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yadi hi buddhādīnāṃ dharmādyupadeśo vedamūlaḥ syāt tadā brāhmaṇebhya evavidvadbhyo manvādivad upadiśeyuḥ, naca tair brāhmaṇebhya evopadiṣṭam, kintu vaṭharaśūdrebhya eva, ato 'vagamyate, sāṃvṛtam alīkam, tat upadeśanam, yathā kūṭadīnārādikarmeti // | How is it known that the teaching of Buddha does not proceed on the basis of the Veda? Answer: [see verses 3226-3227 above] If Buddha’s teachings regarding Dharma had been based upon the Veda, then, He would have imparted them, like Manu and other teachers to learned Brāhmaṇas; as a matter of fact, however they were imparted not to Brāhmaṇas, but to the ignorant Śūdras; hence we conclude that the teaching must be ‘illusory’ false, just like the making of counterfeit coins. |
ye tu manvādayasteṣāṃ vedajñatvād vedamūla eva dharmādyupadeśo na svātantryeṇeti darśayati ye tvityādi / ye tu manvādayaḥ siddhāḥ prādhānyena trayīvidām / | “As regards Manu and others, who are well-known among Vedic scholars, and whose compilations are accepted by Vedic scholars, their assertions have their source in the Veda.” (3228) As regards Manu and others, these were learned in the Veda; hence their teachings regarding Dharma, etc. are all based upon the Veda, they are not independent of it. |
ṛgyajuḥsāmākhyās trayo vedās trayī bhaṇyate, tāṃ vidantīti trayīvido brāhmaṇā ucyante / | The tree Vedas, Ṛk, Yajuṣ and Sāman are called ‘Trayī’, ‘Triad’; those who know these are ‘Trayīvid’, ‘Vedic scholars’ Brāhmaṇas. |
trayīvidhir āśrito dharmaśāstrādigrantho yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | These Teachers are such as have their compilations accepted by Vedic scholars. |
tadgranthāśrayaṇā{ṇe---}kāraṇam āha te vedaprabhavoktaya iti / | The reason for this acceptance is stated ‘Their assertions proceed from the Veda’. |
vedaprabhavā uktayo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ // | They are persons whose assertions have their source in the Veda. |
etad api katham avasitam ityatrāha nādṛṣṭvetyādi / | Question: How is this also known? Answer: [see verse 3229 next] |
nādṛṣṭvā vedavākyāni śiṣyebhyaścāpradarśya vā / granthapraṇayanaṃ teṣām arpaṇaṃ copapadyate // | “It is not conceivable that these teachers should have compiled their works and then imparted them to others, without having found, or showed to the pupils, the original Vedic texts.” (3229) |
arpaṇam iti bodhanam / | ‘Imparted’ Taught. |
evaṃ pañcabhir api pramāṇair na sarvajñaḥ siddhyatīti pāriśeṣyād abhāvenaiva gamyata iti siddho 'bhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvādityayaṃ hetuḥ / | Thus, it having been found that the Omniscient Person cannot fall within the scope of any of the five Means of Knowledge, it follows that he must fall within that of the sixth, Non-apprehension, Negation. Hence the Reason that ‘he is envisaged by Negation’ becomes established. |
nāpyanai [p.841] kāntika iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam, nimittāntarābhāvāccābhāvavyavahārasyeti bhāvaḥ // | That this Reason is not Inconclusive has been already shown above; that this is so is proved by the fact that the regarding of the Person as non-existent cannot have any other cause. |
ye 'pi manyante nāsmābhiḥ śṛṅgagrāhikayā sarvajñaḥ prasādhyate, kiṃ tarhi---, sāmānyena sambhavamātraṃ prasādhyate asti ko 'pi sarvajñaḥ, kacid vā sarvajñatvam asti, prajñādīnāṃ prakarṣadarśanād iti, tān pratīdam āha nara ityādi / | “If proofs were adduced to prove that ‘there is some one who is omniscient’, or that ‘there is omniscience in some man’, then that would fall short of your proposition. In fact these assertions do not represent what is meant to be proved. There is no purpose in proving what is asserted in the above form,” (3230-3231) “By proving some omniscient person in general, you cannot get at that particular person whose omniscience you are asserting for the purpose of establishing the truthfulness of his word.” (3232) |
naraḥ ko 'pyasti sarvajñas tat sarvajñatvamityapi / sādhanaṃ yat prayujyeta pratijñānyūnam eva tat // | How can the truthfulness of Buddha be established by the proving of some omniscient person in general?” (3233) |
sisādhayiṣito yo 'rthaḥ so 'nayā nābhidhīyate / yat tūcyate na tat siddhau kiñcid asti prayojanam // | Some people have held the following opinion: We do not seek to single out any particular person as being omniscient; all that we seek to prove is the possibility of there being such a Person; |
hetos tāvat pūrvamanaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam ityata pakṣadoṣam eva tāvat pratipādayati / | It has been explained before that the Reason adduced by the Buddhist is Inconclusive; the Mīmāṃsaka therefore proceeds to point out the defects in his ‘subject’ (Proposition). |
iha ca svasya śāstuḥ sarvajñatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ na sāmānyena / | What the Buddhist wishes to prove is the omniscience of his own Teacher, not merely Omniscience in general. |
tathā hi na vyasanitayā sarvajño 'nviṣyate prekṣāvatā, kiṃ tarhi tadvacanād dharmādharmau jñātvā pravartiṣye nivartiṣye veti pravṛttinivṛttikāmatayā, naca sāmānyena siddhenāpi tena pravṛttiṃ prati puruṣasya kaścid upayogo 'sti, viśeṣaparijñānam antareṇa tadvacanāniścayāt, tasmāt sa eva viśeṣaḥ pravṛttikāmena sādhanīya iti sāmānyapratijñānaṃ pratijñānyūnam eva / | Even if the existence of the Omniscient Person in general were proved, it could have no effect upon the activity of the man; because there can be no conviction regarding the words of such a Person until a particular person had been found to be really such. Hence it is the particular Omniscient Person whose existence should be proved by one who wishes to regulate his activity. Thus therefore the general assertion would be far short of the Proposition. |
sisādhayiṣito yo 'rtha iti / sādhayitumiṣṭo yo 'rthaḥ / sa iti / viśeṣaḥ, svaśāstā / | ‘What is meant to he proved’ i.e. the fact that one wishes to establish. ‘Saḥ’ i.e. the particular Omniscient Person, in the person of your own Teacher. |
anayeti / pratijñayā / | ‘Anayā’ the Proposition now put forward. |
yattūcyata iti / viśeṣāsaṃsparśena ko 'pyati naraḥ sarvajñaḥ kvacid asti sarvajñatvam iti, tenasiddhenāpi na kiñcit prayojanam // | ‘What is asserted,’ i.e. the vague statement that ‘some Omniscient Person exists’ or ‘omniscience belongs to some one’, without reference to any particular person. By the proving of such a Proposition, no useful purpose would be served. |
katham ity āha yadītyetyādi / | Question: How so? Answer: [see verse 3232 next] |
sa{se---}ti / | [verse 3232]: |
kasmān na labhyata ityatrāha yāvad ityādi / | Question: Why cannot such a Person be got at? Answer: [see verse 3233 next] |
tathā hi yāvad buddhasya sarvajñatvaṃ na siddhyati tāvat tadvacanasyāpi na satyatvaniśca [p.842] yo 'sti, na ca sāmānyena sarvajñasiddhau buddhavacanasya satytvaṃ siddhyet, pratibandhābhāvāt // | [verse 3233]: Because so long as the Omniscience of Buddha himself is not proved, there can be no certainty regarding the truthfulness of His Word. On the proving of some Omniscient Person in general, the truthfulness of Buddha’s words does not become established. Because the requisite Invariable Concomitance is not there. |
etad eva darśayati anyasminnityādi / | The same idea is further elucidated: [see verse 3234 next] |
anyasminnahi sarvajñe vacaso 'nyasya satyatā / | “The omniscience of one person cannot establish the truthfulness of the word of another person. |
sāmānādhikaraṇye hi tayor aṅgāṅgitā bhavet // | It is only when the two are co-substrate that they support one another.” (3234) |
kadā nāma tayoḥ pratibandho na bhavatī{pratibandho bhavatī---}tyāha sāmānādhikaraṇye hītyādi / | Question: When is there invariable concomitance between the two (Omniscience and Truthfulness)? |
sāmānādhikaraṇyam ekapuruṣāśritatvam / tayor iti / | Answer: ‘It is only, etc. etc.’ ‘Co-substrates’ subsisting in the same Person. |
sarvajñatva{satya}vacanayoḥ / aṅgāṅgitā / hetuphalatā / | ‘Tayoḥ’ between ‘omniscience’ and ‘truthfulness of word’, ‘Support’ signifies causal relation. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati ekāśrayatve sati satyasya vacasaḥ sarvajñatvaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavet, nānyathātiprasaṅgāt // | What is meant is as follows: It is only when the two reside in the same Person that Omniscience can be the reason for truthfulness; not otherwise. If it were not so, there would be incongruities, (3234) |
yat sarvaṃ nāma loke 'smin pratyakṣaṃ taddhi kasyacit / prameyajñeyavastutvair dadhirūparasādivat // | “[The argument put forward is] ‘All the things that there are in this world must be perceptible to some person, because they are entities, cognisable and knowable, like the curd, colour, taste and other things’. |
jñānamātre 'pi nirdiṣṭe pakṣanyūnatvamāpatet / | Inasmuch as mere knowledge is mentioned, it falls short of the original proposition (of the Buddhist); |
sarvajña iti yo 'bhīṣṭo netthaṃ sa pratipāditaḥ // | so that the ‘omniscient person’ whose existence is desired to be proved does not become established in this manner. |
yadi buddhātirikto 'nyaḥ kaścit sarvajñatāṃ gataḥ / buddhavākyapramāṇatve tajjñānaṃ kvopayujyate // | If some person other than Buddha had become omniscient, of what use could this knowledge be in the proving of the reliability of the words of Buddha?” (3235-3237) |
yat prameyatvavastutvādiyogi tat kasyacit pratyakṣaṃ, yathā dadhirūparasādikaṃ, sarvaṃ ca padārthajātaṃ prameyādisvabhāvam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | ‘Whatever is endowed with cognisability, knowability and the character of being an entity, must be perceptible to some person, e.g. the Curd, Colour, Taste and so forth, all things have the said characters of knowability, etc.; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.’ |
atrāpi pūrvavat pratijñānyūnatvaṃ hetoścānaikāntikatvaṃ vaktavyam / | Here also, as before, it has to be pointed out that the conclusion falls far short of the desired Proposition, and the Reason is Inconclusive, |
tasmān na viśeṣeṇa nāpi sāmānyena sarvajñatvasya siddhiḥ sambhavati / | Thus then, it is not possible to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, either in general or in particular. |
ato nāsti sarvajña iti siddham / | Hence it becomes established that there can be no Omniscient Person. |
tadabhāvāt tadvacanasyābhāva iti na tadvacanāt pravṛttiḥ sambhavati kasyacit // | And when there is no Omniscient Person, there can be no words of such a Person; consequently no man can undertake an activity through such words. |
athavā sambhavatu nāma sarvajñaḥ puruṣas tathāpi sarvajñapraṇītaṃ vacanaṃ na sambhavatyeva yataḥ pravṛttir bhaviṣyati bhavatām ityetat pratipādayann āha daśabhūmītyādi / | Or, there may be an Omniscient Person; even so, there can be no ‘words’ (‘assertion’, uttered by Him, on which your activities could be based. This is shown in the following: [see verses 3238-3239 next] |
daśabhūmigataścāsau sarvarāgādisaṃkṣaye / śuddhasphaṭikatulyena sarvaṃ jñānena buddhyate // | “When he occupies the ten stages, and all his attachment and other defects have ceased, then alone he can apprehend all things, through his knowledge which is like pure crystal. |
dhyānāpannaś ca sarvārthaviṣayāṃ dhāraṇāṃ dadhat / | when rapt in meditation, his mind concentrated on the idea of all things, he would be pervaded by all things; |
tathā vyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ śakto naivopadeśane // | even so, there can be no ‘words’ (‘assertion’, uttered by Him, on which your activities could be based. |
[p.843] tathā hi kila daśabhūmipratiṣṭhito 'śeṣarāgādimalakalaṅkāpagamācchuddhasphaṭikatulyena jñānena sakalaṃ jñeyamavacchedyata ityevaṃ bhavadbhir varṇyate / | This is shown in the following: [see verses 3238-3239 above] Standing upon the Ten Stages, all imposities of Attachment, etc. having disappeared, His Knowledge becomes like the pure crystal, whereby all cognisable things become apprehended such is your explanation. |
tataścāsyāṃ tāvadavasthāyāṃ dhāraṇāṃ cittasyaikāgryatāṃ dadhadarthabodha eva vyāpṛtatvānnāsau śaknoti dharmamupadeṣṭuṃ na hīyato vyāpārān kaścitkartuṃ samarthaḥ // | Now, at this stage, His mind would be concentrated being intent upon the idea of ail things; so that He could not be in a position to propound any teachings relating particularly to Dharma; being unable to perform all these functions all at once. |
vyutthāya deśayati cedityāha yadā cetyādi / | It might be said that “He would impart the teaching on waking from Meditation”. |
ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam // | As a matter of fact, Speaking can never proceed without some Cognition; |
tasmin dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavadāsthite / | hence when He would teach Dharma, He could do so only when His mind would, be in the conceptual state; |
niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kuṭyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ // | “The following assertions have been made (by Buddhists) ‘when Buddha is rapt in communion, and stands unruffled like the cintā-jewel, teachings issue forth, freely, from even the walls; |
tābhir jijñāsitānarthān sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ / | and with the help of these, men come to know all that they want to know; |
hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ kṣipramāsādayanti te // | and thus they quickly secure all that is good for them’. |
ityādikīrtyamānaṃ tu śraddadhāneṣu śobhate / | Such assertions sound well only when addressed to people imbued with faith; |
vayamaśraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe // | we however are wanting in that faith, and hence ask for reasons.” (3241-3243) |
cintāratnam cintāmaṇiḥ / | why? because Buddha is ever rapt in Communion; |
ayamatra samudāyārthaḥ ye śraddhālavastāvan pratīdamapramāṇakamupavarṇyamānaṃ śobheta / | what happens however is that His disciples, who can grasp only teachings expressed in spoken words, hear sounds proceeding from the mouth of Buddha, like that of wool issuing out of the uṣṇīṣa (turban?) |
ye tu punarasmad vidhāḥ pramāṇopapannārthagrāhitayā yuktimeva prārthayante te katham etad ucyamānamapramāṇakaṃ gṛhīṣyanti // | An assertion like the one just made, without any reasons in support, sound well only when addressed to the faithful; people like us, however, admit of only such things as can be supported by reasons, and hence Reason is what we ask for; how then can we accept such assertions wholly unsupported byreasons? (3241-3243) |
kuṭyādiniḥsva{sṛ---}tānāṃ ca na syād āptopadiṣṭatā / | “Teachings issuing from the walls could not be accepted as taught by a reliable person. |
viśvāsaś ca na tāsu syāt kenemāḥ kīritā iti // kiṃnu buddhapraṇītāḥ syuḥ kiṃnu brāhmaṇavañcakaiḥ / krīḍadbhir apadiṣṭāḥ syur dūrasthapratiśabdakaiḥ // | In fact, there would be no confidence in them, it being doubtful by whom they have been propounded have they been propounded by Buddha, or by deceitful Brāhmaṇas [?], put forward in joke, by means of words bearing the semblance of the words (of Buddha), or by petty unseen elementals and others. |
tasmān na tāsu viśvāsaḥ kartavyaḥ prājñamānibhiḥ // | For these reasons, people who regard themselves as wise should place no confidence in such teachings.” (3244-3246) |
sarvaṃ subodham // | All this is easily comprehensible. |
evaṃ sarvajñatā puṃsāṃ svātantryeṇa nirāspadā / | “thus then, there is no room for the omniscience of men. |
idaṃ ca cintyate bhūyaḥ sarvadarśī kathaṃ mataḥ // yugapat paripāṭyā vā sarvaṃ caikasvabhāvataḥ / jānanyathāpradhānaṃ vā śaktyā veṣyeta sarvavit // | We now proceed to consider why the omniscient person has been postulated? Your omniscient person does he apprehend all things by a single cognition? Or by several cognitions? And then, does he apprehend them all at once? Or in succession noticing only the more important things? In no case has it been seen that a single cognition apprehends such contradictory things as pure and impure and so forth; |
jñānaṃ naikadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ bhinnā vā gataḥ kvacit // | nor have several divergent cognitions been found to appear at one and the same time. |
bhūtaṃ bhavadbhaviṣyac ca vastvanantaṃ krameṇa kaḥ / pratyekaṃ śaknuyād boddhuṃ vatsarāṇāṃ śatair api // svabhāvenāvibhaktena yaḥ sarvamavabudhyate / | Who too is there who could apprehend, even in hundreds of years, each of the endless number of things, past, present and future? Even if the person, by his own undiversified nature, apprehends all things, he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things. |
boddhā sāmānyarūpasya sarvajñenāpi tena kim / anyākāreṇa bodhena naiva vastvavagamyate // | Under the circumstances, what would be the use of the omniscient person who knows the things only in their general form? Specially as in no other form is the thing apprehended. |
tadekākāravijñānaṃ samyaṅmithyāpi vā bhavet / | Then again, this uniform cognition could be either true or false. |
samyaktve dṛṣṭabādhaivaṃ prasaktaṃ sarvamadvayam // | If it be held to be true, then this would be contrary to perceived facts; as it would mean that all is one, without a second; |
tataś ca śiṣyasarvajñadharmādharmataduktayaḥ / na syur vo bhinnarūpatve svabhāvānavadhāraṇāt // | and the result of this would be that there would be no such diverse entities as the disciple, the omniscient person, dharma, adharma, and the teachings of the said person; as the distinctive features of these would not be cognised. |
mṛṣātve tvekabodhasya bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti sarvavit / | If the one uniform cognition be held to be false, the omniscient person turns out to be a deluded person; |
na śraddheyaṃ vacas tasya tadonmattādivākyavat // [p.845] | so that no confidence should be reposed in his words, which are like the words of demented and intoxicated men. |
sahetu sakalaṃ karma jñānenālaukikena yaḥ / samādhijena jānāti sa sarvajño yadīṣyate // pratyakṣamanumānaṃ vā śābdaṃ vā tadatat kṛtam / | If then the omniscient person is held to be that person who apprehends all things and their causes, through a single abnormal cognition brought about by communion, then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for his existence, in the shape of perception or inference or word, that is not produced by that person himself. |
pramāṇam asya sadbhāve nāstīti nāsti tādṛśaḥ // | Hence the conclusion would be that such a person does not exist. |
yugapat paripāṭyā vā kathaṃ kāryād vinānumā / sāmarthyam api naivāsti samarthe sarvam eva vā // | Whether simultaneously or successively, how could there be any inference without an effect? As a matter of fact, a certain person can either have no potency at all, or if he has, then he would have all potencies; |
sarve sarvāvabodhe ca kṣetrajñāḥ prabhaviṣṇavaḥ / | so that all beings would be able to have the cognition of all things. |
upāyaviphalatvāt tu budhyante nikhilaṃ na te // | And yet as a matter of fact, wanting in the necessary means, people do not cognise all things. |
tatraikaḥ sarvavitkaścid ityevaṃ niṣpramāṇakam // itthaṃ yadā na sarvajñaḥ kaścid apyupapadyate / | The idea that ‘there is one person who has acquired special powers not common among men, and he knows all things’ is entirely baseless. Thus then, no omniscient person of any kind is conceivable. |
na dharmādhigame hetuḥ pauruṣeyaṃ tadā vacaḥ // | Consequently no human assertion could be the means of providing the knowledge of dharma.” (3247-3261) |
iti mīmāṃsakāḥ prāhuḥ svatantraśrutilālasāḥ / | Thus have the Mīmāṃsakas argued, being firm believers in the self-sufficiency of the Veda. |
vistareṇa ca vedānāṃ sādhitā pauruṣeyatā // | But we have already proved in detail that the Veda is the work of a person. |
kiṃ yugapad aśeṣapadārthaparijñānāt sarvavit, āhosvit paripāṭyo krameṇa, yadvā sarvasya jagata ekena nityādinā rūpeṇa jñānāt, yathā pradhānāvagamād vā yadeva hi puruṣārthopayogi karmaphalādi tasyaiva jñānāt, yadvā sarvapadārthaparijñānasāmarthyayogāt sarvavidcuyate yathāgniḥ sarvaṃ kramayaugapadyābhyām abhuñjāno 'pi sarvabhugiti / | Does the man regarded as ‘omniscient’ know all things at one and the same time? Or in succession, one after the other? Or, does He apprehend the whole world as one, in one form, such as eternal and the like? Or only the more important things those for instance that are useful to men, such as the effects following from Acts and so forth? Or is He called ‘omniscient’ because He possesses the capacity to know all things, like Fire, which, though not actually devouring all things, either simultaneously or in succession, is yet called ‘all-devourer’? |
tatra prathame pakṣe kalpanādvayam, ekayā vā dhiyā yugapad aśeṣaṃ jānīyādanekayā vā / | Under the first alternative, two alternative views are possible, Does He know all things simultaneously through a single Cognition? Or through several Cognitions? He could not know them through a single Cognition; |
na tāvad ekayā, parasparaviruddhānāṃ śucyaśucyādīnām arthānāṃ yugapad ekajñānena grahaṇadarśanāt / | because never has it been seen that several mutually contradictory things, such as the pure and the impure are apprehended by a single Cognition. |
syād etad viruddhānekapadārthaviṣayā bahvyo buddhyas tasya sakṛdvartanta ity āha bhinnā vā gataya iti / | It might be argued that what happens is that at one and the same time there exist in Him several Cognitions envisaging the various mutually contradictory things. |
na dṛṣṭa iti vibhaktivipariṇāmena sambandhaḥ / | The answer to this is ‘Nor have several divergent, etc. etc.’ This has to be construed with ‘na dṛṣṭaḥ’, changed from the ‘dṛṣṭam’, of the previous clause. |
nahi yugapad bhinnagatayo dṛṣṭā ekavijñānasantatayaḥ satvā iti si..................................................................................varṣaśatair api jñātum aśakyatvāt / | As a matter of fact, several Cognitions in the same ‘Chain’ of a Cognition have never been found to appear. [Several lines of the text are missing here.] [The Buddhist’s answer to the Mīmāṃsaka’s arguments against the Omniscient Person, embodied in Texts 3128-3261.] |
[p.846] | [verses 3262-3263]: |
tena sākṣād eva atīndriyārthānāṃ draṣṭā vidyate, natu nityavacanadvāreṇa, tasya nityasya vacaso 'sambhavāt / | Thus the conclusion is that there is a Person who perceives things directly by Himself, not through the ‘Eternal Word’; because the ‘Eternal Word’ is an impossibility. |
draṣṭaivetyavadhāraṇaṃ bhinnakramaṃ sākṣādityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyam // | The ‘eva’ after ‘draṣṭā’ should be construed after ‘sākṣāt (3262-3263) |
bhavatu nāma nityasya vacasaḥ sambhavastathāpi na tasyātīndriyārthapratipattiṃ prati kāraṇabhāvo yuktam ityetat pratipādayann āha nityasyetyādi / nityasya vacasaḥ śaktir na svato vāpi nānyataḥ / | The ‘eternal word’ can never have the capacity to bring about the cognition of its own meaning; because there is incompatibility between ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’. It may be possible to have the ‘Eternal Word’; even so, however, it cannot be right to accept it as a means of knowing supersensuous things. |
tatra svārthaḥ svakīyamabhidheyam / yadvā svaḥ ātmā, śabdasya svabhāvaḥ, arthaḥ abhidheyaḥ, svaścārthaścasvārthau, tayor jñānam, tasmin samutpādye / | ‘Its own meaning’ what is expressed by the word. Or, ‘sva’ (in ‘svārtha’) may stand for the ‘self’, the nature, of the Word; and ‘artha’ for what is expressed by it; so the compound ‘svārthajñāna’ would mean ‘the Cognition of the Word itself and its meaning’. |
tat samutpādanāya nityasya vacasaḥ śaktiḥ svato vā bhavennisargasiddhā, anyato vā sahakārikāraṇāt / | For the bringing about of such Cognition, the capacity of the ‘Eternal Word’ could be either inherent in itself, or due to other contributory causes. |
tatra na tāvat svataḥ, kutaḥ, kramākramābhyāṃ kāryotpādanaṃ prati nityasya virodhāt / | It cannot be inherent in it; because in the matter of an Eternal Thing bringing about its effect, there is incompatibility between succession and simultaneity; |
nahi kramayaugapadyābhyām anyaḥ prakāraḥ sambhavati yenārthakriyā bhavet / | and apart from these, there is no other method possible whereby there could be effective action; |
anyonyavyavacchedasthitalakṣaṇatvādanayoḥ / | as the two (succession and simultaneity) are mutually exclusive. |
tena kramayaugapadyābhyām evārthakriyā vyāptā / na ca nityasya vacasaḥ krameṇa svārthajñānotpādakatvaṃ yuktam / | Hence all effective action must be invariably concomitant with succession and simultaneity. Now, in the case of the ‘Eternal World’, it cannot bring about the Cognition of its ‘meaning’ in succession; |
prathamakāryotpādāvasthāyām uttarakālabhāvijñānakāryotpādakasvabhāvāpracyutestanmātrabhāvīni kāryāṇi yugapad eva syuḥ / | because at the time that the first effect is being brought about, the cause would not have lost its capacity to bring about the subsequent effects (Cognitions); so that all these should appear, all at the same time. |
nāpi krameṇa yuktam uttarakālam api prathamakāryotpādāvasthāvat kāryakāraṇasamarthāvikalasvabhāvānuvṛtter ajanatvavirodhāt / | Nor is it possible for these effects to be brought about in succession; because even at the later moment, just as at the moment of the bringing about of the first effect the efficiency of the cause would be there intact, and hence there would be an incongruity if it did not bring about the first effect over again. |
prayogaḥ yo yadvyāpakadharmarahitaḥ sa tadvyāptadharmavikalaḥ yathā vṛkṣatvadharmaśūnyo ghaṭādis tadvyāptaśiṃśapātvadharmavikalaḥ arthakriyāsāmarthyadharmavyāpakakramākramadharmarahitaṃ ca nityaṃ vedākhyaṃ vacanamityarthato vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ ato na svato nityavacasaḥ śaktisambhavaḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When a thing is devoid of a wider character, it must be devoid of the less wide character; e.g. the Jar, which is devoid of the character of ‘tree’, is devoid of the character of ‘śiṃśapā' (a particular tree); the ‘Eternal Word’ called Veda is devoid of the character of ‘succession and simultaneity’ which includes under itself the character of ‘effective action’; hence, by implication, there is non-apprehension of the wider character. Thus it is not possible for the ‘Eternal Word’ to have the said capacity inherent in itself. |
nāpyanyataḥ sahakārikāraṇāt / | Nor can the said capacity be due to any other contributory cause. |
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