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---V codanā 47ab; PVD75b6 | [verse 2812]: |
ityetasya ca vākyasya bhavadbhiḥ ko 'rtha iṣyate // [p.746] ko 'rtha iṣyata iti praśne para āha meyabodhādika ityādi / meyabodhādike śaktis teṣāṃ svābhāvikī sthitā / | With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view (of the Mīmāṃsaka), by showing the insignificant character of his proposition: [see verse 2812 above] To this question what is the meaning that you attach to this assertion? the other party provides the following answer: [see verse 2813 above] |
2812 = ---V codanā 47cd; PVD75b6 | [verse 2813]: |
yadi jñānaṃ pramāṇam, tadā tasya meyabodhe prameyaparicchede svābhāvikī śaktiḥ arthaparicchedakatvāj jñānasya / | If Cognition is what is ‘Pramāṇa’ in the sense of the form of Cognition, then the capacity to bring about the apprehension of the cognisable, i.e. the cognition of what is to be cognised, must be inherent in it; |
atha cakṣurādīni tadā teṣāṃ yathārthajñānajanane, codanāyā atīndriyārthādhigame svata eva śaktir ityetad ādiśabdena saṃgṛhītam / | If, however, the Eye and the Organs are meant to be ‘Pramāṇa’, in the sense of the ‘means of Cognition’, then the capacity to bring about the right cognition of things must be inherent in it; and the Vedic Injunction also must have the capacity inherent in it, of bringing about the cognition of things beyond the senses. |
atraiva tāvat para upapattim āha na hītyādi. | All this is included under the term ‘ādi’, ‘etc.’ (in the compound ‘meyabodhādike’). |
etad eva darśayann āha anapekṣatvam evaikam ityādi / anapekṣatvam evaikaṃ prāmāṇyasya nibandhanam / | The argument in support of this idea is added in the words (of the second line) ‘The capacity that is not, etc, etc.’. The same idea is further explained by the Mīmāṃsaka: [see verse 2814 next] |
prāmāṇyasyeti / prāmāṇyavyavasthānasya / tadeva hīti / | ‘Basis of validity’ i.e. of the very idea of ‘validity ‘Tadeva’ Validity itself. |
vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyasyānavasthānāt // | Because on the cessation of the more extensive character, the less extensive one cannot continue. |
syād etat vināśyatāṃ nāma ko doṣa ity āha ko hītyādi / | The following might be urged ‘Let the validity be destroyed; what is the harm?’ |
yena tatsiddhyupāyo 'pi svoktyaivāsya vinaśyati // | The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows; |
mūlam prāmāṇyam, tac ca sāpekṣatvenāpahriyate, tasya tadvyāpakaviruddhatvāt / | ‘Root of the matter’ i.e. Validity. This is ‘struck at the root’ done away with by the idea of ‘dependence on something else’; because it is contrary to a character more extensive than that. |
tathā hi nirapekṣatvena prāmāṇyaṃ vyāptam, tacca kathaṃ svavyāpakaviruddhe sāpekṣatve satyavasthāṃ labheta / | Because ‘validity’ is ‘pervaded by’ less extensive than ‘independence’; how then could this ‘validity’ obtain a footing, if there were the said ‘dependence’, which is contrary to ‘Independence’ which pervades ‘validity’ itself? |
yenetyādinā prāmāṇyasyānapekṣatvena vyāptiṃ darśayati yeneti / | ‘When, etc. etc.’ points out the Invariable Concomitance between ‘Validity’ and ‘Independence’. |
yasmād ity arthaḥ // | ‘Yena’ Because. |
kathaṃ vinaśyatītyāha sāpekṣaṃ hīti / | Question: In what way does it destroy the means of establishing it? |
na vyavasthāpyata iti / anavasthā syāt / bhavatvanavasthādoṣa ity āha anavasthita ityādi / | Answer: [see verse 2816 next] ‘Cannot he securely established’, i.e. it would involve an Infinite Regress. Question: There might be an Infinite Regress; |
anavasthito 'pariniścito hetur yasya vādinaḥ sa tathoktaḥ / | Answer ‘When the Reason, etc. etc.’ i.e. that party whose Reason itself has not been established duly ascertained. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati jñāto hi jñāpako vyāpyam arthaṃ jñāpayati, na sattāmātreṇa, tataśca vādī svayam eva tāvad apratipannaḥ kathaṃ parapratipādanāya sādhanam upādāsyate // | What is meant is that it is only when the Indicator itself has become known that it indicates the object which is ‘pervaded by’ invariably concomitant with itself; it does not do so by its mere presence. So that, when the Party himself has no definite idea of the Reason, how can he adduce that Reason for convincing the other party? (2816) |
ityevamityādinā dūṣaṇam ārabhate / [p.747] ityevam iṣyate 'rthaścennatu cāvyatirekiṇī / | With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to refute the above arguments (of the Mīmāṃsaka in support of the Inherent Validity of Cognitions): [see verses 2817-2818 above] |
tasya bhāvātmatābhāve bhāvo na syāt sakārakaḥ // tatra svābhāvikīti ko 'rtho 'bhipretaḥ, kiṃ nityatvena nirhetukatvāt svabhāvikī, āhosvid anityāpi satī svahetubhyo jñānānāṃ svabhāvaniṣpattikāla evabhavati na tūttarakālaṃ hetvantareṇādhīyata iti kṛtvā svābhāvikīti vikalpadvayam / | Now what is it that is meant by the term ‘inherent’ (belonging to it by its very nature)? (a) Does it mean that it is ‘inherent’ in the sense that being eternal, it has no cause? Or (b) that it is ‘inherent’ in the sense that, even though it is not-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Cognitions have their essence (existence) brought about by their causes, and not that it is imposed upon them subsequently by other causes? These are the two alternative views possible. |
tatra na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ, tathā hi sā vyatiriktā vā bhaved avyatiriktā vā yadvobhayānubhayasvabhāaveti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ / | because (1) would such a ‘Capacity’ be something different (from the Cognition to which it belongs)? Or (2) non-different from it? Or (3) neither different nor non-different? Or (4) both different and non-different? These four alternatives are possible. |
tatra na tāvad āyaḥ, sambandhasiddheḥ padārthasyākārakatvaprasaṅgāccetyādinā sarvapadārthānām avyatiriktaiva śaktir iva bahuśaḥ pratipāditatvāt / | Because, there can be no connection between them, and also, because in that case, things could never be active agents, etc. etc. as it has been explained several times, when the conclusion arrived was that in the case of all things, their capacity (Potency) is not anything different from the things themselves. |
etad eva sūcayann āha iṣṭetyādi / kāryakāraṇasamartho hi svabhāvaśaktis tasya ca svabhāvasya bhāvātmatāyā abhāve sati sa bhāvaḥ kārako na syāt / | This is what is pointed out in the words ‘In fact Capacity is the name, etc. etc.’ The ‘Capacity’ of the nature of things consists in its efficiency to produce its effect; and if this ‘nature’ were not of the nature of a positive entity, then that entity could not be an active agent; |
tataścāsyāvastutvaprasaṅga iti bhāvaḥ // | and thus (not being capable of effective action) it would become a ‘non-entity’. |
athāvyatirikteti pakṣas tadā svābhāvikī na syāt, arthasya hetubalabhāvitvenānityatvāt tadavyatiriktāyā api śaktir hetubalabhāvitvenānityatāprasaṅgāt / | If it is meant that the Capacity is not-different (from the thing, the Pramāṇa), then, it could not be ‘natural’, ‘inherent Because things, as coming into existence through the efficiency of their causes, must be non-eternal; so that the Capacity also, if non-different from the thing, would have to be regarded as non-eternal, on account of its coming into existence through the efficiency of its cause. |
anyathā hi bhinnayogakṣematvād abhedo na syāt / | Otherwise, not sharing the same fate, the two could not be non-different |
etad evāha sā cānityedṛśītyādi / | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2819 above] |
svābhāvikyāṃ hi śaktu syān nityatā hetutāthavā / pramāṇānāṃ ca tādātmyānnityatāhetute dhruvam // | Further, if the Pramāṇas are non-different from the said ‘Capacity’, they would themselves, like the Capacity, be eternal and without cause. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2820 above] |
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha sadābhāva ityādi / | Question: “What is the harm if that is so?” Answer: [see verses 2821-2822 above] |
[p.748] ahetutve sadābhāvo 'bhāvo vā / | If they are without cause, they must either exist for ever, or never exist at all. |
nityatve tu sadābhāvo 'n{kto 'pi}usiddha eveti noktaḥ / | That in the event of their eternality, they must exist for ever is well known: hence it has not been mentioned separately. |
aparam api prasaṅgam āha ata ityādi / | Another incongruity is pointed out ‘Under the circumstances, etc. etc.’ |
tadāyattam iti / pramāṇāyattam / | ‘Tadāyattam’ contingent upon the Pramāṇas. |
etena yathāyogaṃ pratyakṣānumānavirodhau pratijñāyā darśitau / | This shows that the Proposition of the other party is contrary to Perception and Inference. |
tathā hi pramāṇānāṃ svarūpaṃ kādācitkaṃ pratyakṣata eva siddham / anumānato 'pi kāryakramato 'numitam tataśca tasya nityatvābhyupagamaḥ sphuṭataram eva pramāṇābhyāṃ bādhyata iti // | For instance, that the form of the Cognitions and their Means is occasional, is known by direct Perception, and is also inferred from the fact of its effects appearing successively, one after the other. Thus these two Means of Cognition clearly set aside the idea of the said Eternality of Cognitions. |
pramāṇānām ityādinā parasya yathoktaprasaṅgadvayasamartha{samādhā---}nopāyamāśaṅkate / | In the following Text, the other party makes an attempt at avoiding the two incongruities just urged: [see verse 2823 next] |
yadā hi vyañjakaiḥ pramāṇasvarūpaṃ vyajyate tadā tadupalabhyate nānyadeti / | When the form of the Pramāṇa is manifested by the manifesting agencies, then alone it is apprehended, not otherwise; |
tena satyapi nityatve na sarvadopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ / | hence, even though it is eternal, there is no possibility of its being apprehended at all times. |
nāpi kāryasya sadā sadbhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, kāraṇāntarāpekṣasya kāryārambhakatvābhyupagamāt, na kevalam asya / | Nor can there be any possibility of its effect appearing at all times; because our idea is that it produces its effects only with the help of other contributory causes, and not by itself alone. |
tena kāraṇāntarasannidhānāsannidhānābhyāṃ kāryasya kādācitkatā bhavatīti bhāvaḥ // | Thus it is that the effect comes about only occasionally, due to the presence or absence of these contributory causes. |
vyaktītyādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above explanation of the Mīmāṃsaka is as follows; |
tasmāt tadrūpakāryāṇāṃ nityaṃ syād upalambhanam // | [see verse 2824 next] |
vyaktiś ca hetvantarāpekṣā ceti vyaktihetvantarāpekṣe / | ‘Manifestation and dependence upon other causes’. |
pūrvaṃ hi śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vistareṇa vyaktir nityasya nirastā / hetvantarāpekṣā cānupakāryasyāyukteti pratipāditam / | Under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’, the idea of ‘manifestation’ of the eternal thing has been refuted in detail; and it has also been explained that the thing that cannot be helped cannot be dependent upon other causes. |
tadrūpakāryāṇām iti / teṣām pramāṇānām / | ‘The effects producible, etc. etc.’ ‘Tat’ stands for the Pramāṇas; |
ubhayapakṣas tu virodhādyathoktapakṣadvayabhāvidoṣaprasaṅgān na yuktaḥ / nāpyanubhayapakṣaḥ parasparavyavacchedarūpāṇām ekaniṣedhasyāparavidhināntarīyakatvān na tadānīm eva vihitasya niṣedho yuktaḥ, ekatra vidhipratiṣedhayor virodhād iti bhāvaḥ / | the effects of these by themselves, etc. etc. The view that “the Potency may be both (different and non-dîfferent)” cannot be right, because they are mutually contradictory and also because it would be open to all the objections that have been urged against Difference as also those urged against Non-difference. Nor can the view that “it is neither different nor non-different” be accepted. Because between two mutually exclusive things, the affirmation of one is inseparable from the denial of the other; |
sphuṭataratvād dūṣaṇasyaitannoktam // | This objection is quite clear; hence it has not been stated in the Text. |
idānīm antimaṃ pakṣatrayamabhyupagamya dūṣaṇam āha pṛthaktvam ityādi / | The Author now admits the last three alternative views (for the sake of argument), and then points out objections against them: [see verse 2825 above] |
pṛthaktvam ubhayātmatvaṃ vāstu śaktes tathāpi tat / | ‘Pṛthaktvam’ i.e. the view that the Capacity is different, from the Cognition. ‘Ubhayātmakam’, ‘Both’; |
pṛthaktvam vyatirekapakṣaḥ / | this is by way of illustration; |
ubhayātmakagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam / anubhayātmakapakṣāṅgīkāro 'pi draṣṭavyaḥ / yadvā tasyāpyubhayarūpapratiṣedhasvabhāvatayobhayātmakatvam astyeva / | it should be taken as including the view that ‘it is neither different nor non-different’, Or this last also may be taken as mentioned in the same term ‘ubhayātmaka’; as this also consists of both i.e. the denial of both. |
asmin pakṣatraye 'pi nityayā śaktyā jñānasya sambandhānnityatvaṃ syāt // | Under all these three views, the Cognition must be eternal, by reason of its being related to the Capacity, which is eternal. |
[p.749] katham ity āha anyathā hītyādi / | Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 2826 next] |
anyathā hi yadi śaktisambaddhaṃ jñānam anityaṃ bhavet tadā śakter nityatvaṃ na prāpnoti / | ‘If that were not so’ i.e. ‘if the Cognition associated with the Capacity were not-eternal, then, the Capacity itself could not be eternal |
kutaḥ ekarūpāsamanvayāt / ekasvabhāvānugamābhāvād ity arthaḥ / | “Why?” ‘Because it would not continue in the same form’ i.e. because there would not be continuance of the same form. |
tamevaikarūpāsamanvayaṃ darśayati kadācid ityādi / | The said ‘non-continuance of the same form’ is pointed out, by the words ‘being at times, etc. etc.’; |
anitye hi vijñāne sati śaktes tajjñānasambandhāsambaddhasvabhāvadvayaṃ syāt, na caikasya parasparaviruddhasvabhāvadvayasambhavo yuktaḥ, ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | if the Cognition is not-eternal, then the Capacity would have two forms, one associated with the Cognition, and the other not-associated with the Cognition; and it is not possible for the same thing to have two mutually contradictory characters; as in that case it would cease to be one; |
bhedavyavahārocchedāpatteś ca // | and there would be an end to all notions of difference. |
dvitīyaṃ vikalpamadhikṛtyāha athetyādi / | The Author now refers to the second alternative view [mentioned in the Commentary on 2817-2818; |
atha śaktiḥ svahetubhyaḥ pramāṇānāṃ prajāyate / jātānāṃ tu svahetubhyo nānyair ādhīyate punaḥ // | viz.: that “the Capacity is inherent, in the sense that though it is non-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Pramāṇas have their essence brought about by their causes”]: [see verse 2827 above] |
tadatretyādinā siddhasādhyatāṃ pakṣadoṣam āha | The following Text provides the answer to this view; |
tadbhāvāntarameveti na tasyātmopadiśyate // | that it is open to the charge of ‘futility’: [see verses 2828-2829 above] |
tathā hi sthirāsthirabhāvabhedena dviprakārasyāpi padārthasya niraṃśatvāt sarvātmanā pariniṣpatter nottarakālaṃ pratyayāntareṇātmabhūtā śaktir ādhātuṃ pāryate, ādhānevārthāntarakaraṇam eva syāt, na tu svabhāvabhūtaśaktyādhānam / | Both kinds of things, permanent and impermanent, which are indivisible come about in their complete form always, as one indivisible whole; and no causal factor can, later on, infuse into them any capacity; if any such capacity were infused, it would mean the production of an entirely new thing, and not the infusion of the Capacity as a new feature of the same thing. |
bhāvasvabhāvanabhyupagame vā śakter akārakatvaprasaṅga ityuktam // | If the Capacity is not regarded as part of the nature of the thing, it would cease to be an active agent; as has been explained before. |
syād etat mābhūdanaṃśasya vastuna uttarakālaṃ śaktyādhānam, sāṃśasya kasmānna bhavatītyāha viruddhadharmasaṅgo hītyādi / | The following might be urged “It may be that no Capacity can be imposed upon an indivisible thing subsequently; why cannot it be imposed upon what is divisible?” |
sa vidyata iti / | Answer: [see verse 2830 above] |
viruddhadharmaprasaṅgaḥ // asthire tu bhāve viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇam āha sādhitetyādi / | The following Text proceeds to point out the objection that is specially applicable when things are impermanent: [see verses 2831-2832 above] |
[p.750] | [verses 2831-2832]: |
kutracitphala iti / arthaniścayādau / | ‘For the bringing, etc. etc.’ such as the definite cognition of things. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily understood. |
syād etat yaid bhavatāṃ na vivādaḥ kathaṃ tarhi parataḥprāmāṇyamabhyupagatam ityata āha etāvattvityādi / | The following might be urged “If you have no dispute with us, then, why have you accepted the view that the validity of Pramāṇas is extraneous?” Answer: [see verse 2833 above] |
boddhum iti / niścetum / | ‘Apprehended’ with certainty. |
svata iti / vijñānasvarūpād anubhavamātrād anapekṣitottarakālabhāvikāryasaṃvādāt // | ‘By itself’ i.e. by the mere presence of the Cognition by the mere apprehension of things, irrespectively of the subsequent conformity of its effects. |
syād etat vijñānāvyatirekācchakter vijñānagrahaṇe sāpi gṛhītaiva / | The following might be urged “Inasmuch as the Capacity is not anything different from the Cognition, when the Cognition has been apprehended, the Capacity also becomes apprehended as a matter of course; |
ko nāmānubhavātmatvān niścetuṃ kevalāt prabhuḥ // | then why cannot it be apprehended?” Answer: [see verse 2834 above] |
bodhaścāptiś ca bodhāptī, yathāvasthitasya vijñeyasya vastuno ye bodhāptī, tatra tadviṣaye, śaktateti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Bodha’ is apprehension; ‘āpti’ is attainment; ‘of the cognised thing as it stands’; the capacity to bring about the said apprehension and attainment [who can apprehend?] |
kevalād iti / sambandhādikāraṇaguṇaparijñānānapekṣāt // | ‘Mere’ independently of the properties of the cause, such as ‘Relationship’ and the like. |
kasmān na prabhur ity āha apramāṇe ityādi / | Question “Why can no one apprehend it?” Answer: [see verse 2835 next] |
keśapāśādidarśana iti / keśoṃḍrakādidarśane / | ‘Keśa, etc. etc.’ In the case of such illusory perceptions as those of the ‘Hair-tuft’ (perceived on pressing the Eyes). |
anenaitad āha yadyapyanubhūtā śaktistathāpyapramāṇasārūpyād bhrānter niścetuṃ na śakyate viṣādiśaktivat / | What is meant by this is as follows: Even when the Capacity has been apprehended, as the apprehension resembles an invalid cognition, there can be no certainty regarding it; just as in the case of the potency of antidotes to poison. |
nahyanubhava eva kevalo niścayaheturanyasyāpyabhyāsāder apekṣaṇāt / | Mere apprehension cannot bring about certainty; as confirmation by actual appearance is needed for that purpose; |
yatra hyaṃśe bhrāntinimittena na guṇāntaramāropyate tatraiva niścayaḥ // | and there is certainty only in regard to that aspect on which other properties have not been imposed by causes of misconception. |
kutas tarhi sā niścitavyetyāha tasmād ityādi / | Question: “How then can it be known with certainty?” Answer: [see verse 2836 next] |
anyadveti / hteuśuddhijñānam / | ‘Some other factor’ such as the knowledge of the purity of its source. |
na tvasyā ādhānāyeti / | ‘Not for the infusion, etc. etc.’; |
anyadapekṣata iti sambandhaḥ / | this has to be construed with ‘anyat apekṣyate’. |
śakteḥ / | ‘Asyāḥ’ of the Capacity. |
niścayasya puruṣādhāratvāt tadutpattaye yuktā kāraṇā [p.751] ntarāpekṣā, natvādhānāya, tasya śaktyādhāratvāt, śakteś ca sahabhāvaniṣpattau niṣpannatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | Because certain cognition subsists in the Cognising Person, it is only right that for the bringing about of such cognition other causes should be needed; not so, for the purpose of infusing the Capacity; as this ‘infusion’ subsists in the Capacity, and the Capacity having come about along with the Cognition, the ‘infusion’ also becomes accomplished on that. |
yathāhītyādinā viṣādivad iti dṛṣṭāntaṃ vyācaṣṭe / | The following Text proceeds to explain the example of ‘Poison, etc.’ (cited under Text 2836): [see verses 2837-2838 above] |
phalānantaratābhāvāccaitadātmāviniścaye{yaḥ---} // mūrcchāsvedalāpāditatphalotpattiniścaye / tādātmyaṃ gamyate 'pyevaṃ jṇyāne tacchaktiniścayaḥ // | ‘Being found, etc. etc.’ the ‘finding’ perception of its similarity to ‘other things’, such for instance as the drink called ‘Nāgara-pāna’. ‘And the effects, etc. etc.’ ‘Effects’ unconsciousness and the like; |
tadanyasamatekṣaṇād iti / | the non-appearance of these immediately; |
phalānantaratābhāvād iti / | that is, because their effects do not follow immediately. |
viṣādādyātmāviniścaye{yaḥ---} / tādātmyam iti / | ‘For the purpose of the certainty, etc. etc.’ the sure Cognition that it is really Poison or Wine. |
yathāvasthitajñeyavastubodhāptiniścayaḥ // | ‘The Capacity’ in the Cognition, of apprehending and attaining (getting at) the cognised thing as it really exists. |
svavacanavirodhaṃ pratijñāyāḥ pratiapadayann āha kiñcetyādi / | The following Text points out that the Proposition (of the other party) involves contradiction of his own words: [see verses 2839-2840 above] |
na siddhaṃ parataḥ katham iti / | ‘Why cannot it, etc’. |
siddham eva / | It must be so regarded; |
arthāpatteḥ pramāṇāntaratvād iti bhāvaḥ // | that is, because the said Presumption is another Pramāṇa. |
yaduktam tadeva hi vināśyeteti, tasyānaikāntikatvaṃ pratipādayann āha niṣpannetyādi / | It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under Text 2814, that “the validity itself would be destroyed, if it were held to be dependent on something else”. |
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