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saṃvṛtisattvaṃ tadeva na pāramārthikaṃ, tasyāsattvāt / | This is what is meant by ‘illusory existence’; it is not real; in reality, it does not exist; |
bhrāntasya ca jñānasya sarvasyaiva nirviṣayatvāt // | and all ‘illusory cognition’ is devoid of objective basis. |
athāpi syād vinā pāramārthikenaikatvena kathaṃ vidhipratiṣedhalakṣaṇaṃ vyavahāramāropavaśena śabdāḥ sampādayantītyāha tathāhītyādi / tathā hi hastakampāder naikatvaṃ buddhibhedataḥ / | For instance, the shaking of the hand and such gestures are not regarded as one and the same (and yet they indicate affirmation and denial). The cognitions of the word-sound that are produced have the varying characteristics of length, shortness, etc. [which also shows that the word is not one]; the idea that the one word is variously ‘manifested’ has been discarded. |
sāmānyaṃ naca tatraikamanugāmyupalakṣyate / | There is no ‘commonalty’ (common character) perceptible in the several appearances of the word; |
saṅketāt pratiṣedhādigatyaṅgaṃ ca bhavatyasau // | and it is only through convention that they become aids to the cognition of denial, affirmation and the rest. |
hastakampāder ityādiśabdenākṣinikocādiparigrahaḥ / śīghramandādibhedeneti / buddhibhedata iti sambandhaḥ / | ‘Suck gestures’ such as winking of the eyes, etc. ‘With such varying characteristics as length, etc.’ this has to be construed with ‘huddhibhedataḥ,’ ‘the cognitions, etc.’. |
nacāyaṃ śīghrādibhedo vyañjakakṛto vyakter niṣiddhatvāt tadvyaktir iti / | Nor can these characteristics be due to variations in the ‘manifester’; as the very idea of such ‘manifestation’ has been discarded. |
nityavyaktiḥ / | ‘Tadvyaktiḥ’ manifestation of the eternal thing (Word-Sound). |
naca sāmānyavaśād vyavahārāṅgatā, tasyāprasiddhatvāt / | Nor can the Word serve as the basis of usage through a commonalty; as no such ‘commonalty’ is known; |
apratītasya sāmānyasya na yuktaṃ vyavahārāṅgatvaṃ, sarvadā vyavahāraprasaṅgāt / | and a ‘commonalty’ that is not known cannot form the basis of usage; as in that case, the usage would go on for all time. |
pratiṣedhādigatyaṅgam iti / ādiśabdena vidhānābhyanujñānābhyarthanādīnāṃ grahaṇam / | ‘Aids to the cognition of denial, etc. etc.’ The ‘etc.’ includes affirmation, permission, request and so forth. The ‘gati’ of these is their cognition, comprehension; |
teṣāṃ gatiḥ pratītiḥ, tasyā aṅgam kāraṇam, asau hastakampādir bhavati / | the ‘aid’ to this is its cause. It is the shaking of the hand, etc. that become such aids. |
tadvacchabde 'pi bhaviṣyatīti śeṣaḥ // | What is meant is that the same would be the case with words also. |
yaduktam "tasmācchabdārthasambandho nitya evābhidhīyate" iti tatrāha sākṣād ityādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2252, that “For these reasons the relationship between the Word and its meaning is declared to be eternal”. |
nahi kaścicchabdārthayor vāstavaḥ sambandho 'sti / yasya nityatvam anityatvaṃ vā syāt / | As a matter of fact, there is no real connection between the Word and the thing expressed by it, which could be either eternal or non-eternal. |
tathā hi na bāhyam arthaṃ śabdāḥ pratipādayanti tena saha pratibandhābhāvād iti pūrvaṃ śabdaparīkṣāyāṃ niveditam / | Because it is not the external objects that words denote; as there is no invariable concomitance between them; as has been previously explained under the chapter on ‘Word’. |
pratibandhamantareṇa ca pratipādayatām atiprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | And if words were to denote things without such concomitance, then there would be incongruities. |
yadyevaṃ kiṃ tarhi pratipādayantītyāha vivakṣāsūcakāstvam iti / vivakṣāmapi na vācyatayā pratipādayanti, kiṃ tarhi---, liṅgatayā sūcayanti / | Question: “If that is so, then what is it that the words express”? Answer: ‘All that the words do, etc. etc.’ this ‘desire to speak’ also, they point to, not as something denoted, by them; they only serve as signs indicative of it. |
ata eva sūcakā ityuktam / | That is why they have been spoken of as ‘indicating’ the Desire to Speak. |
tathā hi śabdād uccaritād arthādhyavasāyī vikalpo jāyate, na vivakṣādhyavasāyī, yaś ca na śabdena jñātenādhyavasīyate sa kathaṃ śabdārthaḥ // | What happens is that when the Word is uttered, there appears a ‘conception’ envisaging the object, and not envisaging the Desire to Speak; and what is not envisaged by the Word when heard, how can that be regarded as ‘denoted’ by it? (2619) |
[p.703] yadyevaṃ vivakṣayāpi saha kasteṣāṃ sambandho yena tāṃ liṅgatvena sūcayed ity āha tasyā ityādi / | Question: “If that is so, then what is the connection between the words and the said Desire to Speak, by virtue of which they could serve to indicate that Desire?” |
tasyāḥ kāryatayā te hi pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ / | hence between them the relationship is clearly that of cause and effect. |
niścitā iti tenātra kāryakāraṇatā sphuṭā // tasyā vivakṣāyāḥ kāryatvenātmani pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ śabdā niścitā iti kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇa eva sambandhaḥ // | As a matter of fact, words are definitely known through Perception and Non-apprehension in oneself, to be the effect of the Desire to Speak; hence the relation between them is that of Cause and Effect. It is only when the man has definitely recognised the said causal relationship through convention that he comprehends, from words, the desire to speak; |
yadyevaṃ samayas tarhi vyarthaḥ, pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām eva kāryakāraṇabhāvasya niścitatvād ity āha kāryakāraṇabhāvaścetyādi / | Says the Opponent: “If that is so, then Convention becomes useless; |
kāryakāraṇabhāvaś ca samayādyena niścitaḥ / | the said causal relation being determined by the said Perception and Nonapprehension”. |
evaṃ manyate yadyapi vivakṣāmātreṇa saha kāryakāraṇabhāvo niścito vivakṣāviśeṣeṇa tu parasantāne samayādṛte na niścetuṃ śakyata ityatastanniścayāya samayaḥ kriyate / | The idea is as follows: The causal relation that has been recognised is with mere ‘Desire to Speak’ in general; as for the said relation with a particular ‘Desire to Speak’, as this would naturally be present in the ‘subjective chain’ of another person (to whom the words are spoken), it could not be known except through Convention; |
nanu ca samayād api katham asau niścetuṃ śakyate / tathā hi yadi samayakāle paravivakṣāviśeṣaḥ pratītyupāyaḥ sambhavet tadāsau samayas tatra kṛtaḥ paścād vyavahārakāle vivakṣāviśeṣapratītihetur bhavet / | Says the Opponent: “How can this be ascertained through Convention also? If, at the time of the making of the Convention, the particular desire of the other person to speak were the means of bringing about the Cognition, then it might be that the Convention thereupon would, at the time of usage, serve to bring about the Cognition of the particular desire to speak. |
yāvatā sa evābhyupāyo nāsti / | As it is, however, the said means is not there yet. |
tathā hi nānuccārya śabdaṃ samayaḥ kriyate, tataśca tata eva śabdād vivakṣāviśeṣapratipattāvitaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ syāt / | Because the Convention cannot be made without pronouncing the Word; so that if the particular ‘desire to speak’ were also comprehended from the same word, then there would be mutual interdependence. |
tathā hi samayavaśācchabdo viśeṣadyotakaḥ samayaś ca viśeṣāviśeṣapratipattimantareṇa na śakyata iti spaṣṭam itaretarāśrayatvam / | Because through Convention, the Word would indicate the particular Desire, and the Convention cannot be made without the Cognition of the particular and general desire to speak; hence there would be clear mutual interdependence”. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | This does not affect our position. |
yadā sarva evāyaṃ śābdo vyavahāraḥ svapratibhāsānurodhenaiveṣyate bhrāntatvāt taimirikadvayadvicandravyavahāravat tadā kā ro{co---}dyacañcutā / | As a matter of fact, the whole verbal usage is admitted only on the basis of one’s own impressions; because it is radically wrong, illusory, like the ideas of the man with the blurred vision having the idea of ‘two moons Where then does the point of the objection lie? |
naca sarvatra śabda eva vivakṣāviśeṣapratītiheturanyathāpi kaścicchṛṅgagrāhikayā prakaraṇādinā cārthaviśeṣopadarśanena ca vivakṣāviśeṣamāvedya samayaṃ kuryād iti netaretarāśrayatvam / | Nor indeed is the Word the only means of knowing the particular ‘Desire to Speak’, in all cases. Because there are other ways also in which the Convention can be made, such as actually pointing to the thing, through Context, etc. by positing a special meaning and thereby indicating the particular ‘Desire to Speak’. |
kiñca bhavato vidhivādinas tulyaṃ codyam, parapratipatter apratyakṛttvāt kathaṃ vaktṛśrotror ekārthapratipattiniścaya iti / | Then again, to you also, who uphold the affirmative view, the objection is equally applicable, that the Cognition of one man not bringing about the Cognition in another man, how can there be any certainty as to the speaker and the hearer having the Cognition of the same thing? And without the common Cognition of such a thing; |
nacaikārthapratipattiniścayamantareṇa samayo yuktas tasya yo 'tra bhavataḥ parihāraḥ sa mamāpi bhaviṣyati / | The answer that you would make to this objection would be our answer also to your objection. |
syād etacchabdasya vivakṣāyām asamitatvāt kathaṃ tayā saha sambandhaḥ samayānniścīyate / nahyatra samayaḥ kṛto 'nyārthadyotako bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt / | The following might be urged “As the Word does not enter into the ‘Desire to Speak’, how can it have any connection with this desire ascertained through Convention? Any Convention that is made here cannot be indicative of any other me’aning; if it did, there would be incongruities”. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | This does not affect our position. |
vivakṣāśabdenātat parivartī arthākāro vā svarūpatā vyasto yaḥ sa ihābhipretaḥ / | What is meant here by the term ‘Desire to Speak’ is that which, even when in confusion as to being in the form of the object or in its own form, does not vary with it. |
[p.704] paramārthas tasya vivakṣāsvabhāvatvāt / | Because in reality it is only this that has the nature of the ‘Desire to Speak’. |
sa eveha vivakṣāviśeṣo 'bhipretaḥ / | And it is this particular form of the ‘Desire to Speak’ that is meant here. |
tatraiva ca samayo na svalakṣaṇe, sa eva śabdenābhidhīyate / | Convention also is made in relation to this Desire, not in regard to the Specific Individuality of things; and hence that same particular Desire is what is indicated by the word. |
tatas tadākāravikalpotpatteḥ / | Thus alone is it possible for it to be conceived of in that form. |
kevalā tu vivakṣā na śabdenābhidhīyata ityuktam // | Mere desire in general cannot be expressed by the word; as has been explained above. |
vivakṣāvartinārthena kāryakāraṇatātmakaḥ / śabdānām eṣa sambandhaḥ samaye sati jāyate // | It is only when the convention is there that there comes about the causal relationship of the word with the object varying with the speaker’s intentions. |
tena sāmayikaḥ proktas tena ca dyotanādataḥ / samayo 'pyucyate teṣāṃ sambandho natu mukhyataḥ // | It is on this account that it has been declared to be ‘due to convention’; and inasmuch as it is manifested by convention, the said relationship comes to be spoken of as ‘convention’ itself, but not directly, (only figuratively). |
śrotṛcetasi samaye sati jāyate bhavatīti sāmayikaḥ adhyātmāditvāt ṭhaṭ / | ‘Sāmayika’, ‘conventional’, is that which comes about is present when the ‘Samaya’ Convention is present in the mind of the hearer. |
yadyapi tatra bhavatiḥ sattāvacano gṛhītas tathāpi paramārthataḥ sattājanmanor abhedāt tadeva bhāvatvena vivakṣyate / vaktṛsantāne ca samayo na{yena---} dyotanādupacārāt samaya ucyate / | The term is formed from the noun ‘samaya’ with the nominal affix ‘Ṭhañ’, Though this affix has been ordained as to be used in the sense of mere presence, yet, in reality, there being no difference between presence and coming into existence, in the present instance, it is the latter that is meant. |
tasya pratiniyatakālavartitvena tatkālasambhavāt // | and as the said relationship is manifested by that, the relationship comes to be spoken of as ‘Convention’ itself; |
nanu yadi paramārthato vastunaḥ sambandho nāstītyuktam, kāryakāraṇatālakṣaṇas tarhi kathaṃ bhavatītyāha kāryakāraṇabhūtābhyām ityādi / | The relation of cause and effect is not anything different from the things that are the cause and the effect; it is these things themselves that are spoken of as such. Says the Opponent “If, as has been said, there is no real relationship between the Object and the Word, then how does the said caudal relationship come about?” |
te eveti / | Answer: [see verse 2624 above]: |
kāryakāraṇabhūtābhyāṃ vastubhyām anya eva na / | ‘The Cause and the Effect’ i.e. the two things of which one is the Cause and another the Effect. |
kāryakāraṇatetyādinā lāghavārtham // | ‘Spoken of as such’ as ‘Causal relation’, etc. for the sake of brevity. |
yadyevaṃ pratipuruṣaprayogaṃ tayor bhedāt katham abhinnasambandhapratītir vaktṛśrotror bhavati / tathā hi vaktur evaṃ bhavati, ya eva samayakāle mayā gṛhīto 'rthaḥ śabdo vā tenaiva tamevārthaṃ pratipādayāmīti, tathā śrotur apyevaṃ bhavati tenaiva tamevāyam arthaṃ pratipādayatīti / | thus it is that it is held to continue during all the time from the convention to the usage. Says the Opponent “If that is so, then as they vary with each individual person, how could both the speaker and hearer recognise the same Relationship? For instance, the idea present in the speaker’s mind is that ‘I am speaking of the same thing and by the same word that I knew at the time of the Convention’; and in the mind of the Hearer also, the idea is that ‘this man is speaking of the same thing by the same word’. |
anyathā bhinārodhāvasthitayoḥ kathaṃ vyavahāraḥ syād ity āha te cetyādi / te ca pratyekamekātmarūpatvena jaḍair gate / | If it were not so, then the cause (word) and the effect (cognition of the thing) being in two different places, how could there be any Usage at all?” The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2625 above]: |
jaḍair iti bhrāntaiḥ / | ‘Dull-witted men’ i.e. people under illusion. |
gate iti gṛhīte / | ‘Gate’ apprehended. |
saṅketavyavahārābhyām āpto vyāptaścāsau kālaśceti tathoktaḥ / | ‘Saṅketa, etc.’ i.e. the time taken occupied by the Convention and the Usage; |
kāryakāraṇābhyāsaikarūpābhyām iti śeṣaḥ // | i.e. by the repeated idea of Cause and Effect and of sameness (of the Word and Meaning). |
[p.705] athaika eva pāramārthikaḥ sambandhaḥ kasmānneṣyate, yena kālpanika eveṣṭa ity āha ekastvityādi / ekastu vāstavo naiva sambandha iha yujyate / | It is not possible for the relationship to be real and one. because the things denoted being distinct and diverse, there would be no relationship at all. Question: “Why is not the Relationship regarded to be really one only, and why should it be regarded as illusory (assumed)”? |
sambandho bhavanbhinnānāṃ vā bhaved abhinnānāṃ vā / | The one Relationship, when there, could subsist either in different, or non-different, things. |
na tāvad bhinnānām, sarveṣāṃ svātmani sthitatvenāsaṅkarāt / | It cannot subsist in different things; because each thing rests within itself in its own distinct form; |
abhede 'pyekam eva tadvastviti kasya kena saha śleṣo bhavedato 'sambandhatā bhavet // | If it were in non-different things, then, as the entity would be one only, wherewith would there be any Relationship? So that there would be no Relationship at all. |
samaya pratimartyaṃ ca pratyucāraṇam eva ca / ityādyataḥ pareṇoktaṃ paranītimajānatā // | As regards the assertion that “the convention being made for each mortal being, or for each utterance, etc. etc.” has been made without knowledge of the view of the other party. |
samayo hi na sambandho naradharmatayā tayoḥ / dyotakaḥ sa tu tasyeti sambandhaḥ syān na mukhyataḥ // | As a matter of fact, the convention as constituting the relationship does not belong to the two factors (word and its meaning), it belongs to the man; the only relationship between the two is that one serves to manifest (indicate) the other; and this relationship also is not direct. |
pratyuccāraṇamenaṃ ca na pare pratijānate / īśādeḥ pratiṣiddhatvāt sargādau naca tat kṛtam // | Nor do the other party hold the convention to pertain to each utterance; nor (according to them) is the convention made by god, or any other being, at the beginning of creation; |
aniṣṭāpattir hi dūṣaṇamucyate, naca bauddhena samayaḥ śabdārthayor mukhyaḥ sambandha iṣṭas tasya puruṣadharmatvāt / | What the author means is that the contingency that has been urged by the Mīmāṃsaka does not affect the Buddhist position. Because the Buddhist does not hold that the relationship between the Word and Meaning is direct; according to him, it belongs to the Man; |
tasya ca dūṣaṇe sati neṣṭakṣatiḥ kācit / | so that if the said view is found to be defective, that does no harm to the Buddhist. |
na cānyadharmo 'nyasya sambandho bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt / | What belongs to one thing cannot form the Relationship of another thing; if it did, there would be incongruities. |
yaccoktam pratyuccāraṇam eva vā kriyate jagadādyaiveti pakṣadvayaṃ tasyānabhyupagamādevādūṣaṇam /t tadāha pratyuccāraṇam ityādi / enam iti samayam / | It has been asked “Is the Convention made for each utterance? Or at the time of creation?” where two alternative views have been shown. The answer to that is that this does not affect our position, as we do not accept either of these views. This is what is said in the words ‘Nor do the other party, etc. etc.’ ‘Enam’ stands for the Convention. |
para iti bauddhāḥ / | ‘Pare’ Buddhists. |
īśāder iti īśvarabrahmādeḥ // | ‘God or any other beings’ i.e. God, Brahmā and so forth. |
yaduktaṃ pratyekaṃ vāpi sambandhaḥ ityādi, tatrāha pratyekam ityādi / pratyekaṃ yaś ca sambandhaḥ sannibhaḥ {bhinnaḥ---} kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ / tulyapratyavamarśaś ca bhede 'pi na virudhyate // | The relationship with each being must be different, because of ‘perpetual flux’; as for the idea of ‘similarity’, that is not incompatible with difference. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2255, “Would the Relationship vary with each being or would it be one only for all, etc. etc.?” The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 2630 above]: |
dvitīya evātra pakṣaḥ / | The second view is the one that is favoured. |
na ca bhedadhīprasaṅgo bhede 'pi tulyapratyavamarśahetutvāvirodhāt / | It would not involve the contingency of their being cognised as different; because, even when there is difference, there can be nothing incongruous in their being regarded as similar. |
ato 'naikāntikam etad yaduktam bhinnaśced bhedadhīr bhavediti // | Hence when the Mīmāṃsaka said (in Text 2255) that ‘there should be some idea of difference’ he said what was ‘inconclusive (2630) |
[p.706] krameṇa jāyamānaś ca dhiyas tadviṣayāḥ sphuṭam / | The cognitions of things clearly appear in succession; |
tasyāpyāhuḥ kramaṃ tāsām akramo hyanyathā bhavet // tasyāpīti / | hence they declare that (relationship) also to be successive otherwise there would be no succession. |
sambandhasya kramamāhuḥ pratipādayantītyarthaḥ / akramo hyanyathā bhaved iti / | The following might be urged “The Perpetual Flux is not admitted by us; why then should you say that it must be different on account of Perpetual Flux?” |
dhiyām iti sambandhah / | ‘Tasyāpi’ stands for the Relationships. |
prayogaś ca pūrvavad bodhyaḥ // | ‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’ i.e. there would be no succession in the Cognitions also. |
sakṛdeva bahūnāṃ tu saṅketakaraṇe sati / samayo neṣyate bhinno nīlādyekakṣaṇo yathā // | As the understanding is come to by many persons at one and the same time, the convention is not held to be different (with each individual); just as in the case of the one blue-point. |
vaktur anyo na sambandho buddhau śrotur na cāparaḥ / | It is not that one connection or relationship is present in the mind of the speaker, and an entirely different one in that of the hearer; |
ekarūpā ca sā yasya{smāt---} dvayor apyanuvartanāt // | because it is of one and the same form and is present, as such, in the minds of both. |
śrotuḥ kartuṃ ca sambandhaṃ vaktā pūrvaṃ prapadyate / pūrvopalabdho yastena tameva hi karotyasau // | When the speaker proceeds to lay down a connection for the benefit of the hearer, he lays down only that connection which has been known to himself from before. |
ekākārā yatas tasya vṛttā pratyavamarśadhīḥ / tasmād bhinne 'pi śabdādāvekatvaṃ so 'dhyavasyati // | Thus, inasmuch as its recognition always appears in the same form, even when the word, etc. are different, he comes to cognise the oneness (of the connection). |
yathā nīlādikṣaṇo bahubhir dṛśyamāno 'pi na bhidyate, evaṃ bahūnāṃ saṅketakaraṇe 'pi sati na sambaddho bhetsyati, kiṃ punar dvayoḥ / | Just as the Blue-point, even when seen by several people, does not become diverse, similarly, even when the Convention regarding the connection is made by several people, the connected (Word) will not become diverse; |
sarveṣāṃ tulyapratyavamarśasthitatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | what to say of the case where only two persons are concerned? That is to say, all the persons have the same notion regarding it. |
ato na vaktṛśrotror anyaḥ sambandho bhavati // | Consequently, the connection for the Hearer would not be different from that of the Speaker. |
ghaṭādāvapi sāmānyaṃ prāgeva vinivāritam / | As regards the jar and other things also, the ‘universal’ has been already discarded. |
nahi bhūtaguṇaprakhyā kācid ākṛtiriṣyate // | The ‘configuration’ (‘universal’) is not held to be a quality of material substances. |
nacāsyākṛtitaḥ siddhā śaktirabhdāraṇādiṣu / teṣām api hi nityatvam ākṛter yadyabhedinaḥ // | Nor is the capacity of the jar, to contain water for instance, known from its ‘universal’, if the jar, etc. are non-different from the ‘universal’, then, like it, they also should be eternal. |
bhede sambandhadoṣas tu tadutpattau tvanityatā / | If the relationship were something produced, then the universal would be non-eternal. |
ato nākṛtito yuktā śaktirabdhāraṇādiṣu // ghaṭāder vyatireke 'pi śakter doṣā ime dhruvam / | Hence the capacity (of the jar) to contain the water cannot be due to the ‘universal’, even if the jar etc. were different, there would surely be all these objections regarding the ‘capacity’; |
abdhāraṇādi tat kāryaṃ nityamevaṃ prasajyate // | and the effects of this ‘capacity’, in the shape of the containing of water, etc. would thus have to be regarded as eternal. |
[p.707] prāgeveti / sāmānyaparīkṣāyām / | ‘Already discarded’ in course of the examination of the ‘Universal’. |
punaratraiva saṅkṣepeṇa nirākaraṇam āha nahītyādi / bhūtānām ādityajahādīnāṃ {kśitijalādīnāṃ }kaṇṭhe {kaṣṇryadi---} guṇa{vat}vyatiriktā bhavatā mīmāṃsakena jātiriṣyate / | The refutation of the ‘Universal’ is briefly set forth here also: ‘The Universal is not, etc, etc,’ You, Mīmāṃsaka, do not hold the ‘universal’ to be a quality of the material substances, earth, water, etc. like their dark colour, etc., as something distinct from those substances. |
nāpi dṛśyatveneṣṭā satī sā dṛśyate, avyatiriktāpi na yujyate, teṣām api ghaṭādīnām ākṛtisvarūpavannityatvaprasaṅgāt / | Though it is held to be visible, it is never seen. Nor can it be right to regard it as non-different from these; as in that case the particular material thing also like the Jar would have to be regarded as eternal, just like its Universal. |
athāpi bhinnābhyupagamyate tadā sambandhābhāvadoṣaḥ, bhinnānāṃ hi tadutpattilakṣaṇa eva sambandho bhavet, tataś ca tadutpattau satyāṃ jāter anityatāprāpnoti, utpattidharmakatvād ghaṭavat / | Even when it is regarded as different from these things, it becomes open to the objection that there can be no relationship between them. Between two different things, the only relation possible is the causal one that the one should be produced by the other; so that if the Universal were regarded as produced by the Individual things, then the Universal would become non-eternal, on account of its liability to being produced, like the Jar. |
kvacit tu nityateti pāṭhaḥ / | In some places, the reading is ‘nityatā’, ‘eternality’, for ‘anityatā’, ‘non-eternality’; |
tatrāyam arthaḥ yadi ghaṭādīnāṃ tato jāteḥ sakāśād utpattiraṅgīkriyate tadā ghaṭādīnāṃ nityatā prāpnoti nityaṃ kāraṇasya sannidhānān nityamutpattiḥ prāpnotītyarthaḥ / | the meaning in that case is as follows: If it is held that the Jar, etc. are produced from the Universal, then the Jar, etc. would have to regarded as eternal; that is, this cause being always there, the Jar, etc. would be there at all times. |
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