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prathame pakṣe na kadācit kenacid avagamyate / | In the former case i.e. if it is incapable the Word-Sound would never be cognised by any one. |
dvitīye 'pi sarvaiḥ sarvadaivāvagamyeta, ekarūpatvāt / | In the latter case, it would be cognised by all men at all times; because it would always be of the same form. |
ato na saṃskārasya sāmarthyam // | From this it follows that the Embellishment can have no capacity at all. |
syād etat samartho 'pi virodhipratyayabalāt kadācid vijñānaṃ notpādayet / | The following might be argued “Even if the Word-Sound had the capacity to bring about its cognition, it might not bring it about on account of forces to the contrary; |
tathā asamartho 'pi sahakāripratyayāhitasāmarthyaḥ sannutpādayiṣyatīti, tatrāha taṃ hītyādi / | similarly, even if it did not have the capacity, it could have the capacity imparted to it by auxiliary forces and thereby bring about the cognition |
[p.692] | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2565 above] |
nahi svabhāvakhaṇḍayannanutpādayan vā virodhī sahakārī vā yukto 'tiprasaṇGgāt / | Unless a thing sets aside, or brings about, the nature of a thing, it cannot be regarded as hostile or helpful; otherwise there would he incongruities. |
khaṇḍanotpādanābhyupagame nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ // yaduktam yathaivotpadyamāna ityādi / | And if the said setting aside or bringing about were admitted, the Word-Sound would lose its eternal character. |
jñānotpādanayogyaś ca kāṃścit prati bhavatyayam / | As a matter of fact, when the word-sound appears, it is capable of producing its cognition in some persons only; |
tasmād utpadyamāno 'yaṃ na sarvairavagamyate // | hence when it is produced, it is not cognised by all men. |
athavā yat samīpasthair nādaiḥ syād asya saṃskṛtiḥ / taireva śrūyate śabdo na dūrasthais tu kiṃ punaḥ // | Or, how could it be that the sound is heard only by those men in close proximity to whom it is embellished by articulations, and not by those at a distance? (2566-2567) |
utpattipakṣe nāyaṃ doṣaḥ, yataḥ pratiniyatavijñānotpattisamartha eva svahetorupajāyate, tena na sarvaiḥ sarvadā gamyate / | What has been urged does not affect the view that Word-Sounds are produced (not eternal). Because whenever a Word-Sound is produced by its cause, it is produced as capable of bringing about its cognition under certain limitations; and it is on account of this that it is not heard by all men at all times. |
yasya tu saṃskriyate śabdas tasyaivāyaṃ doṣo yadi nāma saṃskāraḥ sambhavatīti darśayann āha athavetyādi / | The view, however, that the Sound is (eternal and) is only manifested, is open to the said objection, even if the Embellishment is possible. This is what is shown by the sentence beginning with ‘or’. |
na kevalaṃ prakṛtyā jñānotpādanasāmarthyābhyupagame dūrasthasyāpi grahaṇaṃ prāpnotīti doṣaḥ, saṃskārapakṣe 'pi doṣa evetyataḥ pakṣāntaram uktam / | The objection that ‘there should be hearing of far-off sound also’ is applicable, not only to the view that the Word-Sound is endowed, by its very nature, with the capacity to produce its cognition, but it is also applicable to the view that there is Embellishment (of the Word-Sound). |
na dūrasthaistu kiṃ punar iti / | Hence this has been set forth as another alternative view ‘Why it is not heard by persons at a distance?’ ‘is heard’ is to be construed here. |
śrūyata iti sambandhaḥ / | What is meant is that it should certainly be heard. |
api tu {śruyetai---}eveti sākṣād darśayati // etad eva vyaktīkaroti sāmīpye ityādi / | The same idea is further clarified: [see verse 2568 next] |
sāmīpye 'pi hi saṃskāraḥ kāraṇaṃ parikalpyate / | Even in cases of proximity, the embellishment is supposed to be the cause (of the cognition); |
saṃskāraḥ sa samānaś ca teṣu dūrasthiteṣvapi // | and this embellishment would be equally there for persons at a distance also. |
śabdotpattau niṣiddhatvād ityādāvāha viśiṣṭasaṃskṛter ityādi / viśiṣṭasaṃskṛter janma dhvanibhyo yadi gamyate / | If the idea is that particular embellishments are produced by articulations, then in that case, no one can deny the idea of the sound being produced. Because the particular embellishment is not something different from the word-sound; |
śabdotpattiḥ pratikṣeptuṃ na śakyā kenacit tadā // | otherwise the word-sound would be incognisable. consequently the word-sound also should be regarded as produced. |
viśiṣṭasaṃskṛtiḥ śabdāt sā hi na vyatirekiṇī / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2270, that “Inasmuch as the idea of the Word-Sound being produced has been rejected, etc. etc.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2569-2570 above]: |
śabdasyājñeyatāprāptes tataḥ śabdo 'pi jāyate // | If the Embellishment is something that is produced, then there should be production of the Word-Sound also; |
atha vyatirekas tadā saṃskārād eva jñānotpatteḥ śabdasyākārakatvād ajñeyatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | In case it is different, then, as the Cognition would be brought about by the Embellishment itself, the Word-Sound would not be an active agent in it; |
{tataḥ} śabdo 'pi jāyata ityaṅgīkartavyam // | For these reasons it should be admitted that the Word-Sound also is produced. |
athāpi syād yathā pratiniyatajñānotpādanasamarthaḥ śabda utpadyate bhavatāṃ tathā [p.693] smākam api saṃskārapratiniyamo bhaviṣyati, tena dūrasthair na gamyata iti / | The following might be urged “Just as for you, the Buddhist, the Word-Sound is produced as capable of bringing about a particular restricted cognition, so also for us, there is restriction in regard to the Embellishment also; whereby the Sound is not heard by people at a distance The answer to this is as follows”. |
saṃskṛtaścaikadā śabdas tamātmānaṃ na jātucit / jahātyanityatāsaṅgād upalabhyate cet sadā // | Having become embellished once, if the word-sound does not abandon that (embellished) form, on account of its evanescent character, then it should continue to be heard for all time. |
yadi nāma pratiniyatapuruṣasantānavartijñānotpādanasamarthaḥ saṃskriyate tathāpi doṣa eva / | Even if the idea be that “The Word-Sound that is embellished is one that is capable of bringing about the cognition within the ‘chain’ of certain particular persons only” there would be objections against it. |
tathā hi yadi jñānotpādanayogyaṃ saṃskṛtasvabhāvaṃ na jahāti tadā sarvadaiva tajjñānotpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | For instance, if the Sound does not abandon the form which is capable of bringing about the cognition, then its cognition should continue to be produced for all time. |
atha jahāti tadānityatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | If it abandons it, then it becomes evanescent, not eternal. |
tasmād utpadyata evetyaṅgīkartavyam // | Hence it must be admitted that it is produced. |
yaduktam saṃskāradvayapakṣe tvityādi tatrāha dvayetyādi / dvayasaṃskārapakṣe 'pi satyaṃ doṣadvaye {va}caḥ / | Even as regards the view that there is embellishment of both, the assertion that it is open to both sets of objections is quite true; because deficiency is not in one of the two only; |
yannānyataravaikalyaṃ prāktanasyānuvṛttitaḥ // | as the previous one continues. |
yeṣām utpattipakṣas teṣāṃ matenānyataravaikalyaṃ yujyate / natu saṃskāravādināṃ pakṣe teṣāṃ sadaiva prāktanasya saṃskṛtasya svabhāvasyānuvṛtteḥ // | For those who hold the view that the Word-Sound is produced, it is possible that one or the other should be deficient; it is not possible for those who hold that there is Embellishment (not production); as for them, the previous embellished form would continue to exist. |
tathā hītyādinā tāmevānuvṛttiṃ darśayati / | The said ‘continuity’ is further clarified. |
tathā hi saṃskṛtāḥ śrotravarṇā yadvyañjakaiḥ purā / na naṣṭās te cyutiprāpteḥ sarvaiḥ sarvaśrutis tataḥ // | [see verse 2573 next] The auditory organ and the letter-sounds that have been previously embellished by the manifesters cannot become destroyed, because if they did, they would be non-eternal; and consequently they would be heard at all times. |
cyutiprāpter iti / anityatvaprasaṅād ity arthaḥ / | ‘Cyutiprāpteḥ’ because of liability to become non-eternal. |
anyathā pratijñāviśiṣṭeḥ{sṛṣtiḥ---} syāt / | Otherwise, there would be Renunciation of Proposition (on your part). |
natu sarvasya śrutir iti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Sarva-śrutiḥ’ Hearing at all times. not of all; |
"karmaṇi ce" ti samāsapratiṣedhāt // | as in the latter case, the compound would fall under the prohibition contained in Pāṇini’s Sūtra ‘Karmaṇi ca’. |
athāpi syāt pratiniyata{nā}ameva puṃsāṃ śrutiyogo saṃskṛtau śrotravarṇau tena sarvair na śrūyata iti / evaṃ tarhi ye anyeṣāṃ varṇānāṃ pratipatās teṣāṃ śabdaśravaṇaṃ na prāpnoti / | If the embellished organ and letter-sounds were capable of hearing by a few limited persons, then there would be no hearing for other persons who would be going to hear the same letter-sounds. The following might be urged “It is of only a few limited number of persons whose Organ and Letter-Sounds would be embellished and fit for audition, and hence the Sound could not be heard by all men”. But in that case, there would be no hearing by those men who were going to hear other Letter-Sounds. |
etad eva darśayati niyatetyādi / | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2574 above]: |
niyatānāṃ puṃsāṃ śrutiyogyāv iti samāsaḥ / | The compound ‘niyataśrutiyogyau’ is to be explained as ‘śrutiyogyau’ capable of hearing ‘niyatānām puṃsām’ by a few limited persons. |
anye ca te varṇaprapattāro 'nyeṣāṃ vā varṇānāṃ prapattāra iti vigrahaḥ // | ‘Anyavarṇa, etc.’ This may be taken as ‘other persons who would be going to hear that same sound’, or as ‘persons who would be going to hear other sounds’. |
athāpi syādye te 'nyavarṇapratipattārastajjñānotpattiyogyaṃ punar api saṃskārāntaraṃ śabdaśrotrayor bhaved ityetadāśaṅkya pariharati tadvarṇetyādi / | If it be said that “the organ and the letter-sound are embellished again, and are pit for the purpose of the cognition of that sound by other persons”, then also there would be continuation of the same organ and sound, and hence of the hearing also of the same sound and by the same person. |
tayor evānuvṛttau syāt tayor api nanu śrutiḥ // te ca te varṇanarāśceti samāsaḥ / | The following might be urged “For the benefit of those other persons who would be going to hear the same sound, there would be another embellishment of the Auditory Organ and the Letter-Sound”. |
ke punas te varṇā ye 'naiḥ pratipattṛbhir gṛhyante, narāś ca teṣām eva ye prapattāraḥ, teṣāṃ vijñānaṃ tatra yogyāviti samāsaḥ / | The compound ‘tadvarṇa, etc.’ is to be expounded as fit for the vijñāna cognition of those Sounds by those persons; “which Letter-Sounds?” those that are heard by the other hearers; and the ‘persons’ are the ‘hearers of those sounds’. |
tayor eveti / pūrvasaṃskṛtayoḥ śrotraśabdayoḥ / | ‘Tayoreva’ i.e. the Organ and Letter-Sound embellished previously. |
tayor apīti / pūrvakayor varṇanarayoḥ / | ‘Tayorapi’ of the previous Person and Letter-Sound. |
paścādyadānyaiḥ śrūyate kakārādivarṇas tadāpi yaiḥ pūrvaśrutas tadvattair api śrūyeta / | What is meant is that, when the Letters ka and the rest are heard later on by other persons, they should be heard exactly as they had been heard by the previous persons; |
prāktanasvabhāvānuvṛtter iti // | because their previous character would still continue. |
atha nānuvṛttis tadānityatvaprasaṅgaḥ ityādarśayann āha vyāvṛttāvityādi / vyāvṛttāvanya evāmī śrotravarṇāḥ kathaṃ na te / prāpnuvanti tatas teṣu nityatāśānibandhanā // | If these other organ and letter-sound are distinct (from those embellished before), then why does not the hope of these being eternal become entirely baseless? (2576) The following Text shows that if there is no such continuation as has been pointed out, then they become non-eternal: [see verse 2576 above]: |
subodham // | This is easily understood. |
jalādiṣu na caiko 'yaṃ nānātmā savitekṣyate / | In the water and other reflecting substances, it is not the same sun seen in various forms; |
sarvam eva hi bhrāntaṃ jñānaṃ nirviṣayam iti pūrvam aviśeṣeṇa pratipāditam / | because the cognitions that are there all pertain to the reflected images, and are entirely devoid of any objective basis. |
tathāpi punaḥ pratibimbadhiyāṃ viśeṣaṇā{ṣeṇa---}dvayor api sākāranirākārapakṣayoḥ pratipādayati / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2210, that “Though the Sun is one, yet it is seen, etc. etc.” |
tatra prathamaṃ pakṣam adhikṛṭyāha nirākārā ityādi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2577 above]: |
nirākārā dhiyaḥ sarvāstvatpakṣe 'pi vyavasthitāḥ / | Even under your view, all cognitions are formless, and it is only the external thing that is held to be with form. |
jalādyantargataṃ cedaṃ pratibimbaṃ samīkṣyate / | The reflected image that is seen is seen within the water; |
nabhastalādivarttī ca sūryādir na tathā sthitaḥ // | and yet the sun existing in the sky is not there in the water. |
tat katsmād bhātyasāvevaṃ bhrāntyā cedata eva tat / | “How is it then that it appears as if in the water?” It is through delusion, and hence it is that it is clearly devoid of an objective basis; |
natu spaṣṭamanālambaṃ tadrūpārthaviyogataḥ // | because it has no connection with any object with that form. |
tasyaiva pratipattiśced anyathedaṃ subhāṣitam / | If it is urged that “it is the same sun that is perceived otherwise”, this would be another excellent assertion the same and yet otherwise. |
taccānyatheti kiṃtvevaṃ sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam // | But in this way, every cognition would apprehend everything. |
tasyaiva pratipattiḥ syād yadīkṣyeta tathāsthitam / | It would be the cognition of the same sun only if it were seen exactly as it is; |
anyākāropalabdhau tu tasya dṛṣṭiḥ kathaṃ bhavet // | when however, it is actually perceived in another form, how could it be the perception of the same sun? (2578-2582) |
[p.695] | [verses 2578-2582]: |
sākāre 'pi hi vijñāne na jñātārthāvilakṣaṇe / | It has already been explained before that all wrong cognitions are, without exception, devoid of any objective basis; |
bhavato hi mīmāṃsakasya nirākāraṃ vijñānamākāravān bāhyo 'rthas tataś ca yattājalāntargataṃ rūpaṃ dṛśyate na tāvad asau jñānākāraḥ, bāhyasyaivākāravattvābhyupagamāt / | For you, the Mīmāṃsaka, Cognitions are formless, and it is the external object that is with form. Hence what is seen in the water cannot be the form of the Cognition; because forms are held to belong to external things only. |
nāpi tat pratibimbam arthāntarabhūtam abhyupagataṃ sūryasyāgrahaṇaprasaṅgāt / nāpi sūryo jalāntargato yena tathā bhāseta, tasyākāśadeśavartitvāt / | Nor is the Reflected Image held to be an entirely different thing; as in that case, it would not be a case of the perception of the Sun at all, Nor does the Sun itself enter the water, by virtue of which it could appear there (as the Reflected Image); |
bhrāntyā tathā bhāsata iti cedevaṃ tarhi na sūryālambanaṃ jñānaṃ, tasya sūryasya jalāntargatarūpābhāvāt / | because it remains in the regions of Ākāśa If it be asserted that “it is through illusion that it appears in the water”, in that case, the Cognition would not have the Sun for its objective basis; because the form within the water does not belong to the Sun. |
tataś ca yadrūpo 'rtho yajjñānenāvabhāsate tadrūpārthaviyuktatvāt tadvijṭānamanālambanam iti siddham / | From all this it follows that the form that belongs to the object (Sun) does not figure in the Cognition; and hence having no connection with that form, the said Cognition is clearly baseless (without an objective basis). |
prayogaḥ yo yadvijñānapratibhāsisvarūpo na bhavati na sa tadvijñānaviṣayaḥ, yathā rūpaṃ śrotrajñānasya, na bhavati pratibimbavijñānapratibhāsisvabhāvaś ca sūrya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: When an Object has a form that does not figure in a Cognition, that Object cannot be the objective basis of that Cognition; e.g. Colour cannot be the objective basis of Auditory Cognition; the Sun does not have the form that figures in the Cognition of the Reflected Image; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide character). |
nāsiddho hetuḥ, sūryasya jalāntargatarūpābhāvāt / | because in reality the Sun does not have the form that is within the water. |
nāpyanaikāntiko 'tiprasaṅgāt / | Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’; |
evaṃ hi yatkiñcidyasya kasyacidālambanaṃ prāpnoti / | as that would lead to incongruities; as in this way anything could be the objective basis of any Cognition. |
sapakṣe sadbhāvāt na viruddhaḥ / | Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; |
athāpi syāt sa eva sūryo deśabhedena kevalam anyathā pratīyata ityato heturasiddha eveti / | It might be argued that “It is the same Sun that is seen in the water, only it appears otherwise, on account of the difference in its position, and consequently, the Buddhist’s Reason is ‘Inadmissible’”. |
tadetad bhavataḥ prauḍhatārikādṛte ko 'nyo vaktum arhati tadeva cānyatheti / tathā hi tadevetyanena tat svarūpaṃ vidhīyate, anyathetyanena tanniṣedhaḥ, tatkatham ekatraikadā parasparaviruddhau vidhipratiṣedhau yuktau / | Who, except an audacious logician like yourself, could make such an assertion as ‘it is the same and otherwise’, Because the assertion ‘it is the same’ affirms that it is of the same form, and the assertion that ‘it is otherwise’ denies that it has the same form; how then could these two mutual contraries Affirmation and Denial appertain to the same thing (Sun)? |
yadi punar anyathā pratīyamāno 'pi sa eva syāt tadā sarvaviśvam ekaṃ bhavet / | If, even when cognised as otherwise, the thing (Sun) were the same, then the entire Universe might be regarded as the same; |
tataś ca sahotpattināśau syātām, sarvaṃ ca vijñānamekaviṣayaṃ syāt / | and as a consequence of this, the birth and death of things would come at the same time and all Cognitions would have one and the same object. |
tasmād yathā deśakālādibhedavānasāvarthas tathaiva yadi pratīyeta, evaṃ sa eva pratītaḥ syād iti kuto 'siddhatā / | From this it follows that if the thing were cognised as it actually exists in relation to particular time and place, etc. then, the same Sun would have been cognised. How then can our Reason be ‘Inadmissible’? (2578-2582) |
dvitīye 'pi sākārapakṣe nirālambanatāṃ pratibimbadhiyāṃ pratipādayati sākāre 'pītyādi / | Under the second view also that Cognitions are with form, the Cognitions of the Reflected Images are devoid of objective basis; this is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2583 next] |
sākāravijñānapakṣe hi sākārasaṃvedane 'pi bāhyārthāvilakṣaṇākārānubhavād bāhyo vidita ucyate, natu vilakṣaṇānubhavāt / | Even under the view that Cognitions are with form, though the Cognition of the Reflected Image may be with form, yet, the external object can be said to be ‘cognised’ only when the form in which it is apprehended is not different from the external object itself, and not when it is apprehended in a different form; |
anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | if it were not so, there would be incongruities. |
nacātra pratibimbadhiyāṃ sūryākārāvilakṣaṇākārānubhavo 'sti anyathā hyabhrāntasūryajñānāviśeṣaḥ pratibimbadhiyāṃ syāt // | In the case of the Cognitions of the Reflected Images, the apprehension is not of a form that is non-different from the form of the Sun; for if it were there, the Cognitions of the Reflected Images would be exactly the same as the true Cognition of the Sun itself. |
kintūrdhvavṛttimekatve 'pyavāgevānumanyate // | It may be that what is perceived by the downward rays is the sun shining above presented mediately; |
yathaivāvasthito hyarkas tathaivekṣyeta yadyasau / avabuddhaḥ prakalpyeta nānyathetyupapāditam // | but even so, the perceiver regards the sun shining above as actually down in the water. If the sun were actually perceived just as it stands, then it would be cognised as such, not otherwise. |
avabuddhyatām iti / | this has been already explained. |
ātmā / | ‘What is perceived’ by the Soul. |
ūrddhvavṛttim iti / ādityam paristhitam ity arthaḥ / | ‘Shining above’ this qualifies the ‘Sun’, as it exists. |
manyata iti / ātmā / | ‘Regards’ i.e. the perceiving Soul thinks. |
yadi nāmātmā pāramparyārpitamuparisthitamādityamavāgvṛttyāvabudhyate, kimityavāgeva manyate norddhvam / evaṃ hi sa evāvabuddho bhavati, yadi yathāsthito gṛhyeta / | What is meant is as follows: If what the Percipient Soul sees is the Sun shining above, presented to him mediately, through the downward rays, how is it that he regards the Sun as actually down in the water, and not as shining above? It would be regarded as such, if it were actually apprehended as it exists; |
anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt // | otherwise there would be incongruities. |
yaduktam evaṃ prasaṅgatayā vṛttyā pratyagvṛttisamarpitam ityādi, tatrāha naivaṃ tadga{prāgna---}tayetyādi / naivaṃ tadgatayā vṛttyā pratyagvṛtti samarpitam / budhyamāno mukhaṃ bhrāntyā pratyagityavagacchati // | Similarly it is not true that (in the case of the man looking at the mirror) “it is through illusion that the man cognises the face as facing the west, though in reality what he actually perceives is the face as presented by the visual rays proceeding eastward to the rays as proceeding westward.” (2586) |
pratibimbakavijñānaṃ svāsyādyālambanaṃ na tat / | As a matter of fact, the perception of the reflected image cannot have the man’s own real face as its objective basis; |
tadvilakṣaṇanirbhāsād rasaśabdādivittivat // tadvilakṣaṇanirbhāsād iti / | because what figures in the perception is something entirely different from the real face; just as in the case of the perceptions of taste and sound, etc. |
bhāvalakṣaṇo nirdeśaḥ / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2224, that “In the case of the man looking at the mirror, it is through illusion that, etc. etc.” |
tadvilakṣaṇanirbhāsatvādity arthaḥ / | ‘Tadvilakṣaṇa, etc.’ This word has to be construed as with the abstract ending ‘tva’; |
bahuvrīhiścāyam / | and as a Bahuvrīhi compound. |
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