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" iti/ syād etat nendriyārdimātraṃ prāmāṇyakāraṇam iṣṭam / kiṃ tarhi viśiṣṭam eva yaddoṣaparahitam, tena yathoktadoṣāprasaṅga iti / | The following might be urged “What is held to be the cause of validity is not the mere Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, but only such Sense-organ, etc. as are free from defects; so that the above objections are not applicable”. |
yadyevam, sāmagryantaram eva guṇasahitam indriyādiprāmāṇyakāraṇam iti prāptam, guṇasahitasyaiva doṣarahitatvasambhavāt / | If that is so, then it comes to this that what brings about the Validity is the Sense-organ as along with Excellences which is something different from the cause of the Cognition itself; because it is only when a thing is equipped with Excellence that it can be free from defects. |
tataś ca na vaktavyaṃ sāmagryantarajanyatvāsiddher iti / | Thus you cannot say that “the validity is not known to be brought about by other circumstantial causes”. |
doṣāpagame guṇānāṃ vyāpāro na prāmāṇyotpattāv iti cet / | “What the Excellences operate towards is the removal of defects, not the producing of validity”. |
tan na / | That cannot be right. |
apagamasyāvastutvān na tatra kasyacidvyāpāro yuktaḥ / | ‘Removal’ is a mere negation; hence there can be no operation towards it; |
nahyavastuni śaśaviṣāṇādāvanutpādyasvabhāve kasyacid vyāpāraḥ sambhavati / | for instance, it is not possible for anything to have any operation towards a non-entity, like the ‘Hare’s Horn’, which is not something to be produced. |
yaccoktam vijñānotpādakam eva trairūpyamanumānādau prāmāṇyotpādakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti, etad apyasiddham / | It has been argued that “In the case of Inference, it has been found that the presence of the Three-factors, which produces the Cognition, brings about the Validity also”. |
nahi trairūpyam eva kevalam anumānasyotpādakam kiṃ, tarhi pratipattir gatā {pratipattṛgatā} apyamūḍhasmṛtasaṃskārā guṇāḥ / tathā hi satyapi trairūpye prabhraṣṭasambandhasmṛtisaṃskārasyāpratītasambandhasya ca pratipatti{ttu---} rnopajāyate 'numānamityato 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vijñānotpādakam eva prāmāṇyotpādakam ityetad asiddham / | What brings about the Inferential Cognition is, not merely the presence of the three factors, but also such excellences in the cogniser as absence of delusion, and full remembrances and, impressions. For instance, even when the three factors are present, if the man has no recollection of the relationship and other impressions regarding these factors, the Inferential Cognition does not appear at all; consequently, from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clear that it is not true that what produces the validity is the same cause that produces the cognition itself. |
ato viparyayo durnivāra eva vyavasthitaḥ / | Hence the conclusion to the contrary remains irresistible. |
yaccoktam viparyayajñānarūpaṃ kāryamindriyādisvarūpānnotpadyata iti, tadapyatisāhasam / | It has also been argued that “The effect in the shape of wrong cognition does not proceed from the mere Sense-organs”. |
indriyānapekṣasyāpi viparyayajñānasyotpattiprasaṅgāt / | It implies the possibility of Wrong Cognitions appearing independently of the Sense-organs. |
nahi yo yataḥ svabhāvānnotpadyate tasya tadapekṣā yuktātiprasaṅgāt / | the thing itself cannot be brought about by anything else, i.e. by anything else besides the causes bringing about the Cognition itself’,” |
nacendriyanirapekṣaṃ taimirikādidvicandrādijñānam utpadyate / | As a matter of fact, the causes of cognitions are common to valid as well as invalid cognitions; |
kiṃ ca yadyarthāvisaṃvādititvaṃ prāmāṇyamupavarṇyate tadā codanājanitāyā buddheḥ katham arthāvisaṃvāditvam avagatam / yena tatra bhavatām argāg darśināṃ prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥ syāt / | how then could validity be invariably concomitant with the mere character of ‘being the cause of cognitions’? From this it is clear that validity is due to other circumstantial causes, not merely to the cause of the cognition itself, This ‘other circumstantial cause’ must be one that is accompanied by excellences; |
nahyavidita tatkāryais tacchaktiravadhārayituṃ śakyate, atiprasaṅgāt / tataś ca yasyaiva vedasya prāmāṇyasthirīkaraṇapratyāśayā sarvam etad vāgjālam uparacitaṃ tasyaiva tan na prasiddham iti kevalaṃ tandulārthinā tuṣakaṇdanametat kṛtam ityalam atiprasaṅgena // | so that the cause of validity would consist also in the excellences of the Sense-organs and other Instruments of Cognition. In the ease of Verbal Cognition the excellence of this other cause, as ascertained from actual experience, consists in ‘being composed (spoken) by a trustworthy person’, So that there being no such composer (or Speaker) in the ease of the Veda, it would have to be regarded as invalid. |
iti svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā // | The answer to this (provided by Ubeyaka) is as follows: “What has been just asserted does not affect our position; |
analpakalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmībhūtamahādayaḥ / | because it cannot be proved that validity is due to other circumstantial causes. |
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ jagāda vadatāṃ varaḥ / taṃ sarvajñaṃ praṇamyāyaṃ kriyate tattvasaṅgrahaḥ // | what produces the idea of the cognition being in conformity with the real state of things is the cause in the shape of the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition themselves, independently of anything else. |
TS 0006 | As regards the function of the ointment (applied to the Eyes to remove defective vision), that tends only towards the removal of defects, and not to the producing of excellences”. |
ity anena yat sarvajñopadiṣṭatvaṃ pratītyasamutpādasya viśeṣaṇam uktam. | so that under the above view, validity should be produced in all cases; as the cause of it would be there in its efficient condition. |
tat samarthanārthaṃ prastāvamātraṃ racayann āha evam ityādi / | Ubeyaka’s answer to this is as follows: “True; |
[p.816] evam anantaroktena nyāyena yadā sarveṣām eva pramāṇānāṃ na svata eva prāmāṇyam iti sthitam / | this is so; but through positive and negative concomitance, it has been found in the case of Inference, that what brings about the validity is that same ‘presence of three factors’ which brings about the cognition itself; |
ato 'yatnenaivātīndriyārthadarśī puruṣaḥ siddha iti na tat siddhaye pṛthakprayatnāntaramāsthīyate // syād etat kathaṃ yatnamantareṇa siddhyatītyāha vedasyāpītyādi / | As regards the wrong cognition, on the other hand, it is an effect that is not found to be produced by the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition, and hence it leads to the assumption that it must be due to other circumstantial causes, Thus there can be no objection to our explanation of validity”. |
vedasyāpi pramāṇatvaṃ yasmāt puruṣataḥ sthitam / | For instance, it has been asserted that “the validity of cognitions consists in its being in conformity with the real state of things; |
tasya cātīndriyajñatve tatas tasmin pramāṇatā // anyathājñānasaṃdehaviparyāsānuṣaṅgiṇi / | But the ‘cognition’ is specially mentioned as qualifying ‘validity’; validity is not regarded as belonging directly to the Smoke and such other means of cognition, which are themselves not of the nature of ‘cognition’; |
puṃsi kartari naivāsya prāmāṇyaṃ syāt tadanyavat // | hence it cannot be admitted that validity consists only in ‘being in conformity with the real state of things’. |
svargayāgādisambandho jñātvā tadyena bhāṣitaḥ / | Specially because it is Cognition alone which is primarily operative towards things to be abandoned or acquired. |
tasya ceti / puruṣasya / tata iti \ puruṣāt kartuḥ / | which shows that it is the cognition that is the direct and immediate prompting agent towards the man’s activity. |
tasminniti / vede / pramāṇatetyetadapekṣādhikaraṇasaptamī / | This has been thus declared ‘The Cognition must be valid, because that is the primary cause of activity towards things to be abandoned or obtained’. |
etac ca paramatāpekṣayābhihitam / | as it is only in regard to this that Invariable Concomitance is possible; |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi bhavadbhir avaśyaṃ vedasya prāmāṇyam abhyupeyate tadāsya puruṣādiva kartuḥ prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam, na svata iti, etac ca pūrvaṃ pratipāditam / | hence who could ever think of securing it from other things, in view of which it would have to be specially denied? Because when the thing itself has been produced, it cannot be that its property and nature have not been produced. If this were so, then there would be incongruities. |
sa ca vedasya kartā yadyatīndriyadṛgbhavati tadāsya tataḥ kartur api pramāṇatā yuktā, anyathā hi viparītasaṃśayajñānādiyukte kartari satyunmattādivākyavad vedo 'pramāṇatāmevāśnuvīta / | This validity then, though being the very essence of the cognitions, cannot be recognised until the effects of the cognition have been brought about, because of the presence of causes likely to lead to wrong cognitions. Hence the effect is ascertained from extraneous causes such as the cognition of effective action. Hence when the validity is said to be extraneous; |
tasmād yo 'sau vedakartā pūrvaṃ śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ prasādhitaḥ parair api mīmāṃsakair atīndriyārthadarśī sāmarthyād aṅgīkartavya iti tat pratikṣepo na kāryaḥ / | Consequently, there can be no useful purpose served by the denial of the production of the validity by other causes; |
pramāṇayanti cātra / | as on that point there is no dispute at all. |
yaḥ pramāṇapañcakavirahasvabhāvābhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahaḥ sa viduṣāmabhāvavyavahāragocaratām evāvatarati, [p.817] yathā gagananalinam abhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahaś ca sarvadarśī puruṣa iti svabhavahetuḥ / | As regards the argument that “the capacity that does not belong to a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else”, which has been put forward in support of the denial of the idea of the validity being due to other circumstantial causes, that is equally applicable to Invalidity also; so that that also should have to be regarded as inherent in the cognition. Hence the Reason adduced is no Reason at all; as it is false and inconclusive. |
vyavahārayogyatāyāḥ sādhyatvāt / | It has been argued that “Excellences are never recognised as operating positively towards the bringing about of Invalidity”. |
abhāvastvabhāvapramāṇata eva siddhaḥ // | It cannot be understood what the clear meaning of this affirmation is. |
nanu caitāvadeva sarvaṃ prameyaṃ vastu yaduta pañcaviṣayā rūpādayaḥ tāṃś ca jānanto narā loke 'tipratītā eveti / | What is the meaning of this ‘positive operation’? If it means intentional activity towards the producing of a certain effect, following upon the determination that ‘I shall do this’, then such activity cannot be possible for the Sense-organs. Nor is it possible for things to act intelligently and intentionally; because all things being momentary, effort and activity are impossible; |
tataś ca pratītibādhā pratijñāyā ityetadāśaṅkyāha dharmajñatvaniṣedha ityādi / | It has been argued that “The form of the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, independently of anything else, serves to bring about cognitions in conformity with the real state of things”. |
dharmajñatvaniṣedhaścet kevalo 'tropayujyate / | because Validity and its opposite, being mutually exclusive, could never be present in the same cognition. |
sarvamanyadvijānānaḥ puruṣaḥ kena vāryate // | What is independent of everything else can never fail to be productive of its effect; |
atra hi vedaprāmāṇyasiddhau dharmātmaviśvaparijñātṛtvaniṣedhamātraṃ vivakṣitam, natu sarvaśabdābhidheyamātraparijñātṛtvaniṣedhaḥ, tena dharmādharmavyatiriktāśeṣapadārthaparijñānāpekṣayā yaḥ kasmiṃścit puṃsi sarvajñavyavahāro lokasya sambhavati na tasya pratiṣedho 'smābhiḥ kriyate, ato na pratītibādhā sambhavatīti bhāvaḥ // | The following might be urged “What is held to be the cause of validity is not the mere Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, but only such Sense-organ, etc. as are free from defects; so that the above objections are not applicable”. If that is so, then it comes to this that what brings about the Validity is the Sense-organ as along with Excellences which is something different from the cause of the Cognition itself; because it is only when a thing is equipped with Excellence that it can be free from defects. Thus you cannot say that “the validity is not known to be brought about by other circumstantial causes”. |
kiṃ ca yadi bhavadbhir api bauddhair dharmādharmajñavyatirekeṇānyasmin puṃsi sarvajñatvaṃ prasajyate tadā siddhasādhyateti darśayann āha sarvaśabdaścetyādi / | Further, if Validity is described as ‘conformity with the real state of things’, then how is it ascertained that the Cognition produced by the Veda is in conformity with the real state of things, in view of which you, who are a man of limited vision, come to regard it as valid i In fact, the presence of a potency in a thing cannot be ascertained by men who have not perceived the effects of such Potency. |
sarvaśabdaśca sarvatra prakṛtāpekṣa iṣyate / | “All that is pertinent to the present context is the denial of the knowledge of dharma (by man); |
tataḥ prakṛtasarvajñe sati kiṃ no 'vahīyate // | who is denying the possibility of a person knowing other things?” (3128) |
kiñca tat prakṛaṃ, sarvamity ucyata iti darśayati arthe cetyādi / | Says the Mīmāṃsaka’s Opponent: “All that is cognisable is included under the five things. |
tatra yaḥ sarvaśabdajñaḥ sa sarvajño 'stu nāmataḥ // | Colour (Taste, Odour, Touch and Speech); and men who know all these are well known; |
yathāhi vyākaraṇe 'gnir dṛgityādinā lakṣaṇena pratyayāgamādi kāryaṃ vidhīyamānamarthe na sambhavatīti sāmarthyād arthavācini śabde 'vagamyata iti vaiyākaraṇair varṇyate tadvadyadi bhavadbhir api sarvasya kenacit parijñātumaśakyatvād iti kṛtvā sa {sva---} siddhāntaparipāṭhitasya sarvajñaśabdasya yat sarvapadxaṃ tasya svarūpadhānatāmāśritya sarvaśabdaṃ yo vetti sa sarvajña ityevaṃ varṇyate, tadāstu bhavatu, nāmataḥ saṃjñāmātrāt, nahi yatheṣṭaṃ nāma kurvāṇasya kasyacit kvacit pratiroddhā svatantrecchāmātraprabhavatvān nāmna iti bhāvaḥ // | hence the Mīmāṃsakà’s Proposition that ‘there is no one who knows all things is contrary to ordinary experience”. The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3128 above] “In the present context, which deals with the question of the Reliability of the Veda, all that is meant by us is the denial of the existence of any person who knows all things relating to Dharma, not the denial of the person knowing all things that are included under the denotation of the term ‘all Thus if people apply the term ‘omniscient’ (all-knowing) to a certain person, in the sense that he knows all things except Dharma and Adhdrma, we do not deny this; |
tena sarveṇa sarvajñas tathāpyastu na vāryate // | hence our Proposition does not run counter to ordinary experience”. |
kiñca sāmānyākārataḥ viśvasya jagataḥ saṅkṣepaparijñānād vā sarvajña iṣṭaḥ, āhosvid viśeṣākāreṇa vistaraparijñānāt, tatrādye pakṣe siddhasādhyateti darśayati bhāvābhāvetyādi / | “If the thing related to the context is some such thing as oil, water or clarified butter, and if a person knowing all about such a thing is called ‘all-knowing’, then he may be so; |
bhāvābhāvasvarūpaṃ vā jagatsarvaṃ yadocyate / | “If what is meant by the term ‘all’ are things other than Dharma and Adharma, such as Oil, Water, Clarified Butter, etc. |
tat saṃkṣepeṇa sarvajñaḥ puruṣaḥ kena neṣyate // | and the Person is regarded as ‘all-knowing’ on account of his knowledge of these things, then your argument is superfluous”. |
evaṃ jñeyaprameyatvasaṃkṣepeṇāpi sarvatām / āśritya yadi sarvajñaḥ kastaṃ vārayituṃ kṣamaḥ // | “Further, is the ‘all-knowing’ person regarded as such because he knows a little of the universe as a whole? Or because he knows the whole of it in full detail? If the former, then it is futile; it being admitted by us. |
sarvam eva hi jagaditaretarābhāvādisvabhāvatvād abhāvasvabhāvaṃ, vidhirūpatayā vyavasthitatvāt bhāvasvabhavam iti yadetad asmābhir bhābhāvābhāvasvabhāvatvaṃ sarvajagadvyāpī sāmānyadharmo varṇitaḥ, tena rūpeṇa sarvajagatparijñānād yadi sarvajñaḥ prasādhyate, tathāpīṣṭameva, na hyetāvatā dharmajñatvaṃ prasiddhyati kasyacit / | “The whole world, consisting of things that are mutually exclusive, is ‘negative’; and when the things are spoken of positively, it is ‘positive’ thus these two characters, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, have been described by us as standing for the entire universe; if, it is on the basis of the knowledge of the whole world in this form (as consisting of Positive and Negative entities), that the ‘Omniscient Person’ is sought to be proved, even this is acceptable to us. But this alone cannot prove the ‘omniscient character’ of any person”. |
tadeva bhāvābhāvarūpatvaṃ jagataḥ saṅkṣepaḥ, saṅkṣipyate 'neneti kṛtvā / | ‘This epitome of the world ’ Being of the Positive and Negative form constitutes the ‘epitome’ of the World, in the sense that it epitomises it. |
evaṃ prameyatvādibhiḥ sāmānyadharmaiḥ parijñāne 'pi siddhasādhyatā // | Similarly if the whole world is viewed as ‘knowable’, ‘cognisable’, etc. and one knowing it thus is ‘all-knowing’, then this also is what is readily admitted by us. |
padārthā yaiś ca yāvantaḥ sarvatvenāvadhāritāḥ / tajjñatvenāpi sarvajñāḥ sarve tadgranthavedinaḥ // | “When certain people have come to the conclusion that such and so many are all the things that exist, all those who know this and those who have learnt the works written by them should be ‘all-knowing’.” (3134) |
athāpi syād yaiḥ svasmin svasmin śāstre yāvantaḥ padārthāḥ sarvatvenāvadhārya nirdiṣṭāḥ yathā bauddhaiḥ pañca skandhāḥ, vaiśeṣikaiḥ ṣaṭ padārthāḥ, naiyāyikaiḥ pramāṇaprameyādayaḥ ṣoḍaśa, sāṅkhyaiḥ prakṛtimahadādayaḥ pañcaviṃśatirityevamādi, tat parijñānāt sarvavit prasādhyata iti / | It might be that there are some people who have come to the conclusion in their own systems that so many are all the things that exist, and have postulated them to be as such; e.g. the Bauddhas have postulated the ‘Five Thought-phases’; the Vaiśeṣikas have postulated the ‘Six Categories’; the Naiyāyikas have postulated the ‘Sixteen Categories’, ‘Means of Cognition’, ‘Objects of Cognition’ and so forth; the Sāṃkhyas have postulated the twenty-five Principles ‘Primordial Matter’, the ‘Great Principle’ and so forth. |
evaṃ satyatiprasaṅgaḥ, tadgranthārthavedino 'nye ye 'dhyetāraḥ te sarvajñāḥ prāpnuvanti // | And one who knows these is held to be ‘all-knowing’. In this way, it leads to absurdities; such as people who read the works written by these people also become ‘all-knowing’. |
tathā ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇair yaḥ ṣaḍprameyavivekavān / | “For instance, one who has knowledge of the six ‘objects of cognition’, through the six ‘means of cognition’, would be ‘knowing all’ in an epitomised form; |
so 'pi saṃkṣiptasarvajñaḥ kasya nāma na saṃmataḥ // | who is there who would not admit such an omniscient person?” (3135) |
athāpi syādyo hi pratyakṣānumānaśabdopamānārthāpattyabhāvākhyaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇair yathāsvameṣāṃ viṣayaṣaṭkaṃ vivekena parijānāti sa sarvajña iti, atrāpi siddhasādhyatā / | It might be urged that ‘If a man, through the six Means of Cognition Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension cognises the six kinds of objects, he would be regarded as omniscient’; but this also would be futile, proving what is already admitted. |
tathā hi pratyakṣaṃ rūpādiviṣayapañcakaniyatatvān na dharmādharmaviṣayam / | Because (a) Perception being restricted in its scope to the five objects, in the shape of Colour, etc. cannot apply to Dharma and Adharma; |
anumānam api pratya [p.819] kṣagṛhītaliṅgasambandhaliṅgiviṣayatvān na tadviṣayam, dharmāder atīndriyatvena kenacit sambandhasya gṛhītumaśakyatvāt / | (6) Inference also, envisaging the subject as related to the Probans which has been cognised by Perception, cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; because Dharma, etc. |
śābdaṃ yadyapi sarvaṃ parokṣāviṣayaṃ, tathāpi na tena jñānenātīndriyārthadarśīṃ bhavitum arhati, tasya jñānasya parokṣārthaviṣayatvenāpratyakṣatvāt / | are beyond the reach of the senses; hence no relationship of these with anything can be apprehended by Perception; (c) as regards the Word, even though it appertains wholly to imperceptible things, yet through verbal cognition one cannot be regarded as ‘perceiving supersensuous things’; because verbal cognition, envisaging imperceptible things, cannot be of the nature of Perception; |
nācāpratyakṣajñānāt saṅgī puruṣaḥ sākṣād darśī yujyate / | and the man who is wholly addicted to non-perceptional cognition can never be one ‘perceiving supersensuous things’; |
upamānam api sādṛśyatadupādhiviṣayatvān na dharmādharmādiviṣayam, yathoktam | (d) as regards Analogy, envisaging Similarity and its adjuncts, can never apply to Dharma and Adharma; |
"tasmād yat smaryate tasyāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam / | as has been thus declared ‘Hence what is remembered would be qualified by similarity, and this would be the object of Analogical Cognition; |
prameyamupamānasya sādṛśyaṃ vā tadāśritam // | or the similarity as resting in that thing’ (Ślokavārtika Analogy, 37); |
arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaśrutārthānyathānupapattiparikalpyārthāntaraviṣayā, nāsau dharmādigocarā, nahi kaścid dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'sti yo dharmādinā vinā nopapannaḥ / bhavatu vā dharmādiviṣayatvam arthāpatteḥ, tathāpi tasyā apratyakṣasvabhāvatvān na tatsaṅgī dharmādisākṣād darśī siddhyati / | (e) as regards Presumption, it envisages only a thing different from the one in question, which, as heard of or seen, would be inexplicable without that other thing; hence, it cannot appertain to Dharma and Adharma; as there is nothing either seen or hoard of, which cannot be explained without the presumption of Dharma and Adharma, Even if Presumption does envisage Dharma and Adharma it cannot be of the nature of Perception; hence one who rests upon it cannot be said to be ‘directly perceiving Dharma and Adharma’; |
abhāvasya tu prameyābhāvaviṣayatvād evāyuktaṃ dharmādiviṣayatvam // | (f) as regards Non-apprehension, as it envisages only the absence of cognisable things, it can never envisage Dharma and Adharma. |
evaṃ tāvat saṅkṣiptasarvajñaprasādhane siddhasādhyateti pratipāditam, idānīṃ vistareṇāśeṣajagat parijñānāt sarvajñatvasādhane doṣam āha viśeṣeṇetyādi / viśeṣeṇa tu sarvārthasākṣāt pratyakṣadarśinam / yaḥ kalpayati tasyāsau mudhā mithyā ca kalpanā // | “If one assumes the existence of a person capable of directly perceiving all things in detail, such assumption is absolutely futile and false.” (3136) Thus it has been explained that the attempt to prove the Omniscient Person on the basis of the knowledge of the epitomised form of things, is superfluous. The Mīmāṃsaka now proceeds to point out objections against the idea of the ‘Omniscient Person’, on the basis of his knowing the whole world in detail: [see verse 3136 above] |
mudheti / niṣphalā / | ‘Mudhā’ Futile, useless; |
puruṣārthasiddhāvanupayogāt / | because it is not conducive to the fulfilment of any purpose of man. |
mithyeti / asambhāvanīyārthaviṣayatvād vitathā // | ‘False’ not true, as envisaging an impossibility. |
ekasyaiva śarīrasya yāvantaḥ paramāṇavaḥ / | “Even in a single body, there are so many atoms, and so many hairs, etc.; |
keśaromāṇi yāvanti kastāni jñātumarhati // | who can know all these?” (3137) |
ekaśarīrāntargatāśeṣaparamāṇupravibhāgaparijñānam eva tāvat khalu puṃsāmasambhāvyam kimutāśeṣajagadgatasūkṣmādiviśeṣaparijñānaṃ bhaviṣyati // | As a matter of fact, it is impossible for men to know in detail all the atoms contained even in a single body; what to say of the knowledge of all the little details that go to make up the entire Universe? (3137) “If an attempt were made to prove that one has the knowledge of the details of all individuals and components of the whole world, it would be as futile as the investigation of the crow’s teeth.” (3138) |
mudhātvaṃ kalpanāyā darśayann āha samastāvayavetyādi / | The following Text points out the futility of assuming the Omniscient Person: [see verse 3138 above] |
avayavāś ca pāṇyādayaḥ, vyaktayaś ca dhavakhadirapalāśādaya ityavayavavyaktayaḥ, samastāś ca tā avayavavyaktayaśceti vigrahaḥ, tāsāmaṇukeśapatrādilakṣaṇaṃ vistaraṃ jānātīti tathoktam / | ‘Components’ Hands and Feet, etc. ‘Individuals’ in the shape of the particular trees, Dhava, Khadira, Palāśa and so forth. ‘Samasta, etc.’ all components and individuals; the ‘details’ of these are in the shape of atoms, hairs, leaves and so forth; one who has the knowledge of all this is ‘Samasta... |
"kṛtyalyuṭo bahul"am iti kartari lyuṭ / | jñāna’, the term ‘jñāna’ standing for one who knows the ‘Lyuṭ-affix’ in ‘jñāna’ denoting the active agent; |
tasya sādhanaṃ pratipāditam / | any attempt to prove, establish the presence of such a knower would be absolutely futile; |
[p.820] tadanarthakam asambhavitvena dharmādharmāviṣayatvena tu puruṣārthaṃ pratyanupayogitvād iti bhāvaḥ // | that is, because, being impossible and not having any bearing upon Dharma and Adharma, it can be of no use in fulfilling any purpose of man. |
etad eva dṛṣṭāntenopapādayann āha yathetyādi / | This same idea is further supported by means of an illustration: [see verse 3139 next] |
yathā ca cakṣuṣā sarvān bhāvān vettīti niṣphalam / sarvapratyakṣadarśitvapratijñāpyaphalā tathā // | “Just as the assertion that ‘one knows all things with his eyes’ is futile, so also would be the proposition that ‘there is a person capable of directly perceiving all things’.” (3139) |
etena siddhasādhyatvaṃ pratītibādhitatvaṃ ca pratijñāyā yathāyogamuktaṃ bhavati // | This means that the Proposition is superfluous and also contrary to common experience. |
yatra tu vivādo yat sādhane ca puruṣārthopayogitvaṃ taddarśayati svadharmetyādi / svadharmādharmamātrajñasādhanapratiṣedhayoḥ / | “By proving the existence of the person knowing only dharma and adharma, whom the Buddhist postulates, one secures the reliability and acceptability of the scripture composed by him; |
tat praṇītāgamagrāhyaheyatve hi prasiddhyataḥ // | and by denying the said person, one secures the unreliability and rejectability of the said scripture. |
tatra sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñatvaprasādhane / asthāne kliśyate lokaḥ saṃrambhād granthavādayoḥ // | Thus when people proceed to prove the existence of the person knowing all the little details of the entire world, they put themselves to the unnecessary trouble of writing treatises on the subject and carrying on 'discussions on the same.” (3140-3141) |
svakīyaścāsau dharmādharmamātrajñaśceti tathoktaḥ, tasya sādhanapratiṣedhāv iti vigrahaḥ / | The following Text proceeds to point out where there is difference of opinion, and the proving of which would be useful for man: [see verses 3140-3141 above] ‘Sva-dharma, etc. etc.’ the Person cognisant of Dharma and Adharma, as posited by the Buddhist himself; |
tat praṇītasyāgamasya grāhyatvaheyatve hi prasiddhyata iti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ / | when there is proving or denying of such a Person. The compound is to be taken as with the Locative ending. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi sādhanavādī svakīyaśāstāraṃ dharmādharmajñaṃ sādhayati tadā tasya sādhane kṛte sati tat praṇītāgamasya grāhyatā siddhyati / dūṣaṇavādī ca yadi parābhyupagataṃ svadharmādharmamātrajñaṃ pratiṣedhati tadā tasya niṣedhe kṛte sati dūṣitadharmādharmajñapraṇītasyāgamasya heyatvaṃ prasiddhyati / | When there is (a) proving and (b) denying of such a person, it becomes established whether the scripture composed by such a person is to be (a) accepted or (6) rejected, respectively. What is meant is as follows: If the Party postulating the said Person succeeds in proving that such a Person exists as his Instructor fully conversant with Dharma and Adharma, then it becomes established that the scripture composed by him should be accepted; on the other hand, if the Party denying the said Person postulated by the other party as conversant with Dharma and Adharma only, succeeds in refuting the existence of such a Person, it becomes proved that the Scripture composed by the said Person should be rejected; |
yat punar dharmaviṣayāṃ citrā{ntā---}mapahāya svaparaprasiddhasya sarvajñasya sakalajagadgataḥ sūkṣmādibhedajñatvājñatvasādhanāya sāṅkhyabuddhādibhir grantharacanāyāṃ vāde vā saṃrambhaḥ kriyate sa kevalam eṣāṃ saṃkleśaphala eva / | when, however, one gives up all consideration of only Dharma and Adharma, and proceeds to compose treatises and carry on discussions, regarding the ‘Omniscient Person’ who is affirmed by one party as knowing all the minute details of the whole world, and is denied by the other party, such attempt involves useless trouble. |
sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñatvaprasādhana iti nimittasaptamī / granthavādayor ityatra tu saṃrambhāpekṣāvadhārasaptamī // | The Locative ending at the end of the compound ‘Sarva, etc.’ connotes ‘for the purpose of’, while that at the end of the compound ‘granthavādayoḥ’, it connotes the receptacle of the attempt. |
syād etad yadi na kaścid dharmādiparijñātāsti naras tadā loke kathaṃ puṇyāpuṇyāvagatirbhava{tī}tyāśaṅkāyām āha sarvapramātṛsambaddhetyādi / | “If the person has the direct perception of all things, then he should have direct knowledge of such tastes, etc. also as are unclean; who could assume the existence of such a person?” (3145) |
sarvapramātṛsambaddhapratyakṣadinivāraṇāt / | “As a matter of fact, the words of the Buddha and others are not found to provide any knowledge of what is contained in the Vedas, the Upavedas and the subsidiary sciences and their auxiliaries; |
sarvajñavāraṇe yatnas tatkṛtaṃ mṛtamāraṇam // | how then can such a person be regarded as ‘omniscient’, without reason?” (3146) |
[p.821] | [verse 3145]: |
yadyapyāgamaśabdaḥ sāmānyavacanas tathāpyarthād apauruṣeyāgamniṣṭha eva draṣṭavyaḥ / | The following Text shows that the said attempt of the Buddhist to prove the Omniscient Person is not only futile, it also involves something undesirable for him: [see verse 3145 above] |
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