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etad eva spaṣṭayann āha na tatsvabhāvetyādi / | The following Text points out that this argument is ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 2841 above] |
tadrūpaniścayārthaṃ tu pratipattāvapekṣyate // | The same idea is f urther clarified: [see verse 2842 above] |
[p.752] syād etat yadi bhavatāṃ jñānāpekṣayā parataḥprāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate, tadāsmākam api siddhasādhyatā / | The following might be urged: “If you are seeking to prove the fact of the validity of Cognition being ‘extraneous’ in relation to the Pramāṇa itself, then we also admit it, and hence your argument is futile; |
tathā hi jñānamapyarthāpattitas tāvat siddham iṣyate, kimaṅga punaḥ tacchaktirūpaṃ prāmāṇyam / arthaniścayalakṣaṇe svakārye tu kartavye jñānaṃ nāpekṣata iti svatastaducyata iti / | because the existence of the Cognition itself is held to be proved by Presumption, what to say of its validity, which consists in its Capacity? In the matter, however, of the bringing about of its effect in the shape of the certain cognition of the object, the Cognition does not need anything else; that is why the validity has been described as ‘self-sufficient’, ‘inherent’”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This cannot be right; |
prāmāṇyaniścayamantareṇa svārthaniścayasyaivāsambhavāt / | because the certain cognition of the object of the Cognition cannot be got at without certainty regarding its validity. |
saṃśayādiviṣayīkṛtasya ca kathaṃ kārye nirapekṣatā, pramāṇāntaragrahaṇāpekṣāyāṃ vā kathaṃ svapakṣe anavasthā na syād iti yatkiñcidetat // | Because how can the object, which is still subject to doubt and uncertainty, be independent and self-sufficient, in the bringing about of its effect? If it were dependent upon apprehensions produced by other Means of Cognition, how could you avoid Infinite Regress involved in your view? So what has been suggested is nothing. |
kiñcetyādinā hetos tadbhāvaniyatatvād ityetasyānaikāntikatām udbhāvayati / | The following Texts point out the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Reason “because it is restricted to its presence [the Validity must be self-sufficient]”: [see verses 2843-2846 above] |
tathā saṃvādasāmarthyam niścayamanyata iti vartate / | ‘So also the capacity for conformity’ ‘and certain cognition’ is to be construed here also. |
samaṃ dvayam iti / pramāṇamapramāṇaṃ ca / | ‘Both would be on the same footing i.e. both Validity and Invalidity. |
viparyayād iti / aprāmāṇyāt / | ‘In its contrary’ i.e. in Invalidity. |
na nityatvācchaktīnāṃ svābhāvikatvaṃ nāpi svahetubhya evotpatter uttarakālaṃ kāraṇāntarānapekṣaṇāt / kiṃ tarhi / | Some people argue as follows “The inherent character of the Capacities is not due to their eternality; nor is it due to the fact of their coming about from the causes of the Cognition itself; and it does not appear later on-on account of its being not dependent upon other causes; |
svabhāvata eva bhāvānāṃ pratiniyatarūpāḥ śaktayaḥ samudbhavantīti svābhāvikatvam āsām / | as a matter of fact, it is the potencies of things that come about, with specific characters, from the nature of the things themselves; and herein lies their ‘naturalness’ (or Inherent character). |
tathā hi yadeva svātmani rūpam asti kāraṇānāṃ tadeva taiḥ kārye samādhīyate, yathā kāpālairupajanyamāne ghaṭe rūpādayaḥ svaguṇadvāreṇaiva prārabhyante, udakādyāharaṇaśaktis tu tair ātmanyavidyamānatvānnādhīyate ghaṭe, svata eva tu sā tasya prādurbhavati, tathā jñāne 'pi tat kāraṇair indriyādibhir arthaparicchedaśaktirātmanyavidyamānatvānnādhīyate, svata eva sā tasya bhavatīti / | For instance, that same form (and character) which belongs to the causes is infused by them in their effect; for example, when the Jar is produced out of the potsherds, the colour and other properties in the Jar are brought about by the potsherds through their own properties; and as for the capacity to contain water, that capacity is not present in the potsherds, and hence that is not brought about in the Jar in the said manner; this capacity in fact, appears in the Jar by itself; similarly, in the case of Cognitions, the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things, which, is not present in the sense-organs and other causes of the Cognitions, is not brought about by these causes; |
ataḥ svābhāvikī śaktir iti tasyāpyetat pralāpamātram / | it appears in the Cognitions by themselves. Thus it is that the Capacity is ‘natural’ (inherent)”. |
anena nyāyenāprāmāṇyasyāpi svata eva prasaṅgāt / | This also is mere senseless babbling. |
tathā hi tadapi viparītārthaparicchedādiśaktilakṣaṇam, na ca nayanādīnāṃ tathāvidhaśaktiyogo 'stīti / | Because by the same process of reasoning, Invalidity also may be shown to be ‘inherent For instance, ‘invalidity’ consists in ‘the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things otherwise than this real form’; |
kiñca yadyātmanyavidyamānaṃ rūpaṃ kāraṇair nādhīyate kārye, tadā katham indriyādayo jñāne{na---} rūpatāmātmanyasatīmādadhati vijñāne / ta{ya---}thāvidyamānāpi [p.753] sā tairādhīyate, {tathā} arthaparicchedaśaktiṃ kiṃ nādadhīran / | Further, if it is true that the form that is not present in the Causes is not produced by them in the Effect, then how is it that the Sense-organ and other causes of Cognition produce, in the Cognition, the form that was not present there before? Just as this form, though not present there, is produced there by the causes, so, in the same manner, why could not they produce in it the capacity for apprehending things also? There can be nothing to prevent their producing such capacity. |
kiñca yadi tāvad avyatirekiṇyaḥ śaktayo bhāvādabhyupagamyante, tadā bhāvasvarūpavat tāsām api hetupratibaddhair ātmasthitir iti kutaḥ svābhāvikatvam āsām / atha vyatirekiṇyas tadā svayam eva bhāvān na svāśrayais tāsāṃ sambandhaḥ siddhyati, teṣāṃ tadanupakārakatvāt / | Then again, if Potencies or Capacities are held to be non-different from the thing (to which they belong), then, like the form of the Thing the capacities also must have their existence concomitant with (and due to) their causes; whence then could they be ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’? If’, on the other hand, the capacities are different from the thing, then, as they would be existent by themselves, they would have no connection with their substratum (the Thing); |
nacānupakāraka āśrayo yukte 'tiprasaṅgāt / | as it would be rendering no help to them and what cannot render any help cannot be the substratum; |
kiñcānimittāḥ svātantryeṇaitā bhavatyo na deśakālaniyamam apekṣeran / | Further, as they would have no causes, they would be appearing by themselves without being dependent upon the exigencies of time and place. |
tathā hi yasya yatkiñcit kvacidāyattamanāyattaṃ vā bhūtvopalīyate / | For instance, a thing, having come into existence, disappears only when it is dependent upon something else; |
na vā yat punar anāyattaṃ, svātantryeṇa pravṛttam tat kimiti kadācit kvacid viramet / tataśca pratiniyataśaktiyogitā bhāvānāṃ na syāt / | that which is not so dependent, and operates by itself independently, why should it cease to operate at any time or place? If that were so, then the capacities of things would not be restricted; |
anyathā sarvasya sarvatropayogaḥ syād iti / | anything could operate towards everything else. |
anye tu manyante tat kāryadarśanamāśrityedam ucyate svataḥ sarvapramāṇānām ityādi / | Other people argue as follows: “What has been said (by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2812) as to the validity of the Pramāṇas being inherent in them, is on the basis of what is seen of their effects. |
yataḥ sarva eva bhāvāḥ santa eva kāraṇaiḥ kriyante kāryotpādaniyamāt / | Because it is only as positive existent entities that effects are produced by the Causes; as is clear from the fact that the producing of effects is always restricted. |
nahyasanto vyomakusumādayaḥ kvacid api śakyante kartum, sikatāsu vā tailam / | What are mere non-entities, such as the ‘sky-lotus’ cannot be produced anywhere; nor is oil produced out of Sands. |
asata utpattau sarvasyāsattve 'tiśayābhāvāt sarvadā sarvatra cotpattiḥ syāditi / | If the non-existent thing were produced, as all things would be equally non-existent, and there would be no difference among them on that score, their production should come about at all times and at all places |
tadetad ayuktam / | This cannot be right; |
kāraṇavaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt / | as, in that case, the Cause would be entirely futile. |
asattāvadbhavanmate na kiñcit kriyate / | According to you, nothing that is non-existent is produced; |
sato 'pi sarvanirāśaṃsatvān na kiñcit kartavyam astīti kiṃ hi kurvaṃs tasya tat kārakaṃ bhavet / ataḥ kāryakāraṇatvābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ / | while as for the existent, as it does not stand in need of anything, what is there that could be produced for it; then what is there by producing which the Cause would be an active agent? So that under this view there would be an end to the -whole principle of Cause and Effect. |
abhivyaktiḥ sataḥ kriyata iti cen na / | It might be argued that “what is brought about by the Cause is the manifestation of what has been existent”. That cannot be; |
tasyā api sadasattvena karaṇavirodhāt / yatas tatrāpīdaṃ vikalpadvayam avatarati kiṃ sā satī kriyate, āhosvid asatīti / prathame pakṣe 'tiśayābhāvāt karaṇānupapattir ityuktam / | because the bringing about of the Manifestation also would be incompatible with the view that it is existent or non-existent Because, in regard to the Manifestation also the same alternatives present themselves before being brought about, has it been existent or non-existent? In the former case, as nothing new is produced, the notion of its being ‘produced’ cannot be right. |
tatrāpyabhivyaktyāśrayaṇe 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ / | If it be held that there is manifestation of the existent Manifestation, then there would be an infinite regress. |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣo 'sataḥ kriyānabhyupagamāt / | Nor is the second alternative acceptable; because the other party does not admit of the idea of anything non-existent being produced. |
abhyupagame vā bhaktyāpyasataḥ karaṇaprasaṅgāt / kiñcārthāntarabhūtā vā bhāvādabhivyaktiḥ kriyeta anarthāntarabhūtā vā / yadyarthāntarabhūtā kriyeta tadā bhāvasya na kiñcit kṛtaṃ syāt / | Even if it be accepted, it would mean that in the case of a positive entity itself, what is produced is something non-existent. Then again, when the Manifestation is produced, is it produced as something different from the entity manifested? Or as something riot-different from it? If it is something different, then such production of the Manifested entity would have no effect on the manifested entity itself; |
nahyanyasya karaṇe 'nyatkṛtaṃ nāma, atiprasaṅgāt / | because the producing of one thing can have no effect on a thing different from it; |
tat sambandhinyabhivyaktiḥ kriyata iti cen na / | It might be said that “the manifestation is produced in what is related to the manifested entity That, however, cannot be so; |
anupakāryatayā tat sambandhitvāsiddheḥ / | because it cannot be related to it, as it is not benefited by it in any way. |
upakāre vābhyupagamyamāne tasyāpyarthāntaratve 'navasthāprasaṅgāt sambandhāsiddhiḥ / | If there is any benefit admitted, if that is something different, etc. etc. there is an Infinite regress. Hence there can be no relationship in the case. |
anarthāntaratve 'pi kāraṇānāṃ vaiyarthyaprasaṅgaḥ / | If the Manifestation is not-different from the manifested entity, then Causes become futile. |
bhāvād evāśrayabhūtād upakārasvabhāvāyā abhivyakter utpādānnityābhivyaktiprasaṅgaḥ, svabhāvasyābhivyaktikāraṇasya sarvadā vidyamānatvāt / | If the Manifestation, in the form of some benefit, is produced out of the Entity in which it subsists, then there should be such Manifestation at all times; as the cause of Manifestation, in the shape of the nature of the Entity, would be always there. |
nāpyanupakāryasya parāpekṣā yukteti pratipāditaṃ bahudhā / | It has been explained repeatedly that what cannot be benefited cannot depend upon anything else. |
athānarthāntarabhūtābhivyaktiḥ kriyata iti pakṣaḥ, so 'pyayukto 'tiśayābhāvāt / | If then, the view is that what is produced is the Manifestation which is not-different from the entity, that also cannot be right; |
tathāhyanarthāntarabhūtā kriyata iti bhāvasvabhāvaḥ kriyata ityuktaṃ bhavati / | Because what the assertion, ‘The Manifestation, non-difîerent from the entity, is produced,’ means is that ‘the nature of the entity is produced’; |
tasya ca sattvena sarvaniraśaṃsatvāt karaṇama [p.754] yuktamityetad eva cintyate / | and hence the idea of its being produced would be most improper. |
kiñca abhivyaktivadbhāvasyāpyasataḥ karaṇaṃ syād avyatirekāt / | Then again, like the Manifestation, the entity also that would he produced, would have to be non-existent; |
bhāvasvabhāvavadvābhivyakter api satyā eva karaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, na caitad api yuktam, atiśayābhāvāt / | Or, like the nature of the entity, the Manifestation also that would be produced would be existent. Nor is this right; as nothing new is produced in this case; |
anavasthāprasaṅgādityuktam / | as there would be an infinite regress, as already explained. |
sadarthaviṣaye ca kāraṇavyāpāra iṣyamāṇe kāraṇānāṃ kāryakriyānuparamaprasaṅgaḥ / kiṃ hi tadopalabdhe kāraṇāni nivartteran / kāryasattām iti cen na / | Further, if it be held that the Cause operates upon what is already existent, then there would be no cessation of the producing of effects by Causes; as in that case, on securing what, would the Causes cease to operate? If it be urged that “they would cease on securing the existence of the effect” then that cannot be right; |
bhavanmatyā tasyāḥ prāgapi bhāvāt / | as, under your view, that existence would be already there. |
tasmād asadevotpadyate, yasya kāraṇam asti / na vyomakusumādi / | Hence that non-existent thing alone is produced of which there is a Cause, and not such non-existent things as the ‘sky-lotus’; |
tadutpādanasamarthakāraṇābhāvād iti / | as there are no causes capable of producing these latter. |
ataḥ kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamāt kāryakāraṇabhāvaniyamo bhaviṣyati / | Thus it is that the causal relation is always restricted by the limitations of the efficiency of the Cause. |
nahi sarvo bhāvaḥ sarvotpādanasamartho 'ṅgīkriyate / | Everything cannot be regarded as capable of producing everything else; |
anādisvahetuparamparayā sarvabhāvānāṃ śakter niyamitatvāt / | as the efficiency of all things is restricted within limits through a beginningless ‘chain of causes’, |
yadi cāsatprāmāṇyam anyena kartuṃ na śakyata iti svatas tad ucyate, aprāmāṇyam api tarhy anenaiva nyāyena svata eva prāpnotīti yatkiñcid etat / | If the idea is that “because validity, if not existent, could not be produced by anything else, therefore it is said to be inherent”, then, for the same reason, Invalidity also should be regarded as inherent. Hence the explanation is not worthy of notice. |
yo 'pi manyate prāmāṇyaṃ nāma vijñānasyārthaparicchedotpādikā śaktiḥ, śaktiś ca kṣaṇikavijñānāśritatvāt svato 'satī na śakyate kartum / | Some people argue as follows: “The validity of the Cognition consists in its capacity to bring about the apprehension of the Object; and this Capacity resting in the Cognition, which is momentary, if not existent by itself, cannot be produced; |
kālatraye 'pi tasyāḥ kriyānupapatteḥ / | and no producing of it can be possible at any of the three points of time. |
tathā hi na tāvat prāgvijñānotpatteḥ kriyate, āśritatvāt / | For instance, it cannot be produced before the appearance of the Cognition, as it is in the Cognition that it subsists; |
na hy āśritasyāśrayābhāve karaṇaṃ yuktam, yathā kuḍyābhāve citrasya, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt / | and what is subsistent cannot be produced in the absence of the substratum.; e.g. the painting cannot be produced in the absence of the wall; as if it did, it would cease to be subsistent. |
ata eva sahakaraṇamapyayuktamāśritatvāt / | It is for this same reason of the Capacity being subsistent in the Cognition, that both cannot be regarded as produced simultaneously; |
na hi kuḍyālekhyayor āśrayāśritayor yugapadārambhaḥ sambhavati / | e.g. the wall and the painting, which are the substratum and the subsistent respectively, are not produced at one and the same time. |
nāpy utpannasya sato vijñānasya paścāt kriyate kṣaṇikatvāt / | Nor, on the other hand, can the Capacity be produced in the Cognition after the latter has been in existence; |
tāvat kālaṃ sthiter abhāvāt / | because the Cognition is momentary, and cannot continue to exist so long. |
ataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyam ucyataTT iti tad etad asamyak, tathā hi yat tāvad uktam arthaparicchedotpādikāśaktiḥ prāmāṇyam iti tadasambaddham / | It is on all these grounds that the validity of all Pramāṇas is held to be inherent in them”. All this cannot be right. Because, as regards the assertion that “The validity of cognitions consists in the Capacity productive of the apprehension of things”, this is entirely irrelevant; |
arthaparicchedasya jñānaparyāyatvāt / | because ‘the apprehension of things’ is synonymous with ‘cognition’; |
na ca tadeva jñānamāśritā satī śaktis tasyaivotpādikā yujyate anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt samānakālaṃ ca kāryakāraṇabhāvād upapatteḥ / yac coktam āśritatvāt saha prāk ca na kriyata iti / | and the Capacity subsisting in a Cognition cannot be productive of the same cognition; as in that case the capacity would not be subsistent in the Cognition; as the relation of cause and effect can be there only when both are there at one and the same time. Then, it has been argued that “being subsistent, the Capacity cannot be produced at the same time as, or before, the Cognition This also cannot be right. |
tad apy ayuktam, avyatirekādāśritatvāsiddheḥ / | Because, the two being non-different (ex hypothesi), the one cannot be subsistent in the other. |
bhāvasvabhāva eva hi viśiṣṭārthakriyākārī tadbhāvamātrajijñāsāyāṃ śaktir iti vyapadiśyate / | The fact of the matter is that when the nature of the thing itself is found to be capable of a particular effective action, and there arises the question as to its exact character, the same nature of the thing is called ‘Capacity’ (Potency); |
nārthāntaram / | and it is not anything different. |
arthāntaratve bhāvasyākārakatvaprasaṅgaḥ sambandhāsiddhiś ceti nirloḍitam etad bahudhā / | If the Capacity were something different from the Thing, the latter would cease to be an active agent; and there would be no possibility of aṇy relationship between the two. This has been already discussed several times. |
tasmāt svabhāvabhūtā vijñānasya śaktir abhinnayogakṣematvād vijñānasvabhāvavat prāgvijñānotpatter asatyeva kriyata ityaviruddham / | Thus then the capacity of the Cognition forms its very nature, and is subject to the same fate; and as such, before the appearance of the Cognition, it remains nonexistent, just like the nature of the Cognition itself, and is then brought about. |
sahaiva ca vijñānenotpadyata ityapi yuktam eva / | It is also quite right that the Capacity is produced along with the Cognition itself; |
svabhāvabhūtasya dharmasya bhāvena sahaikayogakṣematvāt / | because the property that forms the nature of a thing must always share the same fate as that thing itself. |
bhavatu nāma śakter avyatirekaḥ padārthāt, tathāpi sadasator āśritatvam asiddham / tathā hi sattāvannāśrayate tasya sarvātmanā niṣpatter nirapekṣatvāt / | Even so, as there can be no subsistence between the existent and the non-existent, the said subsistence cannot be admitted. Because the Capacity cannot subsist in the Cognition, in the manner that ‘Being’ does; because it is always completely established and does not depend upon anything else. |
nāpi sata āśrayo yuktas tasyākiñcitkaratvāt / | Nor can there be any substratum for the existent thing; as such a substratum can serve no useful purpose; |
[p.755] yathā vindhyo himavataḥ / | as for instance, in the case of the Vindhya and the Himalaya mountains. |
sthitis tena kriyata iti cet na / | It might be said that “what it brings about is continued existence”. But that cannot be right. |
sthiteḥ sthāturavyatirekāt / sthātureva hi svabhāvas tathā bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇocyate / | Because the ‘continued existence’ cannot be anything different from the existent thing. In fact, it is the nature of the existent thing itself that is spoken of as ‘continued existence’, with a view to the denial of ail other diversities. |
naca tenāśrayeṇāvasthāturātmā kriyata ityakiñcikara eva / | But the essence of the existent thing is not brought about by such a substratum; hence it is futile. |
vyatireke 'pi sthiteḥ sthātuḥ sthāpako 'kiñcitakara eva / | If the continued existence and the existent thing be different from one another, then anything tending to bring about existence would be futile; |
arthāntarabhūtāyāḥ sthiteḥ kāraṇāt / | as what it would bring about is only something else, in the shape of the continued existence; |
na cānyasya karaṇenānyasya kiñcitkṛtamityubhayathāpi sthāpakasyākiñcitkaratvam / | but the bringing about of one thing cannot produce any effect in another thing; so in either case there would be futility of what brings about the continued existence. |
tat sambandhinī sthitiṃ karotīti cet / | It might be argued that it brings about an existence related to it”. |
na, sthāpyasthāpakayor iva sthitimataḥ sthityā saha sambandhāsiddheḥ, anavasthāprasaṅgaśceti nirloḍitaprāyam etat / | That cannot be so; because there can be no relationship between ‘continued existence’ and the ‘existent’, as there is between the permanence and what brings about the permanence; and this would also lead to an infinite regress. |
kiñca padārthasya sthāpikā sthitir arthāntarabhūtāṅgīkriyate, tadā na kasyacit padārthasya vināśaḥ prāpnoti / | Then again, if the ‘continued existence’ that makes the thing ‘lasting’, be admitted to be something different from that thing, then, there can be no Destruction of anything at all; |
sthāpikāyāḥ sthiter vidyamānatvāt / | as the continued existence conducive to permanence would be always there. |
nāpi vināśahetuvaśāt satyām api sthitau vināśo bhaviṣyatīti śakyaṃ vaktum / | Nor can it be asserted that “Even though the continued existence is there, there would be destruction by causes leading to that Destruction”. |
tasyāpyakiñcitkaratvād ayuktaṃ vināśakatvam / | Because such cause also, being futile, could not bring about the Destruction. |
tathā hi tatrāpyayaṃ vikalpo 'vataratyeva kiṃ bhāvād arthāntarabhūtaṃ vināśaṃ nāśahetuḥ karotyāhosvid bhāvam eva / | Because in this case also, the following alternatives present themselves: When the cause of Destruction brings about the Destruction, does it bring this about as something different from the Thing destroyed? Or is it the Thing itself? It cannot bring about the Thing itself; |
na tāvad bhāvam eva karoti, tasya niṣpannatvāt / anyasya ca karaṇe bhāvasya na kiñcit kṛtam iti tadavasthatvāt / | and if it brings about something different, then it brings about nothing in the Thing itself, which continues to remain as before. Then again, as there can be no Destruction of anything, the cause of Destruction must be futile; |
bhāvasya vināśābhāvādakiñcitkaro vināśahetur iti carvitametat sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ vistareṇa / | all this has been discussed in detail in course of the examination of the ‘Permanence of Things |
kiñca prakṛtyā bhāvo 'sthirasvabhāvo vā syāt, sthirasvabhāvo vā / | Further, by its very nature, the thing could be either impermanent or permanent. |
tatra yadi prakṛtyaivāsthirātmā bhāvaḥ svahetor utpannaḥ, tadā tena svabhāvaniṣpatter ūrdhvaṃ svayaṃ na sthātavyam eveti tasyākiñcitkarau dvāvapi sthitirnāśahetū / atha prakṛtyā sthirātmā bhāvaḥ, tathāpi tasya svabhāvānyathātvāsambhavān na kaścid vināśakaḥ, svayam eva sthāvaratvānnāpi kaścit sthāpakaḥ, ityubhayathā sthitināśahetū akiñcitkarau / | If then, the thing appearing from its cause is impermanent by its nature, then, as soon as that impermanent thing has come about, it should cease to exist by itself, so that there would be nothing to be done by the two causes that of continued existence, and that of Destruction. If, on the other hand, the Thing is permanent, by its nature, even so, as its nature could not be altered, there would be nothing that could destroy it; and being permanent, by itself, there could be nothing that could make it lasting; so in both cases the causes of Continuance and of Destruction would be futile. |
nāpyasadāśrayata iti pakṣaḥ / | Nor can it be right to hold that the Capacity subsists in something nonexistent. |
tasya sarvasvabhāvarahitatvenādheyatvavyāpārayor asambhavācchaśaviṣāṇavad ityasiddham āśritatvaṃ śakteḥ / | Because what is non-existent is devoid of all character, it cannot have anything introduced into it; nor can it be operative; hence it would be like the ‘Hare’s Horn’, From all this it follows that the Capacity cannot be subsistent in anything. |
siddhau vānaikāntikatvamāśritānām api rūpādīnāṃ ghaṭe sahotpattidarśanāt / | even so, the Reason would be ‘Inconclusive’; because even though Colour, etc. do not subsist in the Jar, they are produced along with it. |
aprāmāṇye 'pi prasaṅgāc ca / | Then again, the same could be said regarding Invalidity also; |
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