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akṛtārthakriya iti / | ‘Akṛtārtha, etc. |
akṛtā arthakriyā yena sa tathoktaḥ / | that which has not performed any effective action. |
avācyeti / | ‘Avācyā’ not to he deprecated. |
prāmāṇyaniścayapūrvatvād asyā iti manyate // | The idea is that it is so, because it is preceded by the ascertainment of validity. |
yadi svataḥpramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam / bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ tadapodyate // bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhāvāt pramāṇatā / | If self-validity of cognitions is the general rule, and it is discarded when there is either an annulment of it or the cognition of its sources being defective, then validity becomes really due to the absence of annulment and absence of the cognition of the source being defective; |
prāptaivaṃ ca parasmāt te bhavet prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | and for you thus the certainty regarding validity is due to extraneous causes. |
tathā hi tadabhāvo 'yam abhāvākhyaṃ pramāntaram / tvatpakṣe 'nupalambhākhyamanumānaṃ tu manmate // | Because the said ‘absence’ is a negative cognition, which is essentially different from the other form of positive cognition, this other form being ‘non-apprehension’ according to you, and ‘inference’ according to us. |
atra prathamena ślokena parapakṣānuvādaḥ, dvitīyādinā dūṣaṇam / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2997-2999 above] The first two lines reproduce the opinion of the other party, and the other lines state the objection against that opinion. |
yadi hi bādhakādipratyayena prāmāṇyamapodyate, evaṃ sati bādhakādipratyayābhāvāt prāmāṇyaniścayo 'bhyupagataḥ syāt / | If the Cognition of annulment, etc. discards the Validity, then it means that conviction regarding Validity is due to the absence of the Cognition of the annulment, etc.; and this would mean that it is due to causes extraneous to the Cognition itself. |
abhāvasyāpi pramāṇāntaratveneṣṭatvāt / | Because ‘Non-apprehension’ (Negation) has been accepted as a distinct form of Cognition. |
asmatpakṣe tvanupalabdhisaṃjñake 'numāne 'ntarbhāvān na pramāṇāntaram // | According to our view the form of Cognition called ‘Non-apprehension’ is included under ‘Inference’, and is not a distinct form of Cognition. |
tathā hi tvadupavarṇitayaivopapattyā viparīto 'pyutsargāpavādaḥ śakyate kalpayitum iti darśayati anayaivetyādi / | as the same may be asserted in support of it as follows ‘therefore self-invalidity of cognitions is the general rule, and it is discarded when there is either absence of annulment, or absence of the cognition of its source being defective.’ (3000-3001) |
anayaivopapattyā syād aprāmāṇyam api svataḥ / tatrāpi śakyate vaktuṃ yasmān nyāyo 'yamīdṛśaḥ // | Further, the said general rule and its exception being ‘conceptual’, inasmuch as they pertain to Words and their meaning, would be always uncertain (flexible); |
tasmāt svato 'pramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam / bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhāvād apodyate // | hence they have no room in a discussion regarding the nature of entities; because all things are restricted within the limits of their own nature, and as such do not admit of the nature of other things. |
yadapyuktaṃ kumārileṇa | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3000-3001 above] |
"tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā / arthānyathātvahetūtvadoṣajñānād apodyate //" | Kumārila has declared as follows: “For these reasons the Validity of the Cognition must be taken as following from its being of the nature of apprehension, and it can be discarded by the Cognition of the fact of the real object cognised being really unlike what figures in the Cognition, and by the Cognition of defects in its cause”. |
% QUOTE Ślokavārttika | (Ślokavārtika, 1. |
iti, anayāpi hi diśā śakyam api vaktum iti darśayann āha tathā bodhātmakatvenetyādi / | The following Texts show that the same may be said regarding ‘Invalidity’ also: [see verses 3002-3003 next] |
tathā bodhātmakatvena buddheḥ prāptāpramāṇatā / yathārthajñānahetūtthaguṇajñānād apodyate // | Similarly, the invalidity of cognition must be taken as following from its being of the nature of apprehension, and is discarded by the cognition of its being in conformity with the real nature of things and by the cognition of efficiency of its source. |
aprāmāṇye parāyatte bhavatyevānavasthitiḥ / | If ‘invalidity’ were due to extraneous causes, there would be infinite regress; |
pramāṇādhīnametaddhi svatastaccāpratiṣṭhitam // | because it could be dependent upon the valid cognition, and this is itself unstable. An ‘a’ should be read before ‘pramāṇatā’. |
yathārthajñānaṃ ca arthasaṃvādajñānaṃ, hetūtthaguṇajñānaṃ ca kāraṇasamutthaguṇajñānam iti samāhāradvandvaḥ / | ‘Yathārthajñāna’ is Cognition of its being in conformity with the real state of things; ‘Hetūtthaguṇa-jñāna’ is Cognition of the efficiency of the cause, These two terms form a Copulative Compound, |
parāyatte 'pi tasminnityādāvāha / aprāmāṇya ityādi / etaddhīti / aprāmāṇyam / | It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2863, that “If it is due to extraneous causes, then there is no Infinite Regress, because it would be dependent upon Validity and this is there all right”. |
tacceti / pramāṇam // | The answer to this is ‘If Invalidity were due, etc.’ ‘Etat’ stands for Invalidity, ‘tat’, for the Valid Cognition. |
katham apratiṣṭhitam ity āha tathāhītyādi / | Question: “Why is it unstable, not firmly established?” Answer: [see verses 3004-3005 next] |
tathā hi bādhakābhāvāt prāmāṇyaṃ bhavatocyate / | For instance, you assert ‘validity’ on the ground of the absence of sublating cognition; |
bādhābhāvo 'pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaramiṣyate // tasyāpi bādhakābhāvāt prāmāṇyamabhidhīyate / | and ‘absence of sublation’ also is held to be a distinct form of cognition, named ‘non-apprehension’; so that the validity of this latter also is asserted on the ground of the absence of sublating cognition; |
tatra tatraivamicchāyāṃ vyavasthā nopalabhyate // | and this process proceeding on and on, there can be no resting ground (stability). |
yaduktam bādhakaḥ pratyaya ityādi tatrāha anapekṣapramāṇatvam ityādi / | Because the fact of the validity of the sublating cognition being self-sufficient has not been proved, therefore it cannot set aside the preceding cognition. |
anapekṣapramāṇatvaṃ bādhakapratyaye yataḥ / | It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka), under Text 2866, that “The sublating Cognition consists in the conviction that the thing cognised is otherwise than as cognised; |
na siddhaṃ tena naivāyaṃ pūrvajñānamapohate // | and this conviction, being self-sufficient, sets aside the preceding Cognition”. |
abhāvākhyasya pramāṇasyāpekṣi{a}tvād anapekṣapramāṇatvam asyāsiddham // athāpītyādinā anavasthāmeva samarthayate / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3006 above] [verse 3006]: As the form of Cognition called ‘Non-apprehension’ is always dependent upon something else, its validity cannot be regarded as proved. |
athāpi bādhakābhāvaṃ vinā prāmāṇyam iṣyate / kvacid ādye tathābhāve pradveṣaḥ kiṃnimittakaḥ // | If validity is admitted in some cases, even when there is no absence of the sublating cognition, then why should there be hostility against the initial cognition? (3007) |
yadyanavasthābhayāt kvacid vinaiva bādhakābhāvaṃ prāmāṇyam iṣyate tadā prathame 'pi jñāne bādhakābhāvo nāpekṣaṇīyaḥ syāt / | If, in order to avoid Infinite Regress, it be held that in some cases there is validity, even though the sublating Cognition is not absent, then, in the case of the initial Cognition also, there need be no dependence upon the absence of sublation; |
tataś ca sarvajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ // | and in this way, all Cognitions would be equally valid. |
bādhakaḥ pratyayaścāyaṃ pūrvajñānamapohate / anapekṣapramāṇatvād yadi śaṅkātra kiṃ bhavet // | If the sublating cognition sets aside the preceding cognition, because its validity is self-sufficient, why should there arise any suspicion regarding it? What could be suspected would be the possibility of another sublating cognition with self-sufficient validity; |
anapekṣyapramāṇatvaṃ śaṅkyate cātra bādhakam / | but such a suspicion would be self-contradictory, and could never arise in regard to what has been duly ascertained. |
viruddhametadāśaṅkā niścite hi jāyate // | but that suspicion ceases after very little effort”. |
yadi bādhakaḥ pratyayo 'napekṣyapramāṇabhāvas tatkathaṃ tatrāpavādāśaṅkā, yenocyate tatrāpi tvapavādasya syād apekṣeti, tataś ca parasparavyāhatam etaduktam anapekṣapramāṇatvam, tatra cāśaṅkyate bādhakam iti / tathāhyanapekṣamityanena niścayena viṣayīkṛtamu [p.790] cyate, yatra ca niścayas tatrāśaṅkāyā asambhavaḥ, niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvāt, āśaṅkāyāścobhayāṃśāvalambitvenāropākārapravṛttatvāt // | If the sublating Cognition is one of which the validity is not dependent upon anything else, then, how could there arise any suspicion regarding its sublation, in view of which it is said that ‘there may be need for another sublating Cognition’? Hence there is clear self-contradiction involved in the statements that ‘the validity of the sublating Cognition is self-sufficient’ and that ‘its sublation is suspected Because what is meant by ‘independence’, ‘self-sufficiency’, is that it has become an object of firm conviction; and as a matter of fact, where there is firm conviction, any suspicion regarding it is absolutely impossible. Because as between ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’, one always sets aside the other; |
svataḥprāmāṇyapakṣe 'pi svarasenaiva niścayāt / kasmād bādhakasadbhāvasiddhau yatno vidhīyate // tathā hi svarasenaiva na yasmin mānaniścayaḥ / niścīyate 'tra{pya---} yatnena sāmarthyāt tatra bādhakaḥ // | and ‘suspicion’, as envisaging both ends, operates in the manner of ‘uncertainty’, ‘doubt’, (3008-3009) Under the theory of the self-validity of cognitions, the validity being ascertained by itself, why should an effort be made to prove the existence of a sublating cognition? Because, when the validity of a cognition is not definitely cognised by itself, its sublating cognition is got at without effort. |
ataḥ parīkṣakajñānatrayamatra kimucyate / | Thus, why should there be said to be ‘three cognitions’ for the investigator? In fact there is not room for a single one; |
naikasyāpyavakāśo 'sti tasminniścayataḥ svataḥ // | the conviction regarding it having come about by itself. |
yadi cotpadyate śaṅkānupalambhe 'pi saṃśayāt / | If it be held that “even when no sublating cognition is actually found, there arises suspicion due to doubt; |
bādhābhāvāvinābhūtaṃ yasmānnānupalambhanam // | because the non-apprehension of sublating cognition is not always concomitant with its absence”; |
evaṃ sati traye kasmāt paritoṣastvayā kṛtaḥ / adṛṣṭāvapi śaṅkyeta bādhā pūrvavadatra hi // | then, under the circumstances, why have you become satisfied with only three (cognitions)? Because, as before, even when the sublating cognition is not there, its presence could always be suspected; |
yāvanna kāryasaṃvādas tāvan na vinivartate / | and this suspicion of sublation could not cease until one met with conformity to effective action; |
tataścājātabādhenāpyāśaṅkyaṃ bādhakaṃ punaḥ / chalena vastunastattvaṃ nahi jātvavatiṣṭhate // | Thus then, even in a case where no sublation has actually appeared, its presence can always be suspected; specially as casuistry can never lead to the ascertainment of truth. |
ājīvitāt samutpannaṃ bādhapratyayavarjitam / śaṅkhe pītanibhaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ nahi jāyate // | Even though a man may have had the unsublated cognition of the conch-shell as yellow, throughout his life, such cognition can never become valid. |
yadi svata eva prāmāṇyaniścayas tadā niścayena prāmāṇyasya vyāptatvād yatrāniścayas tatra sāmarthyād aprāmāṇyasyāvasthānād bādhakasadbhāvo yatnamantareṇaiva niścita iti tadbhāvasiddhyartho vyartho yatnaḥ, tatra caikasyāpi parīkṣakajñānasyāpekṣāvakāśo naiva sambhavatīti, kiṃ punas trayāṇām ityata idam apyasaṅgatam uktam idaṃ ca parīkṣakajñānatritayaṃ nātīvartata iti darśayati ata ityādi / | If Validity is ascertained by itself, then Validity being invariably concomitant with conviction, where there is no conviction, there, by implication, would be Invalidity; so that the presence of its sublating Cognition becomes secured without any effort; hence any effort to prove the existence of the said sublating Cognition would be futile. So that there is no room for even a single Cognition on the part of the investigator; what to say of three? Hence when it is said that ‘the Cognition of the investigator does not proceed beyond three’, it is something entirely irrelevant. |
syād etat anupalambhamātreṇa bādhakābhāvo na śakyate niścetum, sato 'pi kasyacid dūrasūkṣmavyavahitasyānupalabdher vādhakābhāvenānupalambhasyāvyāptatvāt, tena bādhakābhāvasiddhaye yatno vidhīyata iti / | The following might be urged “The absence of the sublating Cognition cannot be ascertained by mere non-apprehension of it; because even when a thing is existent, it is not apprehended if it happens to be remote, or very small, or hidden; so that non-existence is not invariably concomitant with non-apprehension; hence it is that effort is made for proving that there is no sublating Cognition”. |
yadyevaṃ parīkṣakajñānatrayaniyamaṃ jahīhi, prathamajñānavadanyatrāpi bādhakasyāśaṅkyamānatvāt, [p.791] yāvaddhi{ddhi---} phalajñānaṃ nodeti tāvad bādhāśaṅkā kena nivartatām, yena trayaniyamaḥ syāt, na hyākrośamātreṇaiva vinā pramāṇaṃ prekṣāvatām āśaṅkānivṛttir yuktā / | If that is so, then please give up the idea of any such restriction as that ‘the investigator should have only three Cognitions’; because, as in the case of the first Cognition, so in all other Cognitions, the presence of sublation would be suspected; until the Cognition of the fruit (result) of the Cognition has appeared, how can the suspicion of sublation be prevented, in view of which, there could be the restriction of the number of Cognitions to three only? Unless there is proof for it, mere proclamation cannot bring about the cessation of suspicion in the minds of intelligent men. |
tathā hi vastusthityā pramāṇacintā, nāyaṃ chalavyavahāraḥ prastuto yena katipayapratyayamātraṃ nirūpyate / | Because the whole investigation regarding Cognitions proceeds on the basis of real things; and what has been started is not mere Casuistry, whereby only a few Cognitions are examined. |
yadi punar jñānatrayodayāvadhimātreṇa prāmāṇyamavatiṣṭhate hanta tarhi yeṣām ājīvitaṃ kāmalopahatacakṣuṣāṃ pītaśaṅkhākāram eva jñānam upajāyate teṣāṃ tadvijñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ syāt // | If the validity of Cognitions rested upon the limitation of the investigation to three Cognitions only, then in the case of men who have suffered from the jaundiced eye throughout their life, as the conch-shell is always cognised as yellow, that Cognition would be quite valid. |
syād etad yadyapramāṇaṃ tasya kimiti jñānatrayaparīkṣāyā ūrdhvaṃ bādhakaṃ nopajāyate anutpatter nāstītyavasīyata ityāśaṅkyāha viśuddhītyādi / viśuddhikāraṇābhāvānnopajāyeta bādhakam / anyena vā nimittena nātaḥ śaṅkā nivartate // | It is just possible that the sublating cognition does not appear because the cause of the removal of the defect is not available, or because of some other reason; hence the suspicion regarding the possibility of its being there does not cease. The following question might be raised: If the Cognition is invalid, how is it that the sublation of it does not appear after the investigation of the three Cognitions? The answer may be that, because it does not appear, therefore it is concluded that it does not exist. |
viśuddheḥ kāraṇaṃ droṇakusumarasaniṣekādi / tasyābhāvānnopajāyate bādhakam / | ‘Cause of the removal of the defect’ such as the dropping of the juice of the Droṇa-flower into the eyes (which cures the jaundice); |
anyena vā nimitteneti yathā marumarīcikānicaye samupajātasalilavibhramasya puṃso 'nupasarpaṇāt salilasvabhāvaviviktamarusthalīnirbhāsi jñānaṃ nopajāyate // utprekṣeta hītyādāvāha sanimittaivetyādi / | when no such remedy is available, the Cognition sublating the Cognition of yellowness in the conch-shell does not appear. ‘Or because of some other reason’; for instance, when looking at the mass of mirage and mistaking it for water, if one does not move up to it, the corrective Cognition envisaging the sandy desert as distinguished from water does not appear. |
sanimittaiva teneyam āśaṅkā yatra mohataḥ / | Thus, even where the suspicion (of sublation) is due to stupidity, there is always some ground for it; |
śuddhisaṃvādadṛṣṭau tu nāśaṅkā sudhiyo bhavet // | when there is cognition of the perfectness of the cause and that of conformity to reality, there arises no suspicion in the mind of the wise. |
sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṃśayātmā na jāyate / niḥsaṃśayā hi dhīstasya śuddhisaṃvādadarśane // | so that he does not become beset with doubt in all his dealings: as his mind has become free from doubt, on the cognition of the said perfectness and conformity. |
atrāpi yaḥ punaḥ śaṅkāṃ kaścit prakurute jaḍaḥ / saṃśayātmakatā ye{ 'je---}na manye taṃ prati ninditā // | If even after this, a foolish, man entertains suspicions, it is in reference to such a person that the suspicious character seems to have been deprecated by the unborn one (in the bhagavadgītā). |
pratipāditametad yathā kāraṇaśuddhisaṃvādajñānābhyāṃ śaṅkā nivartate / | It has been explained that all doubt and suspicion cease when the perfect character of the cause, and conformity with reality have become perceived. |
yat punar uktaṃ tathāca vāsudevenetyādi, tat kevalamātmano bhaktivādāvalambanaṃ prakaṭitaṃ na vastusthitiḥ / | It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2873, that “Suspiciousness has been deprecated by Vāsudeva, etc. etc.”. What the person making this assertion has shown by this is only his own devotion to the Bhakti-cult, not the real state of things. |
nahi vacanamātrānniryuktikāt parasya prekṣāvato vyutthitacetasas tatsvabhāvanirṇayo jñāyate / | A mere assertion, without reasons, does not carry conviction regarding the real state of things, to any intelligent person whose mind has risen above the normal. |
tathā hi vāsudevavacanamanyenābhisambandhinā vyavasthitatvād avirodhīti darśayann āha atrāpītyādi / | The words of Vāsudeva (that have been quoted) were pronounced in an entirely different context, and are not incompatible with our view of things. |
atra śuddhisaṃvādadarśane, yo bhavadvidhaḥ śaṅkāṃ kurute saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyas tathaiva hītyevam, taṃ prati, ajena viṣṇunā, saṃśayātmakatā ninditeti sambhāvyate // [p.792] yāvānevāpavādo 'to yatra sambhāvyate matāvityādāvāha deśetyādi / | This is what is shown by the words ‘If, even after this, etc, etc.’ ‘After this’ i.e. after having perceived the perfectness of the cause and also conformity to reality, one, like yourself, entertains suspicions, as asserted (under Text 2834) that ‘the corroboration of the corroboration also has to be sought for’, such suspicious character is what appears to have been deprecated by the ‘Unborn One’ Viṣṇu. |
deśakālanarāvasthābhedāpekṣāprakalpite / prāmāṇyaniścaye 'nyasmād vyaktaṃ prāmāṇyaniścitiḥ // | If the ascertainment of validity is dependent upon the exigencies of place, time, the man and the circumstances, it is clear that the definite cognition of validity is dependent upon extraneous causes. |
tathā hi deśakālādau bādhābhāvatsuniścitau / pramāṇāntarataḥ prāñce jñāne prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | for instance, the place and time having been ascertained through the absence of sublation, the ascertainment of the validity of the initial cognition clearly follows from other means of cognition. |
anena svavacanavirodhaṃ pratipādayati / | In this the Author points out the self-contradiction involved in the position of the other party. |
tathā hi deśakālanarāvasthāpekṣayā prāmāṇyaniścaye prakalpyamāne parataeveti spaṣṭam uktaṃ bhavati / | For instance, if the Cognition of validity is held to be dependent upon the exigencies of place, time, the man and the attendant circumstances, then it is clearly meant that the validity is due to extraneous causes; |
yato deśakālādau prāmāṇāntarato bādhāyā abhāve niścite sati prācye prathame jñāne prāmāṇyaniścayo 'bhyupagamyamānaḥ kathaṃ parato nābhyupagataḥsyāt / | because as regards place, time, etc., when it is ascertained by means of other Means of Cognition, that there is no sublation, it follows that the initial first Cognition is valid when this view has been accepted, how can one avoid the conclusion that the validity of Cognitions is due to extraneous causes? Surely the absence of sublation can be ascertained only by other Means of Cognition. |
avaśyaṃ hi pramāṇāntarato bādhāyā abhāvo niśca{śce---}yaḥ, tathā hi svataḥprāmāṇye 'bhyupagamyamāne sarvajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgo mābhūd ityavaśyaṃ tvayā vaktavyaṃ yatra bādhā nāsti tasyaiva svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ nānyasyeti, sa ca bādhāyā abhāvo 'nupalambhamātrān na śakyate niścetuṃ vyabhicārād iti sāmarthyānupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhato niśceyaḥ, tasyaiva bādhābhāvena vyāptatvāt / | Under the view that the validity of Cognition is inherent in it, all Cognitions would have to be regarded as valid; in order to avoid this contingency, you will have to assert that ‘self-sufficient validity belongs only to that Cognition of which there is no sublation’; and this absence of sublation cannot be cognised by mere non-apprehension. as such a conclusion would be wrong; hence the said absence can be ascertained only by the non-apprehension of that which would have been apprehended (if it existed); |
sa copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhaḥ saṃvādavijñānato nānyo yukta iti pramāṇāntarata eva prāmāṇyaniścayo 'bhyupagataḥ syāt // | and this ‘non-apprehension of what would have been apprehended’ cannot be any other than that which follows from the Cognition of its conformity with reality; so that it would mean the acceptance of the view that certainty relating to validity can be obtained through other Means of Cognition; |
ṛṇādītyādāvāha ṛṇādītyādi / ṛṇādivyavahāras tu yo vākyatrayayogyavān / | As regards dealings regarding debt, etc. which admit of only three statements, this condition (of three statements) is applicable to those cases only, and should not be cited in connection with validity. |
arthipratyarthinau tatra smṛtvā smṛtvā parisphuṭam / nahi sūkṣmekṣikāṃ kartuṃ labhete tatra vastuni // | In those cases, the two disputants make statements on recalling things to their memory, and do not find time to make a careful scrutiny of things. |
vastusthityā pramāṇaṃ tu vyavasthāpyaṃ chalānnanu / | As regards the validity of cognitions however, things have got to be determined in regard to the real state of things, and not by mere casuistry. |
prakṛtāpratirūpo 'to vyavahāra udāhṛtaḥ // | Hence the dealings that have been cited are not analogous to the subject under consideration. |
vastusvabhāvapratibaddhāyāṃ pramāsthitau prakṛtāyāṃ icchāmātraviracitasaṅketapratibaddhasya chalātmano yadṛṇādivyavahārasyodāharaṇaṃ tat kevalaṃ bhavataḥ prakṛtānabhijṇyatāṃ prakaṭayati // | The exact position regarding the validity of Cognitions, which is related to the real nature of things, forms the subject under consideration; while the transactions relating to Debt, etc. consist in Casuistry and are related to Conventions made by the mere whims of men; the citing of these transactions therefore only shows your ignorance of the subject under consideration. |
trisatyatāpi devānām ityādāvāha trisatyetyādi / | The fact of the deities being called ‘trisatya’ cannot lead to any certainty (regarding validity); |
ādyānniścitya sadbhāve naiva syāt parato 'pyasau // | in fact, if this certainty does not follow from the very first (statement), it cannot follow from others. |
[p.793] ādyād iti prathamādvacanānniściterasadbhāvo sati parataḥ uttarakālabhāvino vacanadvayāt asau niścitir naiva syād viśeṣābhāvāt // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3027 above] ‘From the first’ i.e. from the first statement; if the certainty does not follow, then that certainty cannot follow from, others i.e. from the two statements coming later on. |
etad eva darśayati tadīyam ityādi / | The same idea is further elucidated: [see verse 3028 next] |
tadīyam eva yenedaṃ vacanadvayamuttaram / tadādye pratyayābhāve ko viśeṣas tadanyayoḥ // | Inasmuch as the later two statements are of the same two men, if there is no confidence in the first one, what peculiarity is there in the other two (which makes them more trustworthy)? (3028) |
uttaram iti / paścātkālabhāvi / | ‘Later’ i.e. appearing at a later time. |
niścayābhāve / | ‘No confidence’ no certainty of conviction. |
tadanyayor iti / tasmād anyayor uttarakālabhāvinor ity arthaḥ / | ‘In the other two’ The two other than the first, i.e. the two coming at a later time. |
yo hyekaṃ vacanaṃ dvitīyaṃ ca mithyā vadet sa tṛtīyam api kiṃ na vadet, kastadānīṃ tasya pratiroddhā, yena tṛtīyāt sampratyayo jāyate // | The man who makes one, and also two, false statements, why should he not make a third false statement? Who is there to prevent him doing it by virtue of which conviction should result from the third? (3028) |
ataḥ pūrvoktāyā yuktyā tvatpakṣe 'pyanavasthitiḥ / | Thus, in accordance with the reasoning set forth previously, there is infinite regress involved under your view also. |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve yathāyogamataḥ sthiteḥ // | and validity and invalidity remain as they are in reality. |
pūrvoktā yuktiḥ "tathā hi bādhakābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ bhavatocyate / bādhābhāvo 'pyabhāvākhyaṃ pramāṇāntaram iṣyata" // | It has been asserted, in Text 2885, that “under the view of self-validity, there is no Infinite Regress, etc. etc.”. |
ityādinoktā // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3029 above] |
nityam āptapraṇītaṃ cetyādāvāha vākyam ityādi / vākyaṃ nityaṃ purāsmābhir vistareṇa nirākṛtam / | ‘The reasoning set forth previously’ i.e. the one set forth under Text 3004 et seq. The eternal word has been discarded by us previously in detail. |
kṣīṇaniḥśeṣadoṣaś ca nāptosti bhavataḥ smṛtau // | Under your view, there is no trustworthy person entirely free from all defects; |
akṣīṇāvṛtirāśis tu kīdṛgāpto bhaviṣyati / tasya sambhāvyate doṣād anyathāpi vaco yataḥ // | and how can a person be ‘trustworthy’, when the mass of his ignorance has not been dispelled? because on the presence of the defects, it is always open to suspicion that his word may be false. |
purā śrutiparīkṣāyām nityaṃ vākyaṃ vistareṇa nirastamityasiddhatvāt kutas tasya svataḥprāmāṇyacintāvatāro bhavet / āptasya svayam anabhyupagamāt praṇītam api vākyam asiddham eva / | ‘Previously’ i.e. under the Chapter on ‘The Revealed Word’, the idea of the ‘Eternal Word’ has been refuted in detail; and when its very existence is not admitted, how could there be any investigation regarding its self-sufficient validity? As regards the ‘trustworthy person’, no such person is admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka himself; |
tathā hi yasyānṛtahetavo rāgādayo doṣāḥ niḥśeṣaṃ prahīṇāḥ sa evāpto yuktaḥ, anyathā rāgādibhir doṣair anṛtahetubhiḥ parītacetasaḥ katham āptatvaṃ setsyati / naca bhavadbhiḥ prahīṇāśeṣakleśajālaḥ kaścinnaro 'bhyupagamyate, yenāptavacanaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhaved bhavatām // | any work written by him also becomes inadmissible. Because, if a man has had all the defects, Love, Hate, etc. which are the source of untruth, completely destroyed, then alone he can be regarded as ‘trustworthy otherwise, how could trustworthiness be accepted in the case of a man whose mind is beset with the sources of untruth, in the shape of Love, Hate and other defects? And you, Mīmāṃsakas, do not admit of any such person as has completely shaken off the entanglements of the ‘Afflictions’ (Defects); hence there can be no ‘word of the trustworthy person’ for you. |
kiñca bhavatu nāmāptas tathāpi tasya vacanam asiddham eveti darśayati jāte 'pītyādi / | even so any ‘word’ (assertion) of such a person cannot be said to be known. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3032-3034 next] |
jāte 'pyāpte tadīyo 'sau guṇaughaḥ kena śakyate / jñātumāptapraṇīte syād yato vākye 'vadhāraṇam // [p.794] yo 'pyatīndriyadṛkpaśyet tadīyaguṇasampadam / tasyāpyāptapraṇītena vacasā kiṃ prayojanam // | Even though such a ‘trustworthy person’ may be born, who could come to know of the host of his good qualities, and thereby have confidence in the words of such a trustworthy person? If there were some one with supernormal vision who could perceive his excellent qualities, what use could such a person have for any ‘words of the trustworthy person’? Because he would himself know all things, independently of all assertions. |
sa hi vākyanirāśaṃsaḥ svayam arthaṃ prapadyate / anyo 'pyāptāparijñānāt tato 'rthaṃ nāvagāchati // | as for any other person, as he could not recognise the ‘trustworthy person’, he could never learn of things from his words. Then again, granting that there is a ‘trustworthy person’; even so any ‘word’ (assertion) of such a person cannot be said to be known. |
nahyāptamanavadhārya tadīyametad vacanamityevam avadhārayituṃ śakyam, na cāptāvadhāraṇaṃ sambhavati, tathā hi yastāvat kṣīṇaniḥśeṣadoṣo 'tīndriyārthadarśī sa yadyapyāptamavadhārayati tathāpi tadvacanamakiñcitkaram eva, svayaṃ sarvārthapratyakṣadarśitvena tadvacanād apravṛtter atas tasya tadavadhāraṇam anarthakam / | Unless it has been found who the ‘trustworthy person’ is, it cannot be ascertained what is ‘the word of the trustworthy person’; and it is not possible to find out who is the ‘trustworthy person’; because the man who has got rid of all his ‘Afflictions and defects’ and who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things may be able to recognise the ‘trustworthy person’; but the word of such a trustworthy person can serve no useful purpose for such a man, as he would himself be able to perceive all things and as such would not depend, for his activity, upon the ‘trustworthy person’; hence the recognition of such a person would be of no use to him. |
yaścānyo 'rvāgdarśī sa naivāptāvadhāraṇapaṭur iti nāsau svatas tadvacanād artham avagacchati, aniścitatvāt // | As for other ordinary men, whose vision is limited, they cannot recognise the ‘trustworthy person’; and hence they cannot learn anything from the words of such a person; as there could be no certainty about it. |
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