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puruṣo yadiṣṭe{pauruṣeye, adṛṣṭe, } heyāditatve sopāye puruṣārthopayogini / | ‘Tatra’ to the Scripture propounded by a Personality, which deals with matters useful to men. |
tathā hi tatra nyāyamevānupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa / | That is, the wise followers of Buddha have recourse to their scriptures in full accordance with Reason, and not by mere hearsay. |
śraddhayeti / | ‘Faith and confidence’. |
abhisampratyayena yuktinidhyānajena niścayeneti yāvat / pramāṇasiddhaevārthe 'bhisampratyayasya yujyamānatvāt / | The confidence born of well-ascertained notions obtained by means of the due pondering over reasons; as it is in things thus ascertained through proofs that people have confidence, not in anything else; |
nānyatra / | as in regard to other things, doubts never cease. |
tatra saṃśayānativṛtteḥ / | so -that it is possible that there is an unbroken line of Tradition from the author down to the present day; |
arthasaṃśayato 'pi veti / | and hence the ideas expressed are true. |
atyantaparokṣe 'rthe svargadevatāpūrvādau / | Such ground for confidence is not available in the case of the Scripture that has not proceeded from a Personality; |
tathā hi tatra pauruṣeye vākye puruṣasya svābhiprāyakathanenāviparītasampradāyasambhavacchrotṛparamparayā cāvicchinnaḥ sampradāyaḥ, samyak sambhāvyate / | Further, if there were a Teacher, then, as such a Teacher would be led to propound the Teachings for the benefit of men, it stands to reason that he would propound through words well-known among men; so that the meanings of those words could be rightly learnt from such use by the Teacher. |
natvevam apauruṣeye tatropadeṣṭur abhāvāt / | This is not possible in the case of the Scripture that is not the work of a Person; |
natvapauruṣeyāṇāṃ tatra kasyacit samīhābhāvāt // | as there can be no intention or effort in that case. |
yadyevaṃ yena kenacid āgamena kiṃ na bhavān pravartate / sandehasya sarvatra tulyatvādityetaccodyanirākaraṇāyedam āha pratyakṣeṇetyādi / | Question: “If this is so;then why do you not act in accordance with any Scripture (from among those propounded by human beings)? Mere doubtfulness would be equally present in the case of all”. The answer to this objection is as follows: [see verse 2775 next] |
pratyekṣeṇānumānena viśuddhe viṣaye sati / | [We have confidence in the scripture] The assertions whereof are found to be confirmed by perception and inference. |
nahyevaṃ vaidike śabde sa svayampratyayo yataḥ // | That cannot be the case with the Veda; as this has been held to be self-sufficient in its authority. |
yatra pratyakṣānumānābhyām abhimatasyārthasya tathābhāvo na virudhyate, tena pravartamānaḥ śobheta satyapi saṃśaye, natu yatrānyathābhāvas tatra, dṛṣṭapramāṇoparodhitānarthasaṃśayasyodbhūtatvāt / | When the matter spoken of in the Scripture is not found to be incompatible with facts ascertained by Perception and Inference, and one acts in accordance with this, then alone does he act wisely, even though the matter be in doubt; not when he acts otherwise; because doubts regarding its being wrong and undesirable are aroused only by its being found to be contrary to well-ascertained facts of Perception (and Inference). |
yadyevaṃ vede 'pyanenaiva nyāyena pravṛttir bhaviṣyatītyāha nahyevam ityādi / | “If that is so, then in the case of the Veda, people would be acting in the same way.” Answer: ‘That cannot, etc.’ |
svayampratyaya iti / svata eva pramāṇabhūta ity arthaḥ / | ‘As this has been held to be self-sufficient, etc. etc.’ that is, it is regarded as an authority by itself; |
ato na pramāṇena parīkṣya tataḥ pravṛttir yuktā, parataḥ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt / | hence in this case it cannot be right to act after having examined the teachings by proofs and reasonings; as in that case, the authority or reliability of the Veda would be due to something exterior to itself. |
nacāpi tasya viṣayaviśuddhiḥ sambhavati / | Nor is it possible for the teachings of the Veda to be confirmed. |
tathā hi apracyutānutpannapūrvāpararūpaḥ pumā{na}nukrameṇa kartrā karmaphalānāṃ ca bhoktā vede paṭhyate / | Because in the Veda we read of the man, in due course, being the actor and the experiencer, his own preceding and succeeding forms being imperishable and unborn; |
sa cāyukta ity āveditam ātmaparīkṣāyām / tathā nityatvaṃ keṣāñcid bhāvānāṃ paṭhyate / | as has been explained under the chapter dealing with the ‘Soul Then again, we read there of the eternality of certain entities; |
tadapi sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyām ayuktam upapāditam / | and that this also is wrong has been explained under the chapter dealing with the ‘Permanence of Things’. |
tathā sāmānyādīnyapratyakṣāṇyapi pratyakṣatveneṣṭāni, tathā krameṇa janmasthitinivṛttayo 'sambhavinyo 'pi bhāvānāṃ nirdiṣṭāḥ / | Thirdly, the followers of the Veda have held that there exist such things as the ‘Universal’ and the like, which, though really imperceptible, are declared to be perceptible; and similarly the successive Birth, Existence and Cessation of things have also been spoken of; |
tathānādheyaviśeṣasya prāgakartuḥ parāpekṣayā janakatvaṃ, tathā niṣpannasya parāśrayeṇa sthitikāryasyāpyupadiṣṭā / | Similarly, it has been taught that the Agent in whom no fresh attributes can be added, and who had not produced a single thing before, becomes the producer of something else; and. similarly it has been taught that an established entity, though not produced as an effect, continues to exist, on the strength of something else; |
tathā kāraṇād vināśa ityādikaṃ bahuvidhaṃ pramāṇaviruddham upalabhyate / | and also the destruction of things by certain causes; and so on and so forth; much is found that is quite contrary to all Forms of Right Cognition. |
tat kathaṃ prekṣāvatas tathābhūtenāgamena pravṛttiḥ syāt // | How then could any intelligent person undertake any activity on the authority of such a Scripture (as the Veda)? (2775) |
yadapyaparaṃ kumārilena sambandhanityatvasādhanāya sādhanam uktam / | Kumārila has put forward another argument in support of the eternality of the Connection between Word and its meaning; |
tasyotpādyakathārūpanāṭakādinānaikāntikatvam iti darśayati utpādyetyādi / utpādyārthakathādharmamanālocya samaṃ śrutau / | and it is pointed out in the following Text that that argument is invalidated as ‘Inconclusive’, with a view to such works composed by men as Stories, Dramas and the like: [see verse 2776 above] |
utpādyo 'rtho yasyāḥ kathāyāḥ sā tathoktā, utpādyārthā cāsau kathā ceti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Original stories, etc.’ those whose subject-matter is entirely new. ‘Said character,’ e.g. that of being composed by the mere whim of man. Question; |
kiṃ tadupavarṇitam ity āha śabdārthānāditām ityādi / | “What is it that has been said by the other party?” Answer: [see verses 2778-2779 next] |
śabdārthānāditāṃ muktvā sambandhānādikāraṇam / na syād anyadato vede sambandhādi na vidyate // | “Barring the eternality of the word and its meaning, there could be no other reason for accepting the eternality of their relationship. Therefore in regard to the veda, there can be no beginning for the said relationship. |
[p.737] | (2777-2778) commentary. |
śabdo varṇasvabhāvaḥ, tasyārthaḥ sāmānyaṃ, tayor anāditvāt sambandho 'pi śaktilakṣaṇo 'nādireva, śakter bhāvāvyatirekāditi bhāvaḥ / tathā sambandhakaraṇasyopāyābhāvena sambandhākaraṇamanumīyate / | ‘Word’ consisting of Letters ; its meaning’ the Universal; both of these being beginningless, their Relationship also in the shape of denotative Potency must be beginningless; that is to say, Potency being not-different from the thing to which it belongs, there can be no means of bringing about the said Relationship, whence it is inferred that there is no bringing about of it. |
prayogaḥ yo yatkaraṇopāyarahitaḥ sa na taṃ karoti yathāvidyamānamṛtpiṇḍadaṇḍacakrasalilasūtrādikāraṇakalāpaḥ kulālo ghaṭam, sambandhakāraṇopāyarahitāś ca sarvapuruṣā iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | the Potter is unable to make the Jar, when he is devoid of the means of making it, in the shape of the Clay, Revolving Stick, Wheel, Water, Thread and so forth; all men are devoid of the means of making the Relationship (between Words and meanings); hence there is apprehension of a character contrary to the wider character. |
nacāsiddho hetuḥ śrotuḥ kartuṃ ca sambandhaṃ vaktā kaṃ pratipadyatām ityādinā sarvapuruṣāṇām upāyarahitatvasya pratipāditatvāt / | The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as Inadmissible. Because it has been already proved that all men are without such means, under the passage “To whom would the Speaker have recourse to for the purpose of-making up the Relationship for the benefit of the Hearer?”. |
yadyevaṃ kāraṇavatsambandhākhyānābhāvānumānaprasaṅga ityāśaṅkhyāha anākhyānānumānaṃ tvityādi / | Question: If that is so, then, as of the Cause, so of the absence of the assertion of Relationship itself, an Inference may be put forward. |
anākhyānānumāne hetor upāyarahitatvād ityasyāsiddhiḥ // | The answer to that is that for the proving of the ‘absence of the said assertion’, the Reason ‘being devoid of the means’ would be inadmissible. |
vṛddhānāṃ dṛśyamānā ca pratipattiḥ punaḥ punaḥ / | “The only means (of comprehending the meaning) consists in the perceiving of its repeated comprehension by experienced people. |
upāya iti taddhānirasiddhāvagamaṃ prati // | and certainly the failure of such means cannot be admitted, in regard to the bringing about of the comprehension”. |
yeyaṃ vṛddhānāṃ sambandhapratītiḥ punaḥpunardṛśyate, sa eva sambandhakathanopāyaḥ, nahyapratipadya parasmai kathayitum īśa{te} / | The comprehension of the Relationship by experienced persons perceived again and again is the only way of asserting that Relationship: unless one knows the Relationship himself, he cannot speak of it to another person. |
taddhāniriti / upāyahāniḥ / | ‘The failure of such means,’ i.e. the said means being ineffective. |
sambandhāvavodhaṃ prati // | ‘The comprehension’ of the Relationship. |
ityetaddhi bhavet sarvaṃ yadi vedārthaniścayaḥ / | All this would be true, only if there were certainty in regard to the meaning of the Veda; |
vṛddhyebhyo 'pyavisaṃvādī siddhaḥ syād anyathā kṣatiḥ // | otherwise the whole fabric will fall to the ground. |
{yaduktam ---} śabdārthānāditām ityādi, tatra yadi nityatvaṃ śabdārthayor anāditvam abhipretaṃ tadasiddham, vyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya pratipāditatvāt / | It has been argued (under Text 2777) above that “Barring the beginninglessness of the Word and its Meaning, etc. etc.” If, it is eternality of the Word and Meaning that is meant by their ‘beginninglessness’, then that is inadmissible; |
atha kāryakāraṇaparamparāyās tadānaikāntikatvaṃ viruddhatvaṃ ca, sambandhibhyaḥ sambandhasyāvyatirekāt tadvadanityatvaprasaṅgāt / | If what is meant by the ‘beginninglessness’ of the Word and Meaning is that there is no beginning of the series of causes and effects, then the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’, and also ‘Contradictory’; because the Relationship has no existence apart from the Relatives; and consequently, that relationship also would be eternal like the Word and Meaning. |
yaccoktam upāyarahitatveneti, tadapyasiddham, yato bhede 'pi prakṛtyā cakṣurādivadekākārapratyavamarśajanane samarthāḥ kecid arthā iti pratipāditam / | As regards ‘Being devoid of the means, etc.’ (Text 1978), that also is ‘Inadmissible’; because it has been proved that even when there is difference by their nature, there are some things that are capable of bringing about the idea of sameness. |
tataśca vaktṛśrotror ekārthādhyavasāyī pratyayaḥ sa svakaraṇe 'bhyupāya ityabhiprāyaḥ / | Consequently, what is meant is that there is a means available in the shape of the idea of the sameness of the thing cognised by both Speaker and Hearer. |
yadapyucyate vṛddhānāṃ dṛśyamānā ca pratipattir iti, tatrāpyuktam "vṛddhebhyo na ca [p.738] tadbodhaste 'pi hy ajñāḥ svataḥsthitāḥ" iti / | And it has also been pointed out (Text 2773) that ‘the Cognition cannot be obtained from the experienced men, and they also are equally ignorant’. |
anyathā kṣatir iti / | ‘Otherwise, it would fall to the ground’; |
yadi vṛddhāḥ svayam ajñā api santaḥ sambandhaṃ pratipadyanta itīṣyate tadā dṛṣṭavirodho 'ndhasyeva rūpadarśanapratijñāyā ity arthaḥ // | If it be held that “the experienced persons, though themselves ignorant, comprehend the Relationship” then such a view would be clearly contrary to a fact of Sense-perception; the Proposition being like the assertion of the blind man relating to Colours. |
siddhasarvopasaṃhāravyāptikatvān na sambhavi / saṅghātatvādiliṅgasya kiñcana pratisādhanam // | As a matter of fact, there can be no ‘counter-argument’ against the reason ‘because it is an aggregate’; because this is a character whose invariable concomitance has been recognised as embracing all things. |
siddhā sarvopasaṃhāravyāptir yasya tat tathoktam, tadbhāvas tattvam, anena vastubalapravṛttatvam asya pratipādayati anyasya sarvopasaṃhāreṇa vyāptyasiddheḥ / | That is, the character of having its invariable concomitance with all things has been duly recognised. This shows that the Buddhist argument proceeds on the nature and capacity of things; as nothing else can embrace all things. |
na ca vastubalapravṛtte 'numāne pratisādhanasambhavaḥ, vastūnāṃ svabhāvānyathātvasya kartum aśakyatvāt / | And when an Inference has proceeded on the strength of the nature and capacity of things, there can be no counter-argument, against it. Because the nature of things cannot be altered; |
nāpi parasparaviruddhasvabhāvadvayasyaikatra sambhavaḥ, ekatvāhāniprasaṅgāt //2781 // | nor is it possible for two mutually contradictory characters to subsist in the same thing; or else it would cease to be one thing. |
tāmeva sarvopasaṃhāreṇa vyāptisiddhiṃ darśayann āha sārthakā ityādi / sārthakāḥ pravibhaktārthā viśiṣṭakramayoginaḥ / padavākyasamūhākhyā varṇā eva tathoditāḥ // | When letters are expressive, with distinct meanings, and appear in a particular order of sequence, they come to be known as ‘word’, ‘sentence’ and such groups; it is these that have been so spoken of as ‘aggregates and it has been shown that all this expressiveness, distinct meanings and order of sequence is impossible in the case of words not emanating from personalities. |
sārthakapravibhaktārthaviśiṣṭakramayogitā / | The following text points out the all-embracing character of the said Reason (Premiss): [see verses 2782-2783 above] |
tatheti / saṃhatatvenoditaḥ / | ‘So spoken of,’ i.e. as ‘aggregates |
apauruṣeyatve tu varṇānāṃ sarvam etad anupapannam iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam ato vyāptisiddhiḥ // | If Letters do not emanate from Personalities, then all this expressiveness and the rest is impossible; this has been proved by us already. |
nanu ca vedādhyayanavācyatvād ityasyāpi hetor vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhāreṇa siddhaiva, tathā hi vedānāṃ kartā na kadācid apyupalabhyata ityāśaṅkyāha vedādhyayanetyādi / vedādhyayanavācyatve natvevaṃ vyāptiniścayaḥ / | There is no such certainty of invariable concomitance in regard to ‘the character of being spoken of as vedic study’; hence such a reason is open to the charge of its negative concomitance being doubtful. Says the Opponent: “The Reason (Premiss) that we have put forward (under 2342), ‘because it is preceded by Vedic study’, also comprehends all things; as the Author of the Veda has never been found”. |
saṃdigdhavyatirkitvaṃ vyaktaṃ tenātra sādhane // | ‘Such certainty’ as there is regarding the character of ‘being an aggregate’; |
yathā saṅghātatvasya / yato na saṅghātatvasya sādhyaviparyaye vyatirekitvaṃ saṃdigdham, asya tu saṃdigdham // | because in the case of ‘being an aggregate’, its negative concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is not in doubt; as it is in the case of the other party’s reason (‘being spoken of as Vedic study’). |
etad eva pratipādayati tathāvidha ityādi / | The same idea is further explained: [see verses 2785-2786 next] |
tathāvidhe krame kārye narāśaktau ca niścaye / siddhe vyāptir iheyaṃ ca niścituṃ naiva śakyate // | If it were known for certain that men are unable to bring about the said order of letters, etc. Then alone would there be the invariable concomitance desired by the other party. That, however, can never be known for certain; |
samastanaradharmāṇāṃ pratyakṣīkaraṇe sati / syād eva niścayo 'yaṃ ca sarvajñasyopapadyate // | such a certainty could be obtained only if the capacity and property of all men were perceptible; and this could be possible only for a person who is omniscient. |
svargakāmo 'gniṣṭomena yajetetyādike / evambhūtaṃ varṇakramaṃ yadi kartuṃ sarvanarāṇām aśaktir niścitā bhavet, tadā vyāptiniścayo bhavet yāvatā saiva niścetumasarvavidā na śakyata iti darśayati samastanaradharmāṇām ityādi / | Says the Opponent “There are certain characteristics in the Veda such as Teaching of Duty, difficulty of pronunciation and the like, which are never found in the words of men; whence it follows that it is inconceivable that the Veda should be the work of man; under the circumstances, how can our Reason be open to the charge of being doubtful and hence inadmissible?” |
ayaṃ ceti / niścayaḥ // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2787-2789 next] |
sambhāvyate ca vedasya vispaṣṭaṃ pauruṣeyatā / | It is clearly conceivable that the Veda is the work of man; |
kāmamithyākriyāprāṇihiṃsāsatyābhidhā tathā // | as it speaks of wrongful sexual acts, killing of animals and telling of lies. |
durbhaṇatvānudāttatvakliṣṭatvāśravyatādayaḥ / vedadharmā hi dṛśyante nāstikādivacastvapi // | As for the character of being difficult to pronounce, the agreeableness of sound, difficulty of comprehension, disagreeableness to the ear and so forth, these characteristics of the Veda are found in the works of decriers of the Veda also. |
viṣāpagamabhūtyādi yac ca kiñcit samīkṣyate / satyaṃ tadvainateyādimantravāde 'pi dṛśyate // | as regards such properties as capacity to cure poison, etc. that are found to be true, this is found also in the case of incantations laid down by vainateya and such persons. |
evaṃ manyate yadi nāmādarśanam, tathāpyadarśanamātrasyāpramāṇatvāt saṃdigdhāsiddhataiva, kadācit kvacit puruṣās tathāvidhānāṃ vedadharmāṇāṃ kartārau bhaveyur iti / | What the Author means is as follows: Even if certain characteristics are not found in human assertions, mere non-perception cannot prove anything; so that the Reason still remains doubtful and inadmissible; it being just possible that there may be persons who would be able to compose works having the said properties of the Veda. |
nacādarśanamātraṃ siddham / | But the non-perception of the said properties itself cannot be admitted; |
kāmamithyācārādyupadeśāder vedadharmasya nāstikādivacaneṣvapi darśanāt / kāmamithyākriyā kāmamithyācāraḥ / mātrādyabhigamanam iti yāvat / | because there are certain characteristics of the Veda, such as the laying down of such1 Duty’ as consists in wrongful sexual act and the like, which are found in the works of the Decriers of the Veda also. ‘Wrongful sexual acts’ such as..... |
tasyopadeśo gosavādau / | This is laid down in connection with the Gosava sacrifice; |
yathoktam upahā udakaṃ cūṣati tṛṇāni chinatti upaiti mātaramutasvagotrāmityādi / | where we read ‘Upahā udakam cūṣati, etc. etc.’ where ‘Upahā’ stands for the Sacrificer; who is spoken of as sucking water..... |
upaheti yajamānaḥ / aśvamedhādau prāṇivadhopadeśaḥ / | In connection with the Aśvamedha and other sacrifices, the killing of animals is laid down in the Veda; |
yathoktam "bahūni niyujyante paśūnāṃ madhyame 'hani / | in such texts as ‘At midday, six hundred animals are used, etc. etc.’ |
asatyaṃ mṛṣāvādas tadapyupadiṣṭam / | Telling of Lies has been taught in the text ‘Lying in joke does no harm; |
"na narmayuktaṃ hy anṛtaṃ hinasti na strīṣu rājan na vivāhakāle / | nor lying to women; or at the time of marriage; |
prāṇātyaye sarvadhanāpahāre pañcānṛtānyāhur apātakāni" // % Cf. | or when there is danger to life; or when there is danger of losing one’s entire property; on these five occasions Lying is not sinful’, |
eṣāṃ kāmamithyācārādīnāṃ, abhidhā abhidhānam / vedadharmā nāstikādivacastvapi dṛśyanta iti sambandhaḥ / tatheti samuccaye / | The mention of these is found in the Veda; and these are found in the works of the detractors of the Veda also. ‘Tathā’ also ‘Difficulty of pronouncing’, ‘Agreeableness,’ ‘Incomprehensibility’ such as in the Vedic text, ‘Āmandrairindra, etc; |
durbhaṇatvam durabhidhānam, anudāttatvaṃ manojñatvaṃ, kliṣṭam vyavahitam / | where the construction is difficult and far-fetched ‘ā’ being connected with ‘yāhi’ occurring later on ‘Disagreeable to the ear’. |
ādiśabdena padavicchedaplutodāttādiparigrahaḥ / | ‘Ādi’ includes broken words, ultra-long vowels, and difficulties of accentuation and so forth. |
viṣāpagamabhūtyādīti / | The capacity to cure poison, etc. |
ādiśabdena bhūtagrahādyāveśavaśīkaraṇābhicārādayo gṛhyante / | Or ‘removing of poison’ and ‘peculiar potency’, ‘Etc.’ includes the curing of obsession by elements and other evil spells. |
satyam iti avisaṃvādi / | ‘True’ compatible with the real state of things. |
vainateyādītyādiśabdena bauddhādimantravādaparigrahaḥ // | ‘Vainateya, etc.’ ‘Etc.’ stands for the Incantations current among Buddhists and others. |
bhārate 'pi bhavedevam ityādāvāha kiñcāmunetyādi / kiñcāmunā prakāreṇa pauruṣeyaṃ na kiñcana / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2343, that “what has been said regarding the Veda might be said regarding the Mahābhārata; but it is forestalled by the remembrance of its author, etc. etc.”. |
evam anumātum iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2790 next] |
saugatapravacanādhyayanaṃ prathamābhihi{ma---}taṃ sajātīyādhyayanapūrvakaṃ, saugatādhyayanavācyatvāt, adhunādhyayanaṃ yatheti // | A similar Inference may be made, such as The study of the words of the Buddha must have been preceded by similar study, because it is spoken of as the ‘study of the words of the Buddha’, like the present study of the same. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi tat saugataṃ setsyatītyāha tadabhivyaktetyādi / | Question: “If that is so, then how can the words be regarded as those of the Buddha?” Answer: [see verses 2791-2792 next] |
tathabhivyaktarūpatvāt tadīyaṃ ca taducyate / | Because its form was revealed by him, therefore the words are called ‘of the Buddha’. |
kartṛsmṛtiśca tatrāpi bhavatvarthanibandhanā // | the remembrance of the author that is there may also be regarded as merely commendatory. |
parair evaṃ na ceṣṭaṃ cet tulye nyāye na kiṃ matam / mābhūdvaivaṃ parasyeṣṭir nyāyāttvāśaṃkyate tathā // | It might be said that “This is not so accepted by the other party”; but if the reason is equally applicable, why cannot it be accepted? or, it may not be accepted by the other party; even so, it may be regarded as possible, in accordance with reason. |
tena sugatenābhivyaktaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya tat tathā / | Its form character, nature, has been revealed by Buddha. |
tatrāpi saugateyā kartṛsmṛtisvarthavādanibandhanā śakyate vyākhyātum / | In this case also, the idea that people have regarding the author of the Buddhist Scripture may be explained as purely commendatory. |
tathāhyatrāpi karotiḥ smaraṇārthaḥ kiṃ na vyākhyāyate / | And here also ‘author’ may be explained as ‘rememberer’. |
syād etat nahi bauddher evamiṣṭam, yenaivaṃ sādhyetetyāha tulye nyāye na kiṃ matam iti / yadyayam artho yuktyupetaḥ syāttadā kimiti bauddhaonābyupagacchet, nahinyāyopapanne 'rthe prekśāvato 'nabhyupagamo yuktaḥ / mābhūd bauddhasya prekṣāvato 'bhyupagamas tathāpi nyāyādevamāpādyate bhavata iti brūmahe // | The following might be urged “The Buddhists do not accept the view that the idea of the authorship of Buddha is purely commendatory, hence why should you base your argument on this?” Answer: ‘The Reason being equally applicable (to Mahābhārata and the Buddhist Scripture), etc. etc.’ If the idea is in accord with Reason, then why should the Buddhist not accept it? It is not right for intelligent men not to accept what is in accordance with reason. Even if the intelligent Buddhist does not accept this idea, we still put this to you purely on the ground of reason. |
etad eva tadvacanena dṛḍhīkurvann āha sarvadā cetyādi / | This idea is confirmed by the words of the Mīmāṃsaka himself. |
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