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tathāhyaprāmāṇyam api viparītārthaparicchedotpādikā śaktiḥ / | for instance, Invalidity also consists in the capacity productive of the wrong apprehension of things; |
śakteś ca vijñānāśritāyāḥ kālatraye 'pyakaraṇāt prāmāṇyavad aprāmāṇyātmikā śaktiḥ svata eva prasajyeta / | so that, as in the case of Validity so in that of Invalidity also, the Capacity consisting of this Invalidity should be inherent in the Cognition. |
kiñca yadi kālatraye 'pi jñānasya śaktir na prādurbhavati, tadā sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṃ vijñānaṃ prāpnoti / | Further, if at any time, the Capacity of the cognition does not come into existence, then the Cognition becomes devoid of all Capacity. |
yasya hi yo dharmaḥ kālatraye 'pi na saṃjāyate, sa kathaṃ tasya sambhavet, yathākāśasya mūrttatvam / | When a certain property is not produced in it at any time, how can that property belong to it? For instance, corporeality can never belong to Ākāśa. |
kuto vā śaktibhir idamatyadbhutamindrajālaṃ śikṣitam, yenaitā vijñānasya kālatrayepyasamāsāditasambhavā api satyastena saha saṅgatimanubhavantīti / kimapyetan mahadbhūtaṃ nityatvād anubhavantīti cet / | Where, too, have the Capacities learnt this wonderful magic whereby, even though never produced in the Cognition at any time, they enjoy association with it? It might be said that “They enjoy some wonderful substance by reason of their eternality”. |
na / | But that is not possible; |
sarvasya śaktiyogitāprasaṅgāt / | because in that way everything would be endowed with such Capacities; |
niyāmakābhāvāt / | as there would be nothing to restrict them. |
nahyanāyattasya pratiniyatapadārtha [p.756] yogitāyāṃ kiñcitkāraṇaṃ niyāmakaṃ paśyāmo yenaitā vijñānasya bhaveyur nānyasyeti / | When a certain thing is not under the influence of another, we see no reason why it should be restricted in its association with certain particular things only; hence there can be nothing to show that such capacities belong to the Cognition alone, not to anything else. |
tataś ca pratyāsannanibandhanābhāvāt sarvasyaivaitāḥ prāpnuvantītyuktam etat / | Consequently, there being no restrictive agency near at hand, the Capacities should belong to all things; |
na cāpi tāsām akiñcitkaraḥ kaścid āśrayo yukto nityatvena kasyacit svabhāviśeṣasya kartavyasyābhāvād iyalaṃ bahunā // | Nor can there be any substratum for these capacities, as no useful purpose could be served by such a substratum; specially because, being eternal, they cannot have any additional character produced in them. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati / | Enough of this discussion! (2843-2846) |
atha svataḥprāmāṇyamityanenāyam artho 'bhipretaḥ, jātānām uttarakālaṃ svata eva kāraṇāntarānapekṣāṇāṃ {svakārye} vṛttiḥ hetubhāva iti yāvat / | What is meant is as follows: “By the phrase ‘self-validity’ it is meant that after the Pramāṇas (Cognitions) have become born (come about), their subsequent activity towards the producing of their own effects is independent of other causes, that is, their causal efficiency, after they have been born, rests in themselves; |
tena yathoktadoṣānavasara ityabhiprāyaḥ parasya / | so that there is no room for the objections urged above”; this is what is meant by the other party. |
tatra pramānānāṃ svakāryaṃ svagataprāmāṇyaniścayo 'rthaniścayo vā / | The effect of the Pramāṇas themselves consists in either the certainty regarding their own validity, or the definite cognition of the object cognised. |
etasmin svakārye kartavye na hetum apekṣante // | In the bringing about of this effect, the Pramāṇas do not need any other cause. |
kutas tarhyeṣāṃ vyapekṣetyāha ātmalābhe hītyādi / | Question. Wherefore then is their need for other causes? Answer: [see verse 2848 next] |
sāmānyena bhāvānām ātmalābhaṃ prati kāraṇāntarāpekṣitāṃ pratipādya jñāne 'pi | [verse 2848]: Having pointed out that things in general need a cause for securing their own existence, the same principle is applied to the case in question, of the Pramāṇas or Cognitions: [see verse 2849 above] |
svaguṇeṣviti / niścayajanmāpekṣayā"dhārasaptamī / | ‘Regarding their own qualities’, the Locative Ending is in reference to the substratum of the ‘certainty’. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati jñānānāṃ ye svagatā guṇā aviparītabodhātmakatvaṃ viśuddhakāraṇajanitatvam ityevamādayas teṣu niścayotpāde kartavye na tveṣāṃ vyapekṣāstīti // | What is meant is as follows: There are certain qualities belonging to the Cognitions themselves, such qualities, for instance, as being of the nature of right apprehension, being produced by perfect causes, and so forth; in the bringing about of certainty regarding these qualities, they do not need any other causes. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi teṣāṃ tatra hetubhāvo bhavatītyāha janane hītyādi / | Question: If that is so, then what sort of cause are the Cognitions in regard to the bringing about of the said qualities? |
prāmāṇyaṃ cārthaś ca prameya iti prāmāṇyārthau anayorviniścitiḥ / | Answer: [see verse 2850 next] The compound ‘prāmāṇyārtha, etc.’ is to be expounded as the‘prāmāṇya’ validity and the ‘artha’ Object; |
tasyā janana iti sambandhaḥ / | in the ‘janana’ producing, bringing about of the said cognition. |
arthāniścitirālocanāpekṣayocyate / | ‘Arthaniściti’ here stands for mere observance, the vague non-determinate cognition; |
anyeṣāṃ svayam eva niścayātmakatvāt / | because the subsequent determinate cognitions are in the nature of certainty itself. |
hetubhāva ity arthaḥ // | ‘Action,’ is activity, causal character. |
mṛtpiṇḍa ityādinā ghaṭādivad iti dṛṣṭāntaṃ vyācaṣṭe / | The following Texts explain the example of the ‘Jar’ as cited above. |
[p.757] | [see verses 2851-2852 next] |
evaṃ pratijñārthāvirodhaṃ samarthyaṃ hetostadbhāvaniyatatvād ityasya vyāptiṃ prasādhayanna āha ante cāvaśyam eva tadityādi / anta iti / | Having thus shown that there is no incongruity in his Proposition, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to show the Invariable Concomitance of his Reason (Premiss) ‘because it is present when the other is present’ ‘Thus ultimately, etc. etc.’ ‘Ante’ in the last cognition of the series. |
taditi / | ‘Tat’ validity. |
kasmād avaśyamante 'ṅgīkartavyam ity āha parādhīna ityādi // | Question: Why should it be ultimately admitted? Answer: “If the validity, etc. etc.’ (2851-2852) |
etad eva darśayati maulike cedityādi / | The same idea is further clarified. |
mūlam prathamaṃ jñānam, tatra bhavaṃ maulikam / | [see verses 2853-2854 next] ‘Mauliha’ pertaining to the initial or first cognition; |
tat samavāyīti yāvat / | i.e. the validity inhering in the initial cognition. |
tathā hi parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ kadācid arthakriyāsaṃvādajñānād vā, bhavet kāraṇaguṇaparijñānād vā, tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣa iti darśayann āha yathaivetyādi //2852--------- | Validity, if extraneous, could be due either to the corroboration of the resultant activity, or to the recognition of the perfect character of the cause of the cognition. The former, of these cannot be accepted; this is shown by the words ‘Just as, etc. etc.’ (2853-2854) |
athāpi syād arthakriyāsaṃvādijñānasya svata eva prāmāṇyam iṣṭaṃ tenānavasthā na bhaviṣyatīty āha kasyacid ityādi / | It might be argued that in the case of the Cognition which is in conformity with effective action, its validity is held to be inherent, self-sufficient; hence there can be no Infinite Regress. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe 'navasthādoṣaṃ pratipādayann āha evaṃ yadi guṇādhīnetyādi / evaṃ yadi guṇādhīnā pratyakṣādipramāṇatā / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2855 above] Under the second view also [that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress. This is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2856-2857 above] |
guṇāś ca na pramāṇena vinā santi kadācana // | [verses 2856-2857]: |
tato guṇaparicchedipramāṇāntaramicchataḥ / tasyāpyanyaparicchinnaguṇāyattā pramāṇatā // | Under the second view also [that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress. |
guṇādhīneti / | This is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2856-2857 above] |
kāraṇaguṇaparijñānāyattā / pramāṇateti / pramāṇatāniścayaḥ / | ‘Dependent upon, etc.’ i.e. dependent upon the recognition of the perfect character of its cause. ‘Validity’ i.e. certainty regarding its validity. |
na santīti / sadvyavahārā{ra---}yogyā na santītyarthaḥ / tasyāpīti / | ‘Could never be there’ i.e. could not become fit for being regarded as being there. |
guṇaparicchedinaḥ [p.758] pramāṇasya / | ‘Tasyāpi’ of the cognition apprehending the perfection. |
anyaparicchinnaguṇāyatteti / anyena pramāṇena paricchinno yo guṇastanniścayāyattaṃ prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ // | ‘Anyaparicchinna, etc, etc.’ i.e. the validity would be dependent upon the certainty of the perfection apprehended by another cognition. |
atra dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā"dya iti / | An instance is cited in support of the above: [see verses 2858-2860 next] |
yathā"dye ca tathānyatretyanavasthaiva pūrvavat / | “Just as in the case of the initial cognition, so in that of the other also, there would be infinite regress, as before; |
tatra tatraivam icchanto na vyavasthāṃ labhemahi // | and seeking for them one after the other, we could not secure a resting ground. |
guṇajñānaṃ guṇāyattaprāmāṇyamatha neṣyate / ādyamapyarthavijñānaṃ nāpekṣeta guṇapramām // | In case the cognition of the perfection is not held to be one that has its validity dependent upon the presence of those perfections in its cause, then the initial cognition of the object also should not need the valid cognition of perfection in its cause. |
ato dūram api dhyātvā prāmāṇyaṃ yatsvataḥ kvacit / avaśyābhyupagantavyaṃ tatraivādau varaṃ sthitam // | Thus then, even going along to a long distance, if one has to admit, at some stage or the other, the self-validity of the cognition, it is far better to admit it at the very first step.” (2858-2860) |
yathā prathame jñāne pramāṇāntaraparicchinnaguṇāyattā pramāṇatā tathānyatrāpītyarthaḥ / | What is meant is that just as in the initial cognition, the validity is dependent upon the perfections apprehended by another cognition, so should it be in other cognitions also. |
pūrvavad iti / saṃvādataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayavat / | ‘As before’ as in the case of certainty of validity arising from corroboration. |
pūrvapūrvasmin guṇajñāne / | ‘One after the other’ in each preceding cognition of perfections. |
atha guṇajñānasya svata eva prāmāṇyamanavasthābhayād aṅgīkriyate, tadārthavijñāne 'pi kaḥ pradveṣaḥ, yena tasya parataḥprāmāṇyam iṣyate na tu svata iti nahi kiñcit kāraṇamutpaśyāmaḥ / | If, through fear of Infinite Regress, it be held that the validity of the cognition of perfection is inherent in it, self-sufficient, then what hostility should there be against the cognitions of the object itself, by virtue of which its validity is held to be extraneous, not inherent? We do not perceive any reason for this. |
tasmāttīrādarśane ca śakuninā sudūram api gatvā tatraiva punar āgantavyamityalamapratiṣṭhādi{ṣṭita}kupratipattyā / | Thus then the flying bird, not perceiving the end of the other shore, has to return to the place whence it started; consequently, there is no need for the making of baseless assumptions. |
etad eva darśayati guṇajñānam ityādi / guṇāyattam guṇaniścayāyattaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yasya tat tathoktam // | This is what is pointed out by the words ‘In case the cognition of the perfection, etc. etc.’ ‘Dependent upon the perfection’ i.e. that which has its validity dependent upon the certain cognition of the perfection. |
saṃvādaguṇavijñāne kena vābhyadhikena ca / ādyasya tadadhīnatvaṃ yadbalena bhaviṣyati // tasmāt svataḥpramāṇatvaṃ sarvatrautsargikaṃ sthitam / | “On what grounds have the corroborative cognition and the cognition of perfection been held to be superior to the initial cognition, on the strength of which the latter should be dependent upon those two? From all this it follows that validity must be regarded as inherent in all cognitions, as a general rule; |
bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ tadapohyate // | and it is discarded only when there is either an annulment of it or the cognition of its source being defective. |
parāyatte 'pi caitasmin nānavasthā prasajyate / | Even though this way the discarding of the validity will be dependent upon extraneous causes, there would be no infinite regress. |
pramāṇādhīnametaddhi svatas tacca pratiṣṭhitam // | Because after all, it would be dependent upon validity, and this is there, inherent in the cognition.” (2861-2863) |
nanu yadi vijñānaṃ svataḥpramāṇam evaṃ sati sarvajñānaprāmāṇyaprasaṅga ityata āha tasmād ityādi / | Objection: If Cognition is self-sufficient in its validity, then all Cognitions become valid, which is absurd. The answer to this is ‘From all this it follows, etc. etc.’ ‘Utsarga’ is a general principle; |
utsargaḥ sāmānyena vidhānam, tatra bhavamautsargikam / | and ‘autsargika’ is that which is in accordance with -the general principle. |
bādhāḥ arthānyathātvāvadhāraṇaṃ kāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānaṃ ceti bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñāne / | ‘Annulment’ the certainty that the real state of things is different from that figuring in the cognition; ‘cognition of its source being defective’. |
nanu ca{tathāca---} prāmāṇyamautsargikaṃ sthitaṃ satkathama{tkvacida---}pohyate {nanu ca}yadyaprāmāṇyaṃ {p.759} bādhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ pratipādyeta, tac ca tābhyāṃ pratipādyamānaṃ parato bhavet, tatheṣyata eveti cedevaṃ sati prāmāṇyavad atrāpyanavasthābhaved ityata āha parāyatta ityādi / | Objection: Thus then, Validity remaining there as a general rule, how is it discarded? If the invalidity were held to be indicated by annulment and the cognition of the source being defective, then this invalidity would be due to extraneous causes. It might be argued that “it is so held by us”, But, in that case, as in the case of Validity being extraneous, so here also, there would be Infinite Regress. |
bhavedanavasthā, yadyaprāmāṇyamapramāṇato bhavet, yāvatāpramāṇādvijātīyād aprāmāṇyamiṣyate / | The answer to this is as follows: ‘Even though this would be dependent upon, etc. There would be Infinite Regress if the invalidity (of one) were due to the invalidity (of another); as a matter of fact, however, invalidity is held to follow from Validity, which is different in kind from invalidity; |
tac ca svata eva pratiṣṭhitam iti kuto 'navasthā // | and it has been established that Validity is self-sufficient; why then should there be an Infinite Regress? (2861-2863) |
etad eva darśayati pramāṇaṃ hītyādi / | The same idea is further explained: [see verses 2864-2865 next] |
pramāṇaṃ hi pramāṇena yathā nānyena sādhyate / na sidhyatyapramāṇatvamapramāṇāt tathaiva hi // | “Just as validity is not proved by validity cognition, so invalidity also is not proved by invalidity. In the case of one thing being dependent upon another thing of its own kind, there can be no resting ground; |
vijātestvanyahetutvād dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhitā // | in the case of dependence upon something of another kind, its root is firmly established, because it is due to another cause.” (2864-2865) |
vijāter iti / apramāṇasya / | ‘Something of another kind’ i.e. Invalidity; |
asya ca dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhitetyanena sambandhaḥ / | this is to be construed with ‘the root is firmly established’. |
anyahetutvād iti hetunirdeśaḥ / | The reason for this is stated in the words ‘because it is due to another cause’; |
anyo hetuḥ pramāṇalakṣaṇo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | i.e. of which the cause consists of something else, in the shape of the Valid Cognition. |
dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhite 'ti / dṛḍhā anavasthādidoṣair akampyā mūlapratiṣṭhā yasya sa tathā, tadbhāvastattvam // | ‘Has its root firmly established’ i.e. whose root is unshakable by reason of its being free from the defects of Infinite Regress, etc. |
syād etad yadyapyanapekṣyaprāmāṇye bādhakaḥ pratyayaḥ, tathāpyabādhyamānatayā pratīta evānyasyāprāmāṇyamādhātuṃ samartho nānyathetyata āha bādhakapratyayas tāvad ityādi / bādhakapratyayas tāvad arthānyatvāvadhāraṇam / so 'napekṣapramāṇatvāt pūrvajñānamapohate // | “The sublating cognition is always in the form of the cognition of the thing concerned as different from what is envisaged in the previous cognition; and as in this form, it is not dependent for its validity upon anything else, it sets aside that previous cognition.” (2866) The following might be urged Though the sublating or annulling cognition may not have its validity dependent on something else, yet it is only when that Cognition is recognised as itself unsublated that it can stamp invalidity upon another Cognition; |
apohata iti / | i.e. rejects as invalid. |
pratikṣipati{a} pramāṇatvena nirasyatītyarthaḥ // | but that suspicion ceases after very little effort.” (2867) |
syād etad bādhake 'pi pratyaye prathamajñānasyeva bādhakānantaraṃ sambhāvyata eva, tat kathaṃ tatra bādhakāntarāpekṣā nivṛttā, yenāsyā bādhyamānatāniścayo bhaved ityata āha tatrāpītyādi / | The following might be urged Even when the sublating Cognition is there, it is possible that there may be another Cognition sublating it, just as there is one for the initial Cognition; how then can there be a cessation of the dependence upon another sublating Cognition, by virtue of which the sublation of that Cognition would be accepted with certainty? |
tatrāpi kvacid iti / arthānyatvāvadhāraṇalakṣaṇe bādhake pratyaye / | ‘There, in some cases’ i.e. in regard to the sublating Cognition in the form of the ‘Cognition of the thing as different from that envisaged in the previous Cognition’. |
jātāśaṅkasyeti / puṃsaḥ / | ‘Jātāśāṅkasya’ the man whose suspicion has been aroused. |
prathamena jñānena / | ‘Pūrveṇa’ by the initial Cognition. |
sāpīti / apavādāpekṣā / | ‘Sāpi’ i.e. the dependence upon sublation. |
alpeneti / yatneneti śeṣaḥ // | ‘Alpena’ i.e. by very slight effort (2867) |
kathaṃ nivartata ity āha bādhakāntaram ityādi [p.760] | Question: How does it cease? Answer: [see verses 2868-2871 next] |
bādhakānataram utpannaṃ yadyasyānviṣyato 'param tato madhyamabādhena pūrvasyaiva pramāṇatā // | “If another sublating cognition of it is further sought for, then the middle (second) cognition would become sublated; which would establish the validity of the first cognition. |
athānurūpayatnena samyaganveṣaṇe kṛte / mūlābhāvān na vijñātaṃ bhaved bādhakabādhakam // | If even after due effort at seeking for it, no other sublating cognition is found, on account of there being no basis for it, then no cognition sublative of the first sublative cognition would be found; |
tato nirapavādatvāt tenaivādyaṃ balīyasā / bādhyate tena tasyaiva pramāṇatvamapohyate // | and thus there being no sublation of this, this becomes strong and hence sublates the initial cognition; hence it is the validity of this latter that becomes discarded. |
evaṃ parīkṣakajñānatritayaṃ nātivartate / | Thus then, the investigator need not proceed beyond three cognitions; |
yadi nirūpayatas tasyāpi bādhakasya bādhakāntaramutpadyate, tadā madhyamasya tṛtīyena bādhitatvāt prathamam eva pramāṇaṃ bhavet / | If, on further investigation, one finds that there is a sublater of that sublater also, then, as the second Cognition would be set aside by this third sublater, the first Cognition would become valid. |
atha notpadyate mūlasya kāraṇasyābhāvāt / tadā tenaiva dvitīyena balīyasādyaṃ bādhyata iti kṛtvā tasya tena prāmāṇyamapohitaṃ bhavati / | If the further (third) sublating Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the basic-cause, then the second Cognition, which is more powerful, sublates the first Cognition, and thereby its validity becomes set aside. |
nātikrāmati / ko 'sau pumān iti śeṣaḥ / | ‘Need not proceed beyond, etc. etc.’ “Who?” The Man, the observer. |
atha tṛtīye 'pi jñāne dvitīyajñānavad bādhakāpekṣā kasmān na bhavati yena parīkṣakajñānatrayaṃ nityaṃ yataḥ syād ityata āha tataścetyādi / | Question: “On the appearance of the third Cognition also, why is there no need for a further sublating Cognition, as in the case of the second Cognition; and why should there be only three Cognitions for the investigator?” Answer: ‘When no further sublating cognition, etc. etc.’; |
ajāto 'nutpanno bādho yasya pramātuḥ // | ‘produced’ found by the investigator. |
kasmānnāśaṅkyam ity āha utprekṣate hītyādi / | Question: “Why should it not be suspected? Answer: [see verse 2872 next] |
utprekṣate hi yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam / sa sarvavyavahāreṣu saṃśayātmā kṣayaṃ vrajet // | “If the man, through stupidity, should imagine the existence of the sublating cognition, even when none has come about, he would be beset with doubts in all his dealings and would be landed in utter ruin.” (2872) |
kṣayam nāśam / | ‘Utter ruin’ Destruction; |
tatvabhraṃśāt // tathācetyādinā pravacanenaitad eva samarthayate / | on account of having fallen off from the Truth. The following Text confirms the same idea by a quotation [see verse 2873 next] |
tathāca vāsudevena ninditā saṃśayātmatā / | “Vāsudeva himself has deprecated such a suspicious nature; |
nāyaṃ loko 'sti kaunteya na paraḥ saṃśayātmanaḥ // | in the words ‘neither this world, nor the next, o son of Kunti, is for the man of suspicious nature’.” (2873) |
vāsudeveneti / | ‘Vāsudeva’ Viṣṇu. |
kunterapatyaṃ kaunteyo 'rjunaḥ // | ‘Son of Kunti’ Arjuna. |
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