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tasmāt siddhā prameyatvāder hetugaṇasya vyāptiḥ / | Thus the invariable concomitance (Premiss) relating to the Reasons ‘being cognisable’ and the rest (put forward under Text 3157) becomes established; |
ata eva pūrvoktasyābhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvād ityetasya hetor vyāptir uktā bhavati // | and this implies the establishment of the Invariable Concomitance of the previously-mentioned Reason ‘being envisaged by the only Means of Cognition, Non-apprehension’. |
tasmād atīndriyārthānāṃ sākṣād draṣṭā na vidyate / | “Thus then, there can be no one who perceives things beyond the reach of the senses; |
vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati // | he alone knows such things who knows them through the eternal word.” (3175) |
syād etat na nityenaiva vacanena sarvaḥ paśyati / | The following might be urged It is not through the Eternal Word alone that all men know things; |
tathā hi kanakakāśyapamuniprabhṛtipraṇītād vākyācchākyamuniḥ paśyati, tato 'pyanya, iti / | for instance, Śakya-Muni (Buddha) knows things from the words of sages like Kanaka, Kāśyapa and the like; and others know them from His words. |
atrāha etadityādi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3176-3177 above] |
etat anantaroktam vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyatīti, asahamāno ya evaṃ manyate bauddhādir na nityena vānena sarvaṃ paśyati, kintu puruṣāntarakṛtena, tadyathā kanakakāśyapādipraṇītenāgamena śākyamunir iti, tasyaivaṃvādinast [p.829] advākyasyāpramāṇatā vaktavyā tasya puruṣāntarasya vākyaṃ tadvākyam, tenaiva dṛṣṭābhimatapuruṣavākyena tulyatvāt kāraṇāt / | ‘This’ what has been just said, ‘He alone knows such things who knows them through the Eternal Word’; one who does not accept this and thinks that the Buddhist and others do not know all things through the Eternal Word, but through the word uttered by other Persons; e.g. Buddha knows them through the scriptures composed by other persons, like Kanaka, Kāśyapa and others; one who makes this assertion should assert the unreliability of those words i.e. of the words of those other persons; because they stand on the same footing as the words of the person who has been seen by one and who is held to be omniscient. |
puruṣasya cāgamakarturapramāṇatā vaktavyeti sambandhaḥ / kathaṃ ---, pūrvokair jñeyaprameyatvādibhir hetubhiḥ // | He should also assert the unreliability of the man, the composer of the scripture himself, why? because of the Reasons adduced before such as ‘being cognisable’ and the rest. |
nanu cānādir buddhaparamparā tat praṇīto 'pi siddhānto 'nādir eva / | Says the Opponent The line of Buddhas has been without beginning; hence the doctrine propounded by them is also beginningless; |
tataś ca vedābhiyuktaparamparāvad vedavaccānayor apyanāditvād adoṣatvam evetyatrāha kartṛkṛtrimavākyānām ityādi / | so that on account of the beginninglessness of both these being exactly like that of the Veda and the Vedic Tradition, they must be regarded as free from defects. |
kartṛkṛtrimavākyānama ucyate yā tvanāditā / | The answer to this from the Mīmāṃsaka is as follows: [see verse 3178 above] |
apaśyataḥ svayaṃ dharmaṃ tathā śauddhodaner api // | The same idea is further explained: [see verse 3179 above] |
yathā śauddhādanes tadvākyasya cāprāmāṇyaṃ tathānyeṣāṃ kanakakāśyapādīnāṃ tadvacasāṃ ceti // | Just as Buddha himself and his words are unreliable, so also are Kanaka, Kāśyapa, etc. and their words. The beginninglessness of such persons and their words, even though assumed, is not very far from Invalidity; |
aprāmāṇyapadasthatvān na tasmād atiricyate // | because it rests upon an invalid basis. |
tataścedṛśāṃ pudgalānāṃ tadvākyānāṃ cānāditā kalpitāpi satī{na} tasmād aprāmāṇyād atiricyate dūrībhavati / | If the similarity that is pointed out between Buddha and others on the one hand and the Vedic Scholars on the other, is in regard to both being beginningless, then our answer is that mere beginninglessness does not establish their reliability; |
aprāmāṇyapada eva sthitatvāt // | because neither, reliability nor unreliability is incompatible with beginninglessness; |
ato 'nāditvasāmānyaṃ buddhānām abhidhīyate / mīmāṃsakāyamānais tair yadvedādhyāyinām iva // | all that would happen would be that beginninglessness would belong to the Reliability of Vedic Scholars, while it would belong to the Unreliability of Buddha and others; |
tadajñānaviśeṣatvān na teṣāṃ yāti tulyatām / | and neither Reliability nor Unreliability would belong to both, on the ground of beginninglessness. |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve syātām evaṃ hyanādinī // | ‘Pramāṇa, etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as ‘the good and bad points of what is Reliable and what is Unreliable’. |
tatra yadi nāmānāditvamātreṇa buddhāder vedādhyāyibhiḥ saha sāmyamupavarṇitam, tathāpi nānāditvāt prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyati, prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyayor anāditvāvirodhāt. | Now the Vedic Scholar proceeds (1) to refute the objection that “the Reason, in the shape of being amenable to non-apprehension, is inadmissible”, (2) to prove the non-existence of the omniscient Person, and (3) to prove that the case of the Veda is different; |
[p.830] | [see verse 3185 above] |
idānīm abhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigraha{tva}syāsiddhatāparihāreṇa sarvajñasyābhāva{vaṃ}prasādhayan vedasya tato viśeṣam āha sarvajñatvam ityādi / sarvajñatvaṃ ca buddhāder yā ca vedasya nityatā / | ‘Declare as standing on the same footing.’ Some people hold the opinion that “Both Buddha, etc. and the Veda are equal sources of right knowledge, hence the knowledge of supersensuous things can be obtained from the words of Omniscient Persons, as also from the Veda”. |
tulye jalpanti ye tebhyo viśeṣaḥ kathyate 'dhunā // | To these people it is now pointed out wherein the ease of the Veda differs from that of the said Persons. |
tathā hi sarvadarśī pratyakṣānumānaśabdopamānārthāpattīnāṃ madhye naikenāpi pramāṇena siddhaḥ, tat katham abhāvapramaṇagrāsīkṛtamūrter asatas tasya pramāṇabhūtenāgopālāṅganādipratītena vedena sāmyaṃ bhaviṣyatīti manyamānaḥ sarvajña ityādinā pratyakṣādipramāṇapañcakaprasiddhatām asya nirākaroti. | “As a matter of fact, the existence of the Omniscient Person has not been vouched for by any one of the five Means of Cognition Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy, Presumption; how then can such a Person, who falls within the scope of ‘Negation’ (Non-apprehension only) and is non-existent, stand on the same footing as the Veda which is known to all men down even to the milk-woman? With this idea, the Vedic Scholar proceeds to refute the idea of the Omniscient Person being cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest: [see verse 3186 above] |
dṛṣṭo na caikadeśo 'sti liṅgaṃ vā yo 'numāpayet // | “By means of Perception we, men of limited vision, do not see the Omniscient Person; |
tathā hy arvāgdarśinaḥ pratyakṣaṃ trividham, indriyajñānaṃ mānasaṃ sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanaṃ ceti. | because the perception of men of limited vision is of three kinds: (1) Perception through the Senses, (2) Perception through the Mind, and (3) the Self-Cognition of all minds and mental phenomena. |
tad etat trividham api na sarvajñam avagamayitum alam, atadviṣayatvāt. | None of these three kinds of Perception can bring about the Cognition of the Omniscient Person; because He does not form an object of such Cognition; |
indriyajñānaṃ hi rūpādiviṣayapañcakaniyatam ato na tena parasantānasamavāyino buddhidharmā viṣayīkriyante. | (1) Perception through the senses is restricted to the five objects Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound; hence the mental functions subsisting in the ‘chain’ of other persons cannot figure in Perception through the Senses. |
nāpi mānasena, tasya indriyajñānaparigṛhītaviṣayānantaraviṣayagrāhītvenendriyajñānavat pratiniyatarūpādiviṣayatvāt. | (2) Nor can the Omniscient Person be the object of Perception through the Mind; because the Mind, as such, apprehends only such things as have been already apprehended by Perception through the Senses; |
nāpi svasaṃvedanena, tasya svasantānavartivartamānacittacaittaviṣayatvāt. | (3) Nor can He be the object of ‘Self-cognition’, because this apprehends only such mind and mental operations as occur in one’s own ‘Chain’; |
ato na tena parasantānavartinaḥ svasantānikāścānāgatāścetodharmāḥ śakyante vedayitum. | and consequently, it cannot apprehend, the mind, etc. occurring in other ‘Chains’, or even such mental operations occurring in one’s own ‘Chain’ as are yet to come. |
yogijñānasyaiva ca sādhyatvān na tena grahaṇāgrahaṇacintāvatarati. nāpy anumānena, tad dhi trividhaliṅgasamāśrayam iṣyate saugataiḥ. | (2) “Nor can the Omniscient Person be proved by means of Inference. The Buddhists have regarded Inference as based upon three kinds of Indicative (Probans) [viz.: (a) Based on non-apprehension, (b) Based on causal relation, and (c) Based on the nature of things]. |
tatra vidhisādhanasyātrādhi [p.831] kārānānupalabdhis tāvad ihādhikriyate. | (a) In the present instance, what is needed is a positive reason, hence there is no room for non-apprehension. |
nāpi kāryam, pratyakṣānupalambha{pratyakṣopalambha---}sādhanatvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasya viprakarṣiṇā sarvajñena saha kasyacit kāryakāraṇabhāvāsiddheḥ. | (b) Nor is there room for causal relation; because the causal relation is always based upon Perception, and no Perception is possible of the far off Omniscient Person; whose causal relation with anything therefore is impossible. |
svabhāvo 'pi hetur na sarvadarśinaḥ sattāṃ sādhayati, tadapratyakṣatve svabhāvasya tadavyatirekiṇo grahītum aśakyatvāt. | (c) As for the mature of things, any Reason based upon that also cannot prove the existence of the Omniscient Person; because such a Person himself being imperceptible, his nature, which must be inseparable from himself, cannot be apprehended; |
tasmād dṛṣṭaḥ prasiddho liṅgabhūta ekadeśaḥ pakṣadharmaḥ sa na sambhavati, nirūpyamāṇo yaḥ sarvajñam anumāpayet. | hence it cannot serve as an Indicative which is ‘perceived’ well-known, recognised, as ‘being part’ of the ‘Subject’ (Omniscient Person), leading to the inference of the Omniscient Person. |
kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane sarvo hetus trayīṃ doṣajātiṃ nātivartate, asiddhiṃ viruddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ca. tathā hi hetur ucyamāno bhāvadharmo vābhidhīyeta, abhāvadharmo vā, yadvobhayadharma iti pakṣatrayam. | Then again, any Reason that may be adduced in proof of the existence of the Omniscient Person, cannot escape from the three kinds of flaw (fallacy) being ‘inadmissible’, ‘contradictory’ and ‘inconclusive For instance, when the Reason is adduced, is it adduced as a property belonging to a positive entity? Or to a negative entity? Or to both? These are the only three alternatives possible. |
tatra sarvajñe dharmiṇi na bhāvadharmaḥ prativādiprasiddhaḥ sambhavati, tasyaiva dharmiṇaḥ sādhyatvena{nā---} siddhatvāt siddhau vāvivādaprasaṅgāt. | As regards the Omniscient Person, there can be no such ‘Property belonging to a positive entity’ as is admitted by both parties; because that positive entity itself (in the shape of the Omniscient Person) is yet to be proved; |
yo hi bhāvadharmaṃ tatrecchati sa kathaṃ vādī taṃ necchet, nirāśrayasya dharmamātrasya grahītum aśakyatvāt. | if a party accepts the idea of such a property belonging to that entity, how could he not accept the entity itself? Because the mere property cannot exist without its substratum in the shape of the entity. |
nāpy abhāvadharmo hetuḥ sarvajñasiddhaye yuktaḥ, tasya bhāvaviparītasādhakatvena viruddhatvāt. nāpy ubhayadharmaḥ, tasyānaikāntikatvāt. | Nor can the Reason proving the Omniscient Person consist of a property belonging to a negative entity; because such a Reason would prove the non-existence of the entity, and hence it would be ‘contradictory Nor, lastly, can the Reason be one that belongs to both; |
kathaṃ hi nāma bhāvābhāvadharmo bhāvadharmasiddhāv abhāvākhyavipakṣavṛttivyavacchedalabhyam, bhāvād vya{vya---}bhicāritvalakṣaṇaṃ hetutvam anubhavet. | because such a Reason would be ‘inconclusive’, How could any Reason which belongs to both positive and negative entities serve as proving the existence of an entity, which it could do only if it were inseparable from the entity, and if it were excluded from existence in the Negative Entity, which is present in cases where the contrary of the Probandum is present? |
tasmāt triprakāro 'py ekadeśo liṅgabhūto nāsty anumāpaka iti nānumānataḥ sarvajñasya siddhiḥ. | Thus none of the three kinds of Indicative, as part of the ‘Subject’, can bring about the Inference of the Omniscient Person, whose existence, therefore, cannot be proved. |
śabdād api na sarvajñāvasāyo 'stīti darśayati na cāgamavidhir ityādi. | The following Text shows that the Omniscient Person cannot be cognised by means of the Word: [see verse 3187 above] |
śabdāsannikṛṣṭe 'rthe yaj jāyate jñānam. | That Cognition is ‘verbal’ which proceeds from Words, in regard to things not in close proximity to the man. |
tac ca dvividhaṃ nityaśabdajanitaṃ pauruṣeyadhvanihetukaṃ ca. | It is of two kinds that produced by the eternal Word, and that produced by the utterances of men. |
tatra tathāvidhasya sarvajñapratipādakasyāgamasya nityasyābhāvān na tāvad ādyaṃ sambhavati. | As asserting the existence of the Omniscient Person, there is no eternal scriptural Word; hence the former verbal Cognition is not possible in this case. |
yac copaniṣadādau paṭhyate "yaḥ satyavāk satyasaṅkalpaḥ satyakāmaḥ so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ" ityevamādi, so 'py arthavādo draṣṭavyaḥ. | What we read in the Upaniṣads regarding ‘Him who is truthful in word, truthful in volution, truthful in desires He should be sought after, He should be sought to be known’, and so forth, all this should be understood to be merely commendatory. |
yac ca pauruṣeyaṃ vacanam ucyate sa bhagavāṃs tathāgatorhena samyak sambuddha iti tasyāpramāṇatvāt kathaṃ tenāsatyena sa pratyāyyeta // | As regards the human assertion that is quoted, such as ‘The Blessed Lord the Tathāgata, the Arhat, is Truly Enlightened, etc.’, no reliability can attach to such assertions. How then could any reliable information be deduced from such an unreliable source? (3187) |
syād etan na yataḥ kutaścid vacanāt sarvajño 'smābhiḥ pratīyate / | The following might be urged We do not accept the Omniscient Person on the strength of any and every stray assertion; |
kiṃ tarhi tenaiva bhagavatoktena / sarvajño 'haṃ sarvadarśī, nāsti tathāgatasya kiñcid ajñātam ityādi / | we do so on the strength of the assertions of that same Blessed Lord, such as ‘I am omniscient, perceiving all things, there is nothing that is unknown to the Tathāgata, etc. etc.’. |
atha tadvacanenaiva sarvajño 'nyaiḥ pratīyate / | Thus it is on His own word that we accept His omniscience. |
evaṃ satītaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ prāpnoti // | Under the circumstances, there would be an objectionable interdependence. |
katham ity āha sarvajñoktatayetyādi / | Question How so? Answer: [see verse 3189 next] |
sarvajñoktatayā vākyaṃ satyaṃ tena tadastitā / | “The assertion is true because it has been made by the omniscient person, and such an omniscient person exists because he asserts it. |
kathaṃ tadubhayaṃ siddhyet siddhān mūlāntarādṛte // | How can both these notions be established without some other well-known basis?” (3189) |
tathā hi na tāvat tadvacanasya prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate yāvat sarvajñoktametad ityevaṃ nāvagamyeta / | As a matter of fact, there can be no certainty regarding the reliability of his word unless it is recognised that it has been spoken by an Omniscient Person; |
tasya ca sarvajñasyāvagatis tata eva vacanād iti vyaktam itaretarāśrayatvam / | and that the speaker is omniscient is learnt from his own words; hence there is clear interdependence. |
niścitāt kāraṇāntarād vinetyarthaḥ // | ‘Without some other well-known basis’ i.e. some other well-known reason. |
athāpi syācchrāvakā{ka---}cchāriputrāder vacanāt sarvajño 'vasīyate, yatas tenoktam sarvajño 'yaṃ śākyakulanandana iti, atrāha asarvajñapraṇītāttvityādi / | The following might be urged The existence of the Omniscient Person is accepted on the basis of the words of such men as Śrāvaka-Acchāriputra (?), who says ‘This worthy scion of the Śākya-race is omniscient’. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3190 above] |
asarvajñapraṇītāt tu vacanān mūlavarjitāt / | The assertion of men whose reliability has not been demonstrated does not differ from one’s own assertion; |
sarvajñamavagacchantaḥ svavākyāt kiṃ na jāya{na---}te // nahyānāsāditapramāṇābhāvasyānyavākyasya svavacanāt kaścid viśeṣo 'sti, yena bauddhāḥ svavacanād eva sarvajñaṃ na pratipadyante, anyavacanāt pratiyantīti na kiñcit kāraṇam utpaśyāmo 'nyatra jāḍyāt // | hence there is no reason why the Buddhists should not derive their knowledge of the Omniscient Person from their own words. We see no reason except stupidity why they should seek to know it from the words of other persons. “For the proving of the existence of one omniscient person, it would be necessary to assume several omniscient persons; and if a single one of these happen to be not-omniscient, he would not be able to recognise the omniscient person.” (3191) |
atha matamaparimitās tathāgatā abhūvan, bhaviṣyantāś ca, tataścaikasya tadanyavacanāt sarvajñatāvasīyate / | The following view might be held There have been innumerable Tathāgatas (Enlightened Ones) in the past and they are going to appear in the future; |
anyasyāpyanyavacanād ityatrāha sarvajñā bahava ityādi / | and it is from the words of one of these that we derive the knowledge of the omniscience of the other; |
sarvajñā bahavaḥ kalpyāścaikasarvajñasiddhaye / | and that of the omniscience of the former from the words of a third, and so forth. |
ekasarvajñasiddhaye sarvajñaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalapuruṣāyuṣasaṃkṣaye 'pi nārvāg darśanasya sarvajñaniścayotpattisambhava iti sarvajñāḥ kalpyāḥ prasajyeran // | If for the purpose of proving the existence of one Omniscient Person, one goes on following up a series of Omniscient Persons, no man with limited vision could ever get at certainty regarding the Omniscient Person, even at the end of his whole life; hence several Omniscient Persons would have to be assumed. |
api ca āstāṃ tāvadidaṃ yadidānīṃtanāḥ sarvajñamasannihitaṃ boddhumasa{m}arthā iti, api tu tat kālasannihitā api taṃ jñātuṃ na śaknuvantyevāsarvavida ityetad darśayann āha sarvajño 'yam ityādi / sarvajño 'yam iti hyevaṃ tat kālair api boddhibhiḥ / tajjñānajñeyavijñānaśūnyair jñātuṃ na śakyate // | “As a matter of fact, even the contemporaries of the omniscient person could not know him as ‘omniscient’, as they would be devoid of the knowledge of the cognitions of that person [or, of the knowledge of the things cognised by that person]. [see Ślokavārtika 1.1.2, 134], and if the omniscient person is not recognised by any one, for that man, the assertion of that omniscient person could not be reliable; as the very basis of that assertion would be unknown, as in the case of the assertion of other ordinary men.” [see Ślokavārtika 1.1.2, 136.] (3192-3193) commentary. |
sarvajño nāvabuddhaś ca yenaiva syān na taṃ prati / tadvākyānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ mūlājñāne 'nyavākyavat // | Then again, we shall lay aside, for the present, the idea that people of the present day are incapable of knowing the Omniscient Person as no such is present before them; as a matter of fact, even people who lived at the same time as that Person could not know him, because they would themselves be not-omniscient. |
tasya sarvajña{sya}jñānaṃ, tajjñānaṃ tadeva jñeyaṃ paricchedyaṃ yasya vijñānasya tat tathā, tac ca tadvijñānaṃ ceti tathoktam, tena śūnyāḥ rahitāḥ / athavā tajjñānasya yadvijñeyaṃ tena śūnyāḥ, asarvajñā ity arthaḥ / | The compound ‘tajjñānajñeya, etc. etc’. is to be expounded as ‘they are devoid of without that Cognition which has for its object i.e. which envisages the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person’. Or as ‘who are devoid of the Cognition of all the things cognised by that Person’, because he is himself not omniscient. |
nahi śarīramātradarśanāt sarvajña ityevam avasātuṃ pāryate / | By merely looking at the body, one does not conclude that ‘he is omniscient’; |
viśiṣṭajñānasambandhagrahaṇānantarīyakatvād asyāvasāyasya / | because such conclusion must be accompanied by the recognition of the presence of exceptional knowledge (in the Person); |
tac ca viśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ sakalapadārthaviṣayaṃ sādhakam / | this ‘exceptional knowledge’, in order to be able to prove omniscience, must envisage all things; |
sakalapadārthaviṣayatā tasya tadgrāhyaviṣayagrahaṇamantareṇāvasātuṃ na śakyate / | and this fact of the Cognition envisaging all things cannot be recognised unless the things comprehended by that Cognition are known; |
nahi daṇḍipratyayo daṇḍagrahaṇamantareṇa bhavati / | for instance, the Cognition of the ‘man with the stick’ is not possible unless one knows the stick. |
prayogaḥ yasya yadgrahaṇopādhiravagrahas tasya tadupādhigrahaṇābhāve grahaṇaṃ na bhavati, tadyathā daṇḍagrahaṇopādhidaṇḍa {ṇḍi} grahaṇaṃ na daṇḍi{ṇḍ---}rūpā{rūpopādhya---}grahe bhavati, nāsti ca sarvajñajñānagrahaṇasya jñeyagrahaṇopādhir jñeyarūpodhigrahaṇam arvāg darśinām iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When the Cognition of one thing forms the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of another thing, there can be no Cognition of the latter thing without the Cognition of the former thing; e.g. the Cognition of the stick being the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the man with the stick, there is no Cognition, of the man with the stick unless there is Cognition of the stick; the Cognition of things cognised by the Omniscient Person, which is the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person himself, is not possible for men of limited vision; |
upādhigrahaṇenopādhimad grahaṇasya vyāptatvāt / | because the Cognition of the necessary adjunct is more extensive (wider) than the Cognition of that to which the said adjunct belongs; |
tasya cehābhāvaḥ / | and the former is absent in the case in question. |
tataś ca tadānīṃ sannihitenāpyasarvavidā yenaiva sarvajño nāvadhāryate, taṃ prati sarvajñavākyānām api satāmaniścitatvād aprāmāṇyam eva, mūlasya prāmāṇyaniścayakāraṇasya sarvajñajñānaniścayasyābhāvāt / | Thus then, even in the case of a man contemporaneous with the Omniscient Person, unless such a man is himself omniscient, he cannot know the Omniscient Person; so that for such a man, even the assertions of Omniscient Persons would be of doubtful veracity and hence unreliable; as the basis of it the grounds of certainty regarding reliability, in the shape of the definite cognition of the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person, would be absent. |
anyavākyavad iti / rathyāpuruṣavākyasyeti // | ‘As in the case of the assertion of ordinary men’ i.e. of the assertion of common people. |
sarvaśiṣyair api jñātānārthān saṃvādayannapi / na sarvajño bhaved anyalokajñātārthavarjanāt // | “Even if a person were to comprehend the things known to all his disciples, he would not be ‘omniscient’; as he would be devoid of the comprehension of the things known to people other than those disciples. |
naca sarvanarajñātajñeyasaṃvādasambhavaḥ / | Nor is it possible to comprehend all the things cognised by all men; |
kālatrayatrilokasthair narair na samāgamaḥ // | as there can be no coming together of men of the past, present and future, inhabiting all the three regions of the world.” (3194-3195) |
yannāma tat kālasannihitakiyan mātrajananaparijñātārthān parijñātavāṃstathāpi na sarvajño bhavati, tat kālāsannihitānyalokaparijñātasyārthasyāparijñānāt / | Even if the man who knew only those things that were known to the people contemporaneous with, and in close proximity to, himself, he could not be ‘omniscient’; as he would have no knowledge of things known to persons other than those, who may be contemporaneous with him, but not in close proximity to him. |
nahyekadeśaparijñānena sakalajño bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt / | By knowing only a part, one does not know the whole; if he did, there would be an absurdity. |
nāpi tat kālasannihitāśeṣajanaparijñātārthasaṃvādaḥ sambhavati / | As a matter of fact, it is not possible to comprehend even all those things that may be known to all his contemporaries who may be in close proximity to him. |
dūrasthānām anarthināṃ ca saṃvādābhāvāt / | Because there can be no comprehension of what is far off and what is known to people having no connection with him. |
syād etat yadā sarva eva janās tathāgataṃ yugapad upetya yadyat praśnayanti tadā sa bhagavāṃs tadaiva vyākarotītyato 'styeva [p.834] sarvanarajñātajñeyasaṃvāda ityatrāha kālatrayatrilokasthair iti / | The following might be urged It may be that all men approach the Tathāgata simultaneously, and whatever questions they put, He answers them all, so that the people do come to know what is known to that Omniscient Person, |
nahyatītānāgatavartamānakālavartināṃ nṛṇāṃ samāgamaḥ kvacid api sambhavī nāpi, svargapātālamartyātmakalokatrayasthānām / | The answer to this is that ‘there can be no coming together, etc. etc.’ nowhere is it possible to bring together men of the past, present and future, or those inhabiting the regions of Heaven, the Nether World and the World of Mortal Beings. |
yadvā lokatrayaṃ kāmarūpārūpadhātutrayātmakaṃ boddhavyam // | Or, the three ‘regions’ may be taken as standing for the ‘Imaginary’, ‘Objective’ and ‘Subjective’ Regions. |
kiñcijjñope hi śaknoti stokān bhramayituṃ narān / sarvajñaṃ yena gṛhṇīyus te bhaktibhrāntacetasaḥ // | “A man who knows little can delude a few men, to the extent that, having their mind deluded by devotion, they come to accept him as omniscient. |
bhuktacintatamuṣṭisthadravyasaṃvādanakṣaṃāḥ / kecit kuhakavijñānair dharmādijñānavarjitāḥ // | Through the art of chiromancy, some people are able to know what has been eaten, what is being thought of, what lies within a man’s fist and so forth, though they are entirely devoid of any knowledge of dharma and cognate matters. |
tathā mānyendrajālādikuśalāḥ kecid ajñakam / | Similarly, people expert in the arts of illusion, magic, etc. deceive an ignorant man; |
bhrāmayanti janaṃ yena sarvajñāḥ pratibhānti te // | by which they appear to be omniscient.” (3196-3198) |
nahi kiñcin mātrātīndriyapadārthaparijñāmātreṇa dharmādharmādiparijñānaṃ tasya siddhyati, kuhakajñānibhir māyendrajālādikuśalaiścānekāntāt / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3196-3198 above] By knowing only a few supersensuous things, a man cannot be regarded as possessing knowledge of Dharma and Adharma; because such a reasoning would be inconclusive in view of the ease of men expert in chiromancy, magic and so forth. |
tathā hi mantrauṣadhādiprayogeṇa yathā bhuktam annavyañjanādi, yathā cintitaṃ ca manasā vastu, muṣṭisthaṃ ca dravyaṃ saṃvādayantyeva / | For instance.by the use of certain incantations and medicinal herbs, people are found to comprehend rightly the food a man has eaten, the thing he has thought of in his mind, the thing lying in his closed fist; |
na caitāvatā te dharmādivido bhavanti / | and yet merely by this, they do not become persons conversant with such things as Dharma and Adharma. |
yathā kecid indrajālakuśalā vicitrodyānavimānāpsarogaṇadevaputrādikamākāśe darśayantītyanekāntaḥ // | For instance, some people who are expert in magic are able to show to people strange gardens, flying cars, celestial damsels, and heavenly beings in the sky. |
nanu cetihāsapurāṇeṣu brahmādiḥ sarvajñaḥ kīritaḥ, tathā hi brahmaṇo jñānamapratighaṃ vairāgyaṃ ceti tatra paṭhyate, tat katham āgamāt sarvajño na siddha ityatrāha itihāsetyādi / itihāsapurāṇeṣu brahmādir yo 'pi sarvavit / | Hence in view of all this, the reason adduced must be rejected as ‘Inconclusive’. “The description that we meet with in itihāsas and purāṇas of Brahmā being omniscient and of his knowledge and dispassion as untrammelled, all this should be understood in the figurative sense, like the commendatory declarations relating to mantras. |
jñānamapratighaṃ yasya vairāgyaṃ ceti kīrittam // gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaḥ so 'pi mantrārthavādavat / yadvā prakṛtadharmādijñānā{prati}ghatocyate // | Or, the ‘untrammelled knowledge’ that is spoken may be taken as referring to the knowledge of dharma and other matters relating to the particular context; what is meant is that his knowledge of such things as ‘ditty’, ‘property’, ‘pleasure’ and ‘liberation’, is ‘untrammelled’; |
jñānamapratighaṃ tasya na tat sarvārthagocaram // | it cannot refer to all things.” (3199-3201) |
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