, and (3) contrary to ‘Cause’; |
ādiśabdena viruddhakāryakāraṇaviruddhakāryaṃviruddhavyāptāstrayo gṛhyante / | the term ‘ādi’ includes (1) the contrary effect, (2) the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) those pervaded by its contraries. |
punar dvitīyena tacchabdena tadeva svabhāvāditrayaṃ sambadhyate / | The second ‘tat ' refers again to the said three (1) Nature, (2) Pervader and (3) Cause; |
tacca tadviruddhādi ceti tat tadviruddhādīti / yathākramaṃ tayor agatigatī tadviruddhādyagatigatī / tadagatis tadviruddhādivāni{gati}ścetyarthaḥ / | so that the compound ‘tat-tadviruddha’, stands for (a) the three (Nature, etc.), and (b) the contraries of these three the ‘agati’ and ‘gati’ stand for the (a) non-cognition and (b) cognition of these respectively, i.e. the non-cognition of the Nature, the Pervader and the Cause, and the cognition of the contrary of these; the diversities are due to these; |
tayor bhedas tena prayoga iti samāsaḥ / | and the arguments are put forward on the basis of all this. |
tatra tadagatyā sākṣāt trividhā svabhāvakāraṇavyāpakānupalabdhir nirdiṣṭā / | That which is due directly to the non-cognition of these, the Non-apprehensîon of the Nature, Cause and Pervader, has been pointed out above; |
asyā eva trividhāyā adṛṣṭeḥ śeṣānupalabdhayaḥ pāramaparyeṇa sūcikā ityataiyaṃ trividhānupalabdhirāsāṃ mūlabhedarūpā bhavati / tathā hi tadviruddhagatyā svabhāvairuddhopalabdhiḥ vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥkāraṇaviruddhopalabdhiś ca nirdiṣṭā / | of this same basic Non-apprehension, all the other Non-apprehensions are merely indirect indicatives; hence this three-fold Non-apprehension forms their ‘basis For instance, the ‘cognition of the contrary’ indicates (1) the apprehension of the contrary of its Nature, (2) the apprehension of the contrary of its Pervader and (3) the apprehension of the contrary of its Cause. |
ādiśabdena viruddhakāryopalabdhiḥ kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir viruddhavyāptopalabdhiś ca saṃgṛhītāḥ / | The term ‘ādi’ indicates (1) the apprehension of the contrary effect, (2) the apprehension of the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) the apprehension of what is pervaded by the contrary. |
etābhiś ca pāramparyeṇa yathāyogaṃ svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇānupalabdhayaḥ sūcyanta ityatastrividhāyā mūlaprabhedarūpāyāḥ sarvajñābhāvasiddhiṃ pratyasāmarthyapratipādanāt tacchāstrābhūtānāṃ yatnamantareṇaiva pratipāditaṃ bhavatīti nāsyāṃ pṛthagasāmarthyapratipādanāya yatnaḥ kāryaḥ, nahi mūle chinne śākhānām avasthitir bhavet / | All these indirectly indicate, respectively, the Non-apprehension of the Nature, of the Pervader and of the Cause. Thus by showing that the three basic forms of Non-apprehension are not able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, the incapacity of their ramifications to do the same follows without effort; hence no attempt need be made for proving that these ramifications also are unable to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, when the root itself has been cut off, the branches cannot continue to live. |
paramārthatas tu svabhāvānupalabdhir eva sarvāsāṃ mūlabhūtā, arthāntarabhedāśrayaṇāt tu trividhā mūlatvenoktā // | In reality, the Non-apprehension of the nature of the thing itself is the root of ail; it is only in view of the diversity of other things that the threefold Non-apprehension has been spoken of as the ‘basis’ or ‘root’. |
kāryakāraṇatāvyāpyavyāpakatvavirodhitāḥ / dṛśyatve sati siddhyanti yaścātmā saviśeṣaṇaḥ // | Effect and cause, pervaded and pervader, and contrariness all these, as also the ‘nature’ of the thing with a qualification are possible only when the thing is perceptible. |
sarvajño naca dṛśyaste tena naitā adṛṣṭayaḥ / | The omniscient person, however, is not perceptible for you; hence all these ‘non-apprehensigns’ are not capable of proving his nonexistence; |
tannirākaraṇe śaktā niṣedhāṅgaṃ nacāparam // | but His ‘Cause’ and ‘Pervader’ are certainly amenable to Apprehension; |
kāryakāraṇabhāvo vyāpyavyāpakatvaṃ virodhitā ceti dvandvaḥ / | ‘Kārya, etc.’ is a copulative compound formed of (1) the relation of Effect and Cause, (2) the relation of Pervaded and Pervader, and (3) the relation of Contrariness. |
pratyakṣānupalambhasādhano hi kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ, sarvajñāder adṛśyatvān na tena saha kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddhyati / | (1) The relation of Cause and Effect can be proved only by the Nonapprehension of what is perceptible; and as the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, there can be no relation of Cause and Effect with Him. |
nāpi vyāpyavyāpakabhāvastasyāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhapūrvakatvāt / | (2) Nor is the relation of Pervader and Pervaded possible in regard to Him; as that also has to be preceded by the Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible; |
tathā hi yannivṛttau yanniyamena nivartate sa tena vyāpto vyapadiśyate, nivṛtteś ca nānupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhamantareṇa siddhir bhavati / | for instance, when the absence of one thing is always followed by the absence of the other, the latter is said to be ‘pervaded’ by the other; and the said absence is not possible except where there is Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible. |
virodhitāpi dṛśyayor eva vastunoḥ siddhyati nādṛśyayoḥ / | (3) Contrariness also is recognised only between two perceptible things, not between those that are not perceptible. |
tathā hi sahānavasthānalakṣaṇas tāvad virodho 'vikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād dṛśyate / | For instance, there is ‘contrariness’ between two things when they can never co-exist; and this is perceived by you when there is absence of one while the other is present even when the efficient cause of the former is present; |
bhāvābhāvau ca nānupalabhyasvabhāvayor vastunor niścetuṃ śakyau / | and as a matter of fact, the presence and absence of things cannot be ascertained unless the things themselves are capable of being apprehended. |
parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo 'pi virodho yadya{da---}vacchedyānā{na---}ntarīyako yasya paricchedas tayor vyavasthāpyate, yathā kramākramayoḥ / | The other kind of ‘contrariness’ consists in mutual exclusion; and it is recognised in cases where the cognition of one thing is invariably concomitant with the non-cognition of the other; as between succession and simultaneity. |
paricchedaśca nādṛśye sambhavati / | This cognition is not possible if the thing is not apprehensible. |
yadyevaṃ bhāvābhāvādīnāṃ kathaṃ virodhasiddhiḥ, nahi tatrobhayor dṛśyatvam asti / | “If that is so, then how can there be contrariness between Existence and Non-existence? Certainly both of these are not perceptible”. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | This does not affect our position. |
nahi bhāvābhāvau pṛthakparicchidya paścāt tayor vyavacchedavyavacchedakabhāvāt virodho vyavasthāpyate / | As a matter of fact, Existence and Non-existence are not cognised separately, and then they are regarded as ‘contrary’ on account of their exclusion of one another; |
kiṃ tarhipṛthakparicchinnayor eva / | what happens is that they are cognised separately and then ‘contrariness’ becomes cognised. |
tathāhyekasmin dharmiṇyekakālaṃ tayor virodho vyavasthāpyate natu dharmyantare / | For instance, the contrariness of Existence and Non-existence is determined only in reference to one and the same thing and at one and the same time, not in reference to different things. |
nahi gorabhāve aśvasya bhāvavirodhaḥ kaścit / | Certainly the Existence of the Horse is not in any way ‘contrary’ to the non-existence of the Cow. |
nāpyekatradharmiṇi bhinnakālayos tayor virodhaḥ, nahi prāgabhūtasya {bhutasya} vā paścād bhāvābhāvau na sambhavataḥ / ekasmiṃs tu vastuni tayor yugapadaparicchedād virodhaḥ, natu tatraiva, paricchidya vyavacchedāt / | Nor is there any contrariness between existence and non-existence, if taken in reference to different points of time; for instance, if one thing did not exist at some previous time, its non-existence or existence at some future time is not deducible. It is only in regard to the same thing and the same time that both existence and non-existence are found incompatible; and not after being cognised and then found to be mutually exclusive. |
aparicchinnasya kathaṃ vyavaccheda iti cet / ata eva, yata eva na paricchidyate tatra dharmiṇi tata eva tasya vyavacchedaḥ sambhavet / | It might be asked “How can there be exclusion of what has not been cognised?” The answer is that it is for this same reason, i.e. because it is not cognised in connection with the particular thing that its exclusion would be possible. |
anyathā tatra paricchinnadharmasya kathaṃ vyavacchedaḥ śakyate kartum / ayam eva hi tadabhāvavyavacchedo ya eva tat paricchedaḥ, sa evānyābhāvasya tatra paricchedo ya evānyavyatiriktasya tasya paricchedaḥ / | Otherwise, how could, there be any exclusion of what has been definitely cognised? In fact, this cognition itself of the existence of the thing that constitutes the exclusion of its non-existence; and the cognition of the non-existence of one thing also constitutes the exclusion of the existence of the thing other than that. |
tasmād yasya dharmiṇo 'bhāvo vyavacchidyate, [p.856] bhāvaś ca paricchidyate so 'vaśyaṃ dṛśyo 'bhyupagantavyo nahyadṛśyasya paricchedonāparicchinnāsya tadviparītadharmavyavacchedaḥ sambhavati / | Hence when the non-existence of a certain thing is excluded, and its existence is cognised, then they must be regarded as ‘perceptible’; because what is not perceptible cannot be cognised, and what is not cognised cannot have the contrary character excluded. |
na tvevaṃ sarvajñe sambhavati, nahi sarve narā dharmiṇo dṛśyāḥ kasyacit, yena teṣvasarvajñatvadharmaparicchedāt sarvajñatvavyavacchedaḥ siddhyet / | All this is not possible in the case of the Omniscient Person. In the first place all men are not perceived by any one; in view of which the presence of non-omniscience could be cognised in them, and the exclusion of omniscience could be secured; |
tasyaiva sarvajñatvaprasaṅgāt / | because that same man would have to be regarded as omniscient. |
tasmād anupalabhyadharmiṇi sarvajñatvāsarvajñatvayor virodho na siddhyati / | Thus then, there can be no ‘contrariness’ (incompatibility) between omniscience and non-omniscience in connection with a person who is not capable of being apprehended. |
svasantāne tu siddhyati / | It is possible, however, within one’s own ‘chain’; |
tatrāpi nānāgatāvasthāyāṃ tasyās tadānīm adṛśyatvāt / | but there also, not with regard to the future, because the future is not perceptible at the time. |
tasmāt sthitam etat dṛśyasyaiva kāryakāraṇādibhāvaḥ siddhyatīti / yaścātmā saviśeṣaṇa iti / | Thus the fact remains that the relation of cause and effect and the like is possible only in that which is perceptible. ‘As also the nature of a thing, with a qualification’ ‘is possible’ should be construed here. |
tatra ātmā svabhāvaḥ, saha viśeṣaṇena vartata iti saviśeṣaṇaḥ / | ‘Nature’ here stands for the character of the thing; and this is to be taken along with its qualification; |
tatra viśeṣaṇaṃ trividhaviprakarṣarahitatvam / | and this qualification consists in freedom from the three kinds of remoteness. |
etā adṛṣṭaya iti / kāraṇādyanupalabdhayaḥ sarvajñasya kenacit saha kāryakāraṇabhāvavirodhavyāpyavyāpakābhāvāsiddheḥ / | ‘All these non-apprehensions’ i.e. the non-apprehensions of the ‘Cause’ (‘Nature’ and ‘Pervader are not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person can have no such relationship with anything as that of Cause and Effect, of Contrariness, and of Pervader and Pervaded; |
satsvanyeṣūpalambhakāraṇeṣu kvacit kadācit pratyakṣatvāsiddheś ca / | also because, even when there are other causes of apprehension present, the said Person cannot be perceptible. |
niṣedhāṅgaṃ nacāparamastyanupalabdhiviśeṣaṃ tyaktvā // | ‘Any other factor of negation, there is none’, i.e. barring the particular kind of Non-apprehension. |
punar api svānupalambhasya nirviśeṣaṇasya prayoge 'tiprasaṅgāpādanenānaikāntikatām udbhāvayann āha yadītyādi / yadi tvadṛṣṭimātreṇa sarvavin pratiṣidhyate / tadā mātṛvivāhādiniṣedho 'pi bhavet tava // | If the omniscient person is denied on the ground of mere ‘non-apprehension’, then you might also deny the marriage of your own mother and such other facts. The Author again proceeds to point out the Inconclusiveness of the Reason adduced by the other party, by pointing out the incongruity involved in the putting forward of one’s own ‘non-apprehension’, without any qualification: [see verse 3282 above] |
tataś ca jārajātatvamāpannaṃ bhavata iti bhāvaḥ / | ‘Such other facts’ includes the intercourse of....... and in that case there w ould be doubts regarding...... |
yathoktam yadyatra bhavato mandacakṣuṣo 'nupalabdhir arthānāpakuryāt hanta hato 'si, pitṛvyapadeśanibandhanasyāpyapravṛttiprasaṅgād iti // | This has been thus declared ‘If, dull-visioned as you are, your non-apprehension should set aside things, then you would be damned j as it would be impossible to name your Father’. |
atra parasya parihāramāśaṅkate sutākhyetyādi / | The following Text anticipates and rejects the Opponent’s answer to the above: [see verse 3283 next] |
sutākhyakāryadṛṣṭyā ceddhetos tasyāstitāgatiḥ / tadabhāve 'pi tat kāryaṃ nanu kasyāñcidīkṣate // | If it be urged that “on seeing the effect in the form of the son, there is cognition of the cause of that effect”, then (the answer is that) in certain cases, the effect is found in the absence of the cause in question. |
tasya mātṛvivāhādikasya hetoḥ sutākhyādikāryadarśanād anumānapramāṇataḥsiddhatvāt tadanupalabdhir na siddheti na tadabhāvaprasaṅgaḥ / | “The mother’s marriage is inferred from the presence of its effect in the shape of the Son; hence there is no non-apprehension of the said marriage; hence there is no possibility of the marriage not being there”. |
tasya vivāhasyābhāve tathā vivāhitabhartrā ca saha suratopabhogābhāve 'pikasyāścid duṣṭayoṣitaḥ parapuruṣasaṅgatyā sutākhyaṃ kāryamupalabhyate tadvad bhavatu {to---} māturapi syād ityādityasiddham anumānam, tataś ca bhavato jāra [p.857] jātatvaprasaṅgo durnivāraḥ / | The inconclusiveness and doubtful character of the said Cause is pointed out ‘In certain cases, etc. etc.’ Even in the absence of the marriage in quastion, and even in the absence of..... a wicked woman might bring forth the effect in the shape of the Son; and the same might be the case....; so that the said Inference of marriage cannot be true; hence the doubt regarding your parentage is irresistible. |
ācāryadharmakīrtināpi viśiṣṭapitṛvyapadeśanibandhanābhāvaprasaṅgāpādanasya vivakṣitatvājjārajātatvaprasaṅgāpādanam eva kṛtam // | The Teacher Dharmakīrti also has urged this same argument. |
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