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paryudāsdātmakaṃ taccetadviviktānyadarśanāt /
If the absence is of the nature of relative negation, then its cognition would only be the negation of something other than itself;
doṣābhāvāparijñānaṃ guṇajñānātmakaṃ bhavet //
so that the cognition of the absence of defects would be of the nature of the cognition of excellences;
vivakṣitapramājñānasvarūpaṃ ca prasajyate /
and it would thus come to be of the nature of the cognition of the intended valid cognition.
apramāṇadvayāsattvajñānaṃ tadvyatireki ca //
The cognition of the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition also would turn out to be of the contrary nature.
apramādvitayāsattve jñāte svātantryato 'thavā / pariśiṣṭaḥ pramātmeti bhavato niścayaḥ kutaḥ // anyathānupapattyā cennanvarthāpattito bhavet /
Or, in case the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition were cognised independently by itself, how could you secure the conviction that the rest of it is valid? If it be urged that “the conviction is due to the pact that well-known pacts could not be explicable otherwise”, then this
doṣābhāvo hi paryudāsavṛttyā guṇātmaka eva bhavet, tataś ca tat parijñānam api guṇajñānātmakaṃ prāpnoti, tac ca neṣṭam, "tadā na vyāpriyante ca jñāyamānatayā guṇāḥ" iti [p.800] vacanāt /
Through Relative Negation, ‘Absence of Defects’ would be the same as ‘Excellences’; hence the Cognition of the said absence also would be the same as the Cognition of Excellences; and this cannot be desirable (for you); because of your assertion that “The Excellences do not operate, as cognised
apramāṇadvayāsattvam api paryudāsapakṣe pramāṇātmakam evāvatiṣṭhate, tataścāpramāṇadvayāsattājñānam api vivakṣitapramājñānasvarūpaṃ prasajyate, tataśca
The ‘absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ also becomes the same as1 Valid Cognition’, under the view that it is Relative Negation that is meant by ‘absence’; hence the Cognition of ‘the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ also would be of the nature of the intended ‘Valid Cognition’;
"apramāṇadvayāsattvaṃ tenotsargo 'napoditaḥ" iti na yujyate, duḥśliṣṭatvāt /
and in that case the assertion that “there is absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition, hence the general law remains undenied”, cannot be right;
tathā hi tasyaiva pramāṇatvena niścitatvāt tasya pramāṇatvaṃ niścīyata itihetuhetumadbhāvena vākyārtho duḥśliṣṭaḥsyād avyatirekāt /
as it involves a confusion of thought; for instance, the same Cognition being known to be valid, if from that same fact it is deduced that the Cognition is valid, such a confused assertion of Cause and Effect, becomes difficult to understand;
kiñca hetuhetumator bhedāt tadvyatireki pramāṇaparijñānavyatireki apramāṇadvayāsattājñānaṃ prasajyate /
Further, if the two were regarded as different, because the cause must be different from the effect, then it comes to this that ‘the Cognition of the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ is different from ‘the Cognition of the valid Cognition’;
naca paryudāsātmakasya tadvyatirekitā yuktā /
while it is not right to regard what is of the nature of ‘Relative Negation’, as different from the valid Cognition.
apramādvitayāsattve jñāta ityādinābhyupagamyāpramādvayāsattāsiddhiṃ paramatenaiva parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayati anyathānupapattyeti / saṃśayaviparyāsābhyām anyasya jñānasya svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ muktvā gatyantarāsambhavāt // tasmād guṇebhya ityādinoktasya nyāyānaikāntikatvaṃ pratipādayann āha tasmād eva cetyādi /
‘Or, in case the absence of the two kinds, etc. etc.’ This argument admits (for the sake of argument) the Cognition of ‘the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’, and then, in accordance with the views of the other party, shows that the Validity of Cognitions becomes extraneous. ‘Due to the fact that well-known facts, etc. etc.’ That is, “there is no other alternative possible except the self-validity of all Cognitions except the Doubtful and Wrong Cognitions”.
tasmād eva ca te nyāyād aprāmāṇyamapi svataḥ /
From that same reasoning of yours it might follow that the invalidity is inherent in cognitions;
prasaktaṃ śakyate vaktuṃ yasmāt tatrāpyadaḥ sphuṭam //
as the same arguments apply clearly to, and can be asserted in regard to, that view also;
tasmād doṣebhyo guṇānām abhāvāstadabhāvataḥ /
hence it is the absence of excellence that follows from the defects; and from that absence follows the absence of validity;
yasmād utsargabhāvo 'yaṃ vivakṣāmātranirmitaḥ / śakyo 'bhidhātuṃ vispaṣṭamapramāṇe 'pi mānavat //
hence the general law stands undenied. Inasmuch as this general law is the creation of mere whim, it can be asserted quite clearly in regard to invalidity, just as well as in regard to validity.
yato bādhātmakasyaiva buddhaḥ prāptā pramāṇatā / yathārthajñānahetūtthaguṇajñānād apodyate //
Because it is in the nature of apprehension that cognition is regarded as invalid, and it is discarded only by the knowledge that it is right, in accordance with the reality of things, and by the cognition of the excellence of its sources;
guṇaiścājñāyamānatvān nāprāmāṇyamapodyate /
and the invalidity is not set aside by the excellences, as these have not been cognised;
anapoditasiddhaṃ ca svatas tadapi saṃsthitam //
hence being not-denied, the invalidity remains established as being inherent in the cognition.
ada iti /
‘Adaḥ’ This.
etat / kiṃ tacchakyate vaktum ityata āha tasmād ityādi /
Question: “What is it that can be asserted?” Answer: It is this: ‘Hence it is the absence, etc. etc.'
mānavaditi / saptamyantād vatiḥ /
‘Mānavat’ the ‘vati’-affix is added after the Locative, the meaning being ‘as in regard to validity’.
tadapīti /
‘Tadapi’ Invalidity.
śeṣaṃ subodham //
The rest is easily understood.
doṣāḥ santi na santītyādāvāha doṣā ityādi /
In the case of words emanating from personalities, there is always room for doubt whether there are defects or not;
kartur vedepi siddhatvād doṣāśaṅkā na nāstinaḥ // [p.801] śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vedasya kartuḥ prasādhitatvāt kartur abhāvād ity asiddham, tena prekṣāvatām asmākaṃ vede doṣāśaṅkā na nāsti, apitvasyeva //
and as it has been proved that there must be an author of the Veda, it is not true that we can have no suspicion regarding the presence of defects in it. It has been argued under Text 2895, that “In the case of words emanating from personalities, there is always room for doubt, whether there are defects or not; in the case of the Veda, however, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion, for us, regarding the presence of defects”.
ato yadanapekṣatvād ityatrāha ata ityādi /
hence the statement ‘because there is no author’ cannot be admitted.
ato yadanapekṣatvād vede prāmāṇyamucyate / tadasiddhaṃ yataḥ so 'pi kartāraṃ samapekṣate //
Thus, what has been asserted regarding the validity of the Veda being self-sufficient, cannot be admitted, because as a matter of fact, that also is dependent upon the author.
so 'pīti / vedaḥ //
‘That also’ i.e. the Veda.
yadi saṃvādivijñānaṃ na vā hetuviśuddhatā / niścitā saṃśayotpattes tadā vede na mānatā //
In case there is no corroborative cognition, nor perfection in its source, the appearance of doubt, and consequent invalidity, is inevitable, in the veda.
yadyarthakriyāsaṃvādijñānaṃ kāraṇaviśuddhijñānaṃ ca dvayam apyetat prāmāṇyaniścayakāraṇaṃ vede nāṅgīkriyate tadā niścayahetuvaikalyād vede prāmāṇyaniścayo na prāpnoti kāraṇamantareṇa kāryasyāsambhavāt //
Confirmatory Cognition of effective action, and the Cognition of perfection of the cause, supply the source of the certainty regarding Validity; and both these are not admitted (by the other party) in the case of the Veda; consequently there are no means of ascertaining the validity of Cognitions provided by the Veda; hence there can be no certainty regarding such validity; as the effect cannot appear without its cause.
anyasyāpi pramāṇatva ityatrāha anyasyāpītyādi / anyasyāpi pramāṇatve evambhūtaiva saṅgatiḥ / kāraṇaṃ kalpyate yasmānniścayastannibandhanaḥ //
In the case of the validity of other cognitions also, such corroboration is always regarded as the ground (for validity); hence certainty must be based upon that corroboration. It has been argued under Text 2898 that “such corroboration does not form the basis of the validity of other Cognitions also, etc. etc.”.
evambhūtaiveti /
The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3074 above]
saṃvādaguṇaparijñānalakṣaṇā /
‘Such corroboration’, in the shape of conformity with reality, and Cognition of perfection.
atra cānavasthādoṣaḥ pūrvam eva parihṛtaḥ, tasmād yat pramāṇaṃ na tat pramāṇāntarasaṅgatim apekṣata ityetad anaikāntikam, niścayārthaṃ pramāṇātarasyāpekṣaṇāt //
The objection that this involves Infinite Regress has already been refuted. Hence there is no truth (conclusiveness) in the premiss that “what is valid does not need the corroboration of another Cognition”, Because for the purposes of certainty, such corroboration is always needed.
etad eva darśayati sthite hītyādi /
The same idea is further explained: [see verse 3075 next]
sthite hi tasya mānatve niścayaḥ kriyate 'nayā / na tvapūrvaṃ pramāṇatvamanayā tasya janyate //
It is only when the validity is there that certainty regarding it is brought about by this (confirmation), and this does not produce a fresh validity in it.
etenaitad api pratyuktaṃ bhavati yatrāpi syāt paricchedaḥ pramāṇair uttarottarair ityādi /
This also serves to set aside the argument set forth under Text 2899 to the effect that “Even in a case where the thing is definitely apprehended by the later Cognitions, the thing has not been clearly apprehended by the first Cognition”.
nahyanyato mānaniścaye tasya pūrvasya jñānasyārthaprāpaṇaśaktilakṣaṇaṃ mānatvam apaiti //
Because the fact of the certainty of validity being brought about by later Cognitions cannot deprive the first Cognition of that validity which consists in its capacity to lead to its object, (3075)
sakṛjjātavinaṣṭe ca bhavennārthe pramāṇatā ityatrāha sakṛdityādi / sakṛjjātāvinaṣṭe ca syād evārthe pramāṇatā / aniścite 'pi sāstyeva niścayo 'pyuditakramāt //
In the case of the thing that is destroyed immediately on being born, validity does belong to the cognition; in fact, it is there, even in a case where there is no certainty regarding it, the certainty appearing in the manner described. It has been argued under Text 2900, that “no validity could belong to the Cognition of a thing that is destroyed immediately on being born, etc. etc.”.
seti / mānatā //
‘Sā’ validity.
[p.802] uditam eva kramaṃ darśayann āha yadi kāraṇaśuddhatvād ityādi /
The manner in which certainty appears is described in the following: [see verses 3076-3079 next]
yadi kāraṇaśuddhatvādijñānaṃ niścayastataḥ /
When there is cognition of the excellence of the cause and other conditions, then there follows certainty;
yadi cārthakriyā prāptā sākṣādvā{gdā---}hādilakṣaṇā // yadvābhyāsavatī vṛttir nirapekṣā pralodaye /
and also when effective action is found directly, in the share of burning, etc.; or repeated functioning brings about the result independently.
sarvopāyaviyoge tu na pramāṇaviniścayaḥ //
When there is absence of all these means (of certainty), then there is no certainty at all.
ataḥ pramāṇatā tasmin vidyamānāpyaniścitā / avidyamānakalpeti naivāstītyapadiśyate //
Thus even if validity were there, it would be uncertain, as good as non-existent; that is why it is said that it is not present.
yadi cārthakriyā prāpteti / tadā niścayas tata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ /
‘If effective action is found’ ‘then there is certainty’ this has to be construed, with this.
nanu cārthakriyājñānasyānyaviṣayatvāt pūrvapratyayaprāmāṇyasya siddhis tato na yuktā /
Says the Opponent: “As the Cognition of effective action envisages an entirely different thing, the certainty regarding the validity of the preceding Cognition cannot be due to that.
tathā hi avayavidravyāsambhavājjalaviṣayaṃ locanajñānaṃ rūpamātragrāhi, sta {strā---} nādyarthakriyājñānaṃ tu sparśamātragocaram iti katham anyālambanaṃ jñānam anyaviṣayasya jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ śodhayed atiprasaṅgāt /
For instance, the visual Cognition of water can apprehend colour only, as there is no composite substance; as for the Cognition of effective action in the shape of Bathing and the like, it can be secured only by means of Touch; how can the Cognition of one thing confirm the validity of the Cognition of another thing? If it did, then there would be incongruities”.
naiṣa doṣaḥ /
Answer: This does not affect our position.
ekasantānavartino viṣayadvayasyāvinābhāvād anyālambanam api jñānamanyaviṣayasya jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhayiṣyati /
As a matter of fact, when two objects occur in the same ‘chain’, which are invariably concomitant, the Cognition of one object will certainly establish the validity of the Cognition of the other.
nahi tau rūpasparśau vinirbhāgena vartete, ekasāmagryadhīnatvāt /
In the instance cited, the Colour and the Touch do not exist entirely apart from one another; in fact both are placed under exactly the same circumstances.
tatra pūrvasya jñānasyānarthe 'pyartharūpeṇa pravṛttidarśanād uttarakālabhāvinas tadviṣayāvinābhūtasparśagrāhiṇo jñānān na niścayotpattir apekṣyante /
So that, even if the first Cognition is objectless, it proceeds on the basis of a definite objective; and the subsequent Cognition apprehending the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the object of the previous Cognition is not needed for the bringing about of certainty of conviction.
nanvevam api kṣaṇikatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ pūrvajñānaparigṛhītarūpāvinābhāvisparśo naivottarajñānapravṛttyā viṣayīkṛta iti kathaṃ tato viniścayaḥ /
Says the Opponent: “Even so, as all things are momentary, the functioning of the later Cognition cannot envisage the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the Colour envisaged by the previous Cognition; how then could the certainty follow from that?”
naiṣa doṣaḥ uttareṣāṃ rūpādikṣaṇānāṃ pūrvajñānagṛhītai rūpādikṣaṇair aviśiṣṭārthakriyāvāñchāyām abhinnayogakṣematvād aikyem eva vyavahriyate /
Answer; This does not affect our position; because the subsequent colour-moments have the same effective action as the colour-moments envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence all of these colour-moments stand on the same footing and share the same fate; and hence are treated as one and the same.
nahyarvāg darśanānāṃ kṣaṇair vyavahāraḥ /
In fact, people with limited vision do not deal with ‘moments’ at all.
athavā pūrvajñānaparicchinnarūpādyarthāvinābhāvād uttarajñānaviṣayasya tat kāraṇatayā satyapi bhedavyavahāre tato niścayo na virudhyate //
Or, the object envisaged by the later Cognition is invariably concomitant with the colour, etc. envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence even though the previous Cognition being the cause of the later one, the two are regarded as distinct, yet there is no incongruity in the idea of the certainty being brought about by it.
śrotrabuddher api vyaktā netrādimati{tarābhira---}saṅgatiḥ /
It is not true that there can be no corroboration of auditory cognition by the eye and other means of cognition.
ekasāmagryadhīṇaṃ hi rūpaśabdādi vartate //
Because colour, sound and the rest are dependent upon the same circumstances.
parasparavinirbhāgāt saṃtatyānyonyakāraṇam / teṣām astyeva sambandhas tadevaṃ suparisphuṭam //
In fact all these are mutually concomitant and, as occurring in the same ‘chain’, they are the cause of each other. Thus it is clear that there is relationship among them.
taddhiyām api taddvārā dhūmendhanavikāravat /
Through these then there is connection among their cognitions also; just as between ‘smoke’ and ‘the effect of wet fuel’.
śrotradhīs tat pramāṇaṃ syāt tadanyamatisaṅgateḥ //
Thus auditory cognition would be quite valid, on account of being corroborated by other cognitions.
[p.803] itarābhiścakṣurādidhībhir asaṅgatir naiva siddhā /
It has been argued under Text 2900, that “no validity could belong to Auditory Cognition because it could not be corroborated by the Eye and other means of Cognition”.
tathā hi vīṇādiśabdasya tat sambandhinaś ca rūpāder ekasāmagryadhīnatvāt parasparābhir vibhāgalakṣaṇo dhūmendhanavikārayor iva sambandho 'styeva /
It cannot be admitted that the Auditory Cognition cannot be corroborated by other Cognitions. Because the sound emanating from the Lute, and the colour of the Lute are both dependent on the same circumstances; and are consequently inseparable and invariably concomitant with one another;
prabandhavṛttyapekṣāyāṃ ca pūrvapūrvaḥ kalāpo 'nyasyottarottarasya kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti sākṣāc ca kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇo 'pi sambandho 'styeva /
so that the two are quite related; just like ‘Smoke’ and the ‘Effect of wet Fuel’, And as both appear in the same ‘chain’ and are mutually dependent, each preceding factor becomes the cause of each succeeding factor; so that there is between them this direct causal relation also.
tataś ca tadgrāhiṇām api jñānāṃ taddvārakapāramparyeṇa sambandho 'sti /
Thus among the Cognitions also of the said Colour, Touch, etc. there is similar causal relation, based indirectly upon the above-mentioned relation.
tattasmāc chrotradhīḥ pramāṇaṃ bhavatyeva, tadanyābhiścakṣurādimatibhir yathoktasambandhasadbhāvāt /
In this way, Auditory Cognition can be quite valid, because of its being related to the other Cognitions, through the Eye and other Means of Cognition.
tathā hi dūrād vīṇādiśabdaśravaṇāt tadarthino veṇvādiśabdasādharmyād upajātasaṃśayasya puṃsaḥ pravṛttau vīṇārūpadarśanādyaḥ prāgupajātaḥ saṃśayaḥ kimayam vīṇādhvaniruta veṇugītādiśabda iti sa vyāvartate /
For instance, when one hears from a distance the sound proceeding from the Lute, if he wants to have the Lute, there arises a doubt in his mind as to whether or not it is the sound of the Lute that he has heard, this doubt being due to the fact of the sound, of the Lute being similar to the sound of the Flute; he then proceeds towards the Lute; and when he actually sees the Lute, the Doubt that had arisen as to the sound being of the Lute or of the Flute or of singing becomes set aside.
yatra ca deśe mṛdaṅgādipratiśabdaśravaṇāt pravṛttasya tadarthādhigatir na bhavati tatra visaṃvādād aprāmāṇyaṃ pratyeti //
At a place where the man hears what he thinks to be the reverberations of the sounding of the Drum, and proceeds towards it, if ho does not perceive the drum, then there being absence of the necessary corroboration, he concludes that the Cognition is invalid.
sādhanāntarajanyā tu buddhireṣā viniścitā /
This cognition produced by other means is quite certain;
hetvantarakṛtajñānasaṃvādas tena vāñchyate //
that is why the corroboration by cognitions produced by other means is desired.
eṣeti / vīṇādirūpagrāhiṇī //
‘This Cognition’ apprehending the shape of the Lute, etc.
yathā tvekendriyādhīnavijñānāntarasaṅgatirityādāvāha evam ityādi /
Thus, in the case of the validity of sense-perception, there is the definite basis in the form of corroboration by other cognitions produced by several sense-organs;
eṣa na dṛśyata iti /
but such is not found to be the case with the veda.
nānendriyādhīnā vijñānāntarasaṅgatiḥ //
‘Such is, etc. etc.’ i.e. Corroboration by other Cognitions produced by several Sense-organs.
katham asau pratyakṣe kāraṇaṃ klṛptetyāha tathāhītyādi /
Question: “How is this found to be the basis in the case of Sense-perception?” Answer: [see verse 3085 next]
tathā hi salilajñānamādyamutpadyate 'kṣijam / pānasnānādinirbhāsaṃ jihvākāyāśritaṃ param //
The first cognition of water that appears is produced by the eye; then there follows the later cognitions relating to drinking and bathing, as dependent upon the gestatory organ and the body (respectively).
rūpaviṣayaṃ cakṣurvijñānam ity arthaḥ /
‘Produced by the eyes’ i.e. the visual Cognition of Colour.
param iti / uttarakālabhāvi //
‘Later Cognition’, i.e. one appearing at a later time.
ekenāpi tu vākyena deśakālanarādiṣu / labhyate nārthasaṃvādaḥ sarvasmin saṃśayodayāt //
As a matter of fact, the cognition brought about by any one sentence is never found to be the same at all times and places, and in all men; as in all cases there arises doubt.
agnihotrād bhavet svarga itītthaṃ śrūyate samam / niścayāṅgaviyuktaṃ hi ga{śa---}bdadardduramātrakam //
It is true that the same words “heaven is attained by the performance of agnihotra and other rites” are heard by all men; but it is devoid of all elements of certainty, resembling the mere croaking of frogs.
[p.804] anenāsiddhatāmarthasaṃvādasyāha /
The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3086-3087 above]
tathāhyagnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyato vākyāt prekṣāvato niścayakāraṇabhāvāt saṃśayo jāyata eveti na deśakālādau saṃvādasiddhiḥ //
This shows that the corroboration by facts cannot be admitted. Because when the Sentence ‘From the performance of Agnihotra, follows Heaven’ is heard, the intelligent man derives no certain Cognition from it; hence it cannot be admitted that it is the same at all times and places.
nāpi narāntare sarvatra saṃvādo labhyata iti darśayann āha svargādāvityādi /
The following Text proceeds to show that the Cognition is not the same in all men: [see verse 3088 next]
svargādau matabhedaś ca viprāṇām api dṛśyate /
Even among Brāhmaṇas there is difference of opinion in regard to ‘heaven’ and such things;
labhyate nārthasaṃvādas tasmād iha narādiṣu //
hence the cognition derived from the Veda is not found to be the same in all men.
tathā hi manuṣyātiśāyipuruṣaviśeṣaniketaḥ sumerugiriśikharādideśaviśeṣo 'dhimānuṣasukhādhiṣṭhāno nānopakaranasamṛddhaḥ svarga iti niruktakārādayo varṇayanti /
For instance, the author of the Nirukta and other authorities describe ‘Heaven’ as ‘the abode of Personalities superior to human beings, located in such places as the summit of Mount Meru, the place affording superhuman pleasures, full of numerous amenities’;
prītiviśeṣo manuṣyāṇām eva svarga iti mīmāṃsakāḥ /
while the Mīmāṃsakas describe it as ‘a particular form of happiness found among men’.
yāge 'pi vipratipattir dṛśyate /
In regard to ‘Sacrifices’ also, there is difference of opinion.
śrūyate hi purākāle piṣṭamayaḥ paśur yenāyajanta yajvāna iti /
For example, it is heard that in ancient times it was only animals made of flour that were sacrificed;
anyais tu durātmabhirniṣkṛpaiḥ prāṇiviśeṣa eva paśur iti varṇitam //
while other wicked and cruel people have declared that it was the living animal that was sacrificed.
codanājanite jñāne dārḍhyaṃ prāgapahastitam / saṃdigdho hi tathābhāvas tadgrāhyasyānyasāmyataḥ //
As regards the firmness of the conviction produced by the Vedic injunction, that has been already rejected; because as a matter of fact, the said firmness is always doubtful; as the matter apprehended by the said cognition is similar to others.
prāgiti /
The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3089 above]
śrutiparīkṣāyām / anyasāmyata iti /
‘Already’ i.e. under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word ‘Is similar to others’;
agnihotrāt svargo na bhavatītyādipauruṣeyavacanasamudbhūtapratītyā tulyatvāt //
i.e. it stands on the same footing as the notion derived from such human assertions as ‘the performance of Agnihotra does not lead to Heaven (3089)
kiñca vāṅ{mātra}metadbhavatām yathā codanājanitā buddhir deśādiṣu na visaṃvadatīti darśayati asarvadarśibhir ityādi /
Further, it is a mere assertion of yours that “the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunction does not vary at different times and places, etc.”. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3090 next]
asarvadarśibhir vipraiḥ kuta etad viniścitam / codanājanitā buddhiḥ sarvasaṃvādinīti ca //
How have the Brāhmaṇas, who are certainly not omniscient, been able to ascertain that “the cognition produced by the Vedic injunction is the same at all places and times”? (3090)
sādhyā na cānumānenetyādāvāha niścitetyādi /
As a matter of fact, it has been already explained that the validity of perception also is ascertained by means of inference.
śuddhakāraṇajanyatvāt tat pramāṇaṃ tadanyavat //
for instance, a certain perception is valid, because it is produced by flawless causes, like other perceptions.
aniṣṭāpattir hi prasaṅga ucyate, na ca pratyakṣasyānumānataḥ prāmāṇyasiddhir neṣṭā, yena prasaṅgāpādanaṃ syāt /
That argument is called ‘Redtuctio ad Absurdum’ which indicates an undesirable possibility; and it is not undesirable that the validity of Perception should be proved by Inference; hence what has been urged cannot be a Reductio ad Absurdum.