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yathā cānumānena pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate tathā pūrvam uktam / tadeva smārayati śuddhakāraṇajanyatvāt pramāṇam iti / | How the validity of Perception can be proved by Inference has been shown before; this is what is recalled in the words ‘For instance, etc. etc.’ ‘Like other perceptions’ i.e. like Perceptions bearing upon things before one’s eyes. |
tadanyavad iti / | The validity of all cognitions is not proved by other means of cognition; |
sannikṛṣṭaviṣayagrāhipratyakṣavat // | as it has been proved that there is no misconception involved in the case where there is cognition of effective action. |
[p.805] pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ yena cānyena sādhyata ityādāvāha sarvasyetyādi / sarvasya ca na sādhyeyaṃ pramāṇāntarataḥ pramā / | It has been argued under Text 2907, that “If the validity of Cognition were proved by another Cognition, then, of this latter also, the validity would be proved by another and so on and on, there would be Infinite Regress”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3092 above] |
yasmād arthakriyājñāne bhrāntir nāstīti sādhitam // yathā cārthakriyājñāne bhrāntir nāsti tathā pūrvaṃ ucyate vastusaṃvāda ityādinā prasādhitam / tenārthakriyājñānasaṃvādāt prāmāṇye nānavasthā bhavati // | That there is no misconception in the case where there is Cognition of effective action has been proved above under Text 2959. Thus validity being dependent upon corroboration by the Cognition of effective action, there can be no Infinite Regress. When the inference is brought about by the indicative (probans) in the shape of its nature and its effect, the indicative whereof the ‘infallibility’ has been ascertained, there can be no mistake in it. |
anumānenāpi sādhye na bhavatyeveti darśayati ātmetyādi / | The following Text shows that there can be no Infinite Regress even when validity is proved by means of Inference: [see verse 3093 above] |
ātmā ca svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ ceti tathoktam, tadākhyā yasya liṅgasyeti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Ātmā’ nature, and ‘effect’; such being the name of the Indicative (Probans); |
niścito 'vyabhicāro yasya liṅgasya tat tathoktam / | of which Indicative, the ‘infallibility’ has been duly ascertained. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati tādātmyatadutpattisambandhābhyāṃ pratibaddhasvabhāvakāryākhyaliṅganiścayabalenopajāyamānamanumānaṃ vibhramakāraṇābhāvāt svata eva pramāṇam iti nānavasthā // | What is meant is as follows: When the ‘nature’ and ‘effect’ of the Probans has been duly ascertained on the basis of ‘sameness’ and ‘causal relation,’ and on the strength of these Probans, there follows the Inference, this Inference is valid by itself; as there can be no room for mistake in such Inference, Thus there would be no Infinite Regress. |
anenāsādhitā cedityādāvāha kvacid ityādi / kvacit tu vividhabhrāntinimittabalabhāvinī / | In some cases, the mistake or illusion that arises from the various causes of illusion is set aside by another cognition; |
bhrāntirutsāryate 'nena yasmāt tatra na niścayaḥ // | because there is no certainty in such a case. |
abhyāsāder niścayakāraṇasyābhāvāt kvacid ādye pratyakṣe bhrāntir utpadyata iti na tasya siddhyet svata eva pramāṇatā // | In some cases, it so happens that there being no means, in the shape of repeated Cognition, of securing certainty, some sort of illusion or mistake comes in; hence the validity cannot rest in the Cognition itself. |
avyaktavyaktikatvena vyakto 'rtho na prasiddhyati / | There can be no ‘manifested thing’ until its manifestation has become manifested; |
parapratyakṣavat tasmāj jñānaṃ jñātamitīṣyatām // | hence it must be admitted that the cognition itself is actually cognised, just like the sense-perception in other persons. |
avyaktā vyaktir yasyārthasya sa tathoktaḥ / | ‘Avyakta, etc.’ The compound means ‘that thing of which the manifestation has not become manifested’. |
avaśyaṃ hi jñānaṃ jñātavyam / | The Cognition must itself be cognised. |
tadajñāne sarvājñānaprasaṅgāt / | If it were not cognised, then there would be the contingency of the absence of Cognition of all things. |
tathāhyarthābhivyaktir eva jñānam ucyate nānyat, tasyāścābhivyakteḥ parokṣatve 'rthasyāpi parokṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | Because what is spoken of as ‘Cognition’ of a thing is only its manifestation nothing else; if this manifestation then were imperceptible, the thing itself would be imperceptible; |
yathā parasantānavartipratyayaviṣayasyārthasyāvyaktavyaktitvāt / | just as the object envisaged by another man’s Cognition is not perceived by one, because its manifestation is not manifested to the latter. |
prayogaḥ yadyasyāvyaktavyaktikaṃ vastu tat tasya pratyakṣaṃ na bhavati, yathā parasantānavartinaiva pratyakṣeṇa viṣayīkṛtam anyasya, avyaktavyaktikaṃ ca vivādāspadībhūtaṃ vijñānaṃ kasyacid iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: When to a certain person the manifestation of a thing has not become manifested, that thing cannot be perceptible to him; e.g. the object envisaged by the perception appearing in another man; the Cognition in question is one of which the manifestation has not become manifested to any person; hence there is apprehension of something contrary to a more extensive character. |
nacānaikāntiko hetuḥ, tasya vastuno vyaktyutpādamantareṇa pratyakṣatve sarveṣāṃ pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt / | The reason here adduced cannot be regarded as ‘inconclusive’; because if the thing were perceptible without its manifestation having come about, all things would become perceptible. |
nacaivaṃ bhavati / | Such, however, is not the case. |
tasmād viparyayaḥ // | Hence the case is quite the reverse. |
svayaṃ tu jaḍarūpatvāc cakṣurādibhir indriyaiḥ / | Being themselves ‘insentient’ the eye and other sense-organs do not apprehend things; |
gṛhyante viṣayā naivaṃ teṣāṃ jñāne tu hetutā // | they only serve as the cause of cognition of those things. |
viṣayavajjaḍarūpatvāc cakṣurādīnāṃ na viṣayagrahaṇaṃ mukhyato 'sti, kevalaṃ vijñānaṃ prati hetubhāvamātreṇa teṣāṃ viṣayagrahaṇaṃ kalpitamityajñātair eva tair viṣayajñānotpādakatayā viṣayā gṛhyante iti syāt, nanvevaṃ vijñānena viṣayasya kiñcitkriyate, yenājñātam api cakṣurādivad viṣayaṃ gṛhṇātīti syāt / | hence they do not directly apprehend things; they only serve as the cause of the Cognition of those things, by virtue of which fact it is assumed that things are apprehended by them; hence it may be that though themselves uncognised, things are ‘apprehended’ by them, in the sense that they bring about the Cognition of the things. The Cognition itself, however, does not do any such thing for the things; by virtue of which it could be said that “though itself uncognised, it apprehends things, like the Eye and other Sense-organs”. |
abhivyaktiḥ kriyata iti cet / | “But the Cognition does bring about the manifestation of things.” |
na / | That cannot be right; |
jñānaparyāyatvāt / | because “manifestation” is synonymous with ‘Cognition’. |
abhivyaktirupalabdhiḥ paracchittiḥ saṃvedanam ityevamādayaḥ paryāyā ucyante, nārthāntaram / | As a matter of fact, all such words as ‘abhivyakti’, ‘upalabdhi’, ‘pariccitti’, ‘saṃvedana’, etc. etc. are synonymous and do not denote different things. |
na ca svātmanaḥ karaṇaṃ yuktam / | And the Cognition cannot be its own instrument; |
svātmani kāritravirodhāt / | as the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity; |
utpannānutpannāvasthayoḥ sadasattvāc ca / | also because things produced are existent, while those not produced are non-existent. |
tathā hi utpannaṃ vā jñānam ātmānaṃ kuryād anutpannaṃ vā / na tāvad utpannaṃ, tadātmano 'pyekayogakṣamatayotpannatvāt / | That is, when the Cognition would bring about itself, would it do so when it is itself produced? Or would it do so when it is itself not-produced? The first alternative cannot be accepted, because it would be produced as being on the same footing as itself; |
naca yo yena sahaikayogagakṣemo na bhavati sa tatsvabhāvo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | because when one thing does not stand on the same footing as itself, it cannot be of the same nature as this latter; |
nacotpannasya svabhāvasya karaṇaṃ yuktamatiśayasyābhāvāt / | nor can it be right to bring about a nature that has been already produced; because there is no additional peculiarity introduced; |
karaṇāvirāmaprasaṅgāc ca / | and also because there would be no end to such bringing about of things. |
nāpyanutpannam iti pakṣo 'sattvāt / | simply because it does not exist; |
nahyasato vyāpāro yuktas tasya sarvasāmarthyopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇatvāt / | and there can be no functioning of what does not exist; because the non-existent is characterised by the absence of all capacity; |
vyāpāre satyasattvahāniprasaṅgāt / | so that, if it did function, it would cease to be non-existent. |
idam eva hi sattvalakṣaṇaṃ yadarthakriyākāritvam / | In fact capacity for efficient activity is what constitutes the existence of things. |
tasmān na sāmyaṃ dṛṣṭāntasya dārṣṭāntikena // | Thus there is no analogy between the example cited by the other party and the case it is meant to illustrate. |
tenātra jñāyamānatvaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ upayujyate / | Thus then, the fact of being cognised is of great use in the matter of the validity of cognitions; |
viṣayānubhavo yasmād ajñāto naiva labhyate // | because there can be no apprehension of things which is not itself cognised. |
nanu ca yadi jñānaṃ svasaṃvidā svata eva siddham, tarhi svata eva jñānaṃ pramāṇam ityāśaṅkyāha etāvadityādi / | It has been argued under Text 2912, that “The fact of being cognised is of no use in the matter of the validity of Cognitions, etc. etc.”. |
etāvat tu bhaved atra grahaṇe 'pi svasaṃvidaḥ / bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvāt tathātve na viniścayaḥ // tadā cārthatayā bhāvo 'pyasmān naivāsīyate / | Even in the cognition of itself by itself, there is this fact that there can be no certainty regarding its validity, on account of the possibility of causes of misconception being present, consequently it is not ascertained that what is cognised is a real entity; |
sādṛśyād upalambhena tadanyāropasambhavāt // | because mere apprehension can also be due to similarity, and there is always the possibility of the imposition (misconception) of something else. |
nahyanubhūtam ityevaṃ sarvātmanā niścayo jāyate kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvān niścayotpatter iti bahudhā pratipāditaṃ, tena gṛhītam api jñānasya svasaṃvido 'rthapramāṇasāmarthyaṃ bhrāntikāra [p.807] ṇasyāpramāṇasārūpyānabhyāsādeḥ sadbhāvān niścayānutpatter aniścitam ity ucyate / | Merely because the thing has been cognised is not enough to bring about perfect certainty relating to it; because certainty is dependent upon other causes; as has been explained in several places. Hence even when the Cognition is cognised by itself, its capacity to get at its object remains uncertain, because causes of misconception may be present, in the shape of simil-larity, absence of repeated experience and so forth, which bar the way to certainty. |
niścayānubhavayor bhedāt / | Specially because certainty of conviction is something different from, mere apprehension. |
tataś ca samāropavyavacchedena parataḥprāmāṇyamiṣṭamityadoṣaḥ / | Thus it is for the excluding of misconception that extraneous conditions are needed, in view of which the validity of Cognition is held to be extraneous, not inherent; |
yathoktam svarūpasya svato gatiḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti / | This is what has been thus declared ‘The Cognition itself is cognised by itself, but its validity is ascertained by usage’. |
tathā tva iti prāmāṇye // | ‘Tathātve’ regarding its validity. |
apramāṇaṃ punaṇ svārthe ityādāvāha ābhyāsikam ityādi / ābhyāsikaṃ yathā jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ gamyate svataḥ / | Just as repeated cognition is regarded as valid by itself, so also in some cases wrong cognition is invalid by itself. It has been argued under Text 2913, that “Like valid Cognition, Invalid Cognition also operates upon its object by itself; |
mithyājñānaṃ tathā kiñcid apramāṇaṃ svataḥ sthitam // | but the fact of its being false cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition”. |
abhyāse bhavamābhyāsikam / | ‘Repeated Cognition’ such Cognition as has been apprehended repeatedly. |
yathābhyāsabalāt prāmāṇyaṃ kvacit svata eva niścīyate ityuktam, tathā mithyātvam api kasyacit svata evāvasīyate / | Just as in some cases validity is recognised as self-sufficient as asserted above; in the same manner, in some cases, wrongness or Invalidity also is recognised by itself. |
tathā ca dṛśyanta eva taimirikādayaḥ kecid abhyāsabalāt kleśoṇḍrakādivijñānam utpādasamantaram eva mithyātvena niścinvantaḥ // | For instance, it is found that people suffering from deranged vision recognise, through repeated experience, the wrongness of the illusion regarding the ‘Hair-tuft’ immediately after its appearance. |
tadatrāpyanyathābhāve dhīr yathā duṣṭakāraṇa ityādāvāha bādhakāraṇetyādi / bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñāne 'pyuktānavasthitiḥ / | It has been already explained that the idea of falsity of the cognition being ‘due to the presence of sublating cognitions and to the cognition of its source being defective’ involves infinite regress. |
tāvatā tasya mithyātvaṃ grahītuṃ tan na pāryate // | Hence the falsity (invalidity) cannot be recognised merely on the basis of the said cognitions. |
ukteti / "tathā hi bādhakābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ bhavatocyate / bādhābhāvo 'pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaramiṣyata" // | It has been argued under Text 2914, that “It is only when there appears the Cognition of the truth being otherwise that the falsity of a Cognition becomes recognised”. |
% v.3004 ityādinā / taditi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3101 above] |
tasmāt // | ‘Tat’ Hence. |
utpattyavastham evedaṃ pramāṇam iti mīyate / | It cannot be recognised that it is valid at the time that it appears; |
na tāvad avikalpatvād aniṣṭeścātmasaṃvidaḥ // | because it is non-conceptual and because self-cognition is not admitted. |
nāpi jñānāntareṇaiva tatkāle 'sannidhānataḥ / | Nor can it be recognised by another cognition; because it is not there at the time; |
tasyāpyavyaktabhāvatvād aniṣṭāpattito 'pi vā // | also because its presence is not manifested; or because of an undesirable contingency. |
utpattyavasthāyāṃ kimātmanaiva pramāṇam iti niścīyate, āhosvid vijñānāntareṇa sahakālabhāvinā, yadvottarakālabhāvineti pakṣāḥ / | At the time that the Cognition appears (comes about) (a) is it recognised by itself that it is valid? Or (b) is it so recognised by another Cognition, appearing at the same time? Or (c) by another Cognition, appearing at another time? These are the three alternatives possible. |
tatra na tāvad ātmanaiva sarvajñānānām ātmani nirvikalpatvāt pramāṇam ityeva grahaṇam anupapannam / | (a) The Cognition cannot be recognised by itself, as valid; because, as regards themselves, all Cognitions are non-conceptual (indeterminate), and hence any such notion as that ‘this is valid’ is impossible. |
nāpi pareṇa saṃvedanaṃ jñānasyeṣṭam, nityaṃ buddheḥ parokṣatvābhyupagamāt / | (b) Nor is the apprehension of a Cognition by another Cognition admitted (by the other party); because it has been held that Cognition is always uncognisable. |
nāpi jñānāntareṇa samānakālabhāvinā, yugapad vijñānadvayānutpatteḥ / | Nor can the Cognition he cognised by.another Cognition, appearing at the same time; because two Cognitions can never appear at the same time. |
nāpi bhinnakālabhāvinā, tasyāpi jñānāntarasyāsiddhau tadgrāhyasyāsiddhau tadgrāhyasyāpi jñānasyāvyaktavyaktikatvenāsiddhes tasyāpi jñānāntareṇa siddhāviṣyamāṇāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt // | Nor can it be cognised by another Cognition, appearing at another time; because if there be no Cognition of this other Cognition, what is cognised by that third Cognition cannot be known; so that the Cognition cognised by that third Cognition would be one whose manifestation has not been manifested; and if it be held that this also is cognised by yet another Cognition, there would be an Infinite Regress. |
[p.808] ato yatrāpi mithyātvamityādāvāha vede 'pītyādi / | In connection with the Veda, it has been already pointed out that there is a sublating cognition in the form of inference; |
taduktātmādyapohena tasmān mānaṃ na yujyate // | hence by the rejection of the ‘soul’ and other things mentioned in the Veda, it becomes established that the cognition derived from the veda cannot be valid. |
pauruṣeyatvasiddheś ca śaṅkyā duṣṭanimittatā / vahneriva svataḥ śaktir mithyājñāneṣu vā bhavet // | As it has been proved that the Veda is the work of a personal author, the fact of its having a defective source is always open to suspicion. If the capacity in question (i.e. validity) were inherent in cognitions, just as the capacity to burn is inherent in fire, then such validity should belong to wrong cognitions also. |
codanāprabhavaṃ jñānam ato duṣṭanimittakam / śaṅkyate dṛṣṭadoṣāc ca śaṅkyadoṣaṃ na bhidyate // | Thus it is open to suspicion that the cognition provided by the Veda proceeds from a defective source, and what is suspected to be defective does not differ from what is actually perceived to be defective. |
nahi sādharmyamātraṃ bauddhair vede bādhakaṃ pramāṇam ucyate / kiṃ tarhi taduktasyātmasāmānyādeḥ padārthasya pramāṇabādhanāt / | Mere similarity is not urged by the Buddhists as what annuls the Cognition provided by the Veda; what is urged by them is that such things as the Soul, the Universal and the like, which are mentioned in the Veda, are rejected by all Means of Valid Cognition. |
etac cātmaparīkṣādau pratipāditam / kiñca śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vedānāṃ pauruṣeyatvasya sādhitatvāt, satyapi vāpauruṣeyatve dāvavanhyādivan mithyātvakāraṇatāsambhavāt, aprāmāṇyamasya sambhāvyata ityevam ucyate, na sādharmyamātram / | This has been explained in the Chapters dealing with the ‘Soul’, etc. Further, under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’, it has been proved that the Vedas must be the work of an author; or even if they were without an author, it is possible that there may be sources of falsity, as there is in the ease of the Forest-fire (which is regarded by some people as self-produced, which is not true); consequently it is possible that what is said in the Veda may be false; |
syād etat yadi nāma sambhāvyate tathāpi sambhāvanāmātrāt katham aprāmāṇyam asya siddhyatītyāha dṛṣṭadoṣāc ca śaṅkyadoṣaṃ na bhidyata iti / śaṅkyā doṣā yasmin vākye tat tathā / | The following might be urged “Even though this may be possible, yet, how can mere possibility establish the invalidity (falsity) of what is said in the Veda?” The answer to this is ‘What is suspected to be defective, etc. etc.’ The compound ‘Śaṅkyadoṣam’ is to be expounded as ‘that in which defects are suspected’, |
na bhidyata iti / ubhayasyāpi prāmāṇyaṃ{ṇya---} sadvyavahāraniṣedhayogyatayā {yoḥ---} tulyatvāt // | ‘Does not differ, etc.’ Because the validity of both is equally liable to being regarded as non-existent. |
tasmāt svataḥpramāṇatvaṃ vedasyāpi na yujyate / | For these reasons ‘self-sufficient validity’ is not possible in the Veda also; |
tena niścitanirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvam iṣyatām // | consequently please accept the view that the Veda has been composed and expounded by persons who are definitely recognised as free from defects. |
kṛtaścāsāvākhyātaśceti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Kṛtākhyāta’ composed and expounded. |
ākhyāto vyākhyātaḥ, nirdoṣaiḥ puruṣaiḥ kṛtākhyāta iti tṛtīyāsamāsaḥ, tadbhāvas tattvaṃ, niścitaṃ ca tannirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Expounded’ Explained. ‘By persons free from defects the Veda has been composed and expounded The compound thus is the ‘Instrumental Tatpuruṣa ‘Niścita’ ‘definitely known’ qualifies the said ‘character of being composed and expounded by persons free from defects’. |
tadetad iṣyatām, vedasya prāmāṇyasiddhaya iti sambandhaḥ / | This view, please accept, if you wish to establish the validity (reliability) of the Veda. |
tataścaivamiṣyamāṇe parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ syād aniṣyamāṇe tvaprāmāṇyam eveti bhāvaḥ // | What is meant is that, if this view is accepted, then the validity would be extraneous; if this view is not accepted, then there can be no validity at all. |
rāgadveṣādiyuktā hi pravaktāro yathā yathā / tathā tathā hi rakṣanti svādhyāyaṃ sutarāṃ nanu // | “As there go on appearing on the scene expounders of the veda who are beset with love, hatred, etc., people become more and more careful in the preserving of the Vedic text. |
iti yasya hi saṃrabdhāḥ santi randhragaveṣiṇaḥ / kathaṃ na nāma nirdoṣaṃ sa paṭhed vedamādṛtaḥ // śuddhāścedabhyudāsīnāḥ syur vedādhyāyino narāḥ / ācakṣīran parair evaṃ na te vedaṃ vināśitam // tataḥ kālena mahatā tūpekṣitavināśitaḥ / | to this end, they go on investigating all such minute details as (a) Which scholar has a weak memory? (b) Who was the earlier scholar? (c) Who would commit mistakes regarding accents? (d) Who would be breaking up words in the wrong places? When there are so many enthusiastic scrutinisers busy with the guarding of the various points of danger, why cannot the serious reader study the Veda free from flaws? If Vedic scholars, though themselves pure and honest, were indifferent towards the purity of the Veda, they might be unable to notice the Vedic text mutilated; |
anya eva bhaved vedaḥ pratikañcukatāṃ gataḥ // | and in this way in course of time, the Veda, disregarded and mutilated, would become something quite different, a mere semblance of the Veda. |
rāgadveṣādiyuktāṃś ca rundhadbhir vedanāśinaḥ / sarvadā rakṣito vedaḥ svarūpaṃ na prahāsyati // | Under the circumstances, if the Veda is constantly and carefully guarded by persons who keep a check upon persons beset with love and hate bent upon mutilating the Veda, then the Veda will never lose its real form (3108-3113) |
kasyādhyetuḥ kiṃ smṛtimevāti {medhādi---} durbalam, ko vā kuto 'dhītatvān, ko vā svarasyodāttādeḥ kṣāmatāmanyathātvaṃ kurvīta, apadam eva vā kaḥ padatvena bhittvā paṭhed ityeva yasya vedapāṭhakasya randhraṃ nirūpayanto vedādhyāyino narāḥ saṃrabdhāḥ samārabdhavīryāḥ santi, sa kathaṃ vedapāṭhako vedamādarān na paṭhet / | (a) The memory, etc. of which scholars are weak? (b) who has learnt the Veda from whom (e) who is likely to commit mistakes in the Accent, etc.? (d) who would read the text, breaking up the words in the wrong place? when in regard to each reader of the Veda, all these points are being critically examined by Vedic scholars who are enthusiastically devoted to their task, how can any reader of the Veda, under the circumstances, not read the Veda with care? |
tataścāsya vedasyāprāmāṇyāśaṅkāyā abhāvāt kimiti niścitanirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvam iṣyatām ityabhiprāyaḥ / | What is meant by this is that, under the circumstances, as there can be no suspicion regarding the validity of the Veda, why should the view be admitted that ‘the Veda is the work of a person definitely recognised as free from defects’? |
tathā hi yadi vedādhyāyinaḥ śuddadhiyo 'pi parair vināśyamānān vedanānaudāsīnyamālambamānā nācakṣīraṃs tadā sambhāvyate 'nya evāyaṃ vedaḥ praticchāyatāṃ yāta iti / | For instance, if students of the Veda, pure and honest themselves, were indifferent and did not notice the mutilations of the Veda being carried on, then it would be possible that in course of time, that Veda would become a mere semblance of the original. |
yāvatā tair viśuddhadhībhir vedavināśino narān rāgādiparītacetaso rundhadbhir nivārayadbhiḥ sadaivāyaṃ saṃrakṣito veda iti sa katham ātmasvarūpaṃ jahyāt // | As a matter of fact, however, the said pure-minded Vedic scholars are ever alert in putting a check upon people beset with Love and Hate bent upon mutilating the Veda, the Veda is always carefully perceived. How then can it ever lose its original form? (3108-3113) |
iṣyate ca jagat sarvaṃ na kadācid anīdṛśam / | “What we hold is that the world has never been unlike what it is now; and no universal dissolution can ever be perceived in reality.” (3114) |
naitad evam ityādinā pratividhatte / | It cannot be as asserted. |
naitad evaṃ bhavennāma hyevaṃ pāṭhasya tulyatā / tadarthatattvabodhas tu na vinātyakṣadarśanam // | because it may be possible that the actual verbal text has remained the same; but that the same has been the case with the comprehension of its meaning cannot be admitted unless it is actually seen. |
evaṃ hi kila kevalapāṭhamātrasya tulyatvaṃ pratipāditam / | The Author supplies the answer to the above argument of Kumārila’s in the following: [see verse 3115 above] |
nanvathavi{rthādhi---}gamopāyaḥ, tataś ca tadarthamavaśyaṃ niścitanirdoṣakṛtākhyātatvam asyeṣṭavyam eva // [p.810] nacāpi pāṭhamātrasyādarśanamātreṇāsarvavidā sarvadeśādau taulyaṃ niścetuṃ śakyata iti darśayati sarve cetyādi / | Ail that may be regarded as explained by the above is the fact that the verbal text of the Veda has remained the same; but the same has not been the case with the means of comprehending the meaning of the Vedic toxin; hence so far as this is concerned, it has to bo admitted that it has been composed and expounded by a person or persons recognised as free from defects. |
sarve ca yasya puruṣā deśakālau tathākhilau / karāmalakavadvyaktaṃ vartante 'dhyakṣacetasi // | That the verbal text has remained the same can be ascertained only by a person to whom all men, and all times and places are visible like the fruit in the hand; |
deśakālanarāvasthābhedena vimatiḥ katham // | if it were not so, then, why should there have been a difference of opinion due to the divergence of time, place, persons and circumstances? (3116-3117) |
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