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nityasyāpi sambandhasyārthapratipattihetutvaṃ na dṛṣṭam iti samānam hastakampādīnām anityatve 'pi pratipādakatvaṃ dṛṣṭam ityadṛṣṭam asiddham /
The Reason adduced is also ‘inadmissible’; for instance, it can be said, with equal justification, that the eternal Relationship also has never been found to bring about the cognition of the meaning; and further, such things as gestures by the hand, etc., even though non-eternal, are actually found to be expressive of meanings;
ata evāyuktatvam asiddham /
What has been said therefore, deserves no consideration.
tadgavāśvādayaḥ śabdā nityasambandhayoginaḥ / saṅketasavyapekṣatvānnaiva gāvyādiśabdavat //
For these reasons, all such words as ‘cow’, ‘horse’ and so forth cannot have any eternal relationships, because they are dependent upon convention, like such words as ‘gāvī’ and the like.
taditi / tasmāt /
‘Tat’ Therefore.
nityasambandhayogina iti / neti sambandhaḥ /
‘Nityasambandhayoginaḥ’ to be construed with ‘na’.
prayogaracanā tu pūrvam eva darśitā //
The formulation of this argument has been presented before.
gośabdo 'vasthite 'smākaṃ tadaśaktijakāritāt / gāvyāder api gobuddhir mūlaśabdānusāriṇī //
“The capable (expressive) word ‘go’ being there, if the idea of the cow arises from the use of the corrupt form ‘gāvī’, it is due to its resembling the original (correct) word;
iti /
This cannot be right.
ayam asyārthaḥ gośabde sādhau vācake sati yā gāvyāder asādhoḥ prayogātgobuddhir bhavatītyucyate, na sā tata eva bhavati, kiṃ tarhi mūlam ---, pradhānaṃ sādhu gośabdamanusṛtya /
How can any such cognition of the right meaning appear on account of the resemblance to the original correct word, among fishermen, etc., who are ignorant of the Sanskrit language? For these reasons it cannot be admitted that there is an eternal relationship between words and meanings. It can only be based upon convention;
tadaśaktijakāritād iti /
as that is possible in all cases.
tathā bhartṛhariṇoktam
[verse 2668]:
"a{ga---}vāśveti yathā bālaḥ śikṣyamāṇaḥ prabhāṣate /
Says the Opponent: “Such words as ‘gāvī’ and the like are incorrect (grammatically);
avyaktaṃ tadvidāṃ tena vyakter bhavati niścayaḥ //
and as such these are not truly expressive; hence your
evaṃ sādhau prayoktavye yo 'pabhraṃśaḥ prayujyate /
Corroborative Instance is.
" iti /
inadmissible.
ata idam āha gośabde 'tvetyādi / gośabde 'vasthite yogye tadaśaktijakāritāt / gāvyāder api gobuddhir mūlaśabdānusāriṇī //
This has been thus asserted by Kumārila (in Ślokavārtika Eternality of Words, 276) ‘For us, the word Go is eternal, and people have the idea of the animal Cow from such vulgar deformations of it as Gāvī and the like only when they resemble the original correct word Go;
tannaivam ityādinā pratividhatte /
Then how does it arise? It arises from its being like the original correct word Go;
tannaivaṃ śanakādīnāṃ{---} saṃskṛtānavabodhanāt /
this (use of the corrupt word) is due to the incapacity of the man to pronounce the correct form ‘go’;
mūlaśabdānusāreṇa katham arthagatir bhavet //
in the same manner, when the correct word should be used, if one uses the incorrect form, from that there is inferred a certain meaning through the intervention of the correct word’”.
[p.714]
[verses 2669-2670]:
ādiśabdena mlecchādīnāṃ grahaṇam /
‘Śanaka’ is the Fisherman. ‘Etc.’ includes the Mlecchas and other people.
tathā hi teṣāṃ pratyuta saṃskṛtenaiva śabdenārthe pratipādyamāne vyāmoha eva bhavatyato na mūlaśabdānusāriṇī yuktārthagatiḥ //
In the case of these men what really happens is that it is only when things are spoken of by correct Sanskrit words that they become confounded; hence in such cases, the cognition of the meaning cannot be due to resemblance to the original correct word.
yaduktam deśotsādakulotsādarūpo vā pralayo bhavet ityādi tatrāha deśotsādetyādi / deśotsādakulotsādarūpo yaḥ pralayo bhavet / yo vāvyāhatabauddheṣṭo brahmāder api śaṅkyate //
If there be dissolution in the form of the destruction of particular countries or the destruction of particular families, or in the form of that undeniable destruction postulated by the Buddhist, which is suspected of affecting Brahmā, etc. also, such destruction would be possible for the Veda also.
tasmin sambhāvyate vede dhvastamūlā matiḥ parā / mithyāmohamadādibhyo viparītā ca kalpanā //
Hence any subsequent ideas that might appear (as based upon the Veda) would be one whose basis has been destroyed, and it might be assumed that they may all be false and wrong, arising from delusion, stupefaction, and such other sources;
anya eva bhaved vedaḥ pratikañcukatāṃ gataḥ / ityapyāśaṅkyate yāvad bādhaka na prakāśyate //
and hence the Veda now available would be only a mere semblance of the original. All these notions might go on arising until reasons are not available to the contrary.
evaṃ manyate /
The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2671-2673 above]
naivāsmābhir api śabdocchedātmakaḥ pralayo varṇyate /
The view held is as follows: We also do not speak of a dissolution consisting in the disappearance of all words;
nāpyanādipuruṣaḥ sṛṣṭisaṃhārakārakaḥ /
nor do we admit of a beginning-less Personality who creates and destroys the world.
kiṃ tarhi sarvam eva jagadanādi /
What we hold is that the entire universe is beginningless;
vyavahāro 'py anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ śābdaḥ pravartata iti / kintu yo 'yaṃ bhavatā deśotsādādirūpapralayo varṇito yaś ca bauddhair agnyambuvāyusaṃvartanīyasvabhāvaḥ paryantatastrisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātumaryādo 'dhastād vāyumaṇḍalāvadhirupa{ri}ṣṭādyathākramaṃ prathamadvitīyatṛtīyadhyānaparyantaḥ so 'yaṃ pramāṇenābādhitatvād avyāhato 'śakyaniṣedhatvād brahmāder api śaṅkyate, ato 'smin dvividhe 'pi pralaye vedasya dhvaṃsaḥ sambhāvyate, viparītārthakalpanaṃ ca /
Verbal usage also (according to us) goes on, based upon Conceptions arising from beginningless Impressions, But as regards the ‘Dissolution’ that you have described, as consisting in the ‘destruction of particular countries’ or the ‘destruction of particular families’, as also the Buddhist’s idea of Dissolution consisting in the withdrawal of the energy of Fire, Water and Air, extending (a) horizontally over the ‘Trisāhasra-mahāsāhasra’, (b) downwards to the very limits of the atmospheric Air, and (c) upwards, gradually, to the First, Second and Third stages of ‘Dhyāna’, which cannot be negatived by any proofs, and is therefore ‘undeniable’, which it is suspected, affects Brahmā and other Beings also; under both these forms of Dissolution (one posited by the Opponent and the other by the Buddhist), the destruction of the Veda would be quite possible; and it would also be justifiable to assume that what is asserted there is all wrong;
tathā cānya evāyaṃ vedaḥ pratikañcukatām tat pratibhāsatāṃ gataḥ, ityāśaṅkā na nivartate yāvad bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ nocyate bhavateti //
so that what is now known as the ‘Veda’ is something quite different from the original, of which it is a mere ‘Semblance’, a mere husk, masquerading as the real Veda. Such a suspicion is quite possible, and cannot be easily shaken off, until there are proofs to the contrary.
tathāhīdānīṃ tāvat sarvatra tathābhūd bhaviṣyati cetyadhyavasyāma ityataetadāśaṅkyāha anyathā karaṇecchāyām ityādi / anyathā karaṇecchāyām api varteta na dhvaniḥ / tathaiva yadi vāñchā sā nṛṇāṃ jāyeta nānyathā //
As a matter of fact, if there were a desire to alter the text of the Veda, the words could not remain the same, so also if there were no such desire in the minds of men, then and not otherwise, could there be an impossibility of regarding the Veda and its meaning being other than the one usually accepted. Even if this desire is not there, the suspicion does not altogether disappear.
[p.715]
The following might be urged “There is a proof annulling your conclusion.
śaṅkyetāyaṃ tathā vedo na granthārthānyathātmakaḥ /
For instance, throughout the country men cannot alter the text of the Veda; from this we conclude that it has been so in the past and is going to be so in the future”.
anyathecchāpravṛttau tu nāśaṅkā vinivartate //
In anticipation of this, the author provides the following answer: [see verses 2674-2675 above]
yadi hi satyāmanyathākaraṇecchāyāṃ vedadhvaniranyathā na pravarteta, anyathā karaṇecchā cotpādayituṃ na śakyate, tadā vedapāṭhāder anyathātvakaraṇaśaktiḥ puṃsaḥ siddhyet /
If it were a fact that even when one has the desire to alter the text of the Veda, there is no change in the words of the Veda, or if the desire itself to change the text were impossible to be produced, then alone could it be taken as proved that man has no capacity to alter the Vedic text;
tatrāpi na sarvapuṃsāṃ siddhyati, adarśanamātrasyāpramāṇatvāt /
but that conclusion also could not apply to all men; as the mere non-perception (of such change) does not prove anything;
puruṣāṇām atiśayadarśanāc ca /
and also because there is difference in the capacities of men.
yāvatā śakyate śaṃ no devīrabhiṣṭaya ityāder vedavākyasya pāṭho 'nyathāpi kartuṃ, artho vā vyākhyātum /
As a matter of fact, however, it is quite possible for man to alter the text of the Vedic passages such as ‘Śanno devīrabhiṣṭaye, etc.’ or to explain them as meaning something quite different from what they are regarded as meaning.
tathā hi mīmāṃsakaniruktakārādayo bahudhā vedārthaṃ viśaṃsanto dṛśyante /
For instance, we find that even Mīmāṃsakas and the Author of the Nirukta and others do often differ among themselves regarding the explanation of Vedic texts.
tasmān na śaṅkānivṛttiḥ //
Hence the doubts regarding its veracity and fidelity cannot cease altogether.
naca sarvaiḥ kramaiḥ pumbhiḥ sarvasiddhaḥ pragṛhyate /
The order of sequence, is not accepted by all men as fixed for all;
svātantryeṇāpi kurvanti padavākyākṣarakramam //
in pact, people adopt the order of words and sentences and letters according to their own wish.
anyathā kṛtakaḥ kaścit syād grantho vedan na te /
If that were not so, then, for you, like the Veda, there would be no book written by men;
anarthagranthamātre 'pi dhvastā kṛtiratas tathā //
so that the composing of all meaningless (or wicked) works is rendered impossible at one stroke!
yathaivāsya parair uktas tathaivainaṃ vivakṣati / ityeṣāniyatis tan na sambandhavadanāditā //
Because there could be no certainty that this man is uttering words exactly as they had been used previously by others, therefore like the relationship, they also could not be regarded as beginningless.
padāni ca vākyāni cākṣarāṇi ceti tathoktāni, teṣāṃ krama iti vigrahītavyam /
The compound ‘padavākya, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘pada’ words ‘vākya’ sentences ‘akṣara’ letters; the ‘krama’ order of sequence of these.
anarthagranthamātre 'pīti /
‘Anarthagrantha’ is a work which has no ‘artha’ sense;
kṛtirdhvasteti sambandhaḥ, avidyamāno 'rtho yasya granthasyāsau, daśa dāḍimādivākyavad anarthaḥ, vedaviruddhārtho vānartho bauddhādisiddhāntavat, anarthaścāsau granthaśceti tathoktaḥ /
i.e. such meaningless sentences as ‘ten pomegranates’ and the like. Or ‘anartha’ maybe ‘works contrary to the Veda’, wicked, like those formulating the Buddhist doctrines, for instance.
mātraśabdena vyāptiṃ darśayati /
The term ‘mātra’ denotes universality.
kṛtiḥ kāraṇam /
‘kṛti’, doing, composing.
tatheti / vedavat /
‘tathā’ like the Veda.
aniyatir iti /
‘Aniyati’ no certainty;
eṣa niyamo na syād iti yāvat /
i.e. there would be no certainty on the point.
tasmāt //
‘Tat’ Therefore.
yaduktam pareṇoktān bravīmītyādi tatrāha pareṇoktānityādi / pareṇokān bravīmīti vivakṣā cedṛśī bhavet /
The idea that ‘I am using the words that have been used by other persons’ would proceed from illusion, due to the recognition of similarity;
karmabhedavaditi /
just as there is in the case of acts.
pareṇoktās tu nocyante vailakṣaṇyāt svarādibhiḥ /
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2291, that “The idea in the mind of every speaker is that ‘I am uttering words that have been used by other persons’;
svarādibhir iti /
this in itself makes them eternal, etc. etc.”.
ādiśabdena drutamadhyavilambitādiparigrahaḥ / na ca vyañjakadharmo 'yam iti /
The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2679 above] ‘Karmabhedavat’ the ‘vati’ affix added after the Locative ending. This points out the possibility of the recognition of similarity leading to a conclusion contrary to that desired by the other party, and thereby indicates its ‘inconclusiveness’ as a reason in support of the latter.
svarādiḥ / kutaḥ ---/
Answer: [see verses 2680-2681 next]
varṇātmatvena tasya svarāder darśanāt /
because they are always perceived in the form of letters.
siddhatvād ity arthaḥ /
‘Accents’ such as the ‘Udātta’ and the rest.
taccihnam iti /
i.e. they are known as such.
tasya varṇabhedasya cihnaṃ taccihnam, tat kimiti niṣidhyate na cānyaccihnam asti cetyanena //
‘The signs of that’ The signs of the difference of the Letters. ‘Why are you denying’ in the words ‘there is no other sign for you’ (Text 2291).
jātyā yathā ghaṭādīnām ityādāvāha prākcetyādi /
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2292, that “Just as in the ease of the Jar and such things, etc. etc.”.
prākca jātyā ghaṭādīnāṃ vyavahāropalakṣaṇam / niṣiddhaṃ tadasattvena vyaktyā ca tadayogataḥ //2682/
‘Already’ under the chapter dealing with the ‘Universal ‘Because it does not exist’ i.e. because the Universal has no existence. Even if it exists, it can have no connection with the Individual thing, in the shape of the Jar;
prāgiti /
because it cannot be benefited by this latter.
sāmānyaparīkṣāyām / tadasattveneti /
Hence its use cannot be regarded as characterised or indicated by the ‘Universal’.
tena jātidvāreṇa yadetat samupakalpitaṃ tat sarvam asaṅgatam iti darśayati tālvadijātayas tasmād ityādi /
The following text points out that, as a consequence of what has gone above, it follows that all that has been alleged by the other party on the basis of the ‘Universal’ is entirely irrelevant.
tālvādijātayas tasmāt sarvapuṃsvavyavasthitaḥ /
All such universale, therefore, as ‘palate’ and the rest vary in all men;
nāto vaktā dhvanīṃstābhirupa{la}kṣya nirasyati // yaduktam "teṣāṃ ca jātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ" ityādi, tatrāha tannetyādi /
consequently when the speaker utters word-sounds, he does not do so through those universals. Thus there are no distinct universals of these articulations. Which could serve to bring about the manifestation of the word-sounds; nor are there as many of these as there are letters.
tan na tajjātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ / yāvad varṇaṃ pravartante vyaktayo vā tadanvitaḥ //
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2294, that “there are distinct Universals of the Articulations which serve to bring about the manifestation of the Word-Sounds, etc. etc.”
taditi / tasmāt //
‘Tat’ Therefore; thus.
yadapyuktaṃ tatra tālvādisaṃyogetyādi, tatrāha tatra tālvādītyādi / tan na tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgakramapūrvakam /
Nor, as asserted by you, could the order of sequence among the articulations be due to the order among the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate, etc.; nor could the eternality of both be due to their respective universals.
yathā na bhramaṇādīnāṃ bhāgā jātyupalakṣitāḥ / kramānuvṛttirevaṃ no tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāk //
Just as in the actions of moving about, etc. there is no order of sequence through the universals, so too there is none among the palate, etc., the articulation and the letter.
{bhāvaḥ} //
[verse 2685]:
yaduktam vyaktīnām eva vetyādi, tatrāha vyaktinām apītyādi / vyaktīnām api no saukṣmyājjātidharmāvadhāraṇam /
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2295, that “The order of sequence among the Articulations would be due to the order among: the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.”
yaduktam tadvaśeneti /
The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2685 above]
yadapyuktaṃ dhvaniguṇānītyādi, tatrocyate tannetyādi / tanna dhvaniguṇān sarvānnityatvena vyavasthitān /
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2296, that “Just as in the case of Moving About and other actions, there is an order of sequence, through the Universal subsisting in the various factors of the Action,’ etc. etc.”
yaduktam "teṣāṃ ca jātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ" ityādi, tatrābhyupagamya jātidūṣaṇam āha anyaccetyādi /
As against this, it is pointed out in the following Text that the Corroborative Instance, ‘Moving About, etc.’ is ‘inadmissible’: [see verse 2686 above]
iti vyañjakasadbhāvānnityaṃ śabdopalambhanam / ato vyaktikramātmāpi yukto varṇakramo na te //
That is, because the very idea of the ‘Universal’ itself has been discarded. The cognition of the properties of the universal cannot be due to the subtle nature of the individuals;
tenāyam artho bhavati, ta{ya}smājjātayo............śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ sthitās tena.......... śabdopalambho ..........
not can there be, through this, the cognition of order among the letters, even though these are all-pervading.
vyakteḥ kramābhāvāt tadātmā.......
It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2297, that “The individual Articulations themselves being extremely subtle, etc. etc.”.
na yuktaḥ ........
The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2687 above]
vyaktam evā............ iti // tatra jātivyaktyoḥ sambandhamabhyupagamya doṣam āha vyaktisambandharūpāṇām ityādi /
Consequently, the letters, following the properties of the articulations, which appear as eternal, cannot become expressive of diverse meanings. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka in Text 2298, that “The Letters following up the properties of the Articulations, which appear there as eternal, become expressive of diverse meanings”. The answer to this is as follows;
[p.718]
[see verse 2688 above]
vyaktisambandharūpāṇāṃ jātīnāṃ ca vyavasthitau /
There is another point: granting that ‘there are universals which serve to manifest the sounds, and there are as many of these as there are letters’;
vyaktīnām api nityatvaṃ durvāramanuṣajyate //
under this view, as the manifester would be always there, the sound should be heard at all times.
jātisambandharūpāṇāṃ vyaktīnāṃ vā vyavasthitau /
Consequently, the order of sequence among the letter-sounds cannot be in accordance with the order of the manifestations.
jātīnām apyanityatvam akāmasyāpi te bhavet //
The several particles used here are to be taken as serving the purpose of introduction.
dviṣṭhatvāt sambandhasya, jātīnāṃ nityatvābhyupagamāc ca tat sambandhasvabhāvānāṃ vyaktīnām api nityatvaṃ prāpnoti /
‘Iti’ for this reason. The meaning thus comes to be this: As Universals are the manifested of the Word-Sound, there should be apprehension of the Sounds at all times.
anyathā hi jātīnāṃ tat sambandhasvarūpatā na syāt /
And as there is no order of sequence among the manifestations...
tathā vyaktīnām anityatvābhyupagamāt tat sambandhasvarūpaṇāṃ jātīnām apyanityatvaṃ prāpnoti /
hence unintelligible]. If the universals continue to exist as related to the individuals, the eternality of the individuals also is irresistible.
bahi..ṣva ca svarūpeṇavyaktinām anityatāsetsyati yadi tat sambandhādīnāṃ jātīnām apyanityatyā bhavet /
or (conversely), if the individuals exist as related to the universals, then the universals also should be noneternal, even if you do not relish it.
anyathā hi dvitīyasambandhinyavikale sati na yuktam aparasya vaikalyaṃ sambandhasvabhāvahāniprasaṅgāt //
Otherwise the Universals would not have their form consisting of the relationship of the Individuals. Similarly, as Individuals are held to be non-eternal, the Universals, which consist in the relationship to these, must also be non-eternal.
abhivyakter ayoge ca purastād upapādite / itthaṃ pratāyamānaḥ syur varṇās te na nāvabodhakāḥ //
Universals must also be non-eternal. If it were not so, then, while one of the two relatives would be there in a perfect condition, it cannot be right for the other to be imperfect;
ta iti vyaktyaṃtasya {---} //
as in that case, the Relationship itself would cease.
yaduktaṃ kālaścaiko vibhur nitya ityādi, tatrāha kālo 'pītyādi /
It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2300, that “Time is one, all-pervading, eternal, etc. etc.”
kālo 'pyeko vibhur nityaḥ pūrvam eva nirākṛtaḥ /
Time, as something one, all-pervading and eternal, has already been rejected;