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anyathā hi bhedavyavahārocchedaḥ syāt. | if it were not so, there would be an end to all notions of difference. |
anumānasya tu vikalpātmakatvena sāmānyaviṣayatvān na pratibhāsavaśād vastuviṣayatvavyavasthā, vastuno 'pratibhāsāt, kiṃ tarhi niścayavaśāt. yathoktam | As for Inference, on the other hand, as it is by its very nature, conceptual, it envisages generalities, and hence the idea of what forms its object cannot be determined by what actually figures in the cognition; because the object (in the form of generalities) cannot figure in the cognition; |
niścayaiḥ / | its object therefore can be determined only by the conviction (certainty) that it produces; |
yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham PV 1.59'b---------d iti. tataś cānumānasya tadābhāsaśūnyasyāpi nāntarīyakārthadarśanabalenotpatteḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhāt prāmāṇyam ity avaśyaṃ tatrāvinābhāvaniścayo 'pekṣaṇīyaḥ. | as has been thus declared ‘The form that is not determined by convictions, how can that form the objective of those cognitions?’ Thus it is that though Inference is devoid of the actual appearance of the object, yet it is brought about by the inference of the perception of things that are invariably concomitant, and hence becomes indirectly tied down to the object; and it is on this that its validity is based. Hence in this case, certainty regarding the invariable concomitance is essential; |
anyathānumānasyotpattyasambhavād iti nānumānatulyaṃ pratyakṣam // | as otherwise, Inference could not come about at all. For these reasons, Perception cannot be regarded as standing on the same footing as Inference. |
nanu tasya pramāṇatve vijñānasyāviniścite / kathaṃ tatra pravarteta prekṣāvānīpsitāgateḥ // | “If the validity of the cognition is not definitely ascertained, then how could any sane person have recourse to activity? Because what is wanted is not cognised.” (2974) |
TS 2973 | In the following Text, the other party urges that “if the validity of Cognitions depends upon extraneous causes, there is mutual interdependence”: [see verse 2974 above] |
tathā hi prekṣāpūrvakāriṇaḥ prāmāṇyaniścaye sati pravṛttyā bhavitavyam, pravṛttau ca satyāṃ prāmāṇyaniścaya itītaretarāśrayāt kathaṃ prekṣāvata īpsitārthāviniścaye sati pravṛttiḥ syāt // | As a matter of fact, in every case it is necessary that the sane man should have the conviction of the validity of his cognition, and then have recourse to activity following from that cognition; and when this activity is there, then alone can there be any conviction of the validity of the cognition; so that there is mutual interdependence. Thus then, the sane man having no conviction regarding the desired thing, how could he have recourse to any activity? (2974) |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte / [p.783] | The following Text supplies the answer to the above: [see verse 2975 next] |
ucyate saṃśayenaiva vartate 'sau vicakṣaṇaḥ / | Our answer to the above is as follows: it is through the doubtful cognition itself that the clever man has recourse to activity; |
vaicakṣaṇyakṣatis tasya nacaivamanuṣajyate // | and this does not detract from his cleverness. |
dvividhā hi pravṛttir arthakriyārthā prāmāṇyaniścayārthā ca. | Activity is of two kinds (a) tending to fruitful activity, and (b) tending to the ascertainment of validity. |
tatrādyā pravṛttiḥ saty api saṃśaye yathā bhavati, tathā pratipāditam, pratibhāsamānārthāvasāyamātreṇaiva pratyakṣasya pravartakatvāt. | As regards the former, it has been already explained how that activity is possible, even when there is Doubt; and the reason for this lies in the fact that Sense-perception prompts man to activity by the mere Cognition of the thing envisaged by it; |
tena vaicakṣaṇyakṣatir evaṃ sati nānuṣajyate, arthasaṃśayenāpi kṛṣīvalādīnām iva pravṛttidarśanād ity abhiprāyaḥ. | and such activity does not detract from the cleverness of the man; because in the case of agriculturists, activity is found, even though the issue in the matter is doubtful. |
na ca kṛṣīvalādīnām upāyāniścayena pravṛttair yuktā prekṣāpūrvakāriteti yuktaṃ vaktum, upeyāpekṣatvād upāyasya. | It will not be right to assert that “agriculturists are regarded as intelligent agents only because they have recourse to activity only when they are sure regarding the efficacy of the measures adopted by them Because the Measures are always dependent upon the nature of what is meant to be obtained through them; |
upeyāniścaye tanniścayāyogāt. | so that there is this even when there is doubt. |
dvitīyāpi pravṛttiḥ saty api prāmāṇyasaṃśaye sutarāṃ yuktaiveti darśayann āha saṃśayenetyādi. | The following Text proceeds to point out that the second kind of activity (that tending to the ascertainment of validity) is all the more proper, where there is Doubt regarding validity: [see verse 2976 above] |
yato yasmāt prāmāṇyaniścayaṃ prati saṃśayena pravṛtter evopāyatā tena puruṣeṇa niścitā, tataś copāyaviṣaye saṃśayābhāvāt pravṛttir yuktaiva // | Because, in regard to the ascertainment of validity, the man acts through a doubtful idea, and thereby he ascertains the fact of the thing being the proper Means, therefore it is only right that there should be activity in regard to that Means, even when there is Doubt. |
kathaṃ sā tenopāyatā niścitety āha sandehena pravṛttāv ityādi / | Question: “How is the fact of its being the Means ascertained?” Answer: [see verses 2977-2979 next] |
sandehena pravṛttau me phalaprāptir bhavedyadi / prāmāṇyaniścayas tatra jñāta eva bhaviṣyati // | When I have recourse to activity on the basis of a doubtful cognition, if i succeed in obtaining the fruit of that activity, then certainty regarding the validity of that cognition would be automatically apprehended; |
nānyatheti nacāpyevam anuyogo 'tra yuktimān / upāye vartate kasmād iti nahyanyathāgatiḥ // | it cannot be ascertained in any other way. Nor can it be reasonable to raise the question as to ‘how the man has recourse to the said means for the simple reason that there is no other way available. |
na hy upāyād vinā kaścid upeyaṃ pratipadyate / | As a matter of fact, without the means, no one can get at the end. |
iti saṃdehavṛtto 'pi prekṣāvattāṃ jahāti na // | Thus, even when acting on the basis of a doubtful cognition, the man does not lose his character of being a sane person. |
sandehavṛtto 'pīti / | ‘Acting on the basis of a doubtful Cognition’; |
prāmāṇyasandehena pravṛtto 'pītyarthaḥ / | i.e. having recourse to activity, through a were suspicion that his Cognition may be valid and right. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily understood; |
nanu cārthakriyābhāsi jñānaṃ svapne 'pi vidyate / | “As a matter of fact, cognition envisaging effective action is present in dreams also; |
naca tasya pramāṇatvaṃ taddhetoḥ prathamasya ca // | and yet, on that account, it is not valid; nor is its source, the former cognition, valid.” (2980) |
[p.784] taddhetoḥ prathamasyeti / arthakriyājñānahetoḥ / | ‘Its source, the former Cognition’ i.e. the Cognition of effective action; |
naivam ityādinā pratividhatte. | this should be construed with ‘is not valid’. |
naivaṃ bhrāntā hi sāvasthā sarvā bāhyānibandhanā / | It cannot be so; because the whole of that state is illusory? having no basis in the external world; |
na bāhyavastusaṃvādas tāsvavasthāsu vidyate // | hence in those states, there can be no conformity with external objects; |
svasaṃviditarūpāś ca cittacaittāvilakṣaṇaḥ / | all these are known in their own forms, not differing, in this, from the mind and the mental states. |
avasthādvayabhedo 'pi spaṣṭaṃ tena pratīyate // | This is the reason why the difference between the two states is clearly perceived. |
yadi tāvad bāhyārtha{vādinaṃ}bauddhaṃ prati codyate tadāsiddham iti prathamena ślokena darśitam / | If what has been urged is against the Buddhist who accepts the reality of the external world, then the Reason adduced, is ‘inadmissible’; this is what is meant by the first two lines. |
tathā hi tena bāhyārthavādinārthasaṃvādāt prāmāṇyam iṣṭaṃ nārthakriyājñānasaṃvādāt, naca svapno 'rthsaṃvādo 'sti sarvasyā evasvapnāvasthāyā bhrāntatvena sarveṣāmavisaṃvādāt tatra, sarvavijñānānām arthamantareṇaivotpatter nirviṣayatvam, tena jāgradavasthāyāṃ bhāvina eva jñānasya prāmāṇyalakṣaṇāvatārān nānena vyabhicāro yukta iti bhāvaḥ / | What is meant is that the said upholder of the external world admits the validity of Cognitions to be based upon conformity to the real state of things, and not upon conformity to the Cognition of effective action; in the case of dreams, there can be no conformity to the real state of things; because all parties are agreed on the point that the entire dream-state is illusory; hence in that state all the Cognitions that appear are without objects, hence they are objectless. Thus then, as the conditions of validity can be applicable to Cognitions of the waking state only, it is not right to urge the ‘inconclusiveness’ (or falsity) of our Reason on the basis of Dream-Cognition. |
kiñca apravṛtti{tta---}mapūrvakam asthiraṃ vyākulaṃ ca svapne 'rthakriyājñānam, tadviparītaṃ jāgradavasthāyām iti tathāvidhasya prāmāṇye kutaḥ svapnenānaikāntaḥ / | Further, the ‘Cognition of effective action’ that appears during dreams is one that has never appeared before, it is fleeting, and confused; while the reverse of it is the case with similar Cognition during the waking state; how then can the validity of this latter be doubtful in view of what happens in the former? |
atha yogācāraṃ prati codyate, tatrāpīdaṃ prakṛtānupayogi / | If, on the other hand, what has been urged is against the Yogācāra (Idealist), then it has no bearing upon the case in question. |
tathā hi sāṃvyavahārikasyedaṃ pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam --- pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam PV 2.1ab' | Because it is for the practical man (from the practical point of view) that Valid Cognition has been defined as ‘Cognition in conformity with the real state of things’; |
tatra cārthakriyānirbhāsijñānasaṃvedanam evāvisaṃvādaḥ, tadāvirbhāve lokasya tathā vyavahārāt / | and in this connection, ‘conformity’ can consist only in the Cognition envisaging effective action; as it is only when this latter has appeared that people regard the Cognition in question as ‘valid’; |
tadarthatvāc cārthapravṛtteḥ / | and it is for this purpose that people have recourse to activity towards things. |
tac ca sāṃvyavahārikaṃ jñānaṃ jāgradavasthābhāvyena / | This practical Cognition can be only one appearing during the waking state; |
tatraiva loke sarvavyavahārāṇāṃ pāramārthikatvābhiniveśāt / | because it is only activities during this state that are regarded by people as real; |
natu svapnāvasthāyām / | never those occurring during dreams. |
tataś ca jāgratpratyayatve satīti viśeṣaṇasyāśravaṇānnetareṇa vyabhicāraḥ // syān mataṃ paratas tasya prāmāṇyasya viniścaye / prasajyate prameyatvam iti nanvavirodhyadaḥ // | Thus then, so long as ‘being waking Cognition’ has not been introduced as a necessary qualification, there can be no ‘inconclusiveness’ or ‘falsity’ in view of what happens during dreams. The following might be urged: “it being ascertained that its validity is due to extraneous causes, the cognition should be regarded as ‘cognised’”. |
syād etat tulye sarvākārataḥ {sarvasya parataḥ---} pratibhāse katham ayaṃ bhedo niścīyate, tadā pramāṇāntareṇa mīyamānatvāt tat prameyaṃ prāpnoti, na ca pramāṇam eva prameyaṃ yuktaṃ virodhād iti codyam / | The following might he urged “The validity of all Cognitions being equally due to extraneous causes, why should there be this distinction? And under these circumstances, the Cognition itself becomes the object cognised, which is extremely incongruous”. |
nanvavirodhyada iti parihāraḥ / | This is the objection urged by the Opponent. |
ada iti etat / | ‘adaḥ’, this. |
apekṣābhedāt kāryakāraṇapitṛputravyapadeśavad avirodhi // | There is no incongruity in this, as ‘cognition’ and ‘cognised’ are relative terms like ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, and ‘Father’ and ‘Son’. |
etad eva darśayati tadgrāhyetyādi / | The same idea is further explained: [see verses 2984-2985 next] |
tadgrāhyavastvapekṣaṃ hi prāmāṇyaṃ tasya gīyate / parato 'vagates tasya prameyatvavyavasthitiḥ // | The validity of the cognition is always asserted in reference to the thing apprehended by it; and this validity being apprehended by another cognition, the former cognition does become ‘cognised’; |
[p.785] apekṣābhedataścaivaṃ kāryakāraṇatādivat / pramāṇatvaprameyatvavyavasthā na virudhyate // | and there is no incongruity in this, as the notions of ‘cognition and cognised’ are based upon relativity, as in the case of ‘cause and effect’ and the like. |
tena jñānena yad grāhyaṃ vastu tadapekṣayā tatpramāṇam eva na prameyam, vyavasthāpakapramāṇāntarāpekṣayā tu prameyam eva na pramāṇam iti na sāṅkaryadoṣaḥ / | When a certain thing is apprehended by a Cognition, this Cognition itself does not become the ‘cognised’ in relation to itself; but in relation to the other Cognition that asserts its validity, it becomes the ‘cognised’, and is not a ‘Cognition’; hence there is no incongruity or ‘admixture’; |
yathā kāryaṃ kāraṇam iti vyapekṣābhedān na saṅkīryate // | just as one and the same thing, spoken of as ‘cause’ and ‘eSect’, in relation to different things, does not make an undue ‘admixture (2984-2985) |
evam arthakriyājñānāt pramāṇatvaviniścaye / nānavasthā parākāṅkṣāvinivṛtter iti sthitam // | Thus, it is established that the idea of validity, being ascertained through the cognition of effective action, does not involve infinite regress; as all further need has ceased. |
parākāṅkṣāvinivṛtter iti / | ‘As all further need has ceased’; |
parā anyā cāsāvākāṅkṣā ceti vigrahaḥ / parasmin vā saṃvādādanyasmin ākāṅkṣā parākāṅkṣā, tasyā vinivṛtter iti samāsaḥ / | ‘Parākāṅkṣā’ is to be treated as a Karmadhāraya compound; ‘parā’ ‘another’, ‘further’ being a qualification for ‘ākāṅkṣā’ ‘need’, Or it may be taken as Tatpuruṣa ‘need for another’ i.e. anything other than conformity to the reality; |
kiñca pramāṇamavisaṃvādijñānam ityanenārthakriyādhigamalakṣaṇaphalaprāpakahetor jñānasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam ucyate / | Further, when it is said that ‘Cognition in conformity with reality is valid’, it provides the definition (peculiar characteristic) of that Cognition which brings about the result in the shape of the Cognition of effective action. |
tataś ca phala{lā---}jñāne lakṣaṇānavatārāt, kathaṃ tasyāpi prāmaṇyamavasīyata ityasya codyasyāvakāśaḥ kathaṃ bhavet / tathāhyaṅkurasya hetur bījam iti lakṣaṇe sati aṅkurasyāpi kathaṃ bījatvam iti kiṃ viduṣāṃ praśno jāyate / | This definition is not applicable to the Cognition of the result itself; under the circumstances, how could there be any room for the objection that this Cognition also should be regarded as valid? For instance, when the Seed is defined as the cause of the Sprout, do the wise ones raise the question that the Sprout also should be regarded as the Seed? What happens in this case is that the fact of the Seed being the ‘cause of the Sprout’ is cognised only when one sees the Sprout (rising from it); |
yathā ca bījasya tadbhāvo 'ṅkuradarśanādavagamyate tathā pramāṇasyāpi tadbhāvo 'rthakriyālakṣaṇaphaladarśanāt / | in the same manner, the Cognition is cognised as ‘valid’ only when its result in the shape of effective action is perceived; |
na ca tatra phalamanyena pramāṇenāvagamyate yato 'navasthā prasajyate / | and this result is not apprehended by another Cognition; only if it did, would there be an Infinite Regress. |
jñānātmanaḥ phalasya svata eva saṃvedanāt siddheḥ / | Because the Cognition of the result, which is in the shape of Cognition, is cognised by itself (not by another Cognition); |
na ca svarūpe jñānasya bhrāntiḥ sambhavati / | and there can be no mistake or illusion in the Cognition in regard to itself; |
tadaniścaye svasaṃvedanasyaivābhāvaprasaṅgād iti yat kiñcidetat // | because if there were any uncertainty regarding it, the Cognition of itself could not come about at all. |
samutpanne 'pi vijñāne na tāvad avadhāryate / yāvat kāraṇaśuddhatvaṃ na pramāṇāntarādgatam // | “Even when the cognition has come about, its validity is not ascertained until the perfection of its source has been apprehended by another cognition [so that there is an infinite regress].” (2987) The answer of the wise ones to this is that there can be no infinite regress; |
śuddhiḥ saṃvādino jñānād anapekṣāt pratīyate // | because the said perfection of the source is apprehended by the cognition of conformity, which is not dependent upon anything else; |
sannikṛṣṭe hi viṣaye kāryasaṃvādadṛṣṭitaḥ / | as the conformity of the result is perceived when the object is near by; |
kāraṇānāṃ viśuddhatvam ayatnenaiva gamyate // | and from that follows the cognition of the perfection of the sources (of the cognition) without any effort. |
viprakṛṣṭe hi viṣaye tadudbhūtā matiḥ pramā / tajjanyatvādyathaiveyaṃ sannikṛṣṭārthagocaram // | In the case where the object is not in close proximity, the cognition arising from it must be valid, because it has been brought about by it (the perfect cause), just like the cognition apprehending the object which is in close proximity (to the observer), (2987-2990) |
[p.786] dvividhaṃ hi jñānaṃ sannikṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ viprakṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ ca / | There are two kinds of Cognition one envisaging the object near the observer, and the other envisaging the object remote from him. |
tatra yattāvat sannikṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ tasya na kāraṇaguṇāvadhāraṇāt prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / | As regards the former, its validity is ascertained, not by the recognition of the perfection of its cause, but from the Cognition of its being in conformity to effective activity. |
kiṃ tarhi arthakriyāsaṃvādivijñānāt / | As regards the Cognition envisaging remote things, its validity can be ascertained through the Cognition of the perfection of its sources; |
tathā hi na tatra guṇāvadhāraṇaṃ sambhavati yāvad arthakriyāsaṃvādāt samyaktvaṃ nāvasīyate, tataścāvasthite samyaktve paścāt kālabhāvikāraṇaguṇāvadhāraṇamakiñcitkaram eva / yat punar viprakṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tasya kāraṇaguṇaniścayāt prāmāṇyaniścaya iti darśayann āha viprakṛṣṭe hītyādi / | this is what is pointed out in the sentence ‘In the case where the object is not in close proximity, etc. etc.’ For instance, the validity of the Cognition of the golden conch-shell, which is far remote from the observer, can be ascertained only from the fact of its being brought about by it, i.e. being brought about by perfect (efficient) causes, just like the Cognition of the white conch-shell, which is near the man. This argument may be thus formulated That Cognition which has been brought about by perfect causes must be valid, e.g. the Cognition of the white conch-shell, lying near the observer; |
yadviprakṛṣṭaviṣayaṃ sauvarṇaśaṅkhagrāhijñānaṃ tasya tajjanyatvāt viśuddhakāraṇajanyatvāt, sannikṛṣṭaviṣayaśuklaśaṅkhagrāhijñānavat prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / prayogaḥ yad viśuddhakāraṇajanitaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ, yathā sannikṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ śuklaśaṅkhagrāhivijñānaṃ, viśuddhakāraṇajanitaṃ cedaṃ viprakṛṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ pītākāraśaṅkhāvabhāsi vijñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | this particular Cognition envisaging the remote object, in the shape of the yellow conch-shell, is one that has been brought by perfect causes; thus this is a reason based upon the nature of the things concerned. In regard to the conch-shell before our eyes, when it is found that the effective action resulting from its cognition is one that can be produced by the white object, it is understood that the cognition of the white conch-shell is not one produced by eyes affected by jaundice. The purity (perfection) of the cause having become thus recognised, if, at the same time, there should arise the cognition of the yellow colour in connection with the conch-shell made of gold, as that also would have been brought about by flawless causes, there would be certainty regarding the validity of that cognition, just as in that of the cognition of the white colour in connection with the white conch-shell, which has led to effective action. |
nanu cāsiddho hetuḥ / | Says the Opponent: “The Reason adduced in this argument is ‘inadmissible’; |
tathā hi kāraṇaśuddhir nārthasaṃvādamantareṇāvadhārayituṃ śakyate, atīndriyatvād indriyāṇām / | because the ‘perfection of the cause’ cannot be recognised without ‘conformity with the real state of the thing’; because the Sense-organs (which are the cause of Cognitions) are themselves beyond the reach of the senses; |
arthasaṃvādāpekṣāyāṃ ca tadeva prāmāṇyaṃ niścitam iti kāraṇaguṇāvadhāraṇamanarthakam eva syāt / | and when ‘conformity with the real state of things’ is needed, that in itself constitutes well-ascertained validity; so that the recognition of ‘the perfection of the cause’ would serve no useful purpose; |
tasya prāmāṇyaniścayottarakālabhāvitvāt / | as it would come after the validity has become ascertained. |
athāpi syād ekadā sannikṛṣṭaviṣayād vijñānād arthakriyāsaṃvādato guṇattāṃ niścityānyadā viprakṛṣṭaviṣayasyāpi jñānasya saṃvādamantareṇaiva kālāntareṇa guṇavattāyā niścitatvāt tataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayo bhaviṣyatīti / tadetad asamyak / | It might be argued that ‘At times, from the Cognition of the object close by, one would find that it is in conformity with effective action and from that he would know that the source of the Cognition has been perfect, and then he would conclude that the Cognition is valid; while at other times, in the case of the remote object, even though he may not be cognisant with the fact of its being in conformity with effective action, and yet, in course of time, he would become assured of the perfection of the source of the Cognition, and then secure certainty regarding its validity’, But this cannot be right. |
nahi kṣaṇakṣayiṇāṃ bhāvānām ekarūpaivaṃ pravṛttiḥ sambhavati / | Because things being momentary and perishable, their activity cannot be always of one and the same form; |
aparāparapratyayopayogena pratikṣaṇaṃ bhinnaśaktitvādityetat sarvamāśaṅkhyāha sitasādhyakriyāvāptyetyādi / | because, as the result of the influence of a succession of causal conditions, they would be acquiring diverse potencies.” Anticipating all this, the Author supplies the following answer: [see verses 2991-2993 above] |
kāmalākrāntanetrotthavijñānaṃ neti gamyate // itthaṃ kāraṇasaṃśuddhau praṇītāyāṃ tadeva yā / | What is meant by this is as follows: We do not mean that, in the case of the Cognition of the remote object, appearing at some other time, its validity is ascertained through the perfection of its source; |
viśuddhakāraṇotpādāt tvasyāḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / niṣpāditakriye kambau sitākāramatoriva // anenaitad āha nahyasmābhiḥ kālāntarabhāvino viprakṛṣṭaviṣayasya jñānasya kāraṇapariśuddhyā prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate, yenāsiddhatā hetor bhavet, pratikṣaṇamaparāparapratyayopayogena bhinnaśaktisambhavād iti / | if this were our opinion, then alone could our Reason be ‘inadmissible’, on account of the possibility of fresh potencies appearing under the influence of successive causal conditions; what we do mean is that, in the case of the Cognition of the white conch-shell near us, at the same time that we have the certainty regarding the flawlessness of the cause brought about by the securing of the effect due to the white colour, there appears the Cognition of the yellow colour in the golden conch-shell lying far away from us, it is concluded that as the perceptive cause has been found to be flawless, the said Cognition of the yellow colour must be valid, true. |
na vā tasyāmevāvasthāyāṃ kāraṇāntarathātvaṃ sambhavati mābhūt sannikṛṣṭārthaviṣayajñānasyārthakriyāvisaṃvāda iti // | It is not possible that the source of Cognition should have become changed at the same time; as in that case, there would be no conformity of the Cognition of the proximate object with effective action. |
kṣudādyanupaghātādivacanādidam uktavān / bhāṣyakāro 'pyato mohād anavastheha codyate // | The author of the Bhāṣya also has said the same thing by the mention of the attack of hunger, etc.; hence it is through sheer delusion that the infinite regress has been urged. |
anena pratijñāyāḥ svavacanavirodho 'pi pratipāditaḥ / | This shows that the Mīmāṃsaka’s proposition involves self-contradiction also. |
tathā hi bhāṣyakāreṇoktam yadā kṣudādibhir upahataṃ mano bhavatīndriyaṃ vā, saukṣyādibhir vā bāhyo viṣayaḥ, tato mithyājñānam, anupahateṣu samyagjñānam / | “When the Mind or the Sense-organ becomes beset with hunger, etc., or when the external object is beset with smallness, etc., then the Cognition turns out to be wrong; when they are not so beset, the Cognition is right; because the contact of the Sense-organ Mind and object is the cause of Cognition; |
indriyamano 'rthasannikarṣo hi jñānasya hetuḥ, asati tasminnajñānād gato hi doṣo mithyājñānasya hetuḥ, duṣṭeṣu hi jñānaṃ mithyā bhavati, doṣāpagame sampratipattidarśanāt / | when this contact is not present, there can be no Cognition; hence any defect in the said contact becomes the cause of wrong Cognition; when the three factors are defective, the resultant Cognition is wrong; as is clear from the fact, that on the removal of the defect, the correct Cognition is secured. |
kathaṃ duṣṭāvagama iti cetprayatnenānvicchanto na ceddoṣamavagacchema pramāṇābhāvād aduṣṭam iti manyemahīti / | If it is asked ‘how can it be known that the cause is defective?’, the answer is that, if, on careful scrutiny, no defect is discovered, then there being no ground for asserting that there is defect, we conclude that the cause is free from defect.” |
anena hi granthena bhāṣyakṛtā kāraṇaśuddhijñānāt prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ spaṣṭamākhyātaḥ / | In this passage, the Author of the Bhāṣya has clearly stated that the validity of the Cognition is ascertained from the recognition of the flawlessness of the cause. |
anyathā{pra} yatnenānvicchanta ityanena kiṃ darśitaṃ bhavet / | If this were not meant, then what would be the sense of the phrase ‘on careful scrutiny’? |
tataś ca svataḥprāmāṇyapratijñāvyāghātaḥ // | Thus this goes against the assertion that the validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient. |
yaduktam "saṃvādaguṇavijñāne kena vābhyadhike mate ' iti / | “On what grounds have the Corroborative Cognition and the Cognition of perfection been held to be superior to the initial Cognition?” |
tatra saṃvādaṃ prati pūrvam uktam, guṇajñānaṃ pratyāha duṣṭetyādi / | The answer to this, so far as the Corroborative Cognition is concerned, has been explained before; now the Author provides the answer, in regard to the Cognition of perfection: [see verse 2995 above] |
mānateti / | ‘Mānatā’ validity. |
ādyasyeti / arthajñānasya / | ‘Ādyasya’ of the Cognition of the object itself. |
taddhi kāraṇaśuddhijñānāt prathamabhāvitvād ādyam / | It is called ‘initial’ because it comes before the Cognition of the perfection of the cause. |
taditi tasmāt // | ‘Tat’ therefore. |
evam ityādinā pravṛtter adṛ{du}ṣṭatāṃ darśayati | The following Text shows the faultlessness of the activity: [see verse 2996 next] |
evaṃ cārthakriyājñānāddhetuśuddhiviniścitau / akṛtārthakriye vṛtter arthavācyopapadyate // | Thus the perfection of the cause being ascertained through the cognition of effective action, in a case where there is no effective action at all, the functioning cannot be deprecated. |
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