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prayogaḥ yadyadvilakṣaṇanirbhāsaṃ jñānaṃ na tat tadālambanam, yathā rasādivijñānaṃ na śabdālambanaṃ śabdavijñānaṃ vā rasālambanam, mukhādivilakṣaṇanirbhāsāś ca pratibimbadhiya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ // | This argument may be formulated as follows: When a Cognition envisages something entirely different from a certain thing, it cannot have this latter for its objective basis; e.g. the Cognition of Taste cannot have Sound for its objective basis; or the Cognition of Sound cannot have Taste for its objective basis; the Cognitions of the reflected image envisage something entirely different from the real face; |
{a}siddhatām asya pariharann āha alpīyasītyādi / | hence here we have the apprehension of something contrary to the wider factor. |
alpīyasyāsyamalpīyo darpaṇe pratibhāti hi / | In a smaller mirror the face appears as smaller; |
viparyastaś ca vṛkṣādir jalamagnaḥ pratīyate // | the tree reflected in the water appears as upside down, and as sunk in the water; |
darpaṇābhimukhaṃ bimbaṃ naivaṃ tu pratibimbakam / | the object reflected in the mirror faces the mirror, not so its reflected image; |
jalādyantargataṃ cedaṃ bimbaṃ tvārādavasthitam // āśrayānuvidhānena sthūlasūkṣmādibhedi ca / | while the reflected image is in the water, the object reflected is far off; the reflected image always varies with the reflecting surface, as regards its largeness, smallness, etc., not so the object reflected. |
pratibimbaṃ ca bimbaṃ tu nāto hetor asiddhatā // | The reason why this is not true is stated in the following: [see verse 2587 above]: |
alpīyasi darpaṇe mahadapyāsyam mukham alpīyaḥ alpataraṃ pratibhāti / | In a smaller mirror, the face, though really larger, appears as smaller; |
adhogatamu{śā}khādiśca jalamagno vṛkṣādiḥ pratīyate, tathā pratyaṅmukhaṃ mukham upalabhyate jalādiṣu dūrapratiṣṭhaṃ ca, na ca tathā mukhādividha{bimba---}kamavasthitam / | the tree reflected in water is perceived top downward and as sunk in the water; the face reflected in the mirror is perceived as facing the west; and in water, as being far off; similarly in such reflecting media as the Bright Sword and the like, the Reflected Image appears in varying degrees of length, etc. in accordance with the nature of the reflecting medium; |
tathā khaṅgā [p.697] dyāśrayabhedād dīrghādibhedākāreṇa pratibimbakamābhāti, na ca tathā dīrghādibhedavad bimbakam iti tadvilakṣaṇanirbhāsitvaṃ jñānasya nāsiddham // | and yet the object reflected does not possess the varying length, etc. Thus then, the idea that the cognition of the Reflected Image envisages something different from the Reflected object, cannot be ‘inadmissible’. |
vilakṣaṇāvabhāsenāpyarthasaṃvedanaṃ sati / rūpaśabdādicittaṃ syāt sarvaṃ sarvārthagocaram // | If, even when what appears in the cognition is something quite different from the object, it be regarded as the cognition of that object, then all cognitions of colour, sound and other things, would envisage all things. |
īṣatsaṃmīlite 'ṅgulyā yac ca cakṣuṣi dṛśyate / pṛthageko 'pi sāpyevaṃ bhrāntir nirviṣayā matā // | When the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, if a single object is perceived as diverse, that also is pure illusion, entirely baseless. The reality of the appearance of the reflected image has already been discarded before; |
sarvasya jñānasya sarvaviṣayatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | That all cognitions would have all things for their object is the Reason that serves to annul the conclusion of the other party. |
yaduktam īṣatsaṃmīlita ityādi, tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam, tasyāpi nirviṣayatvāt // yathoktamanekadeśavṛttau cetyādi, tatrāha pratibimbodaya ityādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka in Text 2218 that “When the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, even a single object is perceived as diverse, because of the diversity in the functioning of the eye, the same thing happens in the case in question also”. This also is discarded by what has been said above. |
pratibimbasya hi vastutvaṃ pūrvaṃ niṣiddhaṃ mūrttasyābhinnadeśatvānupapatterityādinā // bhavatu nāma pratibimbaṃ vastusattāthāpi tasya samānabuddhigamyatvam asiddham iti darśayannāha anekadeśetyādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under the Text 2225, that “Even granting that the Reflected Image really exists in the different places, there can be no plurality, etc. etc.”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2593 above]: [verse 2593]: The idea of the Reflected Image being an entity has been rejected before; |
anekadeśavṛttau vā satyapi pratibimbake / sthūlasūkṣmādivad bhedād ekatvaṃ naiva vidyate // | where it has been shown that one corporeal object cannot occupy the same place as another and so forth. Even if the reflected image exists in several places, it varies regarding its largeness, smallness and so forth; hence it cannot be one and the same. |
ādiśabdena dīrghatvādibhedaparigrahaḥ / athāpi syāt satyapi sthūlādibhede kenacinnīlādisādharmyeṇa samānabuddhigamyatvamastyeveti / | ‘And so forth’ includes length, etc. It might be argued that “Even though there is diversity of largeness and the rest, yet in some way, on account of all being blue, etc., they might figure in the same cognition”. |
evam api na pāramārthikamaikyaṃ siddhyati / | But even so, that does not prove real one-ness; |
kalpitaṃ tu syāt tatra ca siddhasādhyatā / | but as regards that, your argument would be futile (as that is admitted by us also). |
athāpi pāramārthikam aikyaṃ syād deśādibhedena vedyamāne 'pi tadā vipracāṇḍālayor api manuṣyatvasāmyād ekatvam astu / | If the one-ness were real, even when the Images are perceived in different places, etc., then there may be one-ness between the Brāhmaṇa and the Cāṇḍāla, on the ground of both being men; |
tathā strītvasāmānyena mātuste svabhāryāyāḥ svamukhāpānayoś ca pārthivatvād ekatvamāpadyate / | there would be one-ness between your mother and your wife, on the ground of both being women, one-ness also between your mouth and the lower orifice, on the ground of both being made up of Earth. |
sarvasya viśvasya vastutvād ekatve mahotpattivināśādiprasaṅgaścānivārya eva // | In fact, the whole universe would be one, on the ground of everything being a Entity; and in that case the contingency of the simultaneous birth and death of things would become irresistible. |
mamopari sthito bhānur iti bhrāntaḥ sa niścitaḥ // | The idea that appears in men as to ‘the sun being over my head’ is surely wrong; |
sarve prāṇabhṛto yasmād ekam eva divākaram / paśyanti yaugapadyena na dvitīyaṃ kadācana // | because all living beings see the same sun at the same time, and not different suns; |
rāvaṃ na maṇḍalaṃ yasmād dvitīyādīha vidyate / | because in reality no second solar disc exists; |
dṛśyādṛṣṭer ataścārkaḥ eka eva viniścitaḥ // | if it existed, it would surely be seen, and yet it is not seen; hence it is definitely concluded that only one sun exists. |
natvevaṃ niścitaḥ śabda ekatvena kathañcana / | As regards the word-sound, however, it has never been definitely ascertained to be one and the same; |
krameṇa yugapaccāpi tannānātvopalakṣaṇāt // yadāhi gādivarṇaṃ ca vaktāro bahavaḥ sakṛt / | because whether appearing in succession or simultaneously it is clearly characterised by multiplicity. Even when speakers pronounce the letter ‘ga’ at one and the same time, the difference among them is clearly apprehended. |
prayuñjate tadā bhedau vispaṣṭamupalabhyate // dvitīyasya ravimaṇḍalasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhād abhāvaniścayād ekatvasiddher mamopari sthito bhānur ityeṣa bhrāntaḥ pratyayo 'vadhāryate / | The following has been urged in,the Bhāṣya (of Śabara): “It might be urged that it is not possible for one and the same thing to be seen simultaneously at several places; but the foolish man who says this should look at the sun, where one and the same sun is seen in several places..... It might be that its exact position is not ascertained on account of remoteness; hence there is an illusion. |
natvevaṃ śabdasyaikatvaṃ siddham, yena deśādibhedena vidyamānatvaṃ bhrāntaṃ syāt / | The same may be said in regard to the Word-Sound also; there is no definite cognition of the exact position”. (Sū. Translation, pp. |
siddhe hyekatve tathāvidyamānatvaṃ bhrāntaṃ siddhyet, tadeva tu na siddham iti yatkiñcidetat / | It is only when such one-ness is established that the idea of the said presence could be wrong. But that one-ness itself has not been established. |
rāvam iti / raveridam ityaṇantam etat / | ‘Solar disc The term ‘rāvam’ is made up of the noun ‘ravi’with the ‘aṃ’ affix. |
nanu ca pratyabhijñāpratyayena śabdasyāpyekatvaṃ siddham evetyāha natvevamityādi / pratyabhijñāyāḥ pūrvam aprāmāṇyasya pratipāditatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Says the Opponent: “The one-ness of the Word-Sound has certainly been definitely established through Recognition”. The answer to this is ‘It has never been definitely ascertained, etc. etc.’ That is to say, the validity of Recognition as a means of Right Cognition has been already rejected. |
yaugapadyena nānātvasiddhiṃ pratipādayati yadā hītyādi / | The words ‘even when, etc. etc.’ explain that even when the appearance is simultaneous, there is multiplicity. |
vispaṣṭam iti / | ‘Clearly’; |
drutamadhyavilambitādibhedena pratibhāsanāt // | because all details regarding swiftness, middling and slow, etc. etc. are clearly perceived. |
krameṇa tu prayoge 'sya pratyakṣeṇa na kevalam / bhedo 'vagamyate kintu liṅgād api dhiyāṃ kramāt // | When the letter is pronounced in succession, one after the other, the diversity is not only directly perceived, but also inferred through the inferential indicative in the shape of the fact of the cognitions appearing in succession. |
pratyakṣeṇa na kevalam iti / | ‘Not only directly perceived’; |
tadāpi pajjā{ṣaṅkā---}dibhedena spaṣṭapratibhāsibhedānubhavāt, nacāyaṃ vyañjakabhedas tasya pūrvaṃ nirastatvāt / | because even so it is clearly apprehended, to be diverse, on account of the diversity in the notes, ‘Ṣaḍja’ and the rest. This cannot be a ease of diversity among the manifesters; as that idea has been already discarded. |
liṅgād apīti / | i.e. through Inference also; |
prayogaḥ yadyadā na bhavati na tadā tadavikalakāraṇaṃ bhavati yathā rūpālokamanaskārādipratyayakalāpe 'pi sati cakṣurvikalasyābhavaccakṣurvijñānam, na [p.699] bhavanti caikagakārādivijñānotpattikāle paścātkālabhāvīni tadbhāvitvenābhimatāni vijñānānīti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | the argument being formulated as follows: At the time that a thing does not come into existence, its cause is not present in an efficient form, e.g. visual cognition does not appear when the set of its causes is devoid of the Eye, even though the other factors are there in the form of the Colour, the Light, the mental condition, and so forth; at the time that the several cognitions of the single letter ‘ga’ appear, there do not appear those subsequent cognitions which are held to follow from the said cognitions; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term; |
avikalakāraṇatvasya bhavanena vyāptatvāt tasya cehābhāvaḥ / | the presence of the efficient cause being invariably concomitant with coming into existence, and the said ‘presence’ being not- there, |
nanu ca sāmānyenāvikalakāraṇatvamātrasya pratiṣedhe sādhye siddhasādhyatā / | Says the Opponent: “If what you seek to prove is the negation of the presence of the efficient cause in general, then your argument is superfluous; |
tathā hi nityasya śabdasya kāraṇatve 'pi sahakārikāraṇavaikalyādanutpattiḥ paścāt kālabhāvināṃ pratyayānāmiṣyata eva pareṇa / | because even though the eternal Word-sound is a cause, there may be a deficiency due to the absence of its auxiliaries, which renders the appearance of the subsequent cognitions impossible; |
atha viśiṣṭena śabdākhyena kāraṇena yadavikalakāraṇatvam tat pratiṣedhaḥ sādhyate, tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / dṛṣṭāntaś ca sādhyavikalaḥ / nahi cakṣurvijñānaṃ śabdakāraṇavaikalyān na bhavati / | If, on the other hand, what you are negativing is the causal efficiency of the Word-Sound in particular, then your Reason is ‘Inconclusive’, and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum Because when the Visual Perception does not appear, its non-appearance is not due to the deficiency of the cause of the Word-Sound; |
kiṃ tarhi cakṣurvaikalyāt / | it is due to the deficiency (absence) of the eye”. |
naitad asti / | This is not right. |
sāmānyenaiva sādhyam, na ca siddhasādhyatā, bhavet / | What we seek to prove is the fact in its general aspect. Nor is our argument ‘superfluous’ in that case. |
yāvatā saiva na sambhavati tasya tenānupakāryatvāt / | because such a cause could not render any help to the eternal thing; |
upakārī hyapekṣyaḥ syād anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ / | and it is only what helps that is needed; otherwise there would be incongruities. |
tasmād anapekṣyasya śabdasya kāraṇatvābhyupagame sarvam eva tadbhāvivijñānam avikalakāraṇameveti sadaiva bhavet / | Consequently, if the Word-Sound, independently, were held to be the cause, all the cognitions proceeding therefrom would always have the efficient cause present; and hence they would all appear at alt times. |
abhāve tu tadabhavadvijñānaṃ tasyaiva śabdasya vaikalyaṃ sūcayed iti kathaṃ siddhasādhyatā / | If they did not, then the non-appearance of the cognitions proceeding therefrom would indicate the inefficiency of the Word-Sound itself. How then can our argument be ‘superfluous’? |
viśeṣeṇāpi kāraṇavaikalye sādhye nānaikāntikatā, nāpi dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā / | Even if what is meant to be proved were the deficiency of a particular Cause, our argument could not be ‘inconclusive’; |
tathāhyayam atrārtho vivakṣitaḥ yasmin satyapi yan na bhavati tat kāraṇaṃ bhavato na bhavati, yathā cakṣurvijñānaṃ śabde satyapyabhavat, satyapi ca gakārādiśabdasvarūpaviśeṣe tadbhāvitvenābhimatāni jñānāni na bhavantīti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ / | what is meant is as follows: even when one thing is present, if the other thing does not come into existence, the former cannot be the cause of the latter, according to you; e.g. Visual organ does not appear when Sound is present; even when the particular forms of the letter ‘Ga’ are there, the Cognitions held to proceed from them do not come into existence; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character. |
atrāpi nityasyāpekṣānupapattir viparyaye bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ / | Here also the fact of the Eternal Thing not needing another Cause supplies the reason for the annulment of the contrary conclusion.. |
na ca kuśūlasthena bījādinā vyabhicāras tasyāṅkuraṃ prati mukhyakāraṇatvānupapatter ityalaṃ prapañcena // | The case of the Seed in the granary cannot be cited to the contrary; because the seed cannot be the primary cause of the Sprout. We desist from labouring this point further. |
vyañjakadhvanyadhīnaṃ ca bhavatvasyopalambhanam / | It may be that the apprehension of the word-sound is dependent upon the manifesting articulations; |
yathāvasthitarūpasya kintu tasya graho bhavet // | but even so it could be apprehended only as it really exists; |
nānyathā tadgraho 'yaṃ syāt tadrūpāpratibhāsanāt / | otherwise, the apprehension would not be of that sound at all; as its form would not figure in that apprehension. |
vyāptāśeṣanabhobhāgo nahi śabdaḥ prakāśate // | As a matter of fact, the word-sound is never apprehended as pervading over the whole ākāśa. |
taddhvaner bhinnadeśatvaṃ śrutiḥ kimanurudhyate / vyaktastu pratibhāseta svātmanaiva ghaṭādivat // | Why then does the word-sound follow the diversity of place of the articulation? When manifested, it would appear by itself, like the jar and other things. |
sarvaṃ ca prakriyāmātram idamuktam ca kāraṇam / | All this about the cause has been said only by way of an elaboration of our argument. |
vyañjakānām asāmarthyaṃ vyaktyayogāc ca sādhitam // | In reality the inefficiency of the manifesters has already been proved on the basis of the impossibility of manifestation. |
pratyakṣas tu sa eveti pratyayaḥ prāg nirākṛtaḥ / deśabhedena bhinnatvam ityetat tadabādhitam // | Though this idea has been already refuted, the author reverts to it, in order to point out that the view is open to objection even if there be a manifester for eternal things: [see verses 2601-2605 above]: |
yadi hi śabdasya vyañjakādhīnaṃ grahaṇaṃ tat kimiti yathāsau yāvad vyoma sthitas tadā na gṛhyeta / | If the apprehension of the Word-Sound is dependent upon manifesters, then, how is it that it is not apprehended as pervading the entire Ākāśa, wherein it pervades? Its apprehension must be in that form; |
evaṃ tasya tadgrahaṇaṃ bhaved anyathātiprasajyata ityāveditaṃ pūrvam / | otherwise there would be incongruities; all this has been explained before. |
na ca yāvad vyoma śabdo gṛhyate / | And yet the Word-Sound is not heard throughout the entire Ākāśa; |
tasmād dhvanyanurodhena{na} śabdaśrute{ti---}ryuktā / | hence it cannot be right that the hearing of sound is in accordance with the manifesting articulation; |
kiṃ tarhi ---, yasyāsau śrutis tameva śabdaṃ tasyā anuroddhuṃ yuktam / | in fact, the apprehension must follow that Word-Sound alone of which it is the apprehension. |
evaṃ {ca} tasyāsau siddhyennānyathā, tataś ca ghaṭādivat sarvātmanaiva pratibhāseteti saṅkṣepārthaḥ / | Thus alone could there be apprehension of the Word-Sound, not otherwise. Consequently like the Jar and other things, the Word-Sound should always appear in its entire form. |
taditi / | Such in brief is the sense of the text. |
tasmāt // | ‘Tat’ Therefore. |
paryāyeṇa yathā caika ityādāvāha paryāyeṇetyādi / | When a man passes from place to place, one after the other, it is so because he is in a perpetual flux; |
paryāyeṇa ca yaḥ kaścid bhinnadeśādvra{nvra---}jatya{nna---}sau / siddhyati kṣaṇabhaṅgitvān nānyathā{sya gatir}bhavet // | if it were not so, there could be no such ‘going’; if he remained fixed, permanently, then the man, not dissociated from his previous position, would continue to remain there; |
nahi deśāntaraprāptiḥ sthairye tasyopapadyate // | and as such he could not get at another place. |
anityasya hi deśāntarotpattir eva gatiḥ, na tu nityasya, ekadeśavartisvabhāvamavijahato deśāntaragamanāyogāt / tyāge vā nityatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | In the case of the non-eternal thing, the only ‘movement’ possible is in the shape of being born in another place; not so in the case of the eternal thing, which, unless it abandons its character as associated with one place, can never ‘go’ to another place. |
etad eva darśayati pūrvadeśāviyuktasyetyādi // | This is what is pointed out by the Text 2607. |
yathā mahatyāṃ khātāyām ityādāvāha nabhasa ityādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2230 above, that “when a large pit is dug in the ground, etc. etc.” |
nabhaso nirupākhyatvān nābhivyaktiḥ prakalpate / | It cannot be proved that Ākāśa is a positive entity; |
ata evāha atyakṣatvācceti / | hence there can be no ‘manifestation’ of it; |
yadyevaṃ mṛdi khātāyāṃ kiṃ tadupalabhyata ity āha ālokaḥ sa tatheti // satyapyākāśasya vastutve 'bhivyaktir naiva yujyate iti darśayann āha kiñcetyādi / | Even for those who regard Ākāśa as a positive entity, it is beyond the reach of the senses; how then could there be any cognition of Ākāśa? This is what is meant by the words ‘As it is beyond the reach of the senses, etc. etc.’ Question “If this is so, then what is it that is seen in the pit?” |
[p.701] | Answer It is only Light that is seen. |
kiñca śabdavadākāśe 'pyabhivyaktir na yujyate / | Further, as in the case of the word-sound, so in the case of ākāśa also, there can be no ‘manifestation’; |
jñānaṃ hi vyaktir eṣā ca nityaṃ syāddhetusannidheḥ // | such ‘manifestation’ would mean cognition; and this would be everlasting, as its cause would be always there. |
yathāca vyañjakaḥ śabde na kathañcit prakalpate / | Just as, in the case of the word, there can be no manifester, so it cannot be in the present case also; |
tannātraiva paropādhiḥ śabdabuddhau sati bhramaḥ // | and in reality, it is an illusion appearing, through extraneous circumstances, in regard to the cognition of the word-sound. |
nāto dīrghādayaḥ sarve dhvanidharmā iti sthitam / | Hence the conclusion is that length, shortness and the rest are not properties of the articulation. |
dhvanīnāṃ vyañjakatve hi tat syāt tacca nirākṛtam // | They could be so only if the articulations were the manifesters of the word-sound; and this idea has been rejected. |
tat syād iti / dīrghādīnāṃ dhvanir dharmatvam / | ‘They could be so’ i.e. Length, etc. could be properties of Articulation. |
tacceti / dhvanīnāṃ vyañjakatvam // | ‘This’ the idea that the Articulations are manifesters of the Word-Sound. |
yaduktam nacādṛṣṭārthasambandha ityādi, tatrāha atyantabhedino 'pītyādi / atyantabhedino 'pyete tulyapratyavamarśane / | It has been frequently explained before that words and things that are entirely different from one another are capable of providing the same ideas. Hence it is not true that the word becomes expressive only when its relationship to its denotation has been apprehended. |
śaktāḥ śabdās tadarthāścetyasakṛccarcitaṃ purā // nāto dṛṣṭārthasambandhaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ / khavṛttyā vastutastveṣa vācako neti sādhitam // | because, as already explained before, in reality, the word, by itself, is not expressive at all. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2234, that “a word whose relationship to its denotation has not been apprehended can never be expressive, etc. etc.”. |
ayamatra saṅkṣepārthaḥ / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2612-2613 above]: |
yadi pāramārthikasyārthaśabdayor vācyavācakabhāvasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ kriyate bhavatā tadā siddhasādhyatā / | The sense of this is briefly as follows: If what you are urging is the contingency that there would be no real denotative relationship between the Word and its denotation, then your argument is futile; |
tathā hi vistareṇa jātisvalakṣaṇādīnāṃ vācyavācakatvaṃ śabdaparīkṣāyāṃ nirākṛtam / | because under the chapter on Word, the idea of the ‘Universal’, or the ‘Specific Individuality’ of things, being denoted by words has been refuted at length. |
atha sāṃvṛtasyāpi tadānaikāntikatā tathāhyatyantabhedino 'pi kecid arthāḥprakṛtyaikākārapratyavamarśajñānasya hetutāṃ pratipadya mānāḥ sāṃvṛtaṃ śabdārthayor vācyavācakabhāvaṃ sampādayiṣyantīti prāgevāpohacintāyāṃ pratipāditam / | If what you are urging is in regard to the illusory denotative relationship, then your Reason is ‘Inconclusive Because, as a matter of fact, there are certain things which, though entirely different from one another, serve to bring about cognitions of the same form; and these would bring about the illusory denotative relationship between the Word and its meaning; |
tasmād apohaśabdārthavādino bauddhān prati sarvam idam ucyamānamatyantaparilaghutayā pariplavata eva kevalam iti // saṃvṛttyā vācakatvasyopapattim āha mithyāvabhāsina ityādi / mithyāvabhāsino hyete pratyayāḥ śabdanirmitāḥ / jātisvalakṣaṇādīnāṃ vācyavācakatāsthiteḥ // | as we have already explained in course of the discussion on ‘Apoha’, Consequently, as against the Buddhists, who are upholders of the doctrine of Apoha, all that has been urged is entirely worthless and flickers only for a moment. As a matter of fact, all cognitions produced by words are expressive of what is unreal; |
tadbhrāntyā vyavahartāro vailakṣaṇye 'pi vastutaḥ / gośabda eka eveti manyante samabuddhayaḥ // | but even though in reality, there is diversity, people, through illusion, come to treat and speak of the word ‘cow’ for instance, as one only, regarding all as the same. |
tasmād vijātīnā proktaṃ bahvasambaddhabhāṣiṇā / śabdabhedaṃ puraskṛtya yat tat sarvamanāspadam // | This much of what has been said by the great brāhmaṇa (mīmāṃsaka) on the basis of the diversity of words is entirely baseless. The following texts explain the possibility of ‘Denotation’ on the basis of Illusion: [see verses 2614-2616 above]: |
[p.702] pararūpaṃ hi svapratibhāsena yayā saṃvṛyate buddhyā yathārthamaprakāśanātsākalpikā buddhiḥ saṃvṛtiḥ, tayā yadvyavasthāpitaṃ rūpaṃ tat sāṃvṛtam ucyate / | That idea is called ‘Samvṛti’ (Illusqry) which, by its appearance, conceals ‘samvṛṇoti’ the real character of another through not manifesting the real character of the thing; and it is purely ‘fanciful’; hence the form of things that is presented by such an idea is called ‘Samvṛta,’ ‘illusory,’ ‘fanciful’. |
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