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yadyevaṃ prathame 'pi jñāne bādhāśaṅkā na prāpnoti, tataś ca sarvajñāne 'pi prāmāṇyaprasaṅga ityāśaṅkyāha yāvānetyādi / | Objection: “If that is so, then there should be no suspicion of sublation regarding the first Cognition also; and thus there should be validity of all Cognitions”. |
[p.761] | Answer: [see verses 2874-2875 next] |
kadācit syād apītyevaṃ na bhūyastatra vastuni / utprekṣamāṇaiḥ sthātavyaṃ nātmakāmaiḥ pramātṛbhiḥ // | “When in regard to a cognition, a certain sublation is possible, and on being sought for, is not found, then in regard to that cognition [it has to be concluded that its sublater does not exist]; |
kadācitsyādapītyevaṃ na bhūyastatra vastuni / utprekśamāṇaiḥ sthātavyaṃ nātma{pta---}kāmaiḥpramātṛbhiḥ //2875 // | and in regard to such a thing, investigators desiring their own welfare should not take their stand upon imagining that such sublation might appear at some time.” (2874-2875) |
yatra yasyāṃ matau yāvānevāpavādaḥ sambhāvyate, tāvatyevāpavāde 'nviṣṭe 'nupajāte ca, tadātmani tatra matau, sa nāstītyeva gamyata ityadhyāhāryam // kutra kriyānapavādaḥ sambhāvyata ityetad darśayann āha deśetyādi / | ‘Yatra’ in regard to a certain Cognition, if a certain sublation is likely; but on being sought for, it is not found to appear, then, in regard to that Cognition, ‘it should be concluded that the sublater does not exist’ this has to he taken as understood. Question: “How much of sublation is possible and in regard to which Cognition?” Answer: [see verse 2876 next] |
deśakālanarāvasthābhedāḥ saṃvyavahārataḥ / | “Place, time, man and circumstances, diversities of these are met with in actual experience; |
siddhā eva hi ye yasmiṃste 'pekṣyā bādhakārthinā // | hence when one is seeking for sublation, he should seek for them in these.” (2876) |
deśaś ca kālaś ca naraścāvasthā ceti tathoktāḥ, tāsāṃ bhedā iti samāsaḥ // | The compound ‘Deśa, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘Diversities’ of ‘Place, Time, Man, and Circumstances (2876) |
ete ca deśādibhedāḥ kasyacideva kecid bādhakā natu sarve sarvasya tena na sarvatra sarveṣām āśaṅkā kāryetyetad darśayann āha dūradeśetyādi / | The following Texts proceed to point out that of these diversities of Place, Time, etc. only some are sublaters of a certain Cognition, not all of all Cognitions; hence all should not be suspected in regard to all Cognitions: [see verses 2877-2878 above] |
dūradeśavyavasthānād asamyagdarśane bhavet / | ‘Suspicion, etc.’ of the thing being Water; |
anyāśaṅkāṃ kvacit tatra samīpagatimātrakam // | ‘in some cases,’ in the case of such things as the Mirage. |
apavādāvadhiḥ kālanarāvasthāntare na tu / | and in such a case, the sublation should not be expected or sought for, in regard to Time and the other factors; |
vyapekṣā vidyate tasmin mṛgatṛṣṇādibuddhivat // anyāśaṅketi / anyasya jalāder āśaṅkā anyāśaṅkā / kvacid iti / | because these latter could not be the source of misconception. An instance is cited ‘As for example, etc. etc.’ ‘Cognition of the Mirage’ i.e. the cognition, in regard to the Mirage, that it is Water. |
marīcikādau / samīpagatimātrakam iti apavādāvadhir iti sambandhaḥ / | ‘Etcetera’ includes such notions as that of ‘largeness’, in regard to what is small, and the notion of ‘smallness’ in regard to what is large, this being due to distance; |
etad uktaṃ bhavati / | and other similar notions. |
nahi tatra samīpagatānāṃ kālādyapekṣā sambhavati / | In these cases, there can be no need for investigation of Time and other factors. |
evaṃ kālādiṣvapi / | Similarly in regard to misconceptions due to Time, etc. |
yatra yasyaiva bhrāntinimittatvaṃ sambhavati tasyaivāpekṣā kāryā nānyasyetyetad udāharaṇena darśayati // | whenever there is possibility of a certain factor being the source of error, the enquiry should proceed in regard to that factor only; and not in regard to any other factor. This is what is meant to be shown by means of the example cited. |
tatra kālaviśeṣamadhikṛtyāha evaṃ santamasa ityādi / | The same idea is expressed in regard to particular points of Time: [see verse 2879 next] |
evaṃ santamase kāle yo gavāśvādisaṃśayaḥ / bhrānter vā nirṇayas tatra prakāśībhavanāvadhiḥ // | “Similarly when at a time of dense darkness, there are doubts regarding the animal seen being a cow or a horse, followed by the ascertainment of the truth, the limit of all this consists in the appearance of light.” (2879) |
saṅgataṃ tamo yasmin kale sa tathoktaḥ // | ‘Santamasakāla’ is time when there is deep and dense darkness. |
[p.762] naraviśeṣamadhikṛtyāha tathetyādi / tathā hi candradigmohavedavarṇasvarādiṣu / puruṣāntarasampraśnād anyathātvāvadhāraṇam // | The same idea is expressed in regard to particular men: [see verse 2880 next] “Similarly, in regard to the moon, the misconception of the directions, and the letters and accents of the Veda, and such things, that the truth is otherwise is ascertained by enquiries from other persons.” (2880) |
taimirikādīnāṃ dvicandrādijñāneṣu puruṣāntaraparipraśnādevānyathātvan iścaye bhavati, na tatra kālādyapekṣā // | When a man thinks that he is seeing two moons, or has similar delusions, that the truth is otherwise is ascertained by putting questions to other men; and in that there is no dependence on Time and other factors. |
avasthābhedamadhikṛtyāha rāgadveṣetyādi / rāgadveṣamadonmādakṣuttṛṣṇādikṣatendriyaiḥ / durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe tadabhāvād viparyayaḥ // | “When persons having their perceptive organs deranged by love, hate, intoxication, madness, hunger, thirst and the like, come to cognise things that are cognisable with difficulty, the contrary conclusion is ascertained after the cessation of the said derangement.” (2881) |
tadabhāvād iti / rāgādyavasthāyā abhāvāt // | ‘Tadabhāvāt’ by the cessation of the circumstances created by Love, Hate, etc. |
ṛṇādivyavahāre 'pi dvayor vivadamānayoḥ / ekaṃ pratyarthino vākyaṃ dve vākye pūrvavādinaḥ // | “In transactions relating to debt and other heads, when there is a dispute between two disputants, there is one statement by the dependant and two by the plaintiff; |
anavasthābhayād eva na vākyaṃ likhyate 'dhikam / | and it is for avoiding an infinite regress that no further statements are recorded; |
evaṃ jñānatrayasyaiva sarvatra vikriyeṣyate / | Thus, in all cases, there is a following up of three cognitions only; |
trisatyatāpi devānām ata evābhidhīyate // | and it is for this same reason that the deities are called ‘trisatya’ (three-truth). |
tena svataḥpramāṇatve nānavasthobhayor api / | Thus then, if the validity of cognitions is inherent in them, there is no infinite regress; |
pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve yathāyogamataḥ sthite // | and the validity and invalidity remain as they happen to be in reality.” (2882-2885) |
kiñca yadi nāma pratyakṣādeḥ parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ siddhyati na tu śābdasya, tathāpyasmat pakṣasiddhireva / | “Then again, if it be proved that the validity of Sense-perception and other Pramāṇas is due to extraneous causes, the same is not the case with Verbal Cognition, even so our position becomes established. |
tathā{hi---} sarvo 'yamārambhaścodanāyāḥ prāmāṇyapratipādanaphalaḥ, śābdasya ca pramāṇasya svataḥprāmāṇye siddhe siddham eva codanāyāḥ prāmāṇyamiti kimasmākam anyeṣāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyaprasiddhaye prayāseneti manyamānaḥ śābdasya pramāṇasya svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayannāha nityam ityādi / | Because the whole of this effort of ours is meant for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the Vedic Injunction; so that when it is proved that the validity of the Verbal Cognition is inherent, self-sufficient, the reliability of the Vedic Injunction becomes automatically established; what need there is then for our trying to prove the self-sufficient validity of the other forms of Cognition?” With the above idea in his mind, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to prove the self-sufficient validity of Verbal Cognition: [see verses 2886-2888 next] |
nityamāptapraṇītaṃ vā vākyaṃ yaccāvadhāryate / śrotruccārayitṛbhyāṃ tan na manāgapi dūṣyate // | “That word which is definitely known to be eternal, or uttered by a trustworthy person, is never vitiated by the hearer or the speaker; |
ye vidyāguravas tatra sahādhyāyina eva ca / | because teachers and fellow-students help to prevent mutilations thereof and are fully competent to preserve such assertions. |
ato guṇaniṣiddhair vā doṣair vākyaṃ na dṛṣyate / yadvā karturabhāve te na syur doṣā nirāśrayāḥ // | Consequently, the assertion does not become vitiated by the defects which are warded off by the excellences (of the teacher, etc.). Or, when there is no pronouncer or ‘maker’ of the word or assertion, there can be no defects, as there would be no substratum for these.” (2886-2888) |
dvividhaṃ hi śābdaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam, nityavākyajanitaṃ āptapraṇītavākyahetukaṃ ca / | Two kinds of Verbal Cognition are reliable, valid that produced by the eternal Word, and that produced by the words uttered by a trustworthy person. |
tatraitasmin dvividhe 'pi kāraṇasyāduṣṭatvaṃ pratipādayati / | That in both of these the cause or source is faultless is pointed out by the present text. |
tathā hi yattāvannityaṃ vākyaṃ tasya śrotṛvaktṛkṛto na doṣaḥ sambhavati / | In that Word or Sentence which is eternal, there can be no defects relating to the Speaker or the Hearer; |
nityaṃ vidyāgurubhir adhyāpakair adhyetṛbhiś ca pālyamānatvāt / | because such words and sentences are always preserved by Teachers and Students. |
yadapyāptoktam, tatra guṇaiḥ kṛpādibhir doṣāṇāṃ niṣiddhatvāt / prakārāntareṇa nityasya vākyasyāduṣṭatvaṃ pratipādayann āha yadvetyādi / | That Word or Sentence which is uttered by a reliable Person, there also the presence of defects is rendered impossible by the presence in him of such excellences as those of Compassion and the like. The faultlessness of the eternal Word is proved in another way also: |
doṣā hi rāgādayaḥ puruṣadharmatvāt kartāramevāśritāḥ / | ‘Or when there is no maker of the Word, etc. etc.’ Defects, such as Love and Hate, etc. are properties of men; |
tadānāśritatvaprasaṅgāt / | and as such they could reside only in the Maker; |
nanu cāptavākyasya guṇair doṣāṇāṃ nirākaraṇāt prāmāṇyābhyupagame guṇebhyaḥ prāmāṇyamabhyupagataṃ syāt, tataścāvasthādoṣo 'trāpi sambhavedityāśaṅkyāha tatretyādi / | hence, when there is no substratum, in the shape of the Maker, how could they affect the words that have not emanated from a personal source? If they did, they would be without a substratum; because it is an essential feature of the subsistent that it must follow in the wake of the substratum. |
tatrāptokter dvayaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ doṣābhāvaguṇātmakam / | “In the case of the words of the trustworthy person, two facts have been perceived: (1) that there are no defects, and (2) that there are excellences; |
guṇebhyaś ca pramāṇatvaṃ yathā nāsti tathoditam // guṇavattvādato vaktur na doṣās tannirākṛtāḥ / | that validity is not due to the excellences has already been explained before; and on account of these excellences in the speaker, there can be no defects in him, these being discarded by the excellences. |
svato vākyaṃ pramāṇaṃ ca doṣābhāvopalakṣitam // | tThus the validity belongs to the word itself, and is indicated by the absence of the defects.” (2889-2890) |
doṣābhāvaguṇāvātmā svabhāvo yasya dvayasya tat tathoktam / tathoditam iti evaṃ yadi guṇādhīnā pratyakṣādipramāṇatetyādinā / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2889-2890 above] ‘Doṣābhāva, etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as the ‘dvaya’ ‘two’ which has for its ‘ātmā’, nature, consisting in the absence of defects and the presence of excellences. |
tannirākṛtā iti guṇanirākṛtāḥ / | ‘Discarded by them’ i.e. by the excellences. |
doṣābhāvopalakṣitam iti doṣarahitaguṇānāṃ doṣaniṣedhamātra eva vyāpāro na prāmāṇyādhāna ityabhiprāyaḥ // | ‘Indicated by the absence of defects’; what is meant is that the function of the excellences free from defects consists only in the setting aside of the Defects, and not in creating validity. |
nanu ca doṣābhāvaniścayāt prāmāṇye 'bhyupagamyamāne 'pyanavasthaiveti paramatamāśaṅkayann āha doṣābhāva ityādi / doṣābhāvo guṇebhyaścedāptavākyeṣu gamyate / | If the absence of defects in the words of the trustworthy person is deduced from his excellences, then there is the same infinite regress, for one who would follow up this presence of excellences. Says the Opponent: If Validity is held to be due to the certainty of the absence of defects, then too, the Infinite Regress remains. |
tathā hi doṣābhāvo guṇaparijñānānniśceyaḥ, guṇaparijñānasya ca punar api doṣābhāvāt prāmāṇyam avaseyam, tatrāpi doṣābhāvo guṇebhyaḥ parijñeyaḥ, punas tatrāpyevam ityevaṃ saiva sarvavyavasthālopinyanavasthā tadavasthā // | According to the view detailed above, the absence of defects is to be deduced from the cognition of the excellences; the validity of this cognition of excellences again is to be deduced from the absence of defects; this absence of defects again is to be deduced from excellences; and so on and on; there would be the same Infinite Regress, which would obliterate all usages and distinctions. |
[p.764] naiṣa doṣa ityādinā pratividhatte / | This is answered (by the Mīmāṃsaka) in the following: [see verses 2892-2893 next] |
naiṣa doṣo guṇajñānaṃ tadā naiva hyapekṣyate / jñāyamānatayā naiva guṇāstatropakāriṇaḥ // | “This does not affect us. The cognition of the excellences is not needed at the time. it is not as cognised that the excellences are operative in the matter; |
sattāmātreṇa te sarve doṣavyāvartanakṣamāḥ / | by their sheer presence they are competent to set aside the defects; |
nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ teṣu satsu na jāyate // | and while they are there, there does not appear any cognition of the defects of the man.” (2892-2893) |
teṣu satsviti / | ‘While they are there’; |
guṇeṣu // | i.e. while the excellences are there. |
yadi nāma na jāyate tataḥ kimityata āha doṣaiśceti / | Question: If the cognition of the defects of man does not appear what then? Answer: [see verse 2894 next] |
doṣaiścājñāyamānatvān na prāmāṇyamapodyate / | “Because the defects are not cognised, therefore they do not set aside the validity; |
anapoditasiddhaṃ ca tadihāpi svataḥ sthitam // | not being set aside, it becomes established by itself here also.” (2894) |
na prāmāṇyamapodyata iti sambandhaḥ / | ‘The validity is not set aside’ such is the construction. |
kasmāt ajñāyamānatvāt guṇaniṣiddhatvād doṣāṇām abhāvādevājñāyamānatvam / | Question: Why is it not set aside? Answer: ‘Because they are not cognised’; the defects are discarded by the excellences, hence being non-existent, they are naturally ‘not cognised |
anapoditasiddhaṃ ceti anapoditatvāt siddham utsargasyāpavādavirahe nisargasiddhatvāt / | ‘Not being set aside, etc.’ established, because not set aside. When there is no exception to a general rule, it becomes automatically established. |
ihāpīti / | This is what is indicated by ‘api’. |
āptavākye na kevalam apauruṣeya ityapiśabdaḥ // | “In the case of words emanating from personalities, there is always room for doubt whether there are defects or not. |
nanu ca yadi nāma kvacit pauruṣeye vākye doṣā na jñāyante tathāpi sambhāvyanta eva teṣāṃ tadāśritatvāt / | Says the Opponent If, in the case of certain words emanating from a personality, no defects are found, even so they are suspected; because they always subsist in such words. |
tataś ca yathā guṇāḥ sattāmātreṇa doṣavyāvartanakṣamās tathā doṣā api guṇavyāvartanasamarthā iti tat kimucyate doṣaiścājñāyamānatvān na prāmāṇyamapodyata iti, etad āśaṅkyāha doṣāḥ santītyādi / | So that, just as the excellences, by their sheer presence, are capable of setting aside the defects, so the defects also may be capable of setting aside the excellences; why then should it be said that ‘not being cognised, the Defects do not set aside the validity?’ The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2895-2896 above] |
doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeye tu śaṅkyate / | The idea is as follows: “It is not necessary for us to prove the validity of the human assertion; |
vede karturabhāvāc ca doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ // | in fact, all this effort of ours is meant for proving the authority of the Veda; |
ato yadanapekṣatvād vede prāmāṇyamucyate / tadāptena praṇīte 'pi sutarāṃ siddhyati svataḥ // | so that, if the human assertion turns out to be invalid and unreliable, that does no harm to the Veda; as its validity is proved by the absence of defects; |
evaṃ manyate / | this is what is meant by the phrase ‘on the ground of its being independent and self-sufficient’. |
yathoktaṃ bhāṣye "tasmāt pramāṇam anapekṣatvāt / | This has been thus asserted in the Bhāṣya (Śabara) ‘Hence the Veda is authoritative and reliable, because it is not dependent upon anything else; |
naivaṃ sati pratyayāntaramapekṣitavyaṃ puruṣāntaraṃ vā svayam pratyayo hyasā"viti // | such being the case, there can be no need for another cognition or another Person; because the Veda is self-sufficient in its validity’ (Sū. |
api ca kiṃ pramāṇāntaraparicchinne 'rthe pravṛttiriṣṭā, āhosvinneti pakṣadvayam, [p.765] tatra yadi tāvanneṣṭeti dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā vedasya svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ siddham iti darśayati vedārtha iti / | Then again, is it meant that the Veda operates upon things apprehended by other Means of Cognition? Or is it not so meant? These are the two alternatives possible. If it is the second view that is accepted that the Veda is not operative on things apprehended by other Means, then that fact alone proves the self-sufficient validity of the Veda. |
tayaivāsya pramāṇatvam anuvādatvam anyathā // | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2897 above] |
vedārthaḥ agnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādiḥ / | e.g. that ‘Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra’, and so forth. |
anyapramāṇair iti / | ‘Other means of cognition’; |
vedād anyaiḥ pratyakṣādibhiḥ saṅgatirekaviṣayatayā sambandhaḥ, tat pratiṣedho 'saṅgatiḥ / | ‘Means of Cognition other than the Veda’ are Sense-perception and the rest; the ‘bearing’ of these consists in their having these same for their objective; |
tayaiveti / asaṅgatyā asyeti / | ‘The fact’ i.e. the fact that they have no bearing. |
vedasya / | ‘Asya’ of the Veda. |
atha pravṛttiriṣṭeti pakṣas tadā gṛhītagrāhitvād uttarakālabhāvino jñānasya na prāmāṇyaṃ prāpnotīti darśayann āha anuvādatvamanyatheti / anyathā yadyanyair api pramāṇair avagate 'rthe pramāṇasya pravṛttir iṣyate tadā tasyānyaprakāśitārthaprakāśakatvād anuvādatvam iti smṛtyādivad aprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ / | If the other alternative view is accepted, that the Veda envisages only those things that are apprehended by the other Means of Cognition, then, one cognition (that produced by the Veda or that produced by other Means) would be apprehending what has been already apprehended by other Means; consequently the later of the two would become invalid. This is what is pointed out by the words ‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’; ‘otherwise’, i.e. if it is held that the Veda as a means of Cognition is operative on what is also apprehended by other Means of Cognition, then, as it would be envisaging only what has been already apprehended by other means, it would be as invalid as Remembrance. |
tasmād yatpramāṇaṃ na tat pramāṇāntarasaṅgatimapekṣata iti sarvasyaiva pramāṇasya svataḥprāmāṇyaṃ prasidham iti bhāvaḥ // | Thus what is itself a valid Cognition cannot need the corroboration of other cognitions; hence it becomes established that all Cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity. |
etad eva darśayati anyasyāpītyādi / | The same idea is further elucidated [see verse 2898 next] |
anyasyāpi pramāṇatve saṅgatir naiva kāraṇam / | “Such corroboration (by other means of cognition) does not form the basis of the validity of other cognitions also; |
tulyārthānāṃ vikalpena hyekasyaiva pramāṇatā // | because among cognitions envisaging the same thing, there can be only option, which means that validity can belong to only one of them.” (2898) |
vedād anyasyāpi pratyakṣādeḥ / | ‘Other Means of Cognitions’, i.e. the Means of Cognition other than the Veda, i.e. Sense-perception and the rest. |
tulyārthānām iti / ekaviṣayapravṛttānām / | ‘Tulyārthānām’ bearing upon one and the same thing. |
ekasyaiveti / prathamasya / | ‘To only one’ the one appearing first of all; |
anyeṣām anuvādatvāt / | the other being only reiterative. |
naca tebhya uttarakālabhāvibhyaḥ pratyayebhyaḥ prathamasya prāmāṇyaṃ yuktaṃ teṣāṃ gṛhītaviṣayatvena svayam evāpramāṇatvāt // | The validity of this first Cognition cannot be due to the other subsequent cognitions; because these latter are themselves invalid, inasmuch as they apprehend what has been already apprehended. |
nanu ca dṛśyata eva santamasādipradeśe prathamajñānagṛhītasyāpyarthasyottarottarataḥ pramāṇāt paricchedaḥ spaṣṭālokavasthāyām ityāśaṅkyāha yatrāpītyādi / yatrāpi syāt paricchedaḥ pramāṇair uttaraiḥ punaḥ / | “Even in a case where the thing is definitely apprehended by the later cognitions, the thing has not been clearly and definitely apprehended by the first cognition.” (2899) Says the Opponent In places where there is dense darkness, it is actually seen that a thing that has been apprehended (vaguely) by the first cognition is again apprehended (and defined) by later cognitions appearing after the appearance of light. |
pūrvasya jñānasyānavadhṛtārthatvād aprāmāṇyam eveti bhāvaḥ // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2899 above] What is meant is that the first cognition, being uncertain and vague, cannot be valid. |
apica yadi pramāṇāntarasaṅgatyā prāmāṇyamevaṃ sati sakṛjjātavinaṣṭārthaviṣayasya jñānasya śrotradhiyaś ca prāmāṇyaṃ na prāpnoti tadviṣaye pramāṇāntarāpravṛtter iti darśayati sakṛdityādi / sakṛjjātavinaṣṭe ca bhavennārthe pramāṇatā / | No validity could belong to the cognition of a thing that is destroyed immediately on being born, or to auditory perception, because these would not be corroborated by the eye and other means of cognition. Further, if the validity of a Cognition were due to corroboration by other Cognitions, then no validity could belong to the Cognition of a thing that has been born and immediately destroyed, or to the auditory perception; as no other cognition could operate upon them. |
[p.766] netrādibhir asaṅgateti / ekaviṣayatvenāsambandhāt / | ‘Not corroborated, etc. etc.’ i.e. not related to one another by the relation based upon the sameness of their object. |
prayogaḥ yat pramāṇāntarasaṅgatinirapekṣaṃ tatsvata eva pramāṇam, yathā śrotrajñānaṃ sakṛjjātaṃ vinaṣṭaviṣayaṃ ca vijñānam, pramāṇāntarasaṅgatinirapekṣaṃ ca vedārthaviṣayaṃ jñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The argument may be formulated thus: That which does not need corroboration by other cognitions must be regarded as self-sufficient in its validity; e.g. the auditory cognition produced once, and the cognition of what has been destroyed; the cognition of what is asserted in the Veda does not need corroboration by other cognitions; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
śrotrajñānāntareṇāsyāḥ sambandhāccet pramāṇatā / siddhā vede 'pi tajjanyavijñānāntarasaṅgateḥ // | “If it be urged that ‘the validity of the auditory cognition would be due to its connection with another auditory cognition’, then of the Veda also, the validity may be due to the corroboration of another cognition brought about by the Veda. |
sādhanāntarajanyā tu buddhir nāsti dvayor api / | In both oases, the (corroborative) cognition is not produced by other means; |
hetvantarakṛtajñānasaṃvādo 'to na vāñchyate // | hence they do not need corroboration by cognitions produced by other causes.” (2901-2902) |
tathā hyekasminnapi śabde babhubhiḥ śrūyamāṇe śrotrajñānāntarapravṛtter asyāḥ śrotradhiyaḥ pramāṇāntarasaṅgatyapekṣayā samyaktvam avasīyate / siddhā vede 'pītyādinā pratividhatte tajjanyavijñānāntarasaṅgater iti / | When the same sound is heard by several men, another auditory cognition does become operative (upon the same object); hence it is through the corroboration of this other auditory organ that the validity of the first cognition is ascertained. The answer to this is provided by the words ‘Of the Veda also, etc. etc.’ ‘Due to corroboration by another cognition brought about by the Veda’; |
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