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svataḥprāmāṇyabodhāt tu viparīto na kaścana // | when, however, there is conviction regarding self-validity, no one can be opposed to it. |
TS 2948 | The following Texts point out the perception of another fact which is contrary to firm Conviction: [see verse 2947-2948 above] |
visaṃvādo hi niścayaviruddhāyā bhrānteḥ kāryatvena pratītaḥ, sa ca svataḥprāmāṇyābhyupagame sati na prāpnoti. | Disagreement or diversity of opinion is always found to be the effect of a Misconception, which is always contrary to well-ascertained Conviction; therefore such diversity of opinion should not be there, in face of the opinion that all cognitions are inherently valid; |
niścayena tat kāraṇasya bhrānter apanītatvāt. | because such a Conviction should have removed the misconception that could lead to the said diversity of opinion. |
viparīta iti visaṃvādabhāk. | ‘Opposed to it’ i.e. holding a different opinion. |
nanv apramāṇato vṛtto vidaṃ vā kaṃ{visaṃvādaṃ}sam aśnute / niścayaḥ paratas tasya bādhakāt pratyayān mataḥ // pramāṇataḥ pravṛttas tu na visaṃvādam aśnute / | “One who acts in pursuance of an invalid cognition meets with non-conformity with reality; and certainty regarding invalidity has been held to be due to extraneous causes and ascertainable by a subsequent sublating cognition. On the other hand, one who acts in pursuance of a valid cognition does not meet with the said non-conformity; |
asyaiva ceṣyate 'smābhiḥ svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | and it is in regard to this that we hold that there is firm conviction regarding its validity being inherent and self-sufficient.” (2949-2950) |
visaṃvādo hy apramāṇāt pravṛttasya bhavati / | Non-conformity with reality comes to one who proceeds to act in pursuance of an invalid cognition; |
tasya cāpramāṇasya parato niścayo 'bhyupagata eva / yatpunaḥ pramāṇaṃ na tataḥ pravṛttasya visaṃvādo 'sti / | and it has already been admitted that the invalidity of cognitions is due to extraneous causes. As for the Valid cognition, on the other hand, one who acts in pursuance of that does not meet with non-conformity; |
tasyaiva ca svataḥprāmāṇyamiṣṭam iti kathaṃ svataḥprāmāṇyapratijñāyā anumānabādhā // | and it is of this cognition that validity has been held to be inherent and self-sufficient. In what way then can there be annulment of the assertion of ‘self-validity’ by Inference? |
[p.777] nābhiprāyetyādinā pratividhatte / nābhiprāyāparijñānād idaṃ hyatra vivakṣitam / | The answer to the above is provided in the following [see verses 2951-2954 next] What has been said is not right; as it proceeds from ignorance of what is meant by us. |
svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyasya viniścaye // niyate{to---} yatha{tra} naivāsti svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / | What is meant by us in regard to the subject of conviction regarding the self-validity of all cognitions is as follows: In a case where the conviction regarding self-validity is not certain, what is cognised, by elimination is invalidity; |
arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānānapekṣayā / janmānantaramevātastadaprāmāṇyaniścayāt // | because irrespectively of the fact of the real state of things being otherwise than that envisaged in the cognition, and the fact of the source of the cognition being defective, the conviction regarding its invalidity appears immediately after its birth. |
apramāṇe pramāṇatvaviparyāso na saṅgataḥ / ato 'saṃvādino naiva kaścid varteta tadgateḥ // | Consequently, the invalid cognition cannot be said to be a case of the ‘reversal of validity’; hence no one would ever act in pursuance of the cognition that is not in conformity with reality; |
idamatra vivakṣitam yadi bhavatā sarvapramāṇānāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyamabhyupagamyate, tadā prāmāṇyaniścayotpādena pramāṇaṃ vyāptam ityabhyupagataṃ syāt / | What is meant by us is as follows: If you accept the self-validity of all cognitions, then that would imply the acceptance of the fact that ‘cognition’ is invariably concomitant with the ‘conviction of Validity’; |
tataś ca yatraiva pramāṇavyāpakaḥ prāmāṇyaniścayo nodeti tatra sāmarthyāt prā{daprā}māṇyam avatiṣṭhate / | and as a consequence of this, wherever the ‘conviction of Validity’ which embraces all cognitions does not appear, there, by implication, remains Invalidity; |
pramāṇāpramāṇayoḥ parasparavyavacchedarūpatvāt / | and ‘Validity’ and ‘Invalidity’ are mutually exclusive. |
tataś cāprāmāṇyam api svata eva sāmarthyādāpatitam, visaṃvādakāraṇaoṣaparijñānāda{na---}pekṣaṇāt, prāmāṇyaniścayānutpatter ivāprāmāṇyasya niścitatvāt / | Hence it follows by implication that Invalidity also is inherent in cognitions; irrespectively of any idea of its being not in conformity with reality or of its cause being defective; in fact the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from the mere non-appearance of the conviction regarding Validity. |
evaṃ ca sati nanmottaram eva prāmāṇyaniścayotpādānutpādābhyāṃ prāmāṇyetarayor niścitatvād apramāṇāt pariniścitā naiva kasyacit prekṣāvataḥ pravṛttir eva sambhavatīti kuto visaṃvādasambhava iti / | Thus what has been asserted (by the Mīmāṃsaka) to the effect that “the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from extraneous causes, in the shape of sublating cognitions” (Text 2940) is not right. Such being the case, as soon as the Cognition is born, its validity or invalidity becomes ascertained by the birth or otherwise of Conviction regarding its validity; so that the activity of no sane person can follow from an invalid cognition; how then can there be any possibility of the activity not being in conformity with reality? |
tadgater iti / visaṃvāditvagater niścayād ity arthaḥ / | ‘Tadgateḥ’ i.e. from the conviction regarding non-conformity. |
ete ca pratijñādoṣodbhāvanamukhena hetor avyāptiprakāśanāddhetudoṣā eva draṣṭavyāḥ, na tu pratijñādoṣāḥ / | All these defects that have been pointed out regarding the Proposition (of the Mīmāṃsaka) should be understood to be the defects in his Reason, which is hereby shown to be not-concomitant (with the Probandum); they should not be regarded as defects of the Proposition. |
anyathā hi pratijñāyā asādhanāṅgatvāt taddoṣodbhāvanaṃ prativādino nigrahasthānaṃ syāt // | Otherwise, as the Proposition does not form an integral part of the argument, the pointing out of defects in it would involve a ‘Clincher’ for the other party (the Buddhist). |
janmātiriktakālaś ca kriyākālo na vidyate / | In the case of the jar, there is no time for action, apart from the time of its birth, because it has a momentary existence; |
kṣaṇikatvād ghaṭādīnām ityasiddhaṃ nidarśanam // | In the following Text the Author points out the ‘Inadmissibility’ of the Corroborative Instance cited (under Text 2850) in the shape of the Jar: [see verse 2955 above] |
nanu ca janmottarakālaṃ ghaṭādayo dṛśyante eva kulālādyanapekṣā madhūdakādyarthakriyākāriṇaḥ, tat kathaṃ teṣāṃ janmātiriktaḥ kālo na vidyata ity āha | Says the Opponent “The Jar is actually seen after birth, independently of the Potter, etc. and found to be performing the useful function of containing Honey, Water and other fluids; how then can it be said that there is no time for its action, apart from the time of its birth?” |
teṣām ityādi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2956 next] |
teṣām uttarakālaṃ hi kulālādyanapekṣiṇām / svopādānādyapekṣatvāt svato nāsti pravartanam // | Subsequently to their birth, the jar, etc. do not depend upon the potter and other such causes; but they do depend upon their own constituent causes and other things; |
[p.778] svopādānam pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ sajātīyaḥ kṣaṇaḥ / ādiśabdena taddhārakapuruṣādiparigrahaḥ / | ‘Their own constituent causes,’ in the shape of the preceding homogeneous ‘moments ‘Other things’ include the man holding it. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati uttarakālamanya eva ghaṭādikṣaṇāḥ svopādānādyapekṣā vartamānā dṛśyante na tu kasyacijjanmottarakālamavasthitiḥ siddhā kṣaṇikatvāt sarvabhāvānām iti // | What is meant is as follows: What are seen subsequently are entirely different ‘Jar-moments’ appearing through their own constituent cause, etc.; and no single Jar is known to exist after the moment of its birth; for the simple reason that all things are momentary. |
nacānavasthitiprāptir anyato mānasaṃśritau / | If validity is dependent (upon something else), there can be no infinite regress. |
tasmād arthakriyājñāne svataḥprāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | Hence there can be certainty regarding self-validity only when there is cognition of effective action. |
nanu ko 'tiśayas tasya prāktanādasti yena tat / parataḥ pūrvavijñānam iva nābhyupagamyate // | “What peculiar feature is there in the second cognition, different from those of the previous cognition, on account of which it is not regarded to be entirely like the previous cognition?” (2958) |
ucyata ityādinā pravidhatte / ucyate vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyamabhidhīyate / | The answer to the above is as follows: it is conformity with the real state of things that is called ‘validity’; |
tasya cārthakriyābhyāsajñānād anyan na lakṣaṇam // | and there is no feature of it except the repeated cognition of effective action. |
arthakriyāvabhāsaṃ ca jñānaṃ saṃvedyate sphuṭam / | The cognition envisaging effective action is clearly apprehended; |
niścīyate ca tanmātrabhāvyāmarśanacetasā // | and the apprehension becomes confirmed by the after-thought envisaging the same. |
atas tasya svataḥ samyakprāmāṇyasya viniścayāt / nottarārthakriyāprāptipratyayaḥ samapekṣyate // jñānapramāṇabhāve ca tasmin kāryāvabhāsini / | Thus its own real validity haying been duly ascertained, it does not stand in need of any subsequent cognition of the same effective action. Thus the validity of the cognition becomes manifested in the very first cognition envisaging the said effective action; and thereby its validity becomes confirmed. |
pratyaye prathame 'pyasmāddhetoḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ // | The other party argues as follows: [see verse 2958 next] [verse 2958]: The answer to this (from the Buddhist) is as follows: [see verses 2959-2962 next] |
ayamatra saṅkṣepārthaḥ pramāṇaṃ hi nāmāvisaṃvādi jñānam ucyate / pramāṇam avisaṃvādijñānam iti vacanāt / | The purport of the above, in brief, is as follows: The name ‘Pramāṇa’, ‘valid cognition,’ is given to that cognition which is in conformity with the real state of things; as has been asserted in the declaration that ‘Pramāṇa is that cognition which is in conformity with things’; this ‘conformity’ appears in the shape of effective action; |
na{sa---} cāvisaṃvādo 'rthakriyālakṣaṇa eva, tadarthatvāt pramāṇacintāyāḥ / yatp 'rthakriyārthī pramāṇam apramāṇaṃ vānveṣate prekṣāvān na vyasanitayā / | as it is only for purposes of effective action that there is a desire to investigate the ‘validity’ of Cognitions; because the sane man investigates the validity or invalidity of cognitions only for the purpose of undertaking activity in accordance with it, and not because he likes to do so; |
sā cārthakriyā dāhapākādinirbhāsajñānānodayalakṣaṇā, tadutpādādevārthakriyārthinaḥ pravṛttasyākāṅkṣānivṛtteḥ / | this effective action is one that figures in the notion of such acts as burning, cooking and the like; as it is only when this cognition has appeared that the want of the man seeking to undertake the activity becomes supplied; |
taccārthakriyājñānamātmasaṃvedanapratyakṣatayā svayam evāvirbhavati, spaṣṭānubhavatvāccānantaraṃ yathānubhavaṃ parāmarśajñānotpattyā niścitam iti svata eva siddham / | this cognition of effective action, on account of the perceptibility of its own cognition, appears by itself; and as this apprehension is quite clear, it is followed by an afterthought, in accordance with the same apprehension, which serves to confirm the cognition; all this is self-evident. |
naca tat sādhyaṃ phalāntaramākāṅkṣitaṃ puruṣeṇa, yenāparamarthakriyānirbhāsi pratyayāntarodayamanusarato 'navasthā syāt / | Nor does the man desire any other fruit resulting from the said cognition; for the sake of which he would seek for the appearance of another cognition envisaging another effective action; which would lead to an Infinite Regress. |
tathā hi loke saddhi{vṛddhi---}cchedādikaṃ phalamabhivāñchitam, taccāhlāda [p.779] paritāpādirūpajñānāvirbhāvād evābhinirvṛttam ityetāvataivāhitasantoṣā nivartante janā iti svata eva tasya siddhir ucyate / | For instance, in ordinary life, the fruits of activity that are desired are in the form of prosperity and adversity (happiness and unhappiness); and this is accomplished by the appearance of joy and sorrow; and men, being satisfied with this result, desist from further activity; and this is what is meant when it is said that the result has been accomplished by itself. |
yatpunaḥ pūrvakaṃ tat kāraṇabhūtaṃ jñānaṃ tasya na{ca---} tat prāpaṇaśaktiḥ prāmāṇyam ucyate / | As for the first cognition which has brought about the second cognition, the validity of that is said to consist only in the capacity to bring about the second cognition; |
sā ca śaktir anabhyāsād aviditakāryair avadhārayituṃ na śakyata ityuttarakāryajñānapravṛttyā niścīyata iti prathamasya parataḥprāmāṇyam ucyate // punar apyanavasthāṃ prakārāntareṇa pariharann āha ādya ityādi / | and the presence of this capacity cannot be ascertained by people who, on account of the absence of repetition, do not know of the effective action resulting from it; hence it is ascertained only by the appearance of its effect in the shape of the second cognition. It is for these reasons that the validity of the first cognition is said to be due to something extraneous to itself. |
ādye hi vastuviṣaye vastusaṃvādalakṣaṇam / dvitīyaṃ na pravarteta tasya hetor asambhavāt // | If the initial cognition did not envisage a real entity, then the second cognition, in the form of confirmation by conformity to the real state of the thing, would not appear at all; as its cause would not be there. |
aśokastabakādau hi pāvakādhyavasāyinaḥ / na dāhapākanirbhāsi vijñānaṃ jātu jāyate // jātau vā na vijātīyaṃ jvalanāt tat prasajyate / | For example, when a man has the cognition of fire in reference to the cluster of aśoka-blossoms, there does not appear the cognition envisaging burning and cooking (which are not brought about by what has been cognised as fire). If this latter does appear, then the cognised object turns out to be not anything different from fire; |
tat kāryayogatāmatralakṣaṇatvād vibhāvasoḥ // | because fire is only an entity that is characterised by the capacity for producing its effect (in the shape of burning, cooking and the rest). |
yadi hi ādyam prathamaṃ jñānamavastuni pravṛttam abhaviṣyat tadā phalajñānam uttarakālabhāvi nodapatsyata, kāraṇābhāvāt, vastupratibaddhatvād arthakriyājñānasya / | If the initial first cognition had appeared in regard to a nonentity, then the subsequent cognition of its result (in the shape of effective activity) could not come about; because its cause would not be there; because the cognition of effective action is always concomitant with an entity. |
na hyanagnigrāhiṇo jñānād aśokastabakādāvagnyadhyavasāyena pravṛttasya dāhapākādinirbhāsinaḥ pratyayaḥ prasūyante / | When the cognition does not envisage real Fire, when for instance one has the idea of Fire in regard to the bunch of Aśoka-blossoms, there do not appear the cognitions of such actions as burning and cooking (which are peculiar to Fire). |
prasave vāgnirevāsau, kutaḥ ---, dāhapākādikaryotpattihetutvamātralakṣaṇatvād vibhāvasoḥ vahnerity arthaḥ // | why? because Fire is nothing else but what is characterised by the capacity to burn and to cook things. ‘Vibhāvasu’ is Fire. |
tasmād arthakriyābhāsaṃ jñānaṃ yāvan na jāyate / tāvad ādye 'pramāśaṅkā jāyate bhrāntihetutaḥ // | From all this it follows that so long as the cognition envisaging effective action does not appear, there is always a suspicion of the initial cognition being wrong (invalid); |
nanu cārthakriyājñānavadādyam api jñānaṃ sākṣād agnyādipadārthajanitam eva, tat kimiti tatraivāprāmāṇyāśaṅkā, nottaratretyāśaṅkyāha anantaram ityādi / anantaraṃ phalādṛṣṭiḥ sādṛśyasyopalambhanam / | In regard to the first cognition, there are various grounds for suspecting it to be wrong, such as (1) the non-perception of its effect (in the shape of effective action), (2) perception of similarity, (3) inefficiency of the cognition and so forth. When, however, there appears the cognition envisaging its effect, there are no such grounds; because there is direct perception of action, which is directly related to the entity cognised. |
mater apaṭutetyādi bhrāntikāraṇamatra ca // | The argument is summed up in the following: [see verse 2966 above] |
kāryāvabhāsivijñāne jāte tvetan na vidyate / sākṣād vastunibaddhāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ prativedanāt // | Says the Opponent: “Like the initial cognition, the cognition of effective action also is produced directly by the thing, Fire, itself; then why should there be suspicion of invalidity regarding the initial cognition only, and not regarding the other cognition?” Answer: [see verses 2967-2968 above] |
ādye hi jñāne bhranatikāraṇam asti, tathā hi tadanantaraṃ dāhādilakṣaṇasyaphalasyā [p.780] nutpādo bhrāntajñānasādharmyaṃ buddher apāṭavam / | In connection with the initial cognition (of Eire), there are several grounds for suspecting it to be wrong; for instance, (I) immediately after the cognition, there does not come about its effect in the shape of Burning and the like, (2) it is similar to wrong cognitions, and (3) the inefficiency of the cognition; |
ādiśabdenānādare 'nabhyāsa ityādi gṛhyate / | ‘and so forth’ includes unconcernedness, absence of repetition, etc. |
phalajñāne tu na kiñcid bhrāntikāraṇaṃ vidyata iti tasya svata eva niścayaḥ // | In regard to the cognition of the effect, on the other hand, there is no reason to suspect it to be wrong; hence its confirmation comes from itself. |
ādye 'pi jñāne yatrābhyāsādinā protsāritaṃ bhrāntinimittaṃ tasya svata eva prāmāṇyam iti darśayann āha vṛttāvityādi / | In regard to the initial cognition also, when, by frequent repetition, etc, the grounds of suspicion have been dispelled, the validity comes by itself. This is what is pointed out in the following [see verse 2969 next] |
vṛttāvabhyāsavatyāṃ tu vailakṣaṇyaṃ pratīyate / atadviṣayato jñānād ādye prāpte 'pi tatphale // | In the case of the initial cognition also, even though its effect may not have been seen, if the cognition has been repeated, a distinct peculiarity is perceived in it which differentiates it from cognitions not pertaining to the thing concerned, [and this establishes its validity]. |
abhyāsabalena yathā yogināṃ maṇisyādiṣu vā tadvidāṃ dūrīkṛtabhrāntinimittameva sphuṭapratibhāsaṃ prajāyate vijñānamevamanyatrāpyabhyāsabalāt sphuṭatarapratibhāsatayā nirastavibhramāśaṅkamupajāyamānamadhya{vya---}vadhānena sajātīyasādhāraṇādhyavasāyinaṃ na parā{sāyinaṃ parā ---}marśapratyayaṃ janayad vijātīyato 'tadviṣayād vyāvṛttamavasīyata iti svata eva tasya prāmāṇyam ucyate / | as is found in the case of mystics and in that of experts in gems and coins; in the same manner, in other cases also, through repeated experience a clear and distinct cognition may appear, in regard to which all grounds of suspicion regarding invalidity have been dispelled; and it produces immediately after itself a Cogitative Cognition envisaging an object of the same kind, and thereby it becomes cognised as dissociated from those heterogeneous things which have not figured in the preceding cognition; in this way its validity is spoken of as being due to itself. |
yastu manyate abhyāsavatyām api pravṛttau tādrūpyalakṣaṇaliṅgadarśanādanumānata evārthaprāpaṇaśaktilakṣaṇaprāmāṇyaniścaya iti sarvatra parataḥprāmāṇyāvasāyo na kvacid eva svata iti / | Some people hold the following opinion: “Even when the cognition is repeated, there is certainty regarding its validity, in the shape of the capacity to bring about its effect, and this certainty is brought about by Inference based upon the Probans in the form of ‘similarity’; so that in all cases validity is cognised through extraneous causes, and never by the cognition by itself”. |
tan na buddhyāmahe / | This view, however, we fail to comprehend. |
tathā hi asaṅkīrṇatādrūpyalakṣaṇaliṅganiścaya eva kuto bhavatīti vaktavyam / | Because it is necessary to explain from what resource arises the conviction regarding the said Probans itself in the shape of similarity that is not confused. |
abhyāsād iti cet, evaṃ tarhi yadyabhyāsabalād vijātīyākāravyavacchedena sajātīyasādhāraṇamasaṅkīrṇaṃ sārūpyamavasīyate bhrāntikāraṇābhāvāt kaḥ prāmāṇye pradveṣo yena tadanubhūtaṃ{tau---} bhrāntikāraṇavirahe 'pi nādhyavasīyata iti syāt / | If it be said that “it is obtained through repetition”, then, it means that through repetition, it is possible to cognise unconfused similarity, which is common to homogeneous things, and which serves to differentiate heterogeneous things, because there are no grounds for wrong cognition. If that is so, then whence the hostility to validity itself, whereby its cognition is denied, even when there are no grounds for wrong cognition? |
api ca kimidaṃ sārūpyaṃ nāma, yadi bodharūpatā, sā mithyājñāne 'pyastītyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | Further, what is this ‘similarity’ that is cognised i If it consists in ‘being of the form of cognition’, this is present in wrong cognition also; |
atha lohitākāranirbhāsitā, sāśokastabakādigrāhivijñāne vidyata iti vyabhicāra eva / | hence the Reason becomes ‘inconclusive If it consists in ‘appearing in the red form’ (in the case of the bunch of Aśoka-blossoms and Fire), this is present in the blossoms also; |
athāgnyādipadārthakāryatā, sā kathaṃ niściteti vaktavyam / | hence the Reason becomes ‘false If it consists in ‘producing the effect of Fire’, then it has to be explained, how this character is ascertained. |
tat siddhyartham aparaliṅgāntaram anusarato 'navasthā syāt. | If for the proving of this, another Inferential Indicative is sought for, then there is infinite regress. |
athāpi syād abhyāsabalād eva pratyakṣato liṅgānusaraṇamantareṇāpi svata eva sā siddheti / evaṃ tarhi yadyabhyāsasyedṛśaṃ sāmarthyam abhyupagamyate, tadā mu{śa---}ktiniścayo 'pyabhyāsabalādevāntareṇāpi liṅgānusaraṇaṃ bhavatīti kiṃ nābhyupagamyate / | It might be argued that “the similarity is cognised by itself, even without the help of the Inferential Indicative, by direct Perception, through repetition”, But in that case, if repetition is admitted to possess such capacity, then why is it not admitted that certainty regarding the capacity (of Cognitions and things) also can come without the help of Inferential Indicatives? Then again, if it has been established that it is the effect of the cognition, then it is absolutely futile to follow up the Invariable Concomitance; |
kiñca yadi tat kāryatā siddhā jñānasya tadā vyāptyanusaraṇam anarthakam, tat kāryatāvasāyād eva tadarthaprāpaṇaśaktisiddher anumānajñānavat / yathānumānajñānasya vastupratibaddhaliṅgadarśanabalenotpatteḥ pāramparyeṇa vastukāryatāvasāyād eva svataḥprāmāṇyam, na sārūpyabalāt. | as the recognition of ‘being the effect of the Cognition’ would itself, like the Inferential Cognition, prove the capacity of getting at its objective (in the shape of fruitful activity). That is to say, Inferential Cognition is brought about through the perception of the Probans as concomitant with the thing concerned, and thereby it becomes cognised as brought about, indirectly, by that thing; and it is on this ground that it is regarded as valid by itself, and not through similarity; |
anyathā hy anavasthā syāt, tathehāpi svata eva prāmāṇyaṃ, [p.781] syāt / | as otherwise, there would be an Infinite Regress; in the same manner, in the case in question, the validity of the cognition would be self-sufficient by itself. |
tathā hi yatra pakṣadharmatvaniścaye 'pi sādhyārthapratītir na jāyate tatradṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi vyāptimanusaret pratipattā, yathā kṛtakatvānityatvayoḥ / | Because, in a case where, even when it is known with certainty that the Probans resides in the ‘Subject’, the cognition of the Probandum does not come about; and in such a ease the investigator would seek for the concomitance of the Probans in a Corroborative Instance; |
iha tu jñānasya tatkāryasyāvasāyād eva tadarthāvyabhicāritayā tat prāpaṇaśaktiḥ siddheti na tādrūpyaṃ liṅgam / | in the case in question, however, the capacity of the cognition to get at its objective is proved by the fact of that being its effect and hence non-separable from it; consequently, similarity cannot serve as an Indicative, in this case. |
yady evaṃ katham uktam ācāryeṇa lokāyatam adhikṛtya sa khalu pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ nānumānam iti bruvāṇaḥ kāsāñcid vyaktīnāṃ pravṛttau saṃvādaṃ visaṃvādaṃ copalabhya tallakṣaṇaṃ vyāptyā kathayedyathopadeśaṃ pravartamānasyāvipralambhārtham, tadyathādṛṣṭasādharmyāt tathā prasādhitamanumeyatāṃ nātipatatīBBBtinaiṣa doṣaḥ / | Says the Opponent “If that is so, then how is it that your Teacher has made the following assertion in reference to the Materialist: ‘When the Materialist says that Perception is the only Means of Cognition, and Inference is not so, and finds that while some particular perceptions are in consonance with the reality of things, while others are not so, the necessary definition could be so propounded only on the basis of Invariable Concomitance, for the benefit of a person who would regulate his activity in accordance with this definition; and the definition thus propounded on the basis of similarity to what has been seen cannot escape from being something inferred’.” |
svaparasantānavartinīrananubhūtaviṣayā buddhīradhikṛtyaitad uktam / | This assertion has been made by our Teacher with reference to those cognitions of unapprehended things which appear in one’s own ‘chain’ as well as in the ‘chain’ of others; |
anyatrānubhūtaviṣayābhya iti vacanāt / anyathā hi yadi sārūpyāt sarvatra prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate tadānyatrānubhūtaviṣayābhya iti pratiṣedho 'narthakaḥ syāt / | that this is so is clear from the subsequent qualifying clause ‘apart from the cognitions of apprehended things If it were not so, if validity in all cases were to be ascertained through similarity, then the qualifying exception ‘apart from the cognitions of apprehended things’ would be meaningless. |
tasmād abhyāsabalāt protsāritabhrāntinimittamupajāyate yat tatsvata eva pramāṇam iti sthitam // | From all this it follows that that cognition, which appears as having all grounds of mistake dispelled by repetition, is self-sufficient in its validity. |
vailakṣaṇyāpratītau tu vijātīyārthaśaṅkayā / kāryāvabhāsivijñānād ṛte mānāviniścayaḥ // | If no difference is perceived, then, on account of the suspicion of the thing being otherwise than cognised, there can be no certainty regarding validity, unless there is a cognition envisaging the resultant effect. |
[2946]tasmin sadapi mānatvaṃ viniścetuṃ na śakyate / | In such a case even though the validity may be present there, it cannot be ascertained; |
uttarādyakriyājñānāt kevalaṃ tat pratīyate // | it is recognised only through the subsequent cognition of its resultant activity. |
ataś ca prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tat saṃvādamapekṣate / | It is for this reason that the first cognition needs its corroboration; |
saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyastathaiva na // | and for the same reason it is not necessary to seek for the corroboration of the corroborative cognition also. |
yatra hy anubhūtam api prāmāṇyaṃ bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvād viniścetuṃ na śakyate tatra parato 'rthakriyājñānād niścīyate, tāvanmatreṇaiva ca puruṣasyābhīṣṭārthasaṃsiddher ākāṅkṣā vinivṛtteti na punaḥ saṃvādenāpy aparaḥ saṃvādas tathaiva ādyajñānavadapekṣaṇīyaḥ // | Even in case where the Validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception; and in such cases, the Validity is ascertained only extraneously, through the cognition of the resultant activity; and what is desired by the man having been secured by this, there is no need for further corroboration by another corroborative cognition; as there is in the case of the initial cognition. |
bhrāntihetor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramāṇatā / | Of the second cognition, the validity is self-sufficient, because there are no causes for misapprehension; |
prathamasya tadābhāve pradveṣo bhrāntisambhavāt // | in the case of the first cognition, however, there is hostility towards its self-validity, on account of the possibility of misapprehension. |
TS 2972 | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2973 above] |
[2946,11] nanu ca yat sandigdhārthāvinābhāvitvenāniścitārthaprāpaṇasāmarthyaṃ jñānam, tad anumānavan na pramāṇaṃ prāpnoti. tathā hi anumānasyārthāvinābhāvasaṃśaye sati na prāmāṇyam [p.782] iṣṭam, evaṃ pratyakṣe 'pi na prāpnoti. | Says the Opponent: “That cognition, which is concomitant with the suspicion of invalidity, and hence in regard to which there is no certainty regarding its capacity to get at its objective, would be like Inference and hence not valid. Because, in the case of Inference, when there is doubt regarding the invariable concomitance of the objective, ṇo validity attaches to it; in the same manner Perceptions also would be not valid”. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ. | This does not affect our position. |
na hy anumānavad arthanāntarīyakam ātmānam upadarśayat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭam, kiṃ tarhi pratibhāsamānārthavasāyaṃ kurvatu. | Because when Perception is regarded as valid, it is not because it represents itself as invariably concomitant with its objective, like Inference; but only as tending to the envisaging (or ideating) of the objective. |
tathā hi arthakriyārthino 'bhimatam arthaṃ prāpayat pramāṇām ucyate. | Because it is called ‘valid’, when it presents the desired object to the man seeking for effective action; |
na cārthadeśaṃ puruṣam upasarpavad arthaṃ vā puruṣadeśam ānayat tat prāpakaṃ bhavati, api tu puruṣaṃ pravartayat. | and this presentation of the object is not done either by carrying the man to the place where the object lies, or by carrying the object to the place where the man is; it is done by prompting the man to activity. |
taṃ ca puruṣaṃ na hastena gṛhītvā pravartayati, kiṃ tarhi pravṛttiviṣayam upadarśayat. | Nor does it prompt the man to activity by taking hold of his hand; it does it by showing the objective of that activity; |
tac copadarśanaṃ pratibhāsamānārthāvasāyād, nānyat. yatra ca saṃśayaḥ, tatrāvaśyaṃ pratibhāsamānākārāvasāyo 'sti. | and this showing of the objective is no thing but the cognition of the object figuring in the Perception. In a case where there is doubt, there also there certainly is cognition of the object figuring in the Perception; |
tadanavasāye tadvimarśāyogāt. | if there were no cognition of it, it could not figure in the doubt at all. |
tataś caitāvatā pratyakṣavyāpāraparisamāptaiḥ paścād arthāvinābhāvasaṃśayo bhavan na pratyakṣavyāpāram uparuṇaddhīti, saty api saṃśayodaye bhavaty eva, prāmāṇyaṃ pratyakṣasya. | As the functioning of the Perception would be complete by this much, if there is a doubt later on, regarding the invariable concomitance of the object (with the Perception), this doubt could not prevent the functioning of the Perception; so that even when there is this doubt, the validity of the Perception remains intact. |
[2946,22] yat tu pratibhāsamānapadārthaviruddhākārāvasāyākrāntam udeti, tan na pramāṇam, yathā marīcikāgrāhijñānaṃ jalāvasāyākrāntam, tatra yathoktapramāṇavyāpārābhāvāt. | That Perception, however, which appears as beset by the idea of a form contrary to the object figuring in the Perception, is not valid; e.g. the Perception of the Mirage beset, by the idea of Water; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the aforesaid functioning of the Perception does not take place. |
yac ca śaṅke pītajñānaṃ maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇijñānam, tad apy apramāṇam eva, tatra yathārthaṃ pratibhāsāvasāyayor abhāvāt. | Similarly when there is cognition of the yellow colour in the Conch-shell, or that of the gem in the light radiating from it, all this cognition is clearly invalid; as in both these cases, the cognition is not in accordance with the real state of the things concerned. |
pratibhāsavaśād dhi pratyakṣasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe, na tv arthāvisaṃvādamātrāt. [2947] na cātra yathā svabhāvadeśakālāvasthitavastupratibhāso 'sti, na vā deśakālaḥ sa eva bhavati, deśakālayor api vastusvabhāvabhedakatvāt. | The apprehension or non-apprehension of the Perception is due to what actually figures in it, it is not due to mere conformity with the real state of things. In the cases just cited, the thing that actually figures in the cognition is not as it really exists at the particular time and place; in fact the time and place are not the same at all; as time and place also make a difference in the nature of things; |
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