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ubhayasvabhāvapakṣe ubhayapakṣabhāvī doṣaḥ, ekatvahāniprasaṅgaś ca / | If the Universal (or the Jar) be regarded as being of the nature of both, then it becomes open to the objections that relate to both; |
vastunaḥ svabhāvadvayānupapatteḥ / | and it also leads to its being deprived of its one-ness; |
evaṃ hi dve eva te vastunī kathite syātāṃ naikam ubhayātmakam / | because one and the same thing cannot be of the nature of two things. So that the two would be two distinct entities, and not one, of the nature of both. |
anubhayapakṣe vastutvahāniprasaṅgaḥ / | If the thing be held to be neither the one nor the other, then it ceases to be an entity. |
ekasya vidhipratiṣedhāyogaś ceti / | It has also to be pointed out that one and the same thing cannot be both positive and negative. |
ime doṣā iti / sambandhāsiddhinityatādiprasaṅgalakṣaṇaḥ / | ‘All these objections’ in the shape of (1) absence of relationship, (2) the contingency of being eternal and so forth. |
nityamabdhāraṇādikāryaprasaṅgaścādhiko doṣaḥ // | There is the additional objection that the work of containing water, etc, also would have to be regarded as eternal, (2636-2639) |
yaduktam śaktir eva hi sambandha ityādi / tatrāha śaktir eva cetyādi / śaktir eva ca sambandho bhedaścāsyā na cenmataḥ / | If it is held that “the connection (or relationship) is only a kind of potency, and there can be no diversity in potency”, then the potency of the word and its meaning would be one and the same, as there would be no distinction. |
vyatireke 'pi sambandhastasyāstābhyāṃ na kaścana / | Even if there were some distinction, there could be no connection between the potency and those two. |
tadutpattau na nityatvaṃ nacānyā vastuno gatiḥ // | If it were something produced, then it could not be eternal; and there is no other possibility for anything. |
nacānyeti ubhayānubhayasvabhāvalakṣaṇe pūrvavad doṣaprasaṅgāt // | ‘There is no other, etc. etc.’ There being objections as explained before to the Potency being or not being of the nature of both. |
sambandhākhyānakāle tu gośabdādāvudīrite / kecit sambandhabuddhyārthaṃ budhyante na pare tathā // | At the time of the assertion of the connection, when the word ‘cow’ is uttered, some people, who are cognisant of the connection, comprehend its meaning, while others do not; |
yasmāt sambandhasadbhāvādyādṛśaḥ sa prakāśitaḥ / | and the reason for this lies in the presence of the connection in the form and manner in which it has been made known. |
tāvakīne tu sambandhe sarvo 'rthamavadhārayet // | Under your view of the ‘connection’, however, all men should comprehend the meaning; |
śaktireva hi sambandho nityā yuṣmābhir iṣyate / | because according to you, the connection consists of potency only, and potency is eternal; |
sā cārthabodhajanane niyatānavadhir na vā // | so that it should be able to bring about the cognition of the meaning at all times; or, otherwise, it should not be free from limitations. |
niyatānavadhau sarvaḥ kimarthaṃ nāvadhārayet / | If being eternal, it were free from limitations, why should not all men comprehend the meaning of the word? If, on the other hand, it has limitations, what would be the reason for such limitation, when it is in the nature of the potency itself? A man who has no knowledge of the convention (bearing on the word), or when he has forgotten it, does the cognition of the meaning appear in the same one man? Because the potency restricted to the production of that cognition is there all the time, the idea is that the eternal potency is effective only when it is itself known, so that, if the known potency be different from the unknown one, then it loses its eternality; |
sāvadhāvapi ko hetuḥ prakṛtiścet svatas tathā // | while if it is the same, why is this distinction set forth? (2642-2648) |
saṅketagrahaṇāt pūrvaṃ tasya cāsmaraṇe punaḥ / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2264, that “At the time that the Connection is asserted, etc. etc.”. |
ekasyaiva pravṛttaṃ kiṃ vijñānaṃ tatra vṛttimat // | The proper idea would be that some people comprehend the meaning of words through that relationship of cause and effect which might be there; |
tajjñānajanmaniyatā sā hi śaktiravasthitā / | because the fact always remains that such relationship is the means of such comprehension. |
atha jñātaiva sā śaktir niyatā parikalpyate // | and always restricted to the bringing about of the cognition of the meaning. |
jñātājñātā ca bhinnā cennityatvamavahīyate / aikye tu kiṃnimitto 'yaṃ vibhāga upavarṇyate // yādṛśa etat kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇas tādṛśo yasmāt sambandho 'sti tasmāt kecid buddhyanta iti yuktaṃ syāt, tasya niyatajñānotpādakatvena sthitatvāt / | The following might be urged “In the case of eternal things also, their very nature is such that they bring about only certain effects, not all. And certainly no one can object to the nature of things”. In that case, if such is its nature by itself, independently of other things, then, prior to the knowledge of the Convention, or on forgetting the Convention, under such conditions also, the man who has comprehended that restricted meaning would continue to do so for all time; |
bhavadīyate tu sambandhe sarvamayuktam iti darśayati tāvakīna ityādi / | because the capacity of the Potency to produce that particular cognition would remain there permanently. |
athāpi syāt jñānapakatvāt sambandhalakṣaṇā śaktir jñātā satī jñānaṃ janayati, nājñātā, tena na bhavati yathoktadoṣaprasaṅga iti / | The following might be urged: “As the Potency brings about the Cognition, the Potency in the shape of the Relationship can bring about Cognition only after it has itself been recognised, not while it itself remains uncognised; hence the incongruity pointed out does not arise”. |
tadasamyak / | This is not right. |
yadi hi jñātājñātāvasthayoḥ parasparaṃ bheda iṣyate tadā nityatvahāniḥ / | If it is held that the Potency as known differs from the Potency as unknown, then it loses its eternality. |
athābhedas tadā jñātājñātasvabhāvadvayavibhāgānupapattiḥ, nahyekasya vastuna ekapuruṣāpekṣayā jñātatvamajñātatvaṃ ca parasparaṃ viruddhaṃ svabhāvadvayaṃ yujyata iti // | If there is no difference between them, there is no justification for making any such distinction as the ‘Potency known’ and ‘Potency unknown’. Because for the same person, one and the same thing cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of being known and unknown. |
kiñca kenābhyupāyena vijñātā śaktir iṣyate / | Further, by what means does the potency become known? (2649a) “It is by means of presumption; |
arthāpattyeti cedyasmād ayaṃ nyāya iha sthitaḥ // śabdavṛddhābhidheyāni pratyakṣeṇātra paśyati / śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena paśyati // | the process being as follows: The man perceives the word-sound, the experienced man (pronouncing the word) and the thing spoken of through sense-perception; the fact of the hearer having comprehended the meaning is cognised through inference from his activity; |
anyathānupapattyā ca vetti śaktiṃ dvayāśritām / | and the dual potency is cognised through the fact of the phenomenon not being capable of any other explanation; |
arthāpattyāvabudhyante sambandhaṃ tripramāṇakam // | thus it is by presumption that they recognise the relationship vouched for by the three means of cognition” [Ślokavārtika-sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 140-141]. |
arthāpatter ityādinā parasyottaraṃ vistareṇa tāvadāśaṅkate / | In the following Texts, the Author sets forth in detail the answer from the view-point of the other party (the Mīmāṃsaka): [see verses 2649b-2651 above]: |
tathā hi sambandhapratipatter ayaṃ nyāyaḥ kumārilena varṇitaḥ yasmāt prathamaṃ tāvat pratyakṣeṇa śabdaṃ vṛddhaṃ ca śabdasyākhyātāram abhidyeyaṃ ca vācyaṃ vastu paśyati, tataḥ paścād anumānena ceṣṭālakṣaṇena liṅgena śrotuḥ pratipannatvaṃ paśyati avadhārayatītyarthaḥ / | The process of the comprehension of the Relationship has been thus described by Kumārila: (1) First of all, through Sense-perception, one cognises the Word (pronounced), the experienced man who pronounces the Word, and the thing spoken of; after that, through Inference, through the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the activity (of the man), it is known that the Hearer has understood the meaning of the Word the ‘activity’ is spoken of as ‘Inference’, in the sense of what is instrumental in bringing about the Inferential Cognition; |
tataś ca paścād arthāpattyā dvayāśritām śabdārthāśritāṃ śaktiṃ vetti / | then, through Presumption, he cognises the Potency as ‘dual’, i.e. as subsisting in the Word and the meaning. |
arthāpattyā tu sākṣād avabudhyanta ityato 'rthāpattyāvabudhyanta ityuktam / tripramāṇakam iti / pratyakṣānumārthāpattilakṣaṇāni trīṇi pramāṇāni yasyādhigamāya bhavantisa tathoktaḥ // | As the Potency itself is directly cognised through Presumption, it is said that ‘they recognise it through Presumption ‘Vouched for by the three means of Cognition’ i.e. in the Cognition of which, all the three means of Cognition function in the shape of Perception, Inference and Presumption, (2649-2651) |
anyathaivetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha | The following Text sets forth the objection to the above view: [see verse 2652 next] |
anyathaivopapannatvācchaktir boddhuṃ na śakyate / śabdāt sāmayikādyasmāt pratipattir anākulā // | because the phenomenon is quite explicable otherwise; for instance, there is no difficulty in the comprehension of the meaning of the word from the word itself as aided by convention. |
anenārthāpatter anaikāntikatām āha vināpi nityasambandhaṃ pratipattisambhavasya pratipāditatvāt // na kevalasādhakapramāṇābhāvāt tat kalpanā na yuktā pramāṇabādhitatvād api na yukteti darśayann āha śaktinityatvetyādi / | This shows the inconclusive character of the Presumption (cited by the Mīmāmsaka); the sense is that even without the eternal Relationship, the phenomenon of comprehension of the meaning of words can be explained, as shown. Under the view that the potency is eternal, there can be no need for anything in the shape of convention and the rest; |
na kiñcid iti śabdārthapratipattiḥ sadā bhavet // | and the comprehension of the meaning of the word would be there at all times. |
samarthāntarabhāve ca kalimāryādiśabdavat / nānyārthabodhakatvaṃ syād dhvaner niyataśaktitaḥ // | If a word had the potency of expressing other meanings also, as in the case of the words ‘kali’ and ‘mārya’ it could not bring about the cognition of those other meanings; as the potency of the word is restricted. |
nānārthadyotanāyaiva śaktir ekā yadīṣyate / bhinnā vā śabda ekasmin sakṛnnānārthavidbhavet // | Is the potency held to be indicative of the several meanings, one or diverse 1 if it is one, then at one and the same time, there should be comprehension of the several meanings of the one word all at once. |
[p.710] prayogaḥ ye saṅketāpekṣārthaprakāśanā na te nityasambandhayoginaḥ, yathāgāvyādiśabdāḥ, saṅketāpekṣārthaprakāśanāś ca gavādayo laukikavaidikāḥ śabdā iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: Words that are expressive of things through the aid of Convention cannot have any eternal relationships, e.g. such words as ‘gāvī’ and the like; all Vedic as well as secular words like ‘go’ (Cow) are expressive of meanings through the help of. Convention; |
sāpekṣatvasya nityasambandhayogitvaviruddhenānityasambandhayogitvena vyāptatvāt / etac ca pramāṇaṃ paścātkariṣyate / | hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant -with the contrary; ‘dependence’ being included under ‘presence of non-eternal relationship’, which is ‘contrary’ to the ‘presence of eternal relationship That this is so is going to be proved later on. |
atra tu vyāptimātram asya prasādhyate / | On the present occasion only the Invariable Concomitance is pointed out. |
tathā hi śaktilakṣaṇenārthapratipattihetunā sambandhena nityasambandhayoginaḥ śabdā iṣṭāḥ / | It is through Relationship in the form of Potency, which is what brings about the comprehension of the meaning, that Words are held to have a permanent relationship; |
sā ca śaktir nityatvādanupakāryeti na kiñcit saṅketādi vyapekṣate / | thus Potency, being eternal, cannot be helped by anything else; hence it cannot need any such aids as the Convention and the like. |
tataś ca tadbhāvinī śabdārthapratipattiḥ sarvadā bhavet / | Under the circumstances, the comprehension of the meaning of the -word should be there at all times. |
kiñca sā śaktir ekārthaniyatā vā bhavennānārthaniyatā vā, tatrāpi nānārthaniyamapakṣe kimekasya śabdasya nānārthadyotikā śaktir ekaiva, āhosvid aneketi vikalpāḥ / | Further, such a Potency could either be restricted to one meaning or restricted to several meanings? If it is restricted to several meanings, is the potency of one Word to bring about the cognition of the several meanings, one or several? These are the only alternatives possible. |
tatrādye pakṣe yadetad deśakālādibhedena saṅketāntare kriyamāṇe sati dhvaneḥ śabdasyāpā{nyā---}rthabodhakatvaṃ dṛṣṭam yathā kalimāryādiśabdānāṃ dravidā{ḍā---}ryadeśayoryathākramamantakālavarṣopasargādyabhidhāyināṃ{---} tan na prāpnoti, niyataśaktikatvāt / | Under the first alternative, there could be no comprehension of meanings as is found in such cases as when a different Convention has been set up in reference to diverse times and places, the Word actually expresses another meaning; as for instance, in the case of the words ‘Kali’ and ‘Mārya’ as used among the Draviḍas and the Āryas, which respectively denote (among one people) ‘the last point of time’ (death?) and the ‘Peril of too much Rain’ (?); no comprehension would be possible as the Potency will have been restricted to one meaning only; |
cakṣurādivat / | as in the case of the Eye and other organs of perception; |
nahi cakṣuḥ saṅketavaśād rasādyupalambhāya niyogam arhati / dvitīye 'pi pakṣe ekasmācchabdādyugapat sarveṣāṃ puṃsāṃ śabdārthapratipattiprasaṅgaḥ / | the Eye certainly is not capable of being made by Convention to bring about the apprehension of Taste, etc. Under the second alternative also, there would be the possibility of all men comprehending the meaning of the Word at one and the same time. |
taddarśayati śabda ekasminn ityādi // | This is what is pointed out by the words ‘Of the one word, etc. etc.’, (2653-2655) |
atraiva doṣāntaram āha arthadyotanaśakteścetyādi / | Another objection is pointed out against the same view: [see verses 2656-2657 next] |
athadyotanaśakteś ca sarvadaiva vyavasthiteḥ / taddhetur arthabodho 'pi sarveṣāṃ sarvadā bhavet // | As the potency indicative of the meaning remains there at all times, the comprehension of the meaning brought about by it would also be there at all times and for all men. |
tasmin saṅketasāpekṣā śaktiścet parikalpyate / | If, for that, it is assumed that the potency is dependent upon convention, then it would be dependent upon a helper; |
nanūpakāryapekṣyeta nopakāryā ca sācalā // | and being helped, it could not be permanent, eternal. |
tasminniti / arthabodhe / seti / | ‘For that’ i.e. for the comprehension of the meaning. |
śaktiḥ / | ‘Sā’ the Potency. |
acaleti / nityā / | ‘Acalā’ Eternal. |
ayaṃ cānupakāryatve hetuḥ // | This is the reason why the Potency cannot be ‘helped’, (2656-2657) |
abhyupagamyāpi saṅketasāpekṣatvaṃ doṣāntaram āha arthadyotanahetoścetyādi / | Even granting the dependence of the Potency upon Convention; the Author points out another objection: [see verse 2658 above] |
arthadyotanahetoś ca saṅketasya narāśrayāt / śaktāvitarajanyāyām api mithyātvasambhavaḥ // | With the view that you may have a clear and correct conception of the meanings of words, you have discarded the agency of man (in the matter of the Potency of words), regarding him as the source of confusion and mistake. |
api nāmāsaṅkīrṇamarthaṃ jānīyam iti saṅkarahetuḥ puruṣo 'pākīrṇo bhavatā, tatra yathā kvacit taiḥ prayuktāḥ saṅkīryante śabdās tathā sarvārthasādhāraṇāḥ santo vaidikāḥ [p.711] kvacit tair icchāvaśāt saṃmitāḥ kiṃ na saṅkīryeran / | But when words used by certain persons become confounded regarding their exact signification, then the Vedic scholars would have an equal Cognition of all those significations, and would they not themselves make a confusion among them? Specially as those people would not be cognisant of the truth. |
teṣāṃ puṃsāṃ tattvāparijñānāt / | Thus then the Convention would be dependent upon the whims of men; |
tathāhīcchāvaśāt samayaḥ ca teṣām atattvavidāṃ svātantryeṇa pravartamānā kena niyamyeta / tataś ca svatantryecchābhāvī samayo 'pi svairī vairī ca kimiti viruddham arthaṃ pariharet // | and who could restrain this whim whence it has begun to operate, in the case of men ignorant of the truth? Thus the Convention born of the unrestrained whim would itself be unrestrained and hostile: and being so, why should it avoid the wrong signification? (2658) |
nānārthadyotane śaktir bhavatvekasya hi dhvaneḥ / | A single word may have the potency to express several meanings. |
nāgnihotrādayastvarthāḥ sarve sarvopayoginaḥ // | Even so, such things as the ‘agnihotra’ and the like, cannot all be of use to all men; |
tadiṣṭaviparītārthadyotanasyāpi sambhavāt / | because it is possible that they may express things contrary to what is desired by a certain person. |
nityaśabdārthasambandhakalpanā vo nirarthakā // | Hence your assumption of an eternal relationship between the word and its meaning is entirely futile. |
yadyapi śabdānāṃ nānārthapratipādanasāmarthyamasti, natvarthānāṃ sarvārthakriyākāritvaṃ, pratiniyatatvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasya / | Even though words may have the capacity of expressing several meanings, the things denoted by them are not capable of all effective actions; as the causal efficiency of all things is restricted. |
anyathā hi na kaścid vighātī syād avighātī vā / | If it were not so, then there would be nothing destructive or non-destructive. |
tataś ca pratiniyatārthakriyāsādhane 'rthe pratipipādayiṣite sati sarvārthasādhāraṇasya śabdasyeṣṭārthaviṣayam eva samayaṃ samayakṛtkarotīti kuta etallabhyam / tasmān mithyātvasambhavānnityasambandhakalpanā vyarthaiva // | Thus then, when one wishes to speak of something capable of accomplishing a particular fruitful act, and proceeds to set about the Convention in connection with a Word which by its nature is capable of expressing things, he should set up only that Convention which would be conducive to the expression of only that particular thing which he desires to speak of; but how could this be secured? Thus, there being a possibility of mistake, there is no point in assuming an eternal relationship between Words and Meanings. |
punar apyānarthakyam asya darśayann āha saṅkete cetyādi / | The author again proceeds to point out the futility of the assumption [see verses 2661-2662 next] |
saṅkete ca vyapekṣāyāṃ nityasāmarthyalakṣaṇaḥ / kimakāraṇa evāyaṃ sambandhaḥ paripoṣyate // siddhopasthāyinas tasya nahi kaścit samīkṣyate / | When there is need for the convention, why are you seeking to bolster up, without reason, the ‘relationship’ in the shape of the eternal potency? In the matter of expressing the meaning, there is not found, apart from convention, any operation of such a full-fledged entity as the ‘relationship’. |
yadi sattāmātreṇa sambandho 'rthapratītihetuḥ syāt tadā saṅketānabhijñasyāpi syād ityavaśyaṃ samayāpekṣitā tasyeṣṭavyā / | If the Relationship, by its mere presence, were the cause of the cognition of the meaning, then, there would be such cognition even in a man who is ignorant of the Convention. Hence the need of Convention must be admitted. |
tataś ca samayasyāpyarthapratītihetutve 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe sa kimakāraṇaṃ siddhopasthāyī nityasambandho 'paraḥ poṣyate / tathāhīyāneva sambandhasya vyāpāro yadarthapratītijananaṃ, taccet samayenakriyate tadā kimaparanityasambandhakalpanayā / | That being so, it being admitted that Convention is a means of comprehending the meaning, why is any such thing bolstered up as a full-fledged entity in the shape of the eternal Relationship, without any reason? Because the function of the Relationship would lie in the bringing about of the comprehension of the meaning; and if this is brought about by Convention, what is the use of assuming an eternal Relationship? It has also been explained hundreds of times that being eternal, it cannot have any peculiar feature imposed upon it; |
nacāpi tasyānādheyātiśayasya kācid apekṣeti śataśaścarcitam / | and hence it cannot need the help of anything else. |
adṛṣṭasāmarthyasya ca hetutvakalpane hanta harītakīṃ prāpya devatā virecayantīti kiṃ na kalpyeta // | If causal efficiency is attributed to a thing which has never been found to be efficient, then why cannot it be assumed that on obtaining the Harītakī, the Celestial Beings would have their bowels moved? (2661-2662) |
tathā hi vyavahāro 'yaṃ na dṛṣṭaḥ samayaṃ vinā / | Any functioning (of the relationship) has never been perceived, in the absence of convention. |
tasmāt sambandhasiddhiścetyanartheyaṃ paramparā // | If it be asserted that the relationship proceeds from the convention, then disastrous indeed would such a regress be. |
tasmād iti / saṅketāt / | ‘Tasmāt’ stands for the Convention. |
anartheyaṃ parampareti / adṛṣṭasāmarthyasya hetutvakalpane 'navasthādoṣāt / | ‘Disastrous, etc. etc.’; as there would be an infinite regress involved in the assumption of something as the ‘cause’, whose capacity has never been perceived. |
tathā hi sambandhe 'pi kalpite punar api kasmād aparamadṛṣṭasāmarthyaṃ hetvantaraṃ na kalpyeta, adṛṣṭasāmarthyenāviśeṣāt, evaṃ punar apīti mahatyanarthaparamparā jāyeta // | For instance, having assumed the Relationship, wherefore could you not go on assuming other causes with unknown potencies? ‘Unseen Potency’ would be common to both cases. And so on and on, there would be a disastrous regress. |
narecchāmātrasambhūtasaṅketādapi kevalāt / | All usage becomes explicable on the basis of mere convention proceeding from the whims of men; |
yogo na siddhyatīti / | hence there is no reason for postulating the relationship. |
nitya iti śeṣaḥ // | ‘The Relationship’ i.e. as an eternal factor. |
anyathānupapattis tadvyavahārasya śaṅkyate / | It is merely suspected that there can be no other explanation for usage; |
atīndriyaś ca yogo 'to na narair avagamyate // sarveṣām anabhijñatvāt pūrvapūrvāprasiddhitaḥ / | but that does not bring about the proper cognition of the connection (or relationship) which is beyond the senses. As all men would be ignorant, there could be no ‘long-continued tradition’ which could establish the connection in question. |
na siddho yoga ityevaṃ kimasau parikalpyate // | How then can such an assumption be made? (2665-2666) |
yadi hi sarveṣām anabhijñatvaṃ kathaṃ tarhi pūrvapūrvato 'nabhijñatvāt sambandhaprasiddhir bhavet, nahyandhaparamparā pareṣāṃ rūpaviśeṣopadeśāya prabhavati / | If all men are ignorant, then every preceding generation would also be ignorant; under the circumstances, how could the Connection be established by that tradition? No ‘tradition’ of Blind people ever tends to bring about the right cognition of Colour; |
yathoktaṃ śābare bhāṣye naivañjātīyakeṣvartheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyamupaiti, andhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣviti / | as says Śabara in his Bhāṣya ‘In matters like these mere human assertion cannot bring about right cognition, just as the word of the blind cannot bring about the right cognition of Colour’. |
syād etad apratyakṣadarśitvāt sarve 'nabhijñā ucyante, natu sarvathā parijṇYānābhāvāt, śābdavyavahārānyathānupapattyā tu pramāṇena pūrvapūrveṣāṃ vṛddhānām abhijñatvam asyeveti / | The following might be urged “All men are called ‘ignorant’, in the sense that they cannot perceive things beyond the senses, and not that they do not know anything at all. And it is on the strength of the fact that Verbal usage is otherwise inexplicable that it is believed with certainty that there have been generations of experienced men who have been duly cognisant (of the Connection in question)”. |
naitad evaṃ yato 'nyathāpi saṅketācchabdo vyavahāraḥ pravarteta / | This is not right; because Verbal usage could proceed also on another basis that of Convention. |
etan na nāma darśi {niści---}taṃ, tathāpi saṃdigdham etat kimasau nitya āhosvid anitya iti / | It has not been quite definitely ascertained, but it is doubtful whether this is eternal or non-eternal. |
ata evāha śaṅkyata ityādi / | This is the reason why the Text has used the expression ‘it is suspected’. |
tathā hi arthāpattyā sambandhamātrāstitvaṃ pratipādyate, natu viśeṣaḥ, tena saha pratibandhāsiddher ityabhiprāyaḥ / | What is meant is that on the basis of the said ‘Presumption’, all that is sought to be proved is the mere existence of the Relationship; it indicates nothing about the peculiar feature of it; that is, because there is no concomitance with such a feature. |
ata evānumānānnārthāpatter bhedaḥ / | On this point, there is no difference between Presumption and Inference. |
[p.713] syād etat nānityasyārthapratipādanahetutvaṃ dṛṣṭam, na ca yuktam iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditamato 'sāmarthyān nityaṃ sidhyatīti / | The following might he urged “As a matter of fact, no non-eternal thing has ever been found to bring about the cognition of the meanings of words; nor can this be possible, as has been explained before; and it is this incapacity of the non-eternal that proves the Relationship (which brings about the said Cognition) to be eternal. |
tadetannitye 'pi samānam asiddhaṃ ca / | This same argument, however, can be urged against the eternal thing also. |
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