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sati ca kalpite vācakatve varaṃ varṇabhāgā eva santu vācakāḥ kimadṛṣṭāḥ sphoṭāṃśāḥ kalpyanta iti / atha sārthakatvaṃ tadānekakalpanā nirarthikā, tathā hi parisamāptārthaṃ śabdarūpaṃ vākyam ucyate, pratyekaṃ cedarthavanto 'vayavāḥ syus tadā tāvantyeva tāni vākyāni jñā {jā}tānīti naikā {ko '---} nai{ne---}kāvayavātmā siddhyati / | If on the other hand the Sphoṭa-parts are expressive (the second view) then there can be no need for several assumptions; because the ‘Sentence’ is described as a group of words conveying one complete idea; if each part of the sentence were expressive, then there would be as many ‘sentences’ as those parts, and not one ‘Sentence’ composed of several component parts. |
ekāvayavapratipattau ca satyāṃ vākyārthapratipattiprasaṅgaḥ / | And when the meaning of one of these parts would be comprehended, there would be comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence. |
yathoktam "pratyekaṃ sārthakatve 'pi mithyānekatvakalpanā / | This has been thus declared ‘If each of the parts were expressive, the assuming of several such would be futile; |
ekāvayavagatyā ca vākyārthapratipadbhavet // % QUOTE Pramāṇavārttika v.1:249 | because the comprehension of the meaning of one part would bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence (2715) |
jātau vyaktau kṛtāyāṃ cedekena dhvaninā sakṛt / nitarāṃ vyaktisiddhyarthaṃ varṇānānyān prayuñjate // | “Even when the producing and the manifesting (of the entire sphoṭa) have been done once by one articulation, people pronounce the other letters for the purpose of a clearer manifestation; |
yato duravadhārāsya prakṛtiḥ sā tathā kṛtā / | because it is difficult to determine it as manifested once; |
samānavyaktikair varṇair bhūyo 'pi vyajyate paraiḥ // | therefore it is manifested again and again by means of letters with similar appearances.” (2716-2717) |
yadyapyekena dhvaninā jātir vyaktir vā sarvātmanā sphoṭasya kṛtā, tathāpi nottaradhvaniprayogavaiyarthyaṃ tasya, spaṣṭavyaktyarthatvāt, yathāhi śloka eva punaḥ punarāva [p.724] rtyamāno vyaktībhavati, na ca sakṛduccāraṇāt, natu punaḥ punar āvṛttyā tasyaviśeṣāntaramādhīyate, atha ca na punar āvṛtter vaiyarthyamevam ihāpi nottaradhvanivaiyarthyaṃ bhaviṣyati / | It has been said under Text 2714 that ‘in the case of the indivisible Sphoṭa, production and manifestation are not possible’. The following Text sets forth the Opponent’s answer to that: [see verses 2716-2717 above] Even though the producing or manifesting of the entire Sphoṭa is done by a single Articulation, yet the subsequent Articulations are not entirely useless; |
etad eva darśayati yata ityādi / | as these serve to render the manifestation clearer; |
duravadhāreti / avadhārayitumaśakyā // tasyaivetyādinā pratividhatte / | This is what is pointed out by the words ‘yataḥ, etc. etc.’ ‘Duravadhārā’ difficult to determine or ascertain. |
tasyaivānyasya vaikasya kiṃ nāvṛttau punaḥ punaḥ / vyaktirāvartate tasya nanvevamaviśeṣataḥ // | When, sir, that same, or something else, is repeated again and again, is it not the manifestation of it that is repeated, there being no difference? (2718) |
nanvityāmantraṇe / | ‘Nanu’ signifies address ‘Sir’. |
tasyaiva prathamoccaritasya varṇasya, anyasya vā tadantargatasya kasyacid ekasya punaḥ punar, āvṛttyā kiṃ nābhivyaktiḥ kriyate / nahi tenāpāditā satī vyaktir nāpāditā bhavet / | When ‘that same’ the Letter pronounced for the first time, or ‘something else’, some other Letter contained therein, is repeated again and again, is it not the manifesting that is done? Certainly the manifestation would not fail to be accomplished when done by that. |
tathā hi tadvyaktyāvartanamātraphalānyuttarottaravarṇotccāraṇāni, samānaśaktikatvāt sarveṣāṃ, taccāvartamekenaiva punaḥ punar āvarttyamānena kartuṃ śakyata iti śeṣavarṇoccāravaiyarthyam / | Thus then the only effect that the utterance of the subsequent Letters would have would consist in the repetition of the manifestations, because all of them would be possessed of the same potency; this repetition can be repeated over and over again by the same Letter being repeated; consequently there would be no need for the utterance of the rest of the letters. |
nāpyuttarottaravarṇānāṃ bhinnaśaktikatvamabhyupagantavyam / | Nor will it be right to regard the subsequent Letters as possessed of different potencies; |
niraṃśake viśeṣāntarasyādhātumaśakyatvād viśeṣāntarakaraṇāsambhave bhinna{ca---}śaktikalpanāvaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt // | because into what is indivisible and without parts, no new features can be introduced; and when no new features can be introduced, the assuming of diverse potencies would be useless. |
etac ca satā{ tyā---}mabhivyaktau sarvaṃ sambhavet saiva tu na sambhavatīti darśayann āha viṣayendriyetyādi / | All that is said by the other party might happen, if the Manifestation were there; as a matter of fact, however, this Manifestation itself is not possible. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2719 next] |
viṣayendriyasaṃskārarūpā vyaktiś ca varṇavat / | The ‘manifestation’, as in the case of letters, can only consist in the embellishment of the object or the sense-organ concerned. |
asyāpi pratiṣeddhavyā tadābhāse 'pi cetasi // | And here also, in regard to the cognition envisaging the sphoṭa, the said ‘manifestation’ can be denied in the same way (as in the case of letters). |
varṇavad iti / | ‘As in the case of Letters’; |
yathā varṇeṣu vijñānajananayogyāyogyasvabhāvavikalpena viṣayendriyasaṃskārarūpābhivyaktir dūṣitā tathehāpi dūṣaṇīyetyarthaḥ / | in connection with Letters, the idea that ‘there is manifestation in the shape of the embellishment of the Object and the Sense-organ’ has been refuted by showing that none of the alternatives possible is admissible regarding its capacity or otherwise of bringing about cognitions; |
tadābhāse 'pīti / sphoṭābhāve 'pi ayaṃ cābhyupagamavādaḥ / | the same refutation is applicable to the present case also. ‘The cognition envisaging the Sphoṭa’ ‘Tat’ stands for the Sphoṭa. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi hi varṇavyatirekaiṇāparaḥ sphoṭākhyaḥ śabdātmāvabhāseta tato 'syābhivyaktiḥ sambhaved vyakter upalabdhirūpatvāt / | This is said on admitting (for the sake of argument) that there is such a cognition. What is meant is as follows: If there did really appear in consciousness a verbal entity called ‘Sphoṭa’ as something apart from the Letters, then its ‘manifestation’ could be possible; |
yāvatā nāvabhāsata iti pūrvamāveditam avabhāsatāṃ nāma tathāpi prakṛtyopalabhyānupalabhyasvabhāvasyobhayathāpyabhivyaktir na yukteti // | as ‘manifestation’ would mean ‘apprehension As a matter of fact, however, no such entity appears in Consciousness, as already explained before. But, let it appear in Consciousness; even so, the said ‘manifestation’ cannot be acceptable; as by its very nature, it cannot be either capable or incapable of being apprehended. |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃhṛtya vināpi sphoṭenārthapratipatter upapattikramaṃ darśayati / tasmāt pratyakṣataḥ pūrvaṃ kramajñāneṣu yat padam / samastavarṇavijñānaṃ tadarthajñānakāraṇam // | From all this it follows that it is the word that is apprehended on the wake of the previous successive cognitions of all the component letters, which is the cause of the comprehension of the meaning. The following text sums up the position and proceeds to show that the comprehension of the meaning of words is possible even without the Sphoṭa: [see verse 2720 above] |
[p.725] nanu ca kramavartino hi varṇāḥ krameṇaiva cānubhūtāḥ, yathānubhavaṃ ca smaraṇaṃ, tat kathaṃ samastavarṇanirbhāsi smārttajñānam ekaṃ yujyate sphoṭamantareṇa, na cākrame jñāte kramiṇāṃ varṇānāṃ pratibhāso yukta ityāśaṅkyāha ---antyavarṇe hītyādi / | Says the Opponent “The Letters in a Word stand in a definite order. they are perceived also in a definite order; Remembrance is always in accordance with the previous perception; how then can there be the single cognition envisaging all the Letters, which can only be of the nature of remembrance, except through the Sphoṭa? Certainly when the thing has been cognised as without order, there can be no appearance of the Letters which are there in a definite order?” |
antyavarṇe hi vijñāte sarvasaṃskārakāritam / smaraṇaṃ yaugapadyena sarvavarṇeṣu jāyate // | What happens is that when the final letter in the word has been cognised, the impressions left by the cognition of all the letters brings about the remembrance of all the letters simultaneously. |
anenaiva {na cai}tadāha prathamamanubhavas tatastatsamanantarabhāvīni smaraṇāni yathānubhavaṃ krameṇaiva jāyante, tataḥ smaraṇebhyaḥ uttarakālaṃ yugapat samastavarṇādhyavasāyi samuccayajñānam aparaṃ smārttam utpadyate, yathā paridṛṣṭārthādhyavasāyitvāt // | What is meant by this is as follows First of all, there is apprehension (of the Letters), then the Remembrances immediately following from them come about in the same order as the Letters; then from these Remembrances, there follows the cumulative cognition of all the Letters, this cognition also is of the nature of Remembrance; because it only envisages things that have been previously perceived. All parties agree that there is such subjective (cumulative) cognition in connection with all things, even when they are cognised in a certain order of sequence. |
etac ca sarvavādināṃ prasiddham, na mayaiva kalpitam iti darśayati sarveṣu ceti / | In the following Text the Author points out that what has been stated is admitted by all parties, and it is not only his own assumption: [see verse 2722 above] |
etad iti samuccayajñānam // | ‘Etat’ stands for the cumulative cognition. |
nacet tadabhyupeyeta kramadṛṣṭeṣu naiva hi / śatādirūpaṃ jāyeta tat samuccayadarśanam // | In case this is not admitted, then, in connection with things seen one after the other, there could be no such cumulative cognition as there is in the idea of ‘a hundred’ and other numbers. |
yadi hi sarvam eva smaraṇaṃ yathānubhavaṃ krameṇaivaṃ jāyate, tadā kramānubhūteṣu śatādiṣu yugapacchatādivikalpo na syāt / | If all Remembrances appeared only in a certain order of sequence, then, in connection with things seen one after the other, there could be no such conception of them at one and the same time as is involved in the idea of ‘a hundred’ and so forth; |
śatakoṭyādivikalpānāṃ cotpattikāle bhedo na bhavet // | nor would there be any difference in the conceptions of the ‘hundred’ and the ‘million’ and so forth, at the time of their appearance. |
tena śrotramanobhyāṃ syāt kramādvarṇeṣu yadyapi / pūrvajñānaṃ parastāt tu yugapat smaraṇaṃ bhavet // | Thus then, though, in regard to the letters, the cognitions, auditory and mental, that appear at first are in an order of sequence, yet, later on, there is remembrance of them all, at the same time. |
yadyevaṃ samuccayajñānam evārthapratītihetuḥ syāt, na te varṇāḥ, teṣāṃ ciraniruddhatvāt, na caitad yuktam, yasmācchabdād anataram arthapratītir bhavantītyākumārametat pratītam ityāśaṅkyāha tadārūḍhā ityādi / | The following might be urged “If it is as stated, then the said cumulative cognition itself may be the cause of the comprehension of the meaning, not the Letters; as these will have long ceased to exist. Rut this cannot be right; because all men, down to the child, knows that the meaning is comprehended immediately on the cognition‘of the Word”, In anticipation of this argument, the Author supplies the following answer: [see verse 2725 next] |
tadārūḍhās tato varṇā na dūrārthāvabodhanāt / | Thus the letters do enter into it; as the things denoted are not far removed from them; |
śabdād atha matistena laukikair abhidhīyate // | this is the reason why people speak of the cognition as proceeding from the word. |
[p.726] tasmin samuccayajñāne ārūḍhās tadārūḍhāḥ / | ‘Enter into it’ i.e. enter into the said Cumulative Cognition. |
laukikair iti / svārthataddhitavidhānam // | ‘Laukikaiḥ’ the nominal affix has been used here in the reflective sense. |
ākāravati vijñāne sarvam etac ca yujyate / | All this is quite compatible with the view that cognitions have forms; |
anyathā hi vinaṣṭās te bhāseransmaraṇe katham // | otherwise, as they would be destroyed, how could they figure in the remembrance? (2726) |
nirākāre kasmān na yujyata ity āha anyathā hītyādi / | Question: “Why is it not compatible with the view that Cognitions have no forms?” Answer; ‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’. |
tataś ca yadetat antyavarṇe hi vijñāte ityādinā kumārilena sphoṭavādinamprati samuccayajñānaṃ varṇitam, tadasman mata eva yujyate na tu bhavatāṃ mīmāṃskānāṃ nirākāravādināṃ mata ityuktaṃ bhavati // | Thus the cumulative cognition that Kumārila has urged against the upholder of the Sphoṭa that “when the last Letter has been cognised, there is a simultaneous Remembrance of all the rest, brought about by the impressions of these” [Ślokavārtika, Sphoṭa, 112, reproduced here under Text 2721, with a slight variation] is true only in accordance with our view, not in accordance with the Mīmāṃsaka’s view, that Cognitions are formless. |
nanu ca mīmāṃsakānām api yujyata eva, nahi teṣāṃ matena varṇā vinaṣṭāḥ yena na bhāseran / kiṃ tarhi tirobhūtābhivyaktayaḥ santyevetyetadathetyādinā"śaṅkya netyādinā pariharati / | If it is argued that “the previously cognised letters have only their appearance concealed, but when remembered, they are there all right”, then, the answer is that it cannot be so; as, if it were so, then there would be a clear idea of them. Says the Opponent: “It is true according to the Mīmāṃsakas also; |
atha varṇāstirobhūtavyaktayo viditāḥ purā / smaryante 'vasthitā eva na spaṣṭābhaprasaṅgataḥ // | because under their view, the Letters are not destroyed; hence there is nothing to prevent their figuring in the cognition; it is only that their appearance has become concealed; |
yadi hi ta eva varṇāḥ pūrvamanubhūtāḥ santaḥ paścāt tirobhūtavyaktayaḥ samuccayajñānena gṛhyeraṃstadā"tmānubhavajñānavat tatsamuccayajñānaṃ spaṣṭābhaṃ prāpnoti / | If the same Letters that had been heard before are lying with their appearance concealed, and are subsequently apprehended by the cumulative cognition, then like their own cognition, the cumulative cognition also should apprehend them quite distinctly; |
ākārasya bāhyagatatvāt tasya caikarūpatvāt / | as the form is exterior to the cognition and it is of one and the same form. |
kiñca yadi tirobhūtavyaktayaḥ, kathaṃ bhāseran, vyakter upalabdhisvabhāvatvāt // | Further, if they have their appearance concealed, how can they appear? Because ‘appearance’ is of the nature of apprehension. |
apica yadyatītasyāvasthitiḥ sambhavet tadaitat syād yāvatātītasyāvasthityabhāvād eva na yuktaṃ tasya pratibhāsanam iti darśayati apāstā ityādi / apāstā ca sthitiḥ pūrvaṃ tat sthitau smaraṇaṃ bhavet / | if there were such continuance, then the remembrance should appear at the time of the cognition of the apprehension of the letters; because the two would have one and the same cause. Then again, if it were possible for what is past to continue to exist, then what is asserted might be true; as a matter of fact however, what is past does not continue to exist; |
varṇānubhavavijñānakāla evaikahetutaḥ // | hence the said appearance of the Letters in the Cumulative Cognition cannot be right. |
pūrvam iti / traikālyaparīkṣāyām / atraiva bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha tatsthitāvityādi / | ‘Already’ i.e. under the Chapter on the ‘Three Points of Time In support of this he adduces an argument annulling the Opponent’s idea ‘If there were such continuance, etc. etc.’; |
varṇānubhavajñānakāle smaraṇotpattiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | at the very time when there is cognition of the apprehension of the Letters, there would be the likelihood of the Remembrance appearing. |
ekaheuta iti abhinnakāraṇatvāt // | ‘Having the same cause’ Their causes are not different. |
atra śābdikāścodayanti yadyeko nāsti sphoṭākhyaḥ śabdātmā tat kathaṃ gaurityekākārā gośabde buddhir bhavatīti, ata āha gaurityādi / | The Grammarians urge the following objection “If there is no such single entity as the ‘Sphoṭa’, of the nature of the Word, then how is it that on the utterance of the word ‘go’, (‘Cow there appears the single cognition in the one form of ‘gauḥ’ (and not in that of the component letters)?” |
[p.727] | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2729 above] |
tadgrāhyaikārthatābhyāṃ ca śabde syād ekatāmatiḥ // ekā matīrasyetyekamatiḥ, tadbhāvastatvam / | ‘Ekamatitva’ the fact of there being a single cognition. ‘Tadgrāhyaika, etc. etc.’ It is apprehended by a single cognition, and it serves a single purpose. |
tadgrāhyaikārthatābhyāṃ ceti / | The compound being of the ‘Copulative kind. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati ekabuddhigrāhyatvād ekasāsnādimadarthadyotakatvāccaiko gośabda ucyate iti // | What is meant is that (1) because it is apprehended by a single cognition, and (2) because it denotes the single object, the animal with the dewlap, therefore the word ‘go’ is said to be one. |
ekamatitvaṃ ca na sarvatra suddham iti darśayati śaighryād ityādi / | The following Text shows that the fact of being regarded as one is not true in all cases: [see verse 2730 next] |
śaighryādalpāntaratvāc ca gośabde sā bhaved api / | The unitary conception may be possible in the case of the word ‘go’ on account of the rapidity (of its utterance) and of the smallness of the interval; |
devadattādiśabdeṣu spaṣṭo bhedaḥ pratīyate // | but in the case of such words as ‘Devadatta’, the difference is clearly perceived. |
śaighryāt drutoccāraṇāt / alpāntaratvam svalpavicchedatvam / | ‘Rapidity’ quickness of utterance. ‘Smallness of the interval’, the very slight separation between the letter-sounds. |
seti / ekā matiḥ / | ‘Sā’ the unitary conception, the idea of oneness. |
devadattādipare tu prativarṇaṃ śakvanayā {dhvanayaḥ---} sphuṭataraṃ vicchedena pratīyanta iti pakṣaikadeśāsiddham ekamatitvam // | In the case of words like ‘devadatta’ the articulations are clearly perceived as distinct. Hence the unitary conception is ‘inadmissible’, in regard to a part of the ‘Subject (2730) The same idea is further supported by a formulated argument: [see verse 2731 next] |
varṇotthetyādinā pramāṇayati varṇotthā cārthadhīreṣā tajjñānānantarodbhavāt / | The cognition of the meaning must be regarded as arising from the letters; because it appears after the cognition of these; |
yedṛśī sā tadutthā hi dhūmāder eva vahnidhīḥ // prayogaḥ yā buddhir yadvijñānāntaramudbhāvitā sa tatsamutthitā pāramparyeṇa, yathā dhūmādiliṅgajñānād vahnyādiliṅgidhīḥ / | what is like it arises from that, like the cognition of fire arising from smoke. The formulation of the argument is as follows: When one Cognition appears after another cognition, it must be regarded as arising from this latter, indirectly, e.g. the cognition of the ‘subject’, Fire, proceeding from the cognition of the ‘Indicative’, Smoke; |
varṇavijñānānantarabhāvinī cārthadhīr iti svabhāvahetuḥ / kāryatāvyavahāraścātra sādhyate / tena sādhyasādhanayor bhedaḥ // | the cognition of the Meaning appears after the cognition of the Letters; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. What is meant to be proved here is the fact of its being regarded as the effect of that other cognition; |
asiddhatvam asya pariharann āha na varṇetyādi / | The following Text shows that the Reason adduced in the preceding text is not ‘inadmissible’; |
na varṇabhinnaśabdābhajñānānantarabhāvinī / | As a matter of fact, the cognition of the meaning is not found to follow after a cognition envisaging a verbal entity apart from the letters; |
arthadhīr vidyate tena nānyaḥ śabdo 'sti vācakaḥ // | hence no other word can be expressive (of that meaning). |
varṇebhyo bhinno yaḥ śabdātmā tadābhaṃ yajjñānaṃ tadanantarabhāvinī na vidyate, kiṃ tarhi varṇavijñānānantarabhāvinī, ato nāsiddho hetuḥ / | That ‘cognition’ of meaning does not exist which appears after a cognition envisaging any verbal entity apart from the Letters; what does exist is only that ‘cognition of meaning’ which appears after the cognition of the Letters. Hence the Reason adduced is not ‘inadmissible’, |
anena copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhād abhāvavyavahāro 'pi darśitaḥ // | This also points out the fact of things being treated as non-existent when, being perceptible, they are not perceived. |
nāpyanaikāntika iti darśayann āha kāryatetyādi / | The following Text points out that the said Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 2733 next] |
kāryatāvyavahārāṅgaṃ sarvatraiva viniścitau / | In all cases, positive and negative concomitances are definitely known to be the ground for regarding one thing as the effect of another; |
anvayavyatirekau hi vyāptis tenena niścitā // | and it is thus that the invariable concomitance is recognised in the case in question. |
[p.728] kāryatāvyavahārasyāṅgam kāraṇam, kiṃ tat anvayavyatirekāviti / | ‘Kāryatā, etc. etc.’ Being regarded as the cause, or basis, of being regarded as the effect. “What is that basis?” |
sāmānādhikaraṇyena sambandhaḥ / | It is positive and negative concomitance. |
tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvamātram eva tat kāryatāvyavahṛter aṅgaṃ nānyat, ataḥ kāryatāvyavahārasya nimittāntarāsambhavo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti siddhā vyāptiḥ // | This is co-ordinated with ‘aṅgam The only basis for one thing being regarded as the effect of another lies in following the positive and negative concomitance between the two things. Hence the impossibility of there being any other basis for regarding the ‘cognition of the meaning’ as the effect of anything else (other than the Cognition of Letters) provides the proof for the annulment of a contrary conclusion. |
syād etat mābhūtsphoṭasya vācakatvaṃ, varṇā eva nityāḥ santo vācakā bhaviṣyanti, teca nityāḥ pratyakṣādipramāṇataḥ siddhā ity āha anityeṣvityādi / | It having been established that expressiveness belongs to noneternal letters, the ‘recognition’ and ‘inference put forward in proof of eternality, become annulled. The following might be urged: “It may be that the Sphoṭa is not expressive. The Letters themselves, being eternal, would be expressive; |
anityeṣveva varṇeṣu vācakatve prasādhite / pratyabhijñānumāne ca niraste nityasādhane // | and that these Letters are eternal has been established by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2734 above] |
pratyabhijñā cānumānaṃ ceti pratyabhijñānumāne / | ‘Pratyabhijñānumāne’; i.e. Recognition and Inference. |
kvacit pratyabhijñānānumānam iti pāṭhaḥ, tatra samāhāradvandvo 'pi vidheyaḥ / | In some places, the reading is ‘pratyabhijñānumānam’; in which case the compound is to be treated as ‘Samāhara-Dvandva’; |
sahitaśabdalopād viśeṣaṇasamāso vā // | or as a Karmadhāraya, involving the deletion of the term ‘sahita’ (the meaning being ‘Recognition along with Inference’). |
svavākyādivirodhaścetyādāvāha svavākyādivirodhānām ityādi / svavākyādvirodhānām ajñānāc codanā kṛtā / | The following Text points out that the argument put forward by the other party involves ‘self-contradiction’: [see verses 2735-2736 next] The objection in question has been urged by the other party, through ignorance that his doing so involves self-contradictions on his part; |
ntiyapakṣe tu sarve te bhavanti bhavatāṃ yataḥ // | because there are all these (self-contradictions), if you hold to the view of the eternality (of letters and words). |
nityā satī na vāgyuktādyotiketyupapāditam / | It has been already explained that if words are eternal, they cannot be expressive; |
ānupūrvyādyayogena nityaṃ cānupalambhanāt // | because they could not have any connection with the order of sequence (among the component letters) and so forth; also because they are not perceived at all times. |
sarve ta iti / | ‘All these’ self-contradictions. |
ānupūrvyādīti / ādiśabdena krameṇa śrutismṛtī gṛhyete / | ‘With the order of sequence’, ‘and so forth’ is meant to include the fact of their ‘hearing’ and ‘remembrance’ being successive. |
tathā hi nityatvān na kālakṛtānupūrvī, nāpi deśakṛtā vyāpitvāt, nāpyabhivyaktikṛtā abhivyakter apākṛtatvāt / | All this is so, because on account of the eternality (of words) the particular order of sequence cannot be due to time; and on account of their all-pervasiveness, it cannot be due to place; nor can it be due to manifestation; |
tathā jñānajanane 'pi na nityānām upayogo 'stīti bahudhā niveditam // | Similarly, in the bringing about of cognitions, eternal words can serve no useful purpose; as has been explained on several occasions. |
dharmibhedavikalpena yāśrayāsiddhir ucyate / so 'numālakṣaṇājñānād dharmitvaṃ bhāsino yataḥ // | The ‘inadmissibility of the reason in respect of its substratum’ which has been sought to be proved by the putting forward of a number of likely alternatives regarding the nature of the ‘subject’ (word), is all due to ignorance of the real character of inference; |
avicāraprasiddhortho yoyaṃ jñāne 'vabhāsate / | What actually appears in consciousness is well-known, without cogitation; |
śanakāder api proktā tāvan mātrasya dharmitā // tatraiva hi vivādo 'yaṃ sampravṛttaḥ pravādinām / | even ordinary fishermen know that that alone can form the ‘subject’. And yet, it is on this very point that dispute has arisen among babblers. |
icchāracitabhede tu na vivādo 'sti kasyacit // | There can be no dispute regarding a thing where diversity is created only through one’s whim. |
[p.729] ya eva vādiprativādinoḥ pratibhāsavaśād dharmī siddhaḥ sa eva viśeṣavivādāśrayaḥ, natu svecchopakalpitaḥ, tatra vivādābhāvāt, nahi svecchoparacitadharmiṇi dharmaviśeṣaṃ kalpayanyakiñcinnivāryata iti / | Even with regard to the (mīmāṃsaka’s) inference that “the idea derived from the Vedic injunction must be right, because it is brought about by causes free from defect”, several such alternatives could be urged against him, as ‘if the subject is meant to be the cognition brought about by injunctions that are eternal and related to eternal denotations, then the probans is one whose substratum is not admitted by the other party.’ (2740-2742) |
bhāsita iti / | [verses 2737-2739] |
bhāsamānasya / etad eva darśayati avicāraprasiddho 'rtha ityādi / sugamam // | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2310, that It has to be explained what the Word-Sound is which is being proved to be perishable, etc, etc.”. |
on TS 2739---------2741 | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2737-2739 above] |
aviśeṣeṇa dharmiṇi nirdiṣṭe yadviśeṣeṇa {vi} kalpanaṃ tad etaj jātyuttaram iti darśayann āha ata ityādi. ato 'viśeṣanirdiṣṭe viśeṣeṇa vikalpanam / | When the ‘Subject’ has been indicated in the unqualified form, the setting up of a number of alternatives regarding its qualification constitutes a ‘Futile Rejoinder This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2740-2742 above] |
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