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svataḥprāmāṇyavāde ca svato niścayajātitaḥ / | Under the theory of ‘self-validity’, the certainty comes about from the birth of the cognition itself; |
vināśasambhavāyogāt kimarthaṃ vinivāraṇam // | hence there can be no ‘mutilation’; what then is there to be prevented? (3035) |
niścayajātitaḥ niścayotpatteḥ / | ‘Niścayajātitaḥ’ on account of certainty having come about. |
anyathā yadi svato niśceyo notpadyate tadā svataḥprāmāṇyavādo hīyeta // | Otherwise, if the certainty did not come about from the Cognition itself, then the doctrine of ‘self-validity’ would be done away with. |
na nāma dūṣyate vākyaṃ doṣair guṇanirākṛtaiḥ / | It is true that the assertion is not vitiated by the defects, which are warded off by the excellences; |
guṇāniścayatas tat tu viniścetuṃ na śakyate // | but as there can be no certainty regarding the excellences, there can be no certainty regarding the said fact (of not being vitiated). |
yadi nāma doṣair na guṇavad vākyaṃ guṇair doṣāṇāṃ nirākṛtatvāt, tathāpi parasantānavartināṃ guṇānām atīndriyatvāt tadaniścaye guṇavad vākyaṃ niścetuṃ na śakyate, nacāpi{vi---} niścitaṃ svataḥpramāṇaṃ bhavitum arhati // | It may be true that the assertion of highly qualified men is not vitiated by defects, these latter being warded off by the excellences; but even so, inasmuch as the excellences present in the ‘chain’ of other persons is beyond the reach of the senses, there can be no certainty regarding it; and in the absence of such certainty, there can be no certainty regarding the assertion of the qualified person; and what has not been duly ascertained cannot be self-sufficient in its validity. |
vākyasyākartṛkatvaṃ ca prāgeva vinivāritam / | The idea that the ‘eternal word’ is without a ‘maker’ has been already refuted; |
nātaḥ karturabhāve te{na---}na syur doṣā nirāśrayāḥ // | consequently it cannot be right that “there being no maker, there could be no defects, for which there would be no receptacle.” (3037) |
prāg eveti śruparīkṣāyām // | ‘Already’ under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’. |
guṇebhyaś ca pramāṇatvaṃ yathā yuktaṃ tathoditam / | How validity can be due to excellences has been already explained; |
guṇānāṃ cāparijñāne doṣābhāvo na lakṣyate // | and so long as the excellences are not recognised, the absence of defects cannot be perceived. |
svato vākyaṃ pramāṇaṃ taddoṣābhāvopalakṣitam / | Thus then, it cannot be right that the assertion, valid by itself, is indicated by the absence of defects; |
na yuktam aparijñānād doṣābhāvo hyalakṣaṇam / | because, not being cognised, the absence of defects cannot serve as an indicator. |
tathoditam iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3038-3039 above] |
yaccoktam svato vākyaṃ pramāṇam na doṣābhāvopalakṣitam iti, tadapyayuktam, guṇānām atīndriyatvāt tadaparijñāne doṣābhāvasya guṇabhāvātmakasya lakṣayitum aśakyatvāt / | ‘Has been explained’ under Text 2988, It has been asserted above (2890) that “the assertion, valid by itself, is indicated by the absence of defects This is not right; because excellences are beyond the reach of the senses, and when they cannot be cognised, the absence of defects also, which consists in the presence of excellences, cannot be noticed. |
etad evāha doṣābhāvo hyalakṣaṇam iti / | This is what is said in the words ‘The absence of defects cannot serve as an indicator’; |
lakṣyate 'neneti lakṣaṇam, na lakṣaṇam alakṣaṇam, upalakṣaṇaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ / | that is, it cannot serve the purpose of indicating the validity; |
aparijñātatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | because it is itself uncognised. |
nahi daṇḍāparijñāne puṃsāṃ daṇḍīti lakṣyate / | Unless people know the sticks they cannot have any idea of the stick-holder. |
tallakṣitaṃ svato mānamityetac ca parāhatam // | It has been asserted above (2890) that “the assertion, valid by itself, is indicated by the absence of defects This is not right; |
doṣābhāvaḥ pramābhāvāt pramāṇānniścitātmakaḥ / | that is, it cannot serve the purpose of indicating the validity; because it is itself uncognised. |
vākyasya lakṣaṇaṃ yuktaṃ parato 'taḥ pramāsthitiḥ // | The following Text shows that what is itself unknown cannot serve as an indicator: [see verses 3040-3041 above] |
kiñca bhavatu nāma doṣābhāvo lakṣaṇaṃ tathāpi doṣa eva, svavacanavyāghātaprasaṅgāt / | Further, absence of defects may be a qualification; but even so, the objection remains, as there is possibility of self-contradiction. |
tathā hi yadi doṣābhāvena prāmāṇyam upalakṣyate tadā spaṣṭam eva parataḥprāmāaṇyam uktaṃ syāt, tataś ca svataḥprāmāṇyamityetad vacanaṃ parāhataṃ syāt / | For instance, if Validity is indicated and qualified by the absence of defects, then it would clearly mean that Validity is extraneous; and this would go against and discard the assertion that Validity is inherent. |
etad eva spaṣṭayati doṣābhāvo yadyabhāvākhyena prāmāṇyena niścito bhavet tadāsau lakṣaṇaṃ bhavet, aniścitasya lakṣaṇatvāyogāt, anyasya cābhāvaniścāyakasya pramāṇasyābhāvāt, tataśca parato 'bhāvākhyāt prāmāṇyaṃ sphuṭataramevoktaṃ syāt // yaduktam nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ teṣu satsu na jāyate / | This same idea is further clarified in the words ‘the absence of defects can qualify, etc. etc.’ If the absence of defects is ascertained through the Means of Cognition known as ‘Non-apprehension’, then alone it could serve as a qualification (and an indicator); because what is not ascertained cannot serve as a qualification; and there is no other Means of Cognition that could bring about the certain Cognition of the absence (of defects); consequently it becomes clearly asserted that the Validity of the Cognition follows from Non-apprehension, which is something different from the Cognition itself. |
nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ teṣu satsūpajāyate / | Even when the excellences are there, the cognition of the defects of the man do appear. |
na nāma doṣābhāve tu guṇājñāne kathaṃ matiḥ // | if there is non-cognition of excellences, how can there be any cognition of the absence of defects? (3042) |
yadi nāma guṇeṣu satsu doṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ notpadyate, guṇānāṃ parasantānavartinām atīndriyatvāt tadaparijñāne sati doṣābhāvaniścayo na prāpnoti guṇabhāvātmakatvād doṣābhāvasya, nahi ghaṭaviviktapradeśāparijñāne ghaṭābhāvo jñātuṃ śakyate // | If, while the excellences are there, there can be no Cognition of the defects (of the Man), then, as the excellences, lying within the ‘chain’ of another person, and hence beyond the senses, would not be cognised, there could be no certainty regarding the absence of defects; as the ‘absence of defects’ consists in the ‘presence of excellences’; and unless there is Cognition of the place devoid of the Jar, there can be no Cognition of the absence of the Jar. |
etad eva darśayati dveṣetyādi / | The same idea is further clarified [see verse 3043 next] |
dveṣamohādayo doṣāḥ kṛpāprajñādibādhitāḥ / | Defects, in the shape of hate, delusion and the like are set aside by excellences, in the shape of kindness, wisdom and so forth; |
dayādyaniścaye teṣām asattvaṃ hi kathaṃ gatam // | consequently, if there is no certainty regarding these latter kindness, etc. How can there be any cognition of the absence of those (defects)? (3043) |
[p.796] teṣām iti / | ‘Teṣām’ ‘of those’ i.a. |
doṣāṇām // | of the Defects. |
"tadā na vyāpriyante tu jñāyamānatayā guṇāḥ / | “At the time (of the cognition of the absence of defects), the excellences do not function on being themselves cognised; |
doṣābhāve tu vijñeye sattāmātropakāriṇaḥ // | in fact, it is by mere presence that they help in the cognising of the absence, of defects”. |
" iti, etat tadetyādināśaṅkate / tadā na vyāpriyante tu jñāyamānatayā guṇāḥ / | Kumārila has argued as follows: “At the time (of the Cognition of the absence of defects) the excellences do not function on being themselves cognised; |
doṣābhāve tu vijñeye sattāmātropakāriṇaḥ // | in fact, it is by mere presence that they help in the cognising of the absence of defects”. |
upakāriṇa iti / doṣābhāvaniścayaṃ pratyupakāriṇaḥ // | ‘They help’ they help towards bringing about the certainty regarding the absence of defects. |
yadyevamityādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 3045-3046 next] |
yadyevaṃ saṃśayo na syād viparyastā matis tathā / doṣāḥ santyasya no veti santyevetyāptasammate // | If it were so, then, there would be no (a) doubt, nor (b) wrong cognition (misconception), in the case of the person recognised as ‘trustworthy’ in the shape of (a) ‘are there defects in this person or not?’, and (b) ‘there are defects in him’. |
tat saṃdehaviparyāsau bhavataścātra kasyacit / | And yet there are such doubt and wrong cognition in some men; |
yāvad guṇādhāra ityasau nāvagamyate // | until it is recognised that he is the receptacle of excellences. |
yadi sattāmātreṇa guṇā doṣābhāvaniścayāya vyāpriyeraṃs tadāptasammate puṃsi na kasyacid doṣābhāvaṃ prati saṃśayaviparyāsau prāpnutaḥ, niścayena tayor bādhitatvāt, nacaivaṃ bhavati, tat tasmād yāvadguṇavattāniścayo na jāyate tāvad doṣābhāvaviṣayau saṃśayaviparyāsau bhavata eveti na sattāmātreṇa vyāpriyante guṇāḥ // | If, in bringing about certainty regarding the absence of defects, excellences functioned by their mere presence, then in the case of the person recognised as ‘trustworthy’, no one could have any Doubt or Misconception in regard to the absence of defects; as both these will have been barred by the certainty. And yet such is not the case; so long as the certainty relating to the presence of the excellences does not come about, there certainly do appear Doubt and Misconception regarding the absence of defects. Hence it follows that the excellences are not operative by their mere presence. |
doṣābhāve 'py athājñāne svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / tathāpi vimatir na syāt pūrvavat tatra vaktari // | If there were certainty regarding the self-validity (of cognitions) even when there is no cognition of the absence of defects, then, in regard to the speaker, there could not be the ‘contrary cognition’ spoken of above (under 3045). |
athāpi syāt mā bhūd guṇānāṃ vyāpāro doṣābhāvaniścayāya, tathāpy aniścitād eva doṣābhāvāt prāmāṇyaniścayo bhaviṣyatīti. | It might bo argued that “The excellences may not be operative towards the bringing about of the certainty regarding the absence of defects; even so, from the uncertain absence of defects there would follow the certainty regarding validity”. |
etad apy ayuktam, pūrvavat tatrāptasammate vaktari vimatyabhāvaprasaṅgāt. na hi tadvākyasya svataḥprāmāṇyaniścaye sati tasmin vaktari kimayaṃ satyavādī na vā, naiva veti matir yuktā / vimatiśabdenātra saṃśayaviparyāsau vivakṣitau / | This also cannot be right; as in that case, as before, there could be no diversity of opinion in regard to the speaker recognised as ‘trustworthy Because when there is certainty regarding the self-validity of the assertion, there can be no such notions in regard to the person making that assertion, as ‘is he telling the truth or not, or is he not telling the truth at all?’ The term ‘vimati’ (contrary Cognition) here stands for Doubt and Misconception; |
viparītākārā matir vimatir iti kṛtvā saṃśayasyobhayāṃśāvalambitvena viparītākārasambhavāt // | ‘vimati’ being ‘mati’, notion, that is ‘contrary’; and as Doubt envisages both the extremes, it can be regarded as ‘contrary’. |
tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇām abhāvāt tadabhāvataḥ / | [these would be ‘contrary’] because there is the certainty that all cognitions are valid by themselves. |
ityādi, tad api doṣābhāvaniścaye saty ayuktam eveti darśayati doṣābhāvasyetyādi / doṣābhāvasya cājñānād apramādvayanāstitā / | Kumārila has again argued as follows “Thus then, from excellences follows the absence of defects, from this absence, follows the absence of the two forms of Invalid Cognition; consequently the general law remains undenied”, and so forth. |
[p.797] | [Ślokavārtika 1. |
athāpramādvayāsattāpratītāvapi gamyate / | This also cannot be right, when there is no certainty regarding the absence of defects. |
yadi hi saṃśayaviparyāsābhyām apavādabhūtābhyāṃ rahitaṃ jñānaṃ siddhyettadā tat pramāṇaṃ bhavet / | If there came about a Cognition free from the Doubt and Misconception, which are ‘contrary’ to that Cognition, then that Cognition should be valid; |
anyathāpavādasamākrānte viṣaye katham utsargo niviśeta / tayoś ca saṃśayaviparyāsayor doṣahetutvād doṣābhāvāniścaye tayor abhāvaniścayo na yujyate / | otherwise, if the matter were beset with the contrary notions, how could the general law come in at all? Because the two contrary notions, Doubt and Misconception, are effects of defects; hence there can be no certainty regarding the absence of these contrary notions, unless there is certainty regarding the absence of defects. |
apramādvayanāstiteti / saṃśayaviparyayanāstitā // | ‘The absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’ i.e. the absence of Doubt and Misconception. |
tām eva vimatiṃ darśayati kimasya vacanaṃ mānam ityādi / | The following Text points out the ‘contrary Cognition’: [see verse 3050 above] |
evaṃ doṣābhāvādīnāṃ sattāmātreṇa prāmāṇyaniścayaṃ pratyaṅgabhāvo na yukta iti pratipāditam, idānīṃ teṣu niścayāpekṣaṇe parataḥprāmāṇyamanavasthā ca prasajyata ityetad dvayaṃ vistareṇa pratipādayann āha doṣābhāvetyādi / doṣābhāvāpramābhāvaguṇabhāveṣu triṣvapi / | For the above reasons, it is absolutely necessary that there should be definite cognition of all the three factors (1) absence of defects, (2) absence of invalid cognitions and (3) presence of excellences. So far it has been explained that the absence of defects and other conditions do not, by their mere presence, help in the bringing about of the certainty regarding Validity; now the Author proceeds to explain in detail that if the certainty regarding the said Absence of Defects were essential, then (a) the validity would be extraneons, and (6) there would be an Infinite Regress: [see verse 3051 above] |
doṣābhāve apramāṇadvayābhāve guṇeṣu cāvaśyaṃ pratītiḥ niścayavyākhyābhyupagantavyā / | (1) Absence of defects, (2) absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition (Doubt and Misconception), and (3) the presence of excellences, the Cognition certainty of all these must be admitted. |
anyathā prāmāṇyaniścayāyogād iti pratipāditatvāt // | Otherwise, there could be no certainty regarding Validity, as has been explained already, (3051) |
yadi nāmābhyupagatā tataḥ kimityāha setyādi / | Question: “If the definite Cognition of these three is not admitted, what then?” |
yathārthaniścayāyāṅgamapramāṇaṃ kathaṃ bhavet // saiṣā triṣvapi yathokteṣu pratītiḥ prāmāṇyāṅgatveneṣṭā kimapramāṇamāhosvit pramāṇam iti kalpanādvayam / | In regard to all these, there would be the two possibilities is the cognition of these valid or invalid? how then what is itself invalid be a factor in the ascertainment of validity? (3052) The Cognition of the said three factors, which is regarded as a factor in Validity, is it valid or invalid? These are the two alternatives possible. |
yadyādyaḥ kalpas tadā prāmāṇyaniścayāṅgaṃ na prāpnoti svayam apramāṇatvāt / | If it is invalid, then it cannot form part of the certainty regarding validity, as it is itself invalid; |
nahyapramāṇatvena gṛhītaḥ sākṣī vyavahāre niścayāṅgaṃ bhavati // | if the witness (evidence) has been regarded as untrustworthy, he cannot help in the decision regarding the matter under dispute. |
prāmāṇye parataḥ prāpte tat prāmāṇyaviniścayaḥ / | [If the said cognition is valid, then] its certainty regarding its validity could be possible only if validity were extraneous. |
kathaṃ vā gamyate tasyāḥ pratīteḥ sā pramātmatā // bādhakapratyayābhāvād iti cetso 'pi kiṃ pramā / na veti doṣaḥ sarvo 'pi punaratrānuvartate // | How again is it ascertained that the said cognition (of the three factors) is valid? If it be said that “it is deduced from the absence of cognitions to the contrary”, then the question arises is this deduction itself valid or not? Thus all the objections urged above come back in full force. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā paratas tasya vivakṣitasya jñānasya prāmāṇyaprasṅgo 'nava [p.798] sthādoṣaś ca / | If the second alternative (put forth under 3052) is what is accepted, then the validity of the Main Cognition turns out to be extraneous; and there is Infinite Regress also. |
tāmevānavasthāṃ pratipipādayiṣuḥ san pṛcchati kathaṃ vetyādi / | In order to indicate this Infinite Regress, the Author puts the question ‘How again, etc. etc.’ |
so 'pīti / bādhakapratyayābhāvaḥ // | ‘So’pi’ i.e. the absence of the Cognition to the contrary. |
katham asau doṣo 'trāpyanuvartata ity āha prāmāṇya ityādi / | Question: “How does the same objection become applicable here also?” Answer: [see verses 3055-3056 next] |
prāmāṇye parataḥprāptā prastutasya pramāṇatā / | The validity of the cognition in question could be possible only if validity were extraneous; |
yathārthajñānahetutvamapramāṇasya vā kutaḥ // asyāpi gamyate kena prāmāṇyamiti cintyate / | how too can the invalid cognition bring about a right cognition in keeping with the reality of things? It is to be considered how the validity of this also becomes apprehended; |
bādhakapratyayāsattvādityaniṣṭā prasajyate // | it may be deduced from the absence of cognitions to the contrary and so forth; |
subodham / | This is easily comprehensible. |
asyāpīti / bādhakapratyayābhāvasya // | from this absence, there follows the absence of the two forms of invalid cognition; |
kiñca tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇām abhāva ityādinā pradarśitena nyāyena yadi sarvatra prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate tadā pūrvam eva pramāṇaṃ parato 'bhyupagataṃ syād anavasthā ca / | hence the general law remains undenied” if the validity in all cases is determined on this principle, then in the case in question also, all the aforesaid objections become applicable; and it also involves an infinite regress. Then again, if the Validity in all cases is determined in accordance with the principle propounded in the following assertion “From Excellences follows the Absence of Defects; |
apramāṇadvayāsattvaṃ tenotsargo 'napoditaḥ // | from this absence follows the absence of the two forms of Invalid Cognition; |
sarvatraivaṃ pramāṇatvaṃ niścitaṃ cedihāpyasau / pūrvodito doṣagaṇaḥ prasaktā cānavasthitiḥ // | consequently the general law remains undenied” (Ślokavārtika 1. 65), then it would mean that the very first Cognition is valid, and there would be Infinite Regress also. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3057-3058 above] |
pūrvodita iti / | ‘Aforesaid objections’. |
guṇādīnāṃ parasantānavartināmargāgdarśanasyātīndriyatvāt tadaniścaye doṣābhāvasyāpyaniścayād apramāṇadvayāsattvamapyaniścitam iti na guṇādibhyaḥprāmāṇyaṃ siddhyet, atha te sattāmātreṇopakārakās tadā vimatir na syād ityevam ādidoṣagaṇaḥ sarvatra prasajyate // | That is, Excellences and the rest lying in the ‘chain’ of other persons, they are beyond the senses of people of limited vision, Whence there can be no certainty relating to them; |
api ca tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇām abhāva ityādinā yat prāmāṇyaṃ niścayāṅgatvenoktam apramāṇadvayāsattvaṃ doṣābhāvaścetyetad dvayaṃ tat kiṃ prasajyapratiṣedhamātramiṣṭamāhosvit paryudāsātmakam iti kalpanādvayam / | this would mean that there is no certainty relating to the absence of defects also; and uncertain also is the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition; so that Validity could not be established on the basis of Excellence, etc. If these (Excellence, etc.) help in the matter by their mere presence, then there could be no Cognition to the contrary; |
prathamapakṣe doṣamāha doṣābhāva ityādi / | The assertion that “there is validity when there is absence of defects” contains a negation; |
kevalaṃ yadi kalpyeta tat siddhir naiva sambhavet // | if this negation is meant to be absolute; then it can never be proved. |
abhāvānu{du---}palambhena tat siddhir nāvakalpate / | It cannot be proved by apprehension, because it is of the nature of negation; |
anavasthitidoṣāc ca na yuktānupalambhataḥ // | nor can it be proved by non-apprehension, as that would involve an infinite regress. |
yadi prasajyapratiṣedhamātramiṣṭaṃ tadā tasya siddhir naiva sambhavet / | The following Text points out the objections against the first alternative (that it is of the nature of absolute negation): [see verses 3059-3060 above] If it is Absolute Negation that is meant, then it cannot be proved. |
tathā hi tasya [p.799] svato vā siddhir bhavet parato vā / svato 'pi siddhir bhavanti svayaṃ prakāśātmatayā vā bhavenniścayajananād vā / parato 'pi kadācid upalambhād vā bhavedanupalambhād veti pakṣāḥ / | Because would such Negation be proved by itself? or by something else? If it is proved by itself, (I) would it be due to its being of the nature of ‘self-illumination’? or (2) to the fact of its bringing about certainty? If it is proved by something else, is it proved, (3) by Apprehension? or (4) by Non-apprehension? These are the alternative views possible. |
na tāvat svataḥprakāśātmatayā siddhir yuktā, tasyāvastutvāt prakāśātmatāyāś ca vastudharmatvāt / | (1) Now, it cannot be right to assert that it is proved by itself, through its being ‘self-luminous’; because it is a non-entity, while ‘luminousness’ is the property of entities; |
jñānam eva hi prakāśātmatayā svasaṃvittyā siddhyati / | it is Cognition alone that is proved by its own apprehension, on account of its being ‘self-luminous’ by nature; |
natu vastusvabhāvaniṣedhamātralakṣaṇo 'bhāvaḥ / | not so Negation, which is of the nature of the denial of the nature of things. |
nāpi niścayajananāt svatas tasya siddhiḥ / | (2) Nor can the Negation be regarded as proved by itself, through bringing about certainty. |
sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād abhāvasya janakatvānupapatteḥ / | Because as a matter of fact, Negation is devoid of all capacity; |
janakatve vā vasturūpatvaprasaṅgāt / | hence it cannot bring about anything, If it did bring about anything, it would have to be regarded as an Entity; |
tasyānādheyātiśayatvena sahakārinirapekṣatvāt tanmātrabhāvinaḥ kāryasyāvirāmaprasaṅgāc ca / | and secondly, as it would not be possible for it to have any new peculiarity produced in it, its effect would be such as comes about from it itself, independently of all contributory causes, and hence the appearance of such an effect would be incessant. |
parato 'pyupalambhāt tasya siddhir nāvakalpata, kutaḥ, abhāvāt abhāvātmakatvāt, upalambhasya bhāvaviṣayatvāt / | (3) If the Absence be regarded as proved by something else, through Apprehension, that also is not possible; why? because it is of the nature of Negation, and there can be Apprehension only of what is a positive entity. |
nāpyanupalambhas tasya siddhir anavasthāprasaṅgāt / | (4) Nor lastly can it be right to hold the view that the Absence is proved through Non-apprehension. |
tathāhyanupalambho 'pyabhāvātmakatvāt kathaṃ siddha iti tatrāpīyaṃ svataḥ parata iti cintāvataratyeva / | Because that would involve an Infinite Regress. For instance, this Non-apprehension also being negative in character, how is it proved? By itself? Or through something else? All these questions arise here. |
na tāvat svato yathoktadoṣaprasaṅgāt / nāpi parato 'navasthādoṣāt // | It cannot be by itself, because of the objections urged above; nor can it be through something else, as that would involve an Infinite Regress. |
tāmevānavasthāṃ darśayati doṣāpramādvayāsattetyādi / | The said ‘Infinite Regress’ is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3061 next] |
doṣāpramādvayāsattā gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ / upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenetyanavasthitiḥ // | If the absence of defects and that of the two kinds of invalid cognition are proved by non-apprehension, and this absence of apprehension is proved by another non-apprehension, then there is infinite regress. |
doṣāś ca apramādvayaṃ ca tayor asatteti samāsaḥ // dvitīye 'pi paryudāsātmake doṣam āha paryudāsātmakaṃ tacced ityādi / | ‘Doṣā, etc. etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as ‘the absence of Defects, and of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition’. |
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