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vedajanyavijñānāntarasambandhāt / | i.e. due to the connection of another cognition produced by the Veda. |
dvayor apīti śrotrabuddhivedārthabuddhyoḥ / | ‘In both cases’ i.e. in the case of the auditory cognition and that of the cognition of what is said in the Veda. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati pramāṇāntarasaṅgatinirapekṣatvādityatra sādhanāntarajanyaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ vivakṣitam, natvekasādhanasādhyam, tena hetoḥ saviśeṣaṇatvān na sādhanavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasyeti bhāvaḥ / | What is meant is as follows: In the phrase ‘it does not need the corroboration of other cognitions’, what is meant by ‘other cognitions’ is cognitions produced by other Means of Cognition, not the cognition produced by the same Means as the Cognition in question. Consequently, the Reason being a qualified one, the Corroborative Instance in our argument is not ‘devoid of the Probandum’? |
hetvantarakṛtajñānasaṃvāda iti / | ‘Corroboration of cognitions produced by other causes’; |
hetvantareṇa kṛtaṃ ca tat jñānaṃ ceti tathoktam tasya saṃvāda iti vigrahaḥ // | the compound is to be expounded as the ‘Saṃvāda’ corroboration of such ‘Jñāna’ cognition as is ‘Kṛta’ produced by ‘hetvantara’ other causes. |
athaikasādhanasādhyapramāṇāntarapravṛttimātreṇāpi parataḥ prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, tadā siddhasādhyateti manyamāna āha yathetyādi / yathā tvekendriyādhīnavijñānāntarasaṅgatiḥ / pratyakṣe kāraṇaṃ klṛptā tathā vede 'pi kathyatām // | “Just as, in the case of the validity of sense-perception, there is the definite basis in the form of corroboration by another cognition produced by the same sense-organ, the same should be asserted to be the basis in the case of the Veda also.” (2903) If it be argued that ‘even the operation of such other cognitions as are brought about by the same means as the cognition in question makes the validity of this latter extraneous’, the argument is futile (superfluous). |
śrotrajñānāntareṇāsyāḥ sambandhāccet pramāṇateti vacanāt // | ‘Definite basis’ as stated in the first line of Text 2901. |
kathaṃ vede kathanīyam ityata āha ekenaiva hītyādi / | Question: How can this be said in regard to the Veda? Answer: [see verses 2904-2905 next] |
ekenaiva hi vākyena deśakālana{lāntaḥ---}rādiṣu / labhyamāne 'rthasaṃvāde na mṛgyaṃ kāraṇāntaram // | “When the cognition brought about by any one sentence is found to be the same at all times and places, and in all men, then no other basis need be sought for its validity. |
tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yadutpannaṃ vijñānaṃ na visaṃvadet / deśāntarādivijñānaiḥ pramāṇaṃ tadasaṃśayam // | Thus then, when a firm conviction produced by a sentence is not found to be incompatible with the cognitions appearing at other times and places and in other men, it is undoubtedly valid.” (2904-2905) |
[p.767] dṛḍham iti / | ‘Firm’ free from uncertainty and mistake. |
ādiśabdena narāntarādivijñānaparigrahaḥ // | ‘Cognitions appearing at other, etc. etc.’ ‘ādi’ includes ‘men’ also. |
nacāsiddhatāsya hetor iti darśayann āha sādhyetyādi / | The following Text shows that the Reason adduced is not ‘Inadmissible’: [see verse 2906 next] |
sādhyā na cānumānena śabdādīnāṃ pramāṇatā / | “As a matter of fact, the validity of verbal and other cognitions is not to be proved by means of inference. |
pratyakṣasyāpi sā mābhūt tat sādhyaivāviśeṣataḥ // | otherwise the validity of sense-perception also might have to be proved by inference (which is absurd).” (2906) |
na tāvat pratyakṣeṇa sādhyā vedārthasyātīndriyatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | The cognition produced by the Veda cannot have its validity confirmed by Sense-perception, because what is said in the Veda is beyond the reach of the senses. |
nāpyanumānenātiprasaṅgāt / | Nor can it be proved or confirmed by Inference; |
śabdānām iti / vaidikānām iti śeṣaḥ / | ‘Śabdānām’; this includes the cognitions produced by the Veda. |
prakaraṇād vā viśeṣagatiḥ // | Or, particular details may be learnt from the Context. |
syād etad iṣyata eva pratyakṣasyāpyanumānasādhyā pramāṇatetyāha pramāṇānām ityādi / | “If the validity of cognitions were proved by another cognition, then, of this latter also, the validity would be proved by another, and so on and on, there would be infinite regress. |
pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ yena cānyena sādhyate / tasyāpyanyena sādhyatvād anavasthā prasajyate // | If the validity of the cognition that proves the validity of another cognition be not proved by any other cognition, then the same might be the case with those whose validity is held to be proved by others.” (2907-2908) |
anyenāsādhitā cetsyāt sādhakasya pramāṇatā / | The following might be urged We do hold that the validity of Sense-perception is proved by means of Inference. |
pratyakṣavat tasyāpyanumānasyāpareṇānumānena pramāṇatāyāṃ sādhyāyām anavasthā syāt / athānumānākhyasya sādhanasya prāmāṇyaṃ nānyena sādhyate tadā sādhyasyāpi pratyakṣādeḥ sā sādhyā mābhūd aviśeṣāt // | If, like the Sense-perception, the Inference also had its validity proved by another Inference, then there would be Infinite Regress. If the validity of the cognition called ‘Inference’ were not proved by another cognition, then in the case of Sense-perception also, whose validity is held to be proved by Inference, the validity would be such as is not proved by another cognition; as there would be no difference between the two cases. |
nanvityādinā bauddho hetvasiddhimeva samarthayate / | In the following Text, the Bauddha supports the view that the Reason put forward is ‘Inadmissible’: [see verse 2909 next] |
nanu pramāṇamityevaṃ pratyakṣādi na gṛhyate / | As a matter of fact, sense-perception, etc. are not quite recognised as ‘pramāṇa’, ‘valid’; |
yadi pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇāntarāpekṣā na syāt tadā pramāṇam ityeṣu pratyakṣādiṣu niścayo na syāt / | If Cognitions did not need (corroboration by) other Cognitions, then, in regard to Sense-perception and the rest, there could be no certainty as to their being ‘valid’; |
tataś ca sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ // | and thus there would be an end to all business-transactions. |
pramāṇaṃ grahaṇād ityādinā pratividhatte / | To the above, the Mīmāṃsaka provides the following answer: [see verse 2910 next] |
pramāṇaṃ grahaṇāt pūrvaṃ svarūpeṇa pratiṣṭhitam / | “Before the cognition is apprehended, it remains there in its own form; |
nirapekṣaṃ ca tat svārthe pramite mīyate paraiḥ //2910/ | and so far as its own objective is concerned, it is independent and self-sufficient and after its own objective has been cognised, the cognition itself comes to be cognised by other cognitions.” (2910) |
etaduktaṃ bhavati yadyapi pramāṇaṃ svarūpaniścayaṃ prati pramāṇāntaramapekṣate tathāpi na vyavahārocchedaḥ, arthaparicchedaṃ prati pramāṇāntaranirapekṣatvāt, arthaścetparicchinnas tadā tāvataiva sarvavyavahāraparisamāptir itikiṃ svarūpaṃ prati niścayaniścayanirūpaṇayā, arthaniścayārthatvād asyā iti saṅkṣepārthaḥ / | What is meant is as follows: Even though in regard to the definite cognition of its own form, the Cognition requires another Cognition, yet there can be no end to business-transactions; because in regard to the apprehension of its own objective, the Cognition is independent and self-sufficient; and when the object has become apprehended, then by that alone can all transactions be carried on; what use then would there be for considering whether there is certainty or uncertainty? Because the sole purpose of all this lies in the definite cognition of the object concerned. |
avayavārthas tūcyate grahaṇā [p.768] t pūrvam iti / pramāṇam etad ityato niścayāt pūrvam ity arthaḥ / | Such in brief is the purport of the argument. The meaning of the words is now explained ‘Before the cognition is apprehended’ i.e. before the certainty that ‘this is valid’. |
svarūpeṇeti arthaparicchedātmanā / | ‘In its own form’ i.e. in the form of the apprehension of the thing. |
nirapekṣam iti svārthaparicchedaṃ prati pramāṇāntaraṃ nāpekṣata ity arthaḥ / tat svārthe pramite niścite tūttarakālamanumānād iti pramāṇaiḥ pramīyate / | ‘Independent’ i.e. not depending upon another cognition, for the purpose of the apprehension of its object. When this its object has become duly cognised, with certainty, then, later on, the Cognition itself becomes cognised through Inference, etc. This has been thus declared ‘One does not apprehend the Cognition until the object has been cognised; |
yathoktam vo 'pyasmād ajñātād eva labhyate // | For the same reason the apprehension of things also is obtained from the cognition that is itself uncognised.” (2911-2912) |
sugamam // | This is easily understood. |
yadyevaṃ{a} pramāṇamapyanayā nītyā svata eva prasajyata ityāśaṅkyāha apramāṇam ityādi / | If that is so, then the invalidity also of Cognitions could, in the same way, be regarded as inherent in them. Anticipating this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka provides the following answer: [see verse 2913 next] |
apramāṇaṃ punaḥ svārthe pramāṇam iva hi sthitam / | “Like valid cognition, invalid cognition also operates upon its object, by itself (independently); |
mithyātvaṃ tasya gṛhyeta na pramāṇāntarādṛte // | but the fact of its being false cannot be apprehended without another means of cognition.” (2913) |
apramāṇaṃ hi pramāṇavadābhātīti na tat sattāmātreṇa svārthaṃ paricchinatti tasmān mithyātvam mithyārthapariccheditvam asya pramāṇāntaraṃ vinā grahītuṃ na śakyata iti paratas tadvyavasthāpyate // | Invalid Cognition also has the semblance of the Valid Cognition, and hence it does apprehend [the ‘na’ is wrongly put in] the object, by its mere existence; consequently, ‘falsity’ i.e. the fact of its envisaging an unreal thing cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition; we are going to show later on that this falsity is extraneous. |
na hyarthasyānyathābhāvaḥ pūrveṇāttas tathātvavat / | The false character of the thing is not apprehended by the former (i.e. the invalid cognition) in the way in which the true character (is apprehended by the valid cognition). |
tadatrāpyanyathābhāve dhīr yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe // tāvatā caiva mithyātvaṃ gṛhyate nānyahetukam / | Thus then, it is only when there appears the cognition of the truth being otherwise, or the cognition that the source of the cognition has been defective, that the falsity (invalidity) of the cognition becomes recognised; not on any other grounds. |
utpattyavasthamevedaṃ pramāṇam iti mīyate // | At the time that it appears it is always recognised as valid.” (2914-2915) |
pūrveṇeti / apramāṇena / | ‘The former’ i.e. the invalid cognition. |
ātta iti / gṛhītaḥ / | ‘Atta’ apprehended. ‘True character’; |
tathātvavad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ / | this is a corroborative instance per dissimilarity. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā pramāṇena tathātvamāttaṃ na tathā mithyātva{ma}pramāṇeneti na samānam / | What is meant is as follows Falsity is not. apprehended by the Invalid cognition in the same way in which truth is apprehended by the Valid cognition; hence the two do not stand on the same footing. |
tathā hi utpattyavastham eva pramāṇaṃ pramāṇam iti mīyate natvapra [p.769] māṇamapramāṇamiti tasya nityaṃ pramāṇavadavabhāsanāditi bhāvaḥ / | Because as soon as it is born, the Valid cognition is recognised as valid; but the Invalid cognition is not similarly recognised as invalid, as soon as it is born; because it has always the semblance of the Valid cognition. |
tadityādinā parato 'prāmāṇyamupasaṃharati / | ‘Tadatrāpi, etc. etc.’ This sums up the view that the Invalidity of Cognitions is extra,neous. |
yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe dhīriti sambandhaḥ / | ‘Yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe’ ‘dhīḥ’ has to be construed here also. |
tāvatā caiveti / | ‘It is only then that the falsify of the Cognition becomes apprehended’; |
anyathā bhāvadhiyā duṣṭakāraṇadhiyā ca / syād etat / | i.e. when there, is the idea that the real state of things is otherwise, and when there is the idea that the source of the Cognition has been defective. |
yadyetayor dhiyoḥ samyaktvaṃ gṛhītaṃ bhavettadābhyāṃ mithyātvaṃ gṛhyeta tathośca samyaktvagrahaṇāya pramāṇāntarāpekṣāyāmanavasthā syād ityata āha utpattyavastham ityādi / | The following might be urged The falsity of the Cognition could be admitted only when it would be definitely known that these two ideas are actually true; and for the purpose of recognising the truth of these ideas, there would be need for another Cognition; so that there would be an infinite regress. The answer to this is given in the words ‘At the time that it appears, etc. etc.’; |
arthānyathājñānaṃ duṣṭakāraṇajñānaṃ ca / | ‘it’ stands for the said two ideas (1) of the real state of things being otherwise and (2) of the source of the Cognition being defective. |
tena nānavastheti bhāvaḥ // | Thus there would be no Infinite Regress. |
yaduktaṃ bauddhādīnāṃ mithyārthaṃ vaidikaṃ vaco vākyatvād agniḥ śīta ityādi puruṣavākyavad ityādi sādhanaṃ, tasyānaikāntikateti darśayann āha ato yatrāpītyādi / ato yatrāpi mithyātvaṃ parebhyaḥ pratipādyate / tatrāpyetad dvayaṃ vācyaṃ natu sādharmyamātrakam // | “For these reasons, even in cases where the falsity is explained to others, these two ideas have to be pointed out, and not mere similarity.” (2916) The Buddhists and others have argued that the Words of the Veda must be false, because they are words, like such human assertions as ‘Fire is cool’. The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to show that this argument is ‘Inconclusive’. |
yatrāpīti / codanādau / | ‘In cases’ such as that of the Vedic Injunction. |
etad dvayam iti / anyathātvajñānaṃ duṣṭakāraṇajñānaṃ ca / | ‘These two ideas’ i.e. the idea that the truth is otherwise than what has been said in the Veda, and also that what has been so said has had a defective source. |
sādharmyamātrakam iti asatyārthena puṃvākyena vākyatvādinā tulyatvam // | ‘Mere similarity’ i.e. the mere fact of being ‘words’ and thereby being similar to human assertions. |
kasmān na vācyamityatropapattim āha tatretyādi / | Question: Why should mere similarity not be urged? Answer: [see verses 2917-2919 next] |
sarvaṃ pramāṇamithyātvaṃ sādhayantyavipaścitaḥ // teṣām ātmavadhāyaiva tādṛksādhanakalpanam / | “The ignorant men who, on the basis of mere similarity to invalid cognitions, seek to prove the invalidity of all cognitions, for them such an argument is conducive to their own ruin. |
utpadyate parasyāpi pratibimbena tādṛśam // | Because for the other party also, there comes about an argument which is the reflection of the Buddhist argument; |
tena ca pratiṣiddhatvād ayathābhūtasādhanam / | and thus being refuted by this, the argument (of the Buddhist) turns out to be the means of proving what is not true; |
yadyapramāṇasādharmyamātreṇāpramāṇaṃ syāt tadā sarvatra pramāṇānām aprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ śakyate hi sarvatra vastutvādinā sādharmyaṃ vaktum iti saṅkṣepārthaḥ / | If a Cognition were invalid simply because it is similar (to another Cognition which is invalid), then all Cognitions would have to be regarded as invalid; because some sort of similarity such as being an entity can be asserted in all cases. Such is the meaning of the Text in brief. |
katham ātmavadhāya bhavatītyāha utpadyata ityādi / parasyāpīti / | Question: How is it conducive to their own ruin? Answer: ‘For the other party also, etc. etc.’ ‘Other party’ i.e. the |
mīmāṃsakasya / | Mīmāṃsaka. |
yathā bimbādanantaraṃ pratibimbamutpadyate, tathā bauddhopanyastasādhanānantaraṃ pratisādhanaṃ mīmāṃsakasyodetītyarthaḥ / | ‘Reflection, etc.’ just as the reflection appears after the reflected object, so, after the argument of the Buddhist, there appears the counter-argument of the Mīmāṃsaka. |
tathā hi śakyamidam abhidhātum amṛṣā vaidikaṃ vacaḥ, vacanatvādibhyaḥ, agniruṣṇo bhāsvara ityādipuruṣavacanavad iti / | For instance, it is open to the Mīmāṃsaka to argue as follows: The words of the Veda are not false, because they are Words, etc. etc.; like such human assertions as ‘Fire is hot, bright and so forth |
tenaivaṃvidhena pratipramāṇena pratiṣiddhatvāt vyāhatatvāt, ayathābhūtācodanetyasyārthasya yat sādhanam upanyastaṃ bauddhādinā tan na codanāṃ bādhituṃ kṣamam, kutaḥ ---, autsargikapramāṇatvāt / | Thus being refuted negatived by such counter-arguments, the argument that had been adduced by the Buddhist and others to prove the idea of Vedic Injunction being false is quite incapable of rejecting the Vedic Injunction. Why? Because of the inherent validity of the Vedic |
ausargikaṃ pramāṇaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yasya tat tathoktaṃ tadbhāvas tatvam // | that is to say, the validity of the Vedic Injunction is such as belongs to it by its very nature. |
[p.770] atrābhidhīyata ityādinā ātmalābhe c bhāvānām ityārabhya yathākramaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vaktum ārabhate atrābhidhīyate yeṣāṃ jātānāṃ sthitiriṣyate / teṣām eva tu nanveṣā vyavasthā sanibandhanā // | The answer to the above is as follows: as a matter of fact, the distinction that has been made has some basis only in regard to those things that are held to continue to exist after being produced. With the following Text, the Author begins the refutation seriatim of all the arguments that have been set forth by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Texts 2848 onwards: [see verse 2920 above] |
sanibandhaneti / vastvadhiṣṭhānā / | ‘Has some basis’ i.e. subsists in a real entity; |
asato vyāpārāyogād iti bhāvaḥ // | that is, because what does not exist cannot be operative. |
kā punar asau vyavasthetyādi ātmalābha ityādi / | Question: “What is this ‘distinction’?” Answer: [see verse 2921 next] |
ātmalābhe ghaṭādīnāṃ kāraṇāpekṣiteṣyate / | It is only for the securing of their existence that things like the jar stand in need of a cause; |
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu // | when once they have secured their existence, they become operative by themselves towards their own effects. |
atha jñāne 'pi kasmān na yujyata ity āha yattvityādi / yattu jñānaṃ tvayāpīṣṭaṃ janmānantaramasthiram / | That cognition which you also regard as not lasting after being born, becomes non-existent after having secured its existence; what sort of activity or operation, then, could it have? (2922) [verse 2921]: |
labdhātmano 'sataḥ paścād vyāpārastasya kīdṛśaḥ // asataḥ kīdṛśo vyāpāra iti / | [This is a parody of the Mīmāṃsaka’s assertion in Text 2848.] Question: “Why can this not be possible in the case of Cognition also? [why should it be restricted to things like the Jar only? ]” Answer: [see verse 2922 above] |
naiva kaścit sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvād asattvasyeti bhāvaḥ / | ‘What activity could the non-existent Cognition have?’ none whatsoever; because what is non-existent is devoid of all capacity. |
sattve 'pi vā nirīhatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ naiva vyāpāraḥ siddhyet / | Even if it existed, as all entities are without desire and effort, they could not have any activity. |
na ca jñānasya kiñcitkāryamasti yatra vyāpriyeta / | Nor is there any effect to be produced by the Cognition, towards which the Cognition could operate. |
svārthaparicchedātmakamasteti cet / | “But there is to be produced by it the effect in the shape of making its object cognised”. |
na / | Not so; |
jñānaparyāyatvād asyātmānam eva karotīti cuvyāhṛtam etat / | ‘making cognised its own object’ means exactly the same that is meant by the term ‘Cognition’; so your assertion would mean that the Cognition produces itself; |
pramāṇam etad iti niścayajananaṃ svakāryam iti cen na / | “The effect of the Cognition would be the bringing about of the certainty that the Cognition is right and valid.” That is not possible; |
kvacid aniścayād viparyayadarśanāc ca / anenātrāpi pratijñārthe pratyakṣādivirodhaḥ pratipāditaḥ / | because in the case of some Cognitions, there is no certainty; and in some the contrary is found to be the case. What has been said has also shown that the present Proposition of the Mīmāṃsaka is contrary to Perception and other means of Cognition. |
tathāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhenānyopalambhātmanā pratyakṣeṇāsato vyāpārābhāvo niścitaḥ / | For instance, if there is non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility, and there is apprehension of something else, it follows that what is non-existent cannot have any activity. |
nairūpyāc ca viyadambhojavad anumānato 'pi siddhaḥ / | The same is also proved by Inference, being, as it is, formless, like the ‘sky-lotus’. |
tvayāpīṣṭam ityanena svavacanavirodhaṃ codbhāvayati // tameva vyāpāra ityādinā ślokadvayena darśayati / | The phrase ‘which you also regard’ serves to point out that what has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka involves self-contradiction on his part. This same self-contradiction is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2923-2924 next] |
vyāpāraḥ kāraṇānāṃ hi dṛṣṭo janmātirekataḥ / | The operation of causes has always been found to be something different from the birth of the effects; |
pramāṇe 'pi tathā mābhūd iti janma vivakṣyate // na hi tat kṣaṇamapyāste jāyate vāpramātmakam / | in order to preclude this from the case of cognition (pramāṇa), the term ‘birth’ (‘janma’) has been introduced [by Jaimini in his sūtra 1.1.4] the idea being that the cognition does not continue to exist for even a single moment, and yet it is not born as invalid; |
yenārthagrahaṇe paścād vyāpriyetendriyādivat // | on account of which it could operate only later on towards the apprehending of the object, in the manner of the sense-organs. |
tathā hi satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣamWW ity atra sūtre janmagrahaṇasya sāphalyaṃ pratipādayituṃ vyāpāra ityādyuktaṃ kumārilena / | [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 54-55]. In Sūtra 1. 4, Jaimini has propounded the definition of Sense-perception as consisting in ‘the birth of the man’s apprehension following from the contact of the sense-organs with an existing object’; and the above four lines have been put forward by Kumārila in justification of the use of the term ‘janma’ (Birth) in this definition; |
jñā{jā---}yanāmānāyā eva buddheḥ prāmāṇyaṃ yathā syād iti pratipādanārthaṃ janmagrahaṇaṃ kṛtam iti / | the sense being that the term ‘birth’ has been used in order to point out that the Cognition is valid as soon as it is born. |
kiṃ kāraṇam ity āha na hītyādi / | Question: “What is the reason for this?” |
tad iti jñānam //2923--------- | Answer: ‘The Cognition does not, etc. etc.’ ‘Tat’ stands for the Cognition. |
[p.771] athāpītyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate / | In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the rejoinder of the other party: [see verse 2925 next] |
athāpy akṣaṇikaṃ jñānaṃ nityaṃ cābhyupagamyate / abhyupetavirodho 'yam evaṃ yuktyāvabādhanam // | If the cognition is held to be not-momentary and even eternal, then this goes against what has been accepted elsewhere, and it is also nullified by reasoning. |
tathācānyatra kumārilena nityatvam ekatvaṃ ca buddhīnāṃ varṇitam / yathoktam "buddhīnām api caitanyasvābhāvyātputuṣasyāto nityatvam ekatā ceṣṭā / | In another context, Kumārila has declared the unity and eternality of Cognitions, as declared by him in the following words “For us, Cognitions being of the same nature as the Spirit (Soul), are held to be eternal and one” [Ślokavārtika Eternality of Words, 404]. |
bhedas tu viṣayāśraya" iti / atrāpi pakṣe pratijñāyā abhyupetavirodho 'numānavirodho 'pi / | Under this view, the Proposition put forward (that Cognitions are eternal) would go against what has been accepted elsewhere, as also against Inference. |
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