sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
vicchinnamūlatvād iti / vicchinnaṃ mūlaṃ pradhānaṃ dharmātmakavastuparijñānaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktaḥ / | The following might be urged The omniscience of the Teacher has been inferred by the Buddhists from the fact of His having propounded the teaching of the truth regarding all things; hence this Inference annuls the Mīmāṃsaka’s ‘Proposition’ [that ‘there can be no Omniscient Person’]; |
tadbhāvas tattvam // | and his Reason also is inadmissible. |
sākṣāt pratyakṣadarśitvādyasyāśucirasādayaḥ / | Anticipating this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka supplies the following answer: [see verse 3146 above] |
svasaṃvedyāḥ prasajyante ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati // | [verse 3146]: |
vedāḥ ṛgyajuḥsāmasaṃjñakāḥ, upavedāḥ āyurvedadhanurvedādayaḥ, aṅgāni vedānāṃ ṣaṭ, śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ chando niruktaṃ jyotiṣam iti, pratyaṅgāni tadavayavā dhātvādayaḥ, ādiśabdena tat parikarasya bhāṣyādeḥ parigrahaḥ / | Vedas named ‘Ṛk’, ‘Yajuṣ’ and ‘Sāman Upavedas’ Āyurveda, Dhanurveda and the like. ‘Subsidiary Sciences’ the six subsidiaries of the Veda, in the shape of Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Chandas and Jyotiṣa ‘Auxiliaries’ the parts of these, in the shape of Verbal Roots, etc. including the Commentaries, etc. of these. The ‘artha’ of these is what is contained in them. |
eṣāmartho 'bhidheyas tasya bodhanam pratipādakaṃ vacanaṃ tat tathābhūtaṃ buddhāder na dṛśyate yadvedādyupadiṣṭārthaṃ pratipādayatītyarthaḥ / | Of this ‘artha’, ‘contents’, of the said works, no knowledge is provided by the words of Buddha and other Teachers. |
nahi kasyacid akhilapadārtharāśipratipādakaśāstrapraṇayanaṃ dṛśyate sarvaśāstrāṇāṃ bhinnābhidheyatvadarśanāt // [p.822] athāpi syāt kiyanmātrapadārthopadeśadarśanāt buddhāder anyo 'pi svagranathānupadiṣṭo 'rtho vijñātatvenānumīyate parijñānaśaktidarśanāt, tataś ca tadavastha eva doṣa ity āha svagranthetyādi / | That is, no words of the Buddha are found to expound what is contained in the Veda, etc. As a matter of fact, no such Person is found who has composed a Scripture that provides the knowledge of all things; the reason for this being that the various scriptures are found to deal with different subjects. “When there are many omniscient persons, preaching mutually contradictory doctrines, the grounds of reliability being the same in all, which one of these should be accepted as reliable?” (3148) The following might be urged In the case of Buddha, the Teachings are found to be related to supersensuous things; |
sarvajñāḥ kavayaḥ sarve syuḥ svakāvyanibandhanāt // yadi grantheṣu anibaddho 'pi anupadiṣṭo 'pi yo 'rthaḥ sa tair vijñāta iṣyate 'numānabalāt tadā svotprekṣitakathāprabandhakāriṇo 'pi kavayaḥ parijñānaśaktidarśanāt sarvajñāḥ kalpyāḥ syuḥ, aviśeṣādityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ // | not so the works of poets; hence the knowledge of all such things is inferred only in the case of Buddha, not i n that of others. If it were not so, the -person who does not possess the knowledge of all supersensuous things could not have the knowledge of even some of these things; as there would be no difference between the two cases. |
tenātīndriyārthaparijñātṛtve satīti saviśeṣaṇatvāddhetor na kavibhir vyabhicāra ityāśaṅkyāha sarvajñeṣvityādi / | Consequently the addition of the qualification ‘being a person knowing supersensuous things’ would prevent the Reason applying to the case of Poets and hence from ‘Falsity’ (Inconclusiveness). |
tulyahetuṣu sarveṣu ko nāmaiko 'vadhāryatām // | The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3148 above] |
bahutareṣu sugatakapilakaṇabhakṣākṣapādādiṣu tadbhaktaiḥ sarvajñatvenopakalpiteṣu sādhyeṣu katama eko 'tra sarvajñatvenāvadhāryatāṃ niścīyatām, sarveṣām atīndriyārthopadeṣṭṛtvasya sarvajñaniścayahetos tulyatvāt / | There are many Teachers, Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇāda, Gautama and so forth, who are regarded by their respective devotees as omniscient; and each one of these is sought to be proved to be omniscient; which one of them is to be definitely recognised as reliable? The ground of omniscience, in the shape of having taught doctrines relating to supersensuous things, is equally present in all of them. |
naca sarva eva sarvajñā ityavadhāryituṃ yuktam sarveṣāṃ parasparaviruddhārthopadeṣṭṛtvāt / | It cannot be right to regard them all as omniscient; because what is taught by them is mutually contradictory. |
nahi parasparahitopadeṣṭāraḥ sarva eva tattvadarśino yuktā vastūnām ekarūpatvena parasparaviruddhānekasvabhāvasaṃsargābhāvāt // | When several persons propound teachings contrary to each other, they cannot all be regarded as knowing the truth; as the truth regarding any particular thing can be one only; hence it cannot admit of mutually contradictory properties. |
sugato yadi sarvajñaḥ kapilo neti kā pramā / | “If Buddha is omniscient, then what is the proof for Kapila not being so. |
athobhāvapi sarvajñau matabhedastayoḥ katham // | if both are omniscient, then how is it that there is difference of opinion between them?” (3149) |
dvāvapi tarhi sarvajñau bhavetāmiti cedāha athobhavāpītyādi // | It might be said that both are omniscient; in view of this, it is added ‘If both, etc. etc.’ (3149) |
gaṇitādyekadeśe tu sarveṣāṃ satyavāditā / | “In the matter of one matter, of arithmetic for instance. all beings Jina, Buddha and others, are found to be truthful; |
jinabuddhādisattvānāṃ viśeṣo nāvadhāryate // | and no distinction is found among them.” (3150) |
[p.823] sarveṣāṃ hi jinabuddhādīnāṃ dehināṃ gaṇitādyekadeśeṣu kvacid avisaṃvādi vaco dṛśyata eva / | The words of all men, Jina, Buddha, and others, are found, in the one matter of Arithmetic, to be true, quite in keeping with the real state of things; |
nahyanalpaṃ pralapatām {prajalpatāṃ---} na kiñcit satyārthaṃ bhavet, yathoktam "nahyekaṃ nāsti satyārthaṃ puruṣe bahubhāṣiṇi" iti / | in fact, when people speak of a lot of things, it is not possible that not one should be true; |
tataś ca tulyahetutaḥ sarveṣām eva viśeṣānavadhāraṇāt sarvajñatā prāpnoti, nacaitad yuktam, parasparaviruddhārthopadeśād iti pūrvam uktatvāt // athāpi syād yasya vacanaṃ sarvatra pramāṇair nivāryamāṇaṃ vyāhartuṃ na pāryate, sa eva sarvajño bhaviṣyatīty āha yenaivetyādi. | as has been declared in the following words ‘When a man talks a lot, it cannot be that not a single word is true’, Thus then, the reason being equally present, in all cases, no difference can be recognised among men, and all should be regarded as omniscient. This however cannot be true, because they have propounded mutually contradictory teachings, as already pointed out above. |
[2996] yenaiva hetunaikasya sarvajñatvaṃ prasādhyate / svapakṣaprītimātreṇa so 'nyasyāpy upatiṣṭhate // | “That same reason, by which the omniscience of one person is proved, merely on account of your love for your own view of things, is found to be present in other persons also; |
dūṣaṇāni sasaṃrambhāḥ sarvajñajinasādhane / śākyā yāny eva jalpanti jainās tānyeva yuñjate // | the objections also that the Buddhists, with great zeal, urge against the arguments in proof of the omniscience of Jina, are also urged by the Jainas (against the other party). |
TS 3152 tatrānavasthitais teṣāṃ bhinnaiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇaiḥ / pratibimbodayagrastair nirṇayaḥ kriyate katham // | Under the circumstances, how can any definite conclusion be arrived at through such reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are uncertain and swallowed by their own reflections?” (3151-3153) |
TS 3153 | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3151-3153 above] |
yo hi hetuḥ sugatasarvajña{tā}sādhanāyopādīyate sugatasutaiḥ / | There is a certain reasoning adduced by the Buddhists in support of the omniscience of Buddha; |
yathā sākṣād viditasakalārthatattvaḥ sugataḥ, aśrutānanumitāviparītārthopadeṣṭṛtvāt, yathā pratyakṣāgatasalilādis tadupadeṣṭeti / ayam eva digambarāṇāṃ jinasarvajña{tā}sādhanāya heturupatiṣṭhate / | in this form ‘Buddha must be regarded as a person who directly knew the true nature of all things, because he has taught things unheard of, uninferred and in conformity with the real state of things, just like the ordinary man who has seen water and talks about it’, This same reasoning is put forward by the Digambara Jainas for proving the omniscience of Jina. |
tataś ca tadavastha eva saṃdehaḥ / | So that the matter remains as doubtful as before. |
tathā jinasarvajña{tā}sādhanāya digambaraiḥ sādhane kṛte yāni dūṣaṇāni śākyair upādīyante tadupadiṣṭānāṃ syād vādādīnām ayogānnāsau sarvajña iti, tāni śākyaiḥ sugatasarvajñasādhane kṛte jainā abhyupādadate nāsau sarvajñas tadudiṣṭānāṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgādīnām ayogād iti / | Again, when the Jaina has put forward his reasoning in support of the omniscience of Jina, the Buddhists put forward objections against it, in the form ‘The teachings of Jina, in regard to Syādvāda and other doctrines being impossible, he cannot be regarded as omniscient’; these same are urged by the Jainas when the Buddhist adduces his reasoning in support of the omniscience of Buddha, the Jaina’s counter-reasoning being ‘Buddha cannot be regarded as omniscient because his teachings regarding the Perpetual Flux, etc. are impossible’. |
tataśca yathā bimbasannidhānāntaraṃ pratibimbodaya evam eṣāṃ sādhanadūṣaṇānantaraṃ parasparapratyanīkabhūtāni sādhanadūṣaṇānyupatiṣṭhanta iti tat katham ebhiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇair anavasthitaiḥ pratibimbodayenaiva grastair nirṇayaḥ kriyate kasyacit sarvajñatvena // | In this way this becomes a case like that of Reflection and Counterreflection: When the reflected object is there, its reflection appears; in the same way when the Reasonings and Counter-reasonings have been put forth, reasonings and counter-reasonings to the contrary come forward. These reasonings and counter-reasonings thus being always uncertain, they are swallowed by their own reflections; how then can there be any definite conclusion regarding the omniscience of any Person? (3151-3153) |
evaṃ sarvajñakalpeṣu nihateṣu parasparam / alpaśeṣīkṛtān sarvān vedavādī haniṣyati // | “In this way pseudo-omniscient persons haying been beaten off by each other, the few that remain shall be beaten off by the upholder of the Veda.” (3154) |
yathā nakuladantāgraspṛṣṭā yā kācid auṣadhiḥ / sarvaṃ sarpaviṣaṃ hanti krīḍadbhir api yojitā // | “Any herb that has been touched by the teeth of the mongoose removes the poison of all serpents, even when applied in play (carelessly); |
vedavādimukhasthaivaṃ yuktilaukikavaidikī / yā kācid api śākyādisarpajñānaviṣāpahā // | in the same way any stray secular and spiritual argument proceeding from the mouth of the Vedic scholar will destroy the poison of all serpent-like Buddhists and others.” (3155-3156) |
kā punar asau yā kācid yuktir ity āha yasyetyādi / yasya jñeyaprameyatvavastusattvādilakṣaṇaḥ / | The following might be urged that That person alone may be regarded as omniscient in whose case no objection can be urged to the contrary. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3154 above] |
nihantuṃ hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati // ekenaiva pramāṇena sarvajño yena kalpyate / | The Mīmāṃsaka asserts his own superiority in the following: [see verses 3155-3156 above] Question: What is this ‘stray argument’? Answer: [see verses 3157-3158 above] |
nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyate // | [verses 3157-3158]: |
yasya hi jñeyatvādayaḥ sapakṣavipakṣasādhāraṇatvenāpratītāḥ santo bādhakā bhavanti, so 'tyantāsambhavīti na prekṣāvatābhyupeyaḥ / | When several such Reasons as ‘being knowable’ and the rest, which are free from such defects as ‘being equally co-existent with the Probandum and the absence of the Probandum’ are available for refuting the idea of the Omniscient Person, such a person must be an utter impossibility; |
nacāpyete 'naikāntikā bhavanti / | and cannot be accepted by any sane person. |
tathā hi sarvapadārthajñānāt sarvajña iṣyate, tac ca sakalavastuparijñānaṃ kadācid indriyajñānena vā bhavet, manojñānena vā / | Because a man is called ‘omniscient’ because he knows all things; this knowledge of all things could be either through Sense-perception or through Mental Perception. |
na tāvad indriyajñānena, tasya pratiniyatārthaviṣayatvād ayuktamaśeṣārthaviṣayatvam, tathā hi cakṣurādijñānāni pratiniyatārthaviṣayatvād ayuktamaśeṣārthaviṣayatvam tathā hi cakṣurādijñānāni pratiniyataviṣayagrahaṇasvābhāvānyeva svakāraṇair indriyair niyāmakair janitāni, tataścānatikrāntasvaviṣayamaryādāni loke 'tipratītānīti na yuktam etair aśeṣārthagrahaṇam / | It cannot be through Sense-perception; because the scope of such Perception is limited and it cannot envisage all things; this reasoning may be thus formulated Perceptions through the eye and other Sense-organs are restricted in their scope, because they are produced by the Sense-organs which are always restricted in their scope; that is why in ordinary life, they are never found to go beyond the hounds of those limitations; consequently the apprehension of all things through these is an impossibility. |
anyathā hyanekendriyavaiyarthyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | Otherwise there would be no need for more than one sense-organ; |
tataścaikenaiva jñānena sarvadharmān bhinnendriyagrāhyānapi rasarūpādīn jānātītyevaṃ yena bauddhena kalpyate, ekena sarvaṃ jānāti sarvamekena paśyatīti vacanānnūnaṃ sa vādī bauddhaścakṣuṣā karaṇabhūtena taddūrapravṛttena jñānena sarvadharmān rasādīnavagacchatīti prāptam / | and the result of this would be that all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc. would become apprehended by means of a single Cognition i The Buddhist who makes such an astounding assumption, as is clear from his assertion that “By one He knows all, by one He sees everything”, could apprehend all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc.; through the one Perception proceeding from the eye alone! |
na caitacchakyate vaktum / | No such assertion can be made; |
mābhūd ekena jñānena yugapad aśeṣādarthasya grahaṇam, anekena bhaviṣyatīti / | for if it were so, then there would be the apprehension of several things through a single Cognition at one and the same time. It could be possible only through several Cognitions; |
yato yugapad anekavijñānāsambhavāt / | because there cannot be several Cognitions at one and the same time. |
sambhave 'pi na sarvapadārthagrahaṇam asti, paracittasyendriyajñānāviṣayatvāt, agocaraprāptasya ca dūrasūkṣmavyavahitāder arthasya tena grahītum aśakyatvāt // | Even if it were possible, there could be no apprehension of all things; because the mind of another person cannot be envisaged by the Sense-perception of any man; nor is it possible for him to apprehend, by its means, things beyond the reach, of the senses, such as those that are remote or too small or hidden and so forth. |
syād etat yadi nāma cakṣurādijñānāṃ vijātīyārthagrahaṇam idānīṃ na dṛśyate / [p.825] tathāpi kālāntare kadācid vijātīyārthagrahaṇamabhūt kasyacid iti sambhāvyata ity āha yajjātīyair ityādi / | The following might be urged Though it is true that at present the perceptions derived from the Eye and other sense-organs do not apprehend diverse and heterogeneous things, yet it is possible that at some time in the past, such apprehension of divergent heterogeneous things did appear in a certain Person. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3159 above] |
hetupratibaddho hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiniyamo nākasmikaḥ, anyathā sarvasya sarvasvabhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ, tataś ca tathāvidhahetupratibaddhātmalābhasya katham anyathātvaṃ kadācid api sambhāvyam, nahi dhūmaketupratibaddhātmasaṃsthiteranyato dhūmasyodbhavaḥ sambhāvyata iti bhāvaḥ / | The nature of things is always determined by the exact concomitance of definite causes, not haphazard. If it were not so, then all characters could be attributed to all things; and if such were the case, then how could it ever be possible for the nature determined by causes to be otherwise? That is to say, it is not possible for the Smoke, which has its existence concomitant with Fire to be produced from anything else. |
nāpi manojñāneneti pakṣaḥ / | Nor can the view be accepted that the apprehension of all things comes about through Mental Perception, [the second alternative put forward in the commentary on 3157-3158, on p. |
tathā hi yadyapi tat sarvārthaviṣayam, tathāpi na tasya svātantryeṇārthagrahaṇavyāpāro 'sti, abdhabadhirādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt / | Because, though Mental Perception may envisage all things, yet it has no independent operation of its own towards the apprehension of things; if it had, then there would be no deaf or blind persons. It is then dependent upon something else; |
pāratantrye cendriyajñānaparigṛhītārthaviṣayatvād dūrasūkṣmavyavahitaparacittāder arthasyendriyajñānaṃ{nā} viṣayīkṛtasya tena paricchedo na prāpnoti // | and as a matter of fact it is found that it envisages only those things that have been apprehended by Perception through the Senses; so that there can be no apprehension by Mental Perception of anything that has not been envisaged by Sense-perception, such things, for instance, as are remote, small, hidden, and the mind of another person and so forth. |
ye 'pi sātiśayā dṛṣṭāḥ prajñāmedhābalair narāḥ / stokastokāntaratvena natvatīndriyadarśanāt // | “Those persons who have been found to be superior to others are so only on account of intelligence, memory and strength, which vary slightly with varying persons, and not on account of the capacity to perceive super-sensuous things. |
prājño 'pi hi naraḥ sūkṣmānarthān draṣṭuṃ kṣamo 'pi san / svajātīran atikrāmannatiśete parānnarān // | Even the intelligent man who is capable of perceiving subtle things is superior to other persons, without going beyond the limitations of his own kind.” (3160-3161) |
nahi kasyacid abhyāse 'pyatīndriyārthadarśitvam upalabdham / | As a matter of fact, however much he has practised, no one has been found to become capable of perceiving things beyond the reach of the senses. |
tathā hi naro 'tiprājño 'pi nipuṇabuddhigamyatayā sūkṣmānarthānupalabddhuṃ samartho 'pi svajātiḥ manuṣyajātibhāvinīḥ prakṛtīradivyacakṣuṣṭvādilakṣaṇā anativartamāna etābhyāṃ narānaratiśayāno dṛśyate natu divyacakṣuṣṭvādinā yuktaḥ kaścid dṛśyate iti yāvat / | For instance, a man, even though exceptionally intelligent, and capable of apprehending things that can be apprehended only by keen intelligence, is never found to transcend the limitations of his own species, i.e. the human weakness, in the shape of the absence of abnormal vision and the like, and he is never found to be endowed with such abnormal vision, etc. Consequently there is no justification for any such assertion as the following which has been loudly proclaimed by Buddhists ‘He sees with abnormal eyes, pure and transcending beyond the limitations of man, beings entering into excellent states and even inferior states, etc. etc.’. |
śrotragamyeṣu śabdeṣu dūrasūkṣmopalabdhibhiḥ / puruṣātiśayo dṛṣṭo na rūpādyupalambhanāt // | “As a matter of fact, in the matter of the auditory perception of sounds, superiority among men is found in the apprehending of distant and subtle sounds, not in the apprehending of colour and other things. |
cakṣuṣāpi ca dūrasthasūkṣmarūpaprakāśanam / kriyate 'tiśayaprāptyā natu śabdādidarśanam // | Similarly in the matter of visual perception, what is brought about by the attainment of superiority is the perception of remote and subtle colour, not the perception of sound and other things.” (3162-3163) |
dūrasūkṣmeṣūpalabdhayo jñānāni, tābhir itītthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā, kvacid dūrasūkṣmopalabdhita iti yāvat, tato hetau pañcamī vidhāyādyāditvāt tasir vidheyaḥ / | ‘The apprehensions’ Cognitions ‘of distant and subtle sounds’ the Instrumental ending connotes ‘Indication In some places, the reading is ‘upalabdhitaḥ’, in the Ablative; connoting ‘reason’; the ‘tasi’ at the end coming under the rule ‘Vidhāyādi, etc.’ |
natu śabdādidarśanam cakṣuṣā kriyata iti sambandhaḥ // | ‘The apprehension of sound, etc.’ is not brought about by the Eyes. |
evaṃ śāstravicāreṣu dṛśyate 'tiśayo mahān / | “Similarly great superiority is often found in men, in the matter of scientific discussions; |
natu śāstrāntarajñānaṃ ta{smā}nmātreṇaiva labhyate // | but that alone does not prove that the man is an expert in all sciences.” (3164) |
jñātvā vyākāraṇaṃ dūraṃ buddhiḥ śabdāpaśabdayoḥ / | “When one has learnt grammar, his intelligence goes very ear in the matter of correct and incorrect forms of words; |
prakṛṣyate na nakṣatratithigrahaṇanirṇaye // | but not in the matter of the determination of stars, dates, eclipses and such subjects. |
jyotir vicca prakṛṣṭo 'pi candrārkagrahaṇādikam {vit---} / na bhavatyādiśabdānāṃ sādhutvaṃ jñātumarhati // tathā vedetihāsādijñānātiśayavān api / | Similarly, the astronomer, though superior in the matter of the knowledge of the moon, the sun, eclipses and so forth, is incapable of determining the correctness of such words as ‘bhavati’ and the like. Again a man, very superior in his knowledge of the Veda, history and such subjects, is unable to visualise such matters as creation, deity, and apūrva”. |
na sargadevatāpūrvapratyakṣīkaraṇakṣamah // | Hitherto it has been shown that Sense-perception cannot transcend its limitations; |
jyotir vettīti jyotirvit / vedetihāsādiṣu jñānāni teṣām atiśayaḥ sa vidyate yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Astronomer’ one who knows the science of the stars. ‘Vedetihāsa, etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as meaning ‘one who has the superiority relating to his knowledge of the Veda, etc.’ |
apūrvaśabdena dharmādharmavucyete // | ‘Apūrva’ stands for Dharma and Adharma (Merit and Demerit). |
daśahastāntaraṃ vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati / na yojanamasau gantuṃ śakto 'bhyāsaśatair api // | “The man, who can jump into the sky to the height of 15 feet, can never jump to the height of eight miles, however much he may practise jumping.” (3168) Further, even when the superiority transcends the limitations of its subject, it does not reach its highest point; |
tathā hi yadi nāma kecid upacitaśleṣmavapuṣo hastamātravyomotplavanāsamarthāḥ paścādabhyāsakrameṇa samāsāditagātralāghavaṃ daśahastāntaragaganavilaṅghino jātāḥ, tathāpi na te yojanam ekam api khagapathamutpatituṃ samarthāḥ prayatnaśatenāpi bhavanti // | it is found to proceed only up to a certain point. |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati [p.827] | This is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3168 above] |
tasmād atiśayajñānair atidūragatair api / kiñcid evādhikaṃ jñātuṃ śakyate na tvatīndriyam // | “Thus then, even when the superiority of knowledge proceeds very far, it can comprehend only a little more than others, it can never comprehend things beyond the senses.” (3169) |
atiśayena prakarṣeṇa jñānāni atiśayajñānāni / | ‘Atiśayajñāna’ superiority of knowledge. |
tṛtīyepi{ti---} yogavibhāgāt samāsaḥ / tair iti karaṇatṛīyā // | The compounding is according to the rule ‘Tritīyā, etc.’ The Instrumental Ending connotes instrumentality. |
etad eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha eketyādi / | The same idea is further clarified: [see verses 3170-3171 next] |
ekāpavarakasthasya pratyakṣaṃ yat pravartate / śaktis tatraiva tasya syānnaivāpavarakāntare // | “While the man is seated in a hut, the sense-perception that he has has its range restricted within that hut, it does not extend into another hut. |
ye cārthā dūravicchinnā deśaparvatasāgaraiḥ / varṣadvīpāntarair ye vā kastān paśyedihaiva san // | Those things again which are separated from one another by intervening lands, hills and oceans, countries, continents and islands, who can perceive all these when seated in one place?” (3170-3171) |
varṣam lokaviśeṣaḥ / | ‘Varṣa’, ‘Continent’ a particular region of the world; |
yathā bhārataloko bhāratavarṣamity ucyate // | e.g. the region of Bhārata is called ‘Bhārata-varṣa (3170-3171) |
nalartuparṇayoścāsāvaśvākṣahṛdayajñayoḥ / saṃvāhe gacchatorvākyamṛtuparṇena bhāṣitam // sarvaḥ sarvaṃ na jānāti sarvajño nopapadyate / | “When nala and ṛtuparṇa, who were experts in matters relating to horses and to gambling, respectively were going together in the chariot, ṛtuparṇa made the following statement ‘all men do not know all things, no one can be omniscient, there is no end to knowledge, resting in any one man’.” (3172-3173) |
naikatra pariniṣṭhāsti jñānasya puruṣe kvacit // | In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka shows that his view is supported by others also: [see verses 3172-3173 above] |
saṃvāha iti / rathe / | ‘Saṃvāha’ chariot. |
tathā hi kila śrūyate nalo nāma rājā babhūva / | The following story has been told There was a King named Nala; |
sa kilākṣahṛdayānabhijñatayā sakalam eva rājyaṃ dyūtena hārayāmāsa / | not being expert in the art of Gambling, he lost his entire kingdom at Gambling; |
tasya ca rājñī damayantī nāma babhūva / | he had a queen named Damayantī. |
tatrāgatasyāpi tatra daivavaśāt tayā rājñā saha viyogo 'bhūt / | The King, having lost his entire kingdom, went away into the forest, accompanied by the said Queen alone. |
so 'tīva samupajātapriyāvirahaśokāścudurdinavadanaścintājaladhimavagāhamāno 'tiśayasañjātaśarīrakraśmimāparibhramannitas tataḥ katham api saṅkṣepād ṛtuparṇasya rājño 'nujīvṛttimāsthāyāviditasthito 'bhūt / | When he reached the forest, he became separated from her, through ill-luck. Having his face clouded with tears due to separation from his beloved wife, the King drowned in the ocean of grief and anxiety, his body emaciated, went about wandering hither and thither; and (in brief) somehow managed to secure a living under King Ṛtuparṇa, and remained there incognito. |
sāca tasya rājñī kathaṃ katham api pitṛgṛhamanuprāptā babhūva / | His Queen somehow reached her father’s place. |
śrutam ṛtuparṇena rājñā yathā kila damayantīsvayaṃvareti, sa śrutvā nalena sārathinā tatra gantumabhipratasthe / | In order to fetch her husband, she proclaimed it far and wide that Damayantī was going to choose a husband. When King Ṛtuparṇa heard that Damayantī was going to choose a husband, he started to go there, accompanied by Nala as his charioteer. |
ṛtuparṇaścākṣahṛdayajño nāśvahṛdayavedī / | Ṛtuparṇa was an expert in the art of Gambling, but did not know much about horses; |
nalastvaśvahṛdayajño nākṣahṛdayābhijñaḥ / | while Nala was an expert in matters relating to Horses, but did not know much about Gambling. |
sa jñātvā tenābhyadhāyi, bhoḥ kathaya me 'śvahṛdayam iti / | Having come to know this, he said to Nala ‘Please teach me the science of Horses’. |
nalo 'pyabhihitatvān kathayāmi yadi mama tvamapyakṣahṛdayaṃ kathaya [p.828] sīti / | Nala said ‘I shall teach it to you, if you will teach me the art of Gambling’. |
tata idam ṛtuparṇena kīritam sarvaḥ sarvaṃ na jānātītyādi / tato nalena rājñākṣahṛdayam ṛtuparṇato viditvā punar api tadrājyaṃ jitvā pratyānītam iti vārtā // | Thereupon Ṛtuparṇa said ‘All men do not know all things, etc. etc.’ Then Nala learnt the art of Gambling from Ṛtuparṇa, and won back his kingdom. Such is the story. “Sense-perception has never been found to possess the capacity to apprehend future things; |
kiṃ ca sarvajñena satāvaśyamatītānāgataṃ vastu jñātavyam anyathā hi pratyutpannamātraparijñāne pradeśajñaḥ syān na sarvajñaḥ, na cānāgatādiparijñānaṃ sambhavatīti darśayann āha anāgata ityādi / | and as for inference and other forms of cognition, these can never come about without the indicative and other factors.” (3174) Further, if a man is omniscient, he must know the past and future things also; otherwise, if he knew only what came up at the moment, then he would be only a partial knower, not all-knowing (omniscient); and yet it is not possible for any one to know future things. |
pratyakṣasya vastusāmarthyabalenotpatter anāgatasya cāvastutvān na tatra pratyakṣavyāpāraḥ / | As a matter of fact, Sense-perception is brought about by the capacity of things; and as what is still in the future cannot be an entity, a thing, Sense-perception cannot apply to it. |
nāpyanumānasya, liṅgābhāvāt / | because there can be no Inferential Indicative; |
nahyanāgatavastusambaddhaṃ kvacid viditaṃ liṅgam asti anāgatasyābhāvāt / | there can be no Indicative which is known to be concomitant with what is in the future; because what has not yet appeared is non-existent. |
ādiśabdena dṛṣṭāntaparigrahaḥ / | ‘Other factors’ include the Corroborative Instance. |
anāgatagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam atītasyāpi grahaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam / | The mention of the Future is. only by way of illustration; what has been said should be taken as applicable to the Past also; |
yatas tatrāpyavastutayā na pratyakṣavyāpāro 'sti / | because, the past thing also being a non-entity, there can be no functioning of Sense-perception over it. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.