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tathā{hi} kṣaṇikatvaṃ buddhīnām abhyupagatam / | For instance, it has been held that Cognitions are momentary; |
yathoktaṃ bhāṣye kṣaṇikā hi sā na buddhyantarakālamavasthāsyata iti / | as said in the Bhāṣya (Śabara) “It is momentary and does not remain till the time of the appearance of another Cognition” (Sū. |
tathā na tat kṣaṇam apy āste ityādivacanāt pravacanavirodho 'pi // | and it also goes against the words of Kumārila himself, to the effect that “Cognition does not continue to exist for a single moment” (Ślokavārtika Sense-perception 55). |
sādhitakṣaṇabhaṅgaṃ hi sarvaṃ vastu savistaram / | (a) It has been demonstrated in detail that all things are in ‘perpetual flux’; |
nityaṃ ca janyate neti kāraṇāpekṣitāsya kā // | (b) As for the eternal thing, it is never produced; what need then could it have of a cause? (2926) |
nityatvābhyupagame kāraṇāpekṣitā na yukteti darśayati nityaṃ cetyādinā / | The following Text points out how the assertion of the Eternality of Cognitions is nullified by reasoning: [see verse 2926 above] If Cognition is eternal, then it cannot be right to hold that it needs a Cause; |
ataścetyādinā prayogaracanayānumānabādhāmeva darśayati / | this is pointed out in the words ‘As regards the eternal thing, etc. etc.’ It is only what is produced that needs something else as its Cause; |
ataś ca śakyate vaktuṃ svata eva na vartate / paścāt pramā svakāryeṣu nairūpyād gaganābjavat // | For these reasons, it can be asserted that by itself the cognition cannot be valid, the validity comes only later in relation to its effects, because it is featureless, like the ‘sky-lotus (2927) |
astu vetyādinābhyupagamyākṣaṇikatvaṃ pratyakṣādibādhāṃ darśayati / astu vākṣaṇikaṃ jñānaṃ svata eva pravartate / svaprāmāṇyaviniścityaiḥ cet tatkiṃ saṃśayādayaḥ // | In the following Text the author shows, through a formulated argument, that the idea of the Mīmāṃsaka is annulled by Inference- [see verse 2927 above] In the following Text, the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that Cognitions are not-momentary, and then proceeds to show that the view of the other party is annulled by facts of Sense-perception and other forms of Cognition: [see verse 2928 above]: |
yadi svata eva pramāṇaniścayaṃ janayati tadā pramāṇe saṃśayādayo na prāpnuvanti / | [verse 2928]: If the Cognition itself produces the conviction regarding its own validity, then there should be no Doubt, etc. regarding the Cognition. |
ādiśabdena viparyāsas tatpūrvako virodho viparītā pravṛttiḥ parasparāhatalakṣaṇapraṇayanaṃ visaṃvādaś ca gṛhyate / | The ‘etc.’ includes wrong cognition, as also contradictions due to it, ideas to the contrary, setting forth of self-contradictory definitions, and non-conformity. |
tataś ca saṃśayādeḥ pramāṇānantaraṃ niścayaviparīrākārasya saṃvedanāt pratyakṣata eva niścayābhāvaḥ siddho ghaṭābhāva iva tadviviktapradeśopalambhāt / tataś ca tat sadbhāvapratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣavirodhaḥ // | Thus, inasmuch as we do meet, after the Cognition, with Doubts, etc. which are contrary to the conviction of validity of the Cognition, it is clearly established by Perception itself that there is no conviction in the case; and this absence of Conviction becomes proved by Perception, exactly in the same manner as the absence of the Jar is established by the apprehension of the place devoid of the Jar. |
prāmāṇyetyādinā pratyakṣe virodham eva samarthayate / | Thus the Proposition that there is conviction regarding validity is annulled by a fact of Sense-perception. |
[p.772] | The following Text points out how there is incompatibility with Perception: [see verse 2929 next] |
prāmāṇyaniścayo yasmāt tatra tanmātrabhāvikaḥ / tasmin jāte na sandehaviparyāsāvanāspadau // | Inasmuch as certainty regarding its validity would be obtained from the cognition itself, there can be no room for doubt or wrong cognition, etc. |
tasminn iti prāmāṇyaniścaye. | ‘Tasmin’ stands for certainty regarding validity. |
on TS 2929 kasmād anāspadāv ity āha niścayetyādi / | Question: “Why should there be no room for Doubt, etc,?” Answer: [see verse 2930 next]: |
niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ / samāropaviveke hi niścayo vartate 'khilaḥ // | Inasmuch as conviction and wrong cognition are mutually destructive if wrong cognition becomes excluded, conviction remains entirely unaffected. |
etad eva kuta ity āha samāropetyadi / | Question: “Why should the two be mutually destructive?” |
niścayo hi samāropaviparītākāratvāt tadviṣayam anirākṛtya nātmasthitim āsādayati, uṣṇasparśa iva śītam iti kutas tena viṣayīkṛte viṣaye samāveśo viparyāsasya. | Answer: ‘If Wrong Cognition becomes excluded, etc, etc.’ Conviction has a form which, is the reverse of Wrong Cognition; hence it does not gain a footing until it has set aside the Wrong Cognition; just as warmth does not gain a footing until it has set aside coolness. Hence when an object has been taken up by Conviction, where could there be any room for the Wrong Cognition? (2930) |
on TS 2930 tataś cetyādinā svavacanavirodham api darśayati / | The following Text points out that the Mīmāṃsaka’s view involves self-contradiction also: [see verse 2931 next] |
tataśca codanājanyamatiprāmāṇyasiddhaye / doṣavarjitahetūtthabhāvādyuktir apārthikā // | Thus then, for establishing the validity of the cognition arising from the Veda, any such assertion as that it arises from causes free from defects and so forth, is of no use. |
hetūtthabhāvo hetūtthatvam. | ‘Hetūtthabhāva’ character of arising from causes. |
ādiśabdenānāprāptapraṇītoktijanyatvād bādhavarjanādityādi gṛhyate. tathā hi codanājanitā buddhiḥ pramāṇaṃ doṣavarjitaiḥ / | As has been declared in the following passage “The Cognition produced by the Veda is valid, (a) because it is produced by causes free from defects, like cognitions produced by the Inferential Indicative, the Words of a Trustworthy Person, and Sense-perception; |
tathānāptāpraṇītoktijanyatvād bādhavarjanāt /XX ---V codanā 185ab | also (b) because it is not the work of an untrustworthy person, and (c) because it is free from sublation” (Ślokavārtika, Sū. |
iti codanājanitāyā buddheḥ prāmāṇyasiddhaye sādhanaṃ bruvatā parataḥ sādhanāt prāmāṇyaniścaya ukto bhavati / | Consequently, for the proving of the validity of the Cognition produced by the Veda, when the Mīmāṃsaka states a reason, it becomes implied that the validity of that Cognition is due to extraneous causes; |
svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyamYY ---V codanā 47ab; PVD75b6 | and this idea is negatived by the same writer when he asserts that “the validity of all Cognitions is inherent in themselves”. |
iti ca vadatā tanniṣedhaś ceti parasparavacanavyāghātaḥ // on TS 2931---------2933 | Thus there is clear self-contradiction. The following Texts anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the Mīmāṃsaka to the above: [see verses 2932-2934 next] |
siddha ityādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate. siddhe svataḥpramāṇatve sāpavādanivāriṇī / yadīṣyate tad apy evaṃ nāśaṅkāyā asambhavāt // | If it is held that “the self-sufficiency of the validity of cognitions having been accepted as a fact, the arguments that have been set forth are only for the purpose of refuting the denial of the same”, even that cannot be right; as there can be no possibility of such denial; |
tāvad eva hi sāśaṅkā yāvan nodieti niścayaḥ / | there can be a suspicion of such denial, only so long as the firm conviction regarding the validity has not appeared; |
niścaye tūdgate tasminn aprāmāṇye kuto 'nviyam // TS 2932 yena tadvinivṛttyarthaṃ yatnaḥ sārthakatāṃ vrajet / sthāṇau niścitatādātmyo nānyathātvaṃ hi {śaṅkate} // | as soon as that conviction has appeared, whence could there be any suspicion regarding invalidity, for the removing of which your attempt could be useful? when a man has been convinced that the tall thing standing before him is a post, he no longer suspects it to be anything else. |
athāpi syād nāsmābhiś codanājanitāyāḥ dhiyaḥ prāmāṇyasiddhaye sādhanam abhidhīyate, kiṃ tarhi, yat tatra pareṇāprāmāṇyamāsaktaṃ tanniṣedhāyetyetad api na yuktam / | It might be argued that “when we put forward our arguments, it is not for proving the validity of the Cognition proceeding from the Veda; it is for refuting the invalidity that has been urged by the other party”. This also cannot be right. |
[p.773] kuta āśaṅkāyā asambhavāt / | Why? Because there can be no possibility of any suspicion of invalidity. |
uktaṃ hi "niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ" iti tat kuto niścaye samutpanne satīyam aprāmāṇyāśaṅkā / yena tannivṛttaye bhavataḥ sādhanaprayogaprayāsaḥ saphalo bhavet / | It has been declared that ‘Conviction and Doubt are mutually destructive’ (2930); so that when Conviction has come about, whence could there be any suspicion of invalidity, for the removing of which suspicion, your attempt at setting forth arguments could be fruitful? |
atra dṛṣṭāntam āha sthāṇāv ityādi / | An example is cited ‘When a man, etc. etc.’ i.e. by the observer who has become convinced of its being the post. |
anyathātvam iti / vṛkṣatvapuruṣatvādi. | ‘Any thing else’ in the shape of tree or man or some such thing. |
on TS 2934 yadyevaṃ katham aprāmāṇyāśaṅkā vinā sādhanaprayogaṃ nirvartayituṃ śakyata ity āha yadrūpetyādi / | Question: “If that is so, then how can the suspicion of invalidity be removed without setting forth arguments?” Answer: [see verse 2935 next] |
yadrūpaniścayo yasmājjāyate yatra vastuni / tadviparyayaśaṅkāyās tata eva nivartanam // | When a firm conviction has appeared in a certain form in connection with a certain thing, from a certain cause, all suspicions to the contrary are removed by that same conviction. |
yasmin rūpe niścayo yadrūpaniścayaḥ. | ‘Yadrūpaniścayaḥ’ in a certain form. |
tadrūpaviparīte svabhāve śaṅkāyā ity arthaḥ / | ‘Tadviparyaya, etc.’ the suspicion regarding that form or character. |
tata eveti / tadrūpaniścayāt // | ‘Tata eva’ from the conviction regarding the same form. |
atraiva dṛṣṭāntamāha yathā dhūmādītyādi / | An example is cited in support of this: [see verse 2936 next] |
yathā dhūmādiliṅgebhyaḥ pāvakādyastitāgatau / tannāstitvavyavacchedas tata evopapadyate // | When the existence of fire has become cognised through indicatives like smoke, the idea of the non-existence of fire becomes discarded by that same cognition. |
apramāṇetyādinopasaṃharati / | ‘The idea of its non-existence, etc. etc.’ i.e. the non-existence of the Fire. |
apramāṇyavyavacchedaḥ svata evaivam iṣyatām / | Thus then, please accept the fact that the denial of invalidity is obtained by itself; |
ato na sādhanaṃ yuktam aprāmāṇyanivṛttaye // | hence for the denial of invalidity, no arguments are needed. |
apramāṇadvayāśaṅkā yadi varteta tatra tu / prāmāṇyaniścayo na syād bhrāntyā tadviṣayīkṛteḥ // | If there were any suspicion of the two kinds of ‘invalidity’, then there would be no certainty regarding ‘validity’; since the thing in question would have formed the object of wrong cognition. |
apramāṇadvayaṃ saṃśayaviparyāsātmakam // | ‘Two kinds of Invalidity’ in the form of Doubt and Wrong cognition. |
ya ityādinā viruddhavyāptopalabdhiprasaṅgamādarśayan svavacanavirodham eva samarthayate / yaḥ sandehaviparyāsapratyayair viṣayīkṛtaḥ / sthāṇuvannahi tatrāsti tadā tadrūpaniścayaḥ // | When a thing has become the object of doubt or misconception, there can be no certainty regarding the real form of that thing as in the case of the post. In the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out ‘self-contradiction’ on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka, by showing that his view involves the incongruity of a character concomitant with the contrary: [see verse 2939 above] |
niścayaviruddhābhyāṃ saṃśayaviparyāsābhyāṃ tadviṣayīkṛtasya vastuno vyāptatvān na tatra niścayāvakāśaḥ // | Doubt and Misconception are contrary to Certainty; and when the thing has become subject to the former two, and is concomitant with it then there is no room for Certainty regarding it. |
balibhugdhūmahetūtthadoṣādipratyayair yathā / | For example, (1) the post, (2) the fire, and (3) invalidity are cognised extraneously by means of the notions of (1) the crow, (2) smoke and (3) defects in the source of the cognition. |
sthāṇutejo 'pramāṇādi parebhyo vyavasīyate // prayogaḥ ye sandehaviparyāsaviṣayīkṛtātmānas te parato 'vasātavyātmatattvāḥ, yathā sthāṇvādayaḥ, sandehaviparyāsaviṣayīkṛtātmakaṃ ca keṣāñcit prāmāṇyam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | In the following Text, the Author points out that the view of the Opponent is contrary to Inference, and also asserts the establishment of his own view: [see verse 2940 above] The argument may be formulated as follows: Things whose character has become subject to doubt and misconception can have their reality ascertained only by things extraneous to themselves, e.g. the Post; the validity of cognitions, for some people, has become the object of Doubt and Misconception; |
balibhuk ca dhūmaś ca hetūtthadoṣādayaśceti tathoktāḥ / | ‘Balibhuk’ (Crow) ‘Dhūma’ (Smoke) ‘hetūtthadoṣa’ (defects in the source) the ‘pratyaya’ notions of these; |
ebhiś ca yathākramaṃ sthāṇvādīnāṃ sambandhaḥ / | these are to be construed, respectively, with the ‘Sthāṇu’ (Post) ‘Teja’ (Fire) and ‘Aprāmāṇya’ (Invalidity). |
etena ca hetor vyāptir darśitā // | This shows the Invariable Concomitance of the Probans (with the Probandum). |
sāmprataṃ pakṣadharmopadeśenāsiddhiṃ pariharann āha yat sandehetyādi / yat sandehaviparyāsaviṣayatvaṃ gataṃ tathā / parato niścayas tasya pramāṇatvasya gamyatām // | Because validity has been definitely pound to be subject to doubt and misconception, therefore please understand that any certainty regarding it can be obtained only extraneously. The following Text shows the presence of the Probans in the ‘subject’ and thereby sets aside the defect of ‘Inadmissibility’ from the Reason: [see verse 2941 above] |
yaditi / yasmāt / | ‘Yat’ Because. |
gatam iti / | ‘Gatam’ found. |
niścitam / | Question; |
kasya, pramāṇasyeti śeṣaḥ / | “What has been so found?” Answer; Validity. |
tathā hi codanājanitāyā buddheḥ pratipāditaṃ sandehaviparyāsaviṣayatvam / | For example, it has been already shown that the cognition produced by the Veda is subject to Doubt and Misconception (i.e. it is found to be doubtful and wrong), |
tatheti / yathā sthāṇvādeḥ parato niścayaḥ / | ‘Tathā,’ as in the case of the Post, the certainty is obtained only extraneously. |
tasyetyādinā pramāṇaphalopadarśanam // | ‘Tasya, etc.’ This sets forth the conclusion resulting from the Reasoning. |
yad uktaṃ siddhe svataḥpramāṇatve sāpavādanivāraṇīti tan na yuktam āśaṅkāyā asambhavād iti pratipāditam, idānīṃ bhavatu nāmāprāmāṇyāśaṅkānivṛttaye sādhanaprayogaḥ, tathāpi bhavanmatena so 'pi na yukta iti darśayann āha ayaṃ cetyādi / [2p.938] ayaṃ ca bhavatāṃ pakṣo yatra vākye naṭaḥ śrutiḥ / | Your view is that “it is only in the sentence in which the negative word is found that there is denial of something else, and in all other sentences, it is the positive denotation itself that is apprehended”; now in your assertion (under text 2348) that “the cognition produced by the Veda is valid” the negative word has not been used; hence it cannot mean the denial of invalidity. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under 2932, that “the self-sufficient validity of cognitions having been accepted as a fact, the arguments that have been set forth are only for the purpose of refuting the denial of the same”. |
tatraivānyavyavacchedaḥ svātmaivānyatra gamyate // | because, under the circumstances, there could be no doubt regarding the validity; |
codanājanitābuddhiḥ pramāṇam iti neha ca / prayogo 'sti naṭstena nāprāmāṇyanivartanam // | as has been explained, The position now taken up is that it may be granted (for the sake of argument’, that the arguments have been adduced for the purpose of removing the suspicion of invalidity; but even so, that cannot be right, in accordance with your view. |
TS 2942 | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2942-2953 above] |
bhavatāṃ vidhiśabdārthavādinām ayaṃ pakṣaḥ yatraiva vākye naṭaḥ prayogaḥ, tatraivānyavyavacchedaḥ pratīyate, anyatra tu vidhir eveti / na cātra codanājanitetyādau sādhanavākye naṭaḥ prayogo 'sti / | The view of persons like you, who hold that the denotation of words is always positive, is as follows: “It is only when the negative word is used in a sentence, that ‘the denial of other things’ is comprehended, in all other cases it is only affirmation that is expressed”, In the sentence embodying your argument “The cognition produced by the Veda is valid, etc. etc,”, the negative word has not been used; |
tat katham anenāprāmāṇyavyavacchedaḥ pratipādyatām. | how then could it express the denial of invalidity? (2942-2943) |
kiñca sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ niścitaṃ yadi / svata eva tadā kasmān matabhedaḥ pravādinām // | Further, if the validity of all cognitions is duly recognised as being inherent in them by themselves, then why is there a difference of opinion among disputants? (2944) |
[p.775=2938,16] yadi sarvapramāṇānāṃ svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ bhavet, tadā vādināṃ prāmāṇyaviṣaye matabhedo na syāt // | If the validity of all cognitions were inherent in themselves, then there could not be a difference of opinion among the various parties, regarding this validity. |
sa eva kathaṃ siddha ity āha yenaikair ityādi. | Question: “How do yon know that there is this difference of opinion?” Answer: [see verse 2945 next] |
yenaikaiḥ svata eveti proccair niyama ucyate / | [That there is diversity of opinion is shown by the fact that] one party consisting of the ‘prācyas’ (easterners or ancients) assert definitely that “the validity of cognitions is always inherent, self-sufficient, in themselves”; |
kiñcit svato 'nyataḥ kiñcit paraiś cāniyamo mataḥ // | while others assert that in some cases, the validity is self-sufficient, while in others it is due to extraneous causes; |
ekair iti mīmāṃsakaiḥ. | ‘One party’ i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas; |
parair iti bauddhaiḥ. | ‘others’ ‘the Buddhists. |
taiḥ kiñcit svataḥpramāṇam iṣṭam, yathā svasaṃvedanapratyakṣam, yogijñānam, arthakriyājñānam, anumānamabhyāsavac ca pratyakṣam. | These others hold that some cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity; e.g. (a) the direct perception of themselves by the cognitions by the Mystics, (b) the cognition of the fruitful activity of things, (c) Inferential Cognition, (d) Repeated Perception; |
tad dhi svata eva niścīyate, abhyāsabalenāpahastitabhrāntikāraṇatvāt.AAA kiñcid anyataḥ, yathā vivādāspadībhūtaṃ codanājanitaṃ jñānam, pratyakṣaṃ cānapagatābhrāntinimittam.ZZ abhyāsārthakriyājñānayor anavāptatvāt. | this latter is definitely recognised as valid by itself as the possibility of misconception has been set aside by the repeated experience; while this is so in the case of some cognitions, in that of some others, the validity is derived from extraneous circumstances; e.g. the cognition in dispute, arising from the Veda, and also such Perception as has not had all possibility of mistake removed; |
yady evam anumānādau bhavanmatena vivādo na prāpnoti, tasya svata eva pramāṇatvāt. | [Says the Opponent] “If that is so, then, according to you, there should be no diversity of opinion in regard to Inference; as its validity is self-sufficient. |
tathā hi kecit trirūpaliṅgahetukam anumānam icchanti, kecid dvirūpaliṅgajam, kecid ekarūpaliṅgasamudbhavam. | as some people hold that Inference is brought about by the three-featured Probans; some others hold that it is brought about by the two-featured Probans; while there are others who hold that it is brought by a Probans that is one-featured. |
lakṣaṇapraṇayanaṃ cānarthakam. | Further, under this view, the setting up of the definition of things would be futile. |
tathā lokāyataṃ prati tat prāmāṇyapratipādanaṃ na kartavyam, svata eva prāmāṇyaniścayād iti samānam. | Similarly, the validity of Inference should not be expounded and justified as against the Materialist; because here also, the validity is self-sufficient”. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ, yato 'numānasya tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhaliṅganiścayād utpatter antareṇāpy arthakriyāsaṃvādaṃ pāramparyeṇa tathāvidhavastupratibaddhajanmatayād tadarthāvyabhicāritvaṃ niścitam iti svataḥprāmāṇyam ucyate. | Answer: This does not affect our position; because when we assert the self-validity of Inference, what we mean is as follows: As a matter of fact, Inference proceeds from the definite cognition of the Probans which is invariably concomitant (with the Probandum) through sameness or causation, and then even without confirmation by subsequent fruitful action, it has been ascertained that it is indirectly produced by the Probans as invariably concomitant with the said Probandum and hence never non-concomitant with it. |
tadutpattihetuliṅgasvarūpāparijñānād vādino 'trānutpanna evānumāne parasparaṃ vipravadante, tadūtpanne, tat svarūpādiniścayāt. | When the disputants quarrel in this matter, it is before the Inference has appeared, and the reason for this quarrel lies in their ignorance of the nature of the Probans which is related (to the Probandum) by the causal relation; |
ata evācāryās tadutpattihetuliṅgasvarūpavyutpādanam eva kurvanti lakṣaṇe. | It is for this reason that what the Teachers do, when putting forward the definition of things, is to explain the nature of the Probans related by the causal relation. |
kathaṃ hi nāma viparītaliṅgasvarūpāvadhāraṇād anumānotpattir bhaviṣyatīti. | How could any Inference come about from the cognition of a Probans other than the one mentioned? |
yadapi lokāyataṃ praty anumānasya prāmāṇyapratipādanaṃ na kartavyam iti codyate, tad apy ayuktam. | As regards the argument of the Opponent that “there should be no arguments addressed to the Materialist, for proving the validity of Inference”; it is not right; |
na hy asmābhir anumānasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate, kiṃ tarhi vyavahāraḥ. | because what we are seeking to prove is not the validity of Inference, but its me. |
tathā hi mithyārthaśāstraśravaṇād vyāmūḍho lokāyataḥ siddhe 'py anumānasya prāmāṇye sāṅkyavan na tadvyavahāraṃ pravartayati, tasya viṣayopadarśanena viṣayī vyavahāraḥ sādhyate. | This we do because, even when the validity of Inference has been proved, the Materialist, deluded by listening to the false teachings of Economic Science (Philosophy of Property), does not make use of it, as the Sāṃkhyas do; hence by showing to him the subject-matter of Inference, we seek to demonstrate to him the me of it; |
yad yata utpannam, tat tatprāpaṇaśaktiyuktam, yathā pratyakṣaṃ svārthasya. | by pointing out to him that when one thing is produced by another, the latter is endowed with the capacity to bring about the former; |
anumeyād utpannaṃ cedaṃ tatpratibaddhaliṅgadarśanadvārāyātaṃ liṅgijñānam ity evaṃ saṅketaviṣayakathanena samaye pravartanāt. | as is found in the case of Perception and its object; and the cognition of the ‘Subject’ as containing the Probandum has been brought about by the perception of the Probans as invariably concomitant with the Probandum; |
tathā hi pratyakṣe 'rthāvyabhicāranibandhana evānena prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ. | and by explaining to the Materialist all these conventions, we induce him to make use of Inference. |
yathoktam arthasyāsambhave 'bhāvāt pratyakṣe [p.776] 'pi pramāṇatā / | Because in regard to Perception, he has used it as valid only on account of finding that it is not incompatible with the real state of things; |
na ca codanājanitāyā buddheḥ prāmāṇyaṃ siddham, yenātrāpy anumānavat prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥ sādhyata iti syāt, tatra pratibandhāsiddheḥ prāmāṇyasyaiva sādhyatvād iti na samānam. syād etat bhavatu nāma matabhedaḥ, sa kasmāt svataḥprāmāṇye sati na yujyata ity āha vivādo bhrāntita ityādi. | and what ‘non-incompatibility’ could be there except that one should be produced by the other (as in the case of the Probans based upon causal relation)? This has been thus declared ‘The validity of Sense-perception is proved by the fact that it does not appear when its object is not there; and as regards the causal character of that which is invariably concomitant, both the conditions are equally present in it’. |
vivādo bhrāntito yasmāt sā ca niścayabādhitā / | Dispute always arises from misconception, and such misconception is rendered impossible by the certainty of conviction; |
niścinvantas tatastatvaṃ vivaderan na vādinaḥ // | hence when the various parties would have ascertained the truth (regarding the self-validity of cognitions), they would never quarrel among themselves. |
TS 2945 | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2946 above] |
anena vivādasya niścayaviruddhabhrāntikāryasyopalambhān niścayābhāvasiddhim ādarśayann anumānaviruddhatvaṃ svataḥprāmāṇyapratijñāyā darśayati. aparam api niścayaviruddhakāryopalambhamādarśayati svata ityādi. | What is meant by this is that Dispute is always the effect of Misconception, which is always contrary to firm Conviction, so that when there is Dispute, on any point, it follows that there is no firm Conviction; consequently, the Proposition that “the validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient” is contrary to Inference. |
svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyasya viniścaye / na visaṃvādabhākvacid bhaved niścayavṛttitaḥ // | If there were a firm conviction regarding the self-validity of all cognitions, then, by virtue of this same conviction, no one could hold a different opinion. |
apramāṇe pramāṇatvabuddhyā vṛtto hi vañcyate / | when a man accepts the invalid as valid, he becomes deceived. |
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