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bhavatu cāyaṃ pakṣas tathāpi doṣa eveti darśayann āha bhāvāccetyādi / | The following Text shows that even if it be as suggested, the view remains open to objection: [see verse 2514 next] |
bhāvasvarūpavat saṃskārasyāpi nityatvaṃ prāpnotyavyatirekāt / | Like the form of the thing itself, the Embellishment also should be eternal, as it is non-different from it. |
tataścāyam aparo doṣa ity āha tenetyādi // | So that this is an additional objection to which the said view is open. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe doṣamāha vyatireke tvityādi / | The following Text points out the objection against the second alternative (suggested in the Commentary on 2513, that the Potency imparted to the Auditory Organ is different from it): [see verse 2515 above] |
śakter bhāvād vyatireke 'bhyupagamyamāne tasyāsau śaktir iti sambandho na syāt / | If the Potency be held to be something different from the thing (the Auditory Organ), then there could be no such relationship as ‘this is the Potency of that’; |
anupakāryasya pāratantryāyogāt / | because what does not derive any benefit from another thing cannot be dependent upon this latter. |
atha {naca---} śrotraṃ śaktimupakaroti, vyañjakasyaiva nādāder upakārakatveneṣṭhatvāt / | And as a matter of fact, the Auditory Organ does not benefit the Potency; because what has been held to render help to the Potency is only the manifesting agency in the shape of Articulation. |
atha śrotrasyāpyupakārakatvaṃ tadā śaktyupakāriṇyā api śakteḥ śrotrād vyatireka ityanavasthā syāt / | If the Auditory Organ be regarded as helping the Potency, then that Potency (of the Auditory Organ), which would help the Potency, would be something different from the Auditory Organ; |
tataś ca śaktīnām eva paramparayā ghaṭanācchakter eva kāryotpatteḥ śrotrasyākārakatvaṃ syāt / | And in this way, as the Potencies themselves would accomplish all that is necessary, the effect (in the shape of the Cognition) would follow from the Potency, and the Auditory Organ would not be an active agent in bringing it about; |
tataścāvastutvaprasaṅgaḥ / | and this would render it liable to be regarded as a non-entity. |
atha śaktyupakāriṇyāḥ śakter avyatireko 'bhyupagamyate, kva idānīm ādyāyāṃśaktāvavyatireke pradveṣaḥ / | If (in order to escape from the Infinite Regress) it be held that the Potency that helps the Potency is not anything different (from the Auditory Organ), then why should there be any hostility against the first Potency itself? |
kiñca nityaṃ śaktyutpattiprasaṅgaḥ, taddhetoḥ śrotrasya nityatvāt, na cātupakāryasya sahakāryapekṣā kācit // | Then again, there would be the contingency of the Potency being produced constantly; as its Cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ, is eternal; «nd what does not derive any benefit from anything else could not be dependent upon auxiliaries. |
tṛtīyaṃ pakṣamāha bhedābhedetyādi / bhedābhedavinirmuktaṃ vyastaṃ pakṣāntaraṃ tataḥ / uttaraṃ śrotrasaṃskārād asaṃskṛtatayocyate // | [verse 2516]: The Author now takes up the third alternative (suggested in the Commentary on Text 2513, that ‘the Potency is different-non-different’ from the Auditory Organ): [see verse 2516 above] ‘Already overthrown’ under the chapter on the ‘Pudgala’. |
etenaiva niṣeddhavyā viṣayobhayasaṃskṛtiḥ / tasmānnityeṣvabhivyaktiḥ sarvathāpi nirāspadā // | The reason for it lies in the fact, that the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied. For instance, ‘Difference’ and ‘Non-difference’ are mutually exclusive; |
ye kecit pravibhajyante te 'pi sarve nirāspadāḥ // | and the presence of one is always characterised by the absence of the other; |
vyastam iti / | when between two things e.g. ‘Existence’ and ‘Non-existence’ the nature of one cannot be affirmed without the denial of the other, that is, it can exist only when the other is absent; |
tathā hi [p.681] bhedābhedau pārasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇau, tayor ekasvabhāvavyavacchedenaivāparasya paricchedāt yasya hi yadātmavyavacchedamantareṇa na svabhāvaḥ paricchidyate sa tat parihāreṇa sthito yathā bhāvābhāvayor anyataraḥ, yau ca parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇau tayor ekasvabhāvaniṣedho 'paravidhināntarīyaka ityanyatvaniṣedhe sāmarthyāt tādātmyavidhir iti tadānīm eva tasyāpi pratiṣedho na yuktaḥ, anyatvasyāpyapratiṣedhaprasaṅgād ityevam ubhayapakṣe doṣo vācyaḥ / | and when two things are mutually exclusive, the absence of one implying the presence of the other and vice versa, the affirmation of one must be concomitant with the denial of the other. Consequently when the ‘Difference’ (of the Potency from the Organ) is denied, it implies the affirmation of Sameness (Non-difference); and it cannot be right to deny this latter also at the same time; because in that case there may be affirmation of Difference also. Such are the objections that may be pointed out against the view that there is difference-non-difference (between the Potency and the Auditory Organ). |
etenaiveti prakṛtyā jñānotpādanayogyāyogyasvabhāvavikalpadvāreṇa / | ‘By these same arguments ’ i.e. by putting forward the alternatives regarding the capacity or otherwise to produce Cognitions. |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati / | ‘From all this, etc. etc.’ This sums up the argument. |
kramādaya ityādiśabdena plutodāttādiparigrahaḥ // | ‘Order of sequence, etc.’ ‘Etc.’ is meant to include the ultra-long, the ‘Udātta’ accent and so forth. |
yeṣāṃ tvaprāptajāto 'yaṃ śabdaḥ śrotreṇa gṛhyata ityādi aprāptimātrasāmye 'pītyādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2174, that “There are some people according to whom the Word-Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, when it is produced but not in actual contact with that Organ, etc. etc.” |
ayaskāntena lohasya sāmarthyaniyamasthiteḥ // | The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 2519 above] |
yadyapi sarvo 'prāptas tathāpi padārthānāṃ śaktipratiniyamān na pūrvasya viṣayasya grahaḥ grahaṇaṃ prāpnoti / | Though there is ‘absence of contact’ in all things, yet there is no possibility of the apprehension of the antecedent object, because the capacity of things is always restricted; |
yathā ayaskānto nāmopalo 'prāptamayaḥ karṣannapi na sarvam aprāptaṃ karṣati // | and yet it does not draw all other things which also are not in contact with it. |
ayaskāntaprabhetyādinām śaṅkarasvāmimatena dṛṣṭāntāsiddhimāśaṅkate ayaskāntaprabhāprāptyā tatrāpyākarṣaṇaṃ yadi / | In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the objection that has been taken by Śaṅkarasvāmin against the admissibility of the instance of the ‘Magnet’ just cited: [see verse 2520 above] |
sa hi prāha tatrāpyayaskāntamaṇiprabhāvedhavaśād evākarṣaṇamayaso 'nyathā sarvadeśāvasthitānām ayasāmākarṣaṇaṃ syāt / | Śaṅkarasvāmin has argued as follows: “In the case of the Magnet, the attraction of the Iron is due to its being penetrated by the Light-rays emanating from the Magnet; for, if it were not so, then there would be attraction of all Iron-pieces in the world. |
yadyapi tasya prabhā pradīpaprabhāvannopalabhyate, tathāpyanumeyā, dhyavadhāre {vyavadhāne---} dūre cākarṣaṇa{ṇā}darśanād iti / | Even though the Light emanating from the Magnet is not perceived in the manner of the Light emanating from the Lamp, yet it can be inferred from the fact that there is attraction even where the Iron is at some distance, if there is nothing between the Iron and the Magnet”. |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte / na dṛśyeyam ityanupalambhena sadvyavahāraniṣedhaṃ karoti // | The answer to this is ‘As no such Light, etc. etc.’ The phrase ‘it is not visible’ denies the propriety of the Light being existent, on the ground of its non-apprehension. |
yadapi prasaṅgasādhanam uktaṃ sarvadeśāvasthitānām ayasāmākarṣaṇaprasaṅgād iti, tat pariharann āha kasmād āptam ityādi / | As regards the Reductio ad Absurdum put forward by the assertion that “there would be attraction of all the Iron-pieces in the world”, the answer to that is as follows: [see verse 2521 above] |
tacchaktiniyatatvāccedaprāptāvapi tat samam // prāptipakṣe 'pi tulyaḥ prasaṅgaḥ, kasmāt sāyaskāntaprabhā sarvaṃ prāptaṃ kāṣṭhādikaṃ [p.682] nākarṣatīti / | The same contingency is equally possible under the view that there is actual contact: Why is it that the Light emanating from the Magnet does nob attract all those things,, wood-pieces and the like, that happen to be in contact with it? |
padārthasvabhāvapratiniyamānnātiprasaṅga iti cedaprāptipakṣe 'pi padārthasvabhāvasya niyāmakatvaṃ kenāpahṛtam, yena tatra neṣyate, tasmād adṛṣṭaprabhākalpanaṃ vyartham eva // | If the answer is that “The said contingency does not arise as the capacity of things is restricted”, then the same may be said under the view that there is no contact in such cases; who has deprived things of their capacity, by virtue of which the same is not admitted in this case? Hence it follows that the assumption of the invisible rays of Light is futile. |
yaduktam tatra dūrasamīpasthagrahaṇāgrahaṇe same / syātāṃ na ca krama iti tatrāha dūretyādi / dūramadhyasamīpasthair akrameṇaiva gamyate / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2175, that “For them, the absence of contact being equally present in the case of distant and near sounds, the apprehension and non-apprehension by people far and near would be equally possible, and there could be no order of sequence”. |
prayogānantaraṃ tatra sarveṣāṃ jñānajātitaḥ // | ‘Successive Apprehension’ is not admitted, because the Cognitions of all men appear simultaneously. |
yaccokta nāpi tīvramandrādisambhava iti, tatrāha dūrāsannādītyādi / | It has been argued under the same Text (2175) that “the greater and lesser intensity of Sounds would not be possible”. |
rūpaṃ tathaiva śabde 'pi tīvramandādividbhavet // yathā rūpamaprāpya gṛhyamāṇamadhyā{vyā---}pi ca spaṣṭamīkṣyate tathā śabde 'pyadhyā{vyā---}pinyaprāpya gṛhyamāṇe ca tīvramandādivedanā bhaviṣyati / | Colour also is perceived without contact with the Eye and is not all-pervading, and its perception is distinct or indistinct; in the same manner in the ease of Sound also, which also is not all-pervading and not in contact with the Ear, there would be Cognitions of greater or less intensity. |
nanu ca parasya rūpasyāpyaprāpya grahaṇam asiddhaṃ tat kathaṃ dṛṣṭāntatvenocyata iti / | Objection: “The other party does not admit of the perception of Colour without contact; how then is it put forward as the Corroborative Instance?” Answer: This does not affect our position. |
yadyapi parasya vacanamātrān na siddham, tathāpi yat pramāṇasiddhaṃ tadubhayor api siddham / | Though it is by mere words that the other party does not admit it, yet what is vouched for by proofs must be admitted by both parties. |
kiṃ punar atra pramāṇam, sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭayos tulyakālagrahaṇam / | “What is the proof that vouches for the idea in question (that there is perception without contact)?” The proof is provided by the fact that there is simultaneous perception of near and remote things. |
yo hi gatimān sa sannikṛṣṭamāśu prāpnoti, viprakṛṣṭaṃ cireṇa, yathā devadatto grāmād grāmāntaraṃ gacchan, śākhācandramasos tu tulyakālamunmeṣasamanantaram eva grahaṇaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ, tasmād aprāpyakāri cakṣur iti gamyate / | A thing that has movement gets at the nearer object quickly, and at the remoter object with some delay; when for instance, one goes from one village to another. But in the case of the Branch of the tree and the Moon seen through it, the perception of both is simultaneous, as soon as the Eyes are opened. From this it is deduced that the Eye is operative without actually getting into contact with the object perceived. |
atrodyotakaraḥ prāha jñānānam āśūtpatteḥ kālabhedasyāgrahaṇān mithyāpratyaya eṣa utpalapatraśatavedhavad iti / | In connection with this subject, Uddyotakara argues as follows: “Inasmuch as Cognitions are produced quickly, there can be no perception of the time taken; hence the idea, that ‘the several Cognitions appear in the manner of the piercing of the hundred petals of the Lotus’, is not true”, This is not right. |
tadetad asamyak, evaṃ hi saro rasa ityādāvapi kramavyavasāyo na syād āśūtpattes tulyatvāt, tataś ca pratītibhedo na syāt, sarvāsāṃ ca buddhīnām āśūtpattirastīti na kadācit kramagrahaṇaṃ syād iti prāg nirloḍitam etadvistareṇa / | In this way, in the case of the two words ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’ also, there should be no recognition of the order in which the letters are heard; the quick production of the perception being present here also; and if that is so, then there should be no difference between the Cognition of the word ‘sara’ and that of ‘rasa And as there is ‘quick production’ in the case of all Cognitions, there would be no perception of any order of sequence at all. |
punaḥ sa evāha yadyaprāpyakāri cakṣur bhavet tadā na kuṭyāder āvaraṇasyasāmarthyam astītyāvaraṇānupapattiḥ / | Again says Uddyotakara: “Even if the Eye were operative without contact, the wall would have no power to obstruct it; hence there would be no concealment of things. |
yacca dūrībhūtasyāgrahaṇaṃ antike ca grahaṇaṃ tatra {nna---}syād aviśeṣāt / | Nor would there be this phenomenon that what is remote is not seen while what is near is seen. |
syād etat ya eva hi cakṣuṣo viṣayībhavatyarthaḥ sa upalabhyate yaśca na bhavati nāsāvupalabhyata iti / tacca naivam / | It might be argued that ‘That object alone is seen which comes within range of the Eye, and what does not do so is not seen But that is not so; without some sort of connection, there can be no coming within range. |
ko 'yaṃ sambandhavyatirekeṇa viṣayībhāvo nāma / kevalaṃ mayocyate, [p.683] sambandha iti bhavatābhidhīyate viṣayībhāva iti na kaścid viśeṣa iti / | Because what is this coming within range, apart from being connected? The only difference is that what I call ‘connection’ is called by you ‘coming within range’; there is no other difference”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This is not right. |
kāraṇībhāvo hi viṣayībhāva ucyate 'smābhir na sambandhaḥ / | What is called by us coming within range is becoming the Cause; not Connection. |
tathā hi rūpādir viṣayaścakṣuṣī vijñānotpattau sahakāritāṃ pratipadyamāno viṣayībhavatīyucyate natu tena sahāśliṣyan / | Because when the Eye produces Cognitions, the Object Colour, etc. becomes its auxiliary, and hence called its ‘objective’; and it is not called so because it comes into contact with it. |
dvividhaś ca sahakārārthaḥ / paraspa{sparo---}ropakāro vā, yathā prabhāvaśca{prasa---}rādapavarakapratiṣṭhasya, ekārthakriyā vā, yathonmiṣatamātreṇa rūpaṃ gṛhṇataḥ / | The purpose served by the aid provided by auxiliaries is of two kinds (1) mutual benefit, e.g. between the Light-rays and the thing within cover, and (2) serving the same purpose; e.g. when the man sees Colour immediately on opening his Eyes. |
ubhayathāpi vijñānasya kāraṇaviśeṣa eva viṣaya ucyate, natu sambandhī / | In both ways, the Object of the Cognition is so called because it is its peculiar Cause, and not because it is connected with it. |
sa eva kāraṇaviśeṣapratiniyamo 'sati sambandhe na syād iti cet / | “This same restriction or specification of the Cause would not be possible without some Connection.” |
na / | Not so; |
svakāraṇaśaktitaḥ pratiniyamasiddhes tathābhūta evāsau svakāraṇād utpadyamāna utpa{papa}dyate, yena kaścid eva jñānajanako bhavati nānyaḥ, kāraṇābhedena bhinnasvabhāvatvāt sarvabhāvānām / | because the necessary restriction is secured by the capacity of the Cause itself. In fact when the Cause is produced out of its own Cause? it is produced exactly in the form in which only some of it becomes productive of the Cognition, not all; because the difference among all things is due to the difference in their Causes. |
yathā ca bhavatas tulye 'pi sambandhe kimiti cakṣū rūpam evopalabhate na rasam / tenāsambandhānnopalabhata iti cet, sa eva hi sambandhaḥ kimiti na syāt, deśasyābhinnatvāt / | Just as under your view, even though the Connection is equally present in both cases, why is it that the Eye apprehends the Colour only, not the Taste? It might be argued that “the Taste is not apprehended because it is not connected with the Eye”. Why should not the same Connection be present in the case of Taste also? as the locus of both (Taste and Colour) is the same; |
na hyatra niyāmakaṃ kiñcid asti kāraṇam, yenābhinnadeśatve 'pi rūpamevānusarati cakṣur na rasaṃ taddeśavartinam api, nāpyatidūradeśavarti rūpam iti / | and there is nothing to restrict the Connection (to Colour only), whereby, even though residing in the same locus, the Eye comes up to the Colour only and not to the Taste, though this also is present at the same place, and also it does not come up to the Colour also if it is very remote. |
svahetur niyāmaka iti cet / | It might be urged that “the restriction would be due to its own Cause”. |
tadetad aprāptipakṣe 'pi samānam ityalaṃ vistareṇa // | This can be said also under the view that the Eye is operative without contact. |
bhinnābhānām ityādinā parasya codyamāśaṅkate | The following Text anticipates and answers an objection from the other party: [see verse 2524 next] |
kathaṃ bhinnābhānāṃ matīnām eko viṣayo bhavet, evaṃ hi rasarūpādibuddhīnām ekālambanatā syād iti parasyābhiprāyaḥ / | “How can there be a single object for Cognition which appears as diverse?” What the Opponent means is that in this way the Cognitions of Colour, Taste, etc. might be said to have one and the same objective basis. |
parihāramāha tulyam ityādi / | The answer to this is as follows: ‘The same objection, etc. etc.’; |
rūpadhiyām rūpaviṣayāṇām api buddhīnām, etaccodyaṃ samānam katham ekaviṣayatā bhaved dūrāsannādibhedena spaṣṭādipratibhāsānām iti / | ‘To Cognitions of Colours’ i.e. to Cognitions envisaging Colour this same objection is equally applicable. How can there be a single objective basis for the distinct Cognitions of things far and near? All this objection is applicable to those who uphold the reality of the External World, who attribute the form to the Object, not to the Cognition. |
etac ca bāhyārthavādināṃ codyam / | and hence to these Idealists, the objection does not apply. |
yeṣām api bāhyārthavādināṃ sākāraṃ jñānam iti pakṣas teṣāṃ sarvātmanā viṣayasārūpyānabhyupagamāt kenacidaṃśena sārūpyād bhinnābhānām api matīnām ekaviṣayatvam aviruddham eveti na codyam // | Those upholders of the External World who attribute the form to the Cognition do not admit that there is absolute sameness of form between the Object and the Cognition; so that there would be the same form, in certain aspects; and hence there would be no incongruity in there being the same object for Cognitions appearing as diverse; consequently, the objection would not be applicable to these also. |
[p.684] | Question; |
prāptigrahaṇapakṣe tu karṇābhyantarapakṣavat / na vicchinna iti jñānaṃ meghaśabdādike bhavet // | “What proof then is there against the idea that the Word-Sound is apprehended only on contact with the Auditory Organ, and in support of the idea that it is apprehended without such contact?” |
ṣaṣṭyantād vatiḥ / | Answer: [see verse 2525 above] |
yathā karṇakaṇḍūvinodanakāriṇaḥ patatripakṣasyāvicchinnaṃ śabda upalabhyate, tathā meghādiśabdasyāpi kadambagolakanyāyena pravisarpataḥ karṇadeśamāgatasyaiva grahaṇāt tulyaṃ grahaṇaṃ prāpnoti / | The meaning thus is when a man is engaged in tickling the Ear with a feather, the Sound made by the feather is heard as continuous, without interruption; in the same manner, when there is Sound of Thunder spreading all round like the filaments of the Kadamba flower, and it is heard on reaching the Ear, then this hearing also should be continuous, not interrupted. |
na ca svakāraṇasaṃyogasamavāyideśavaśād ayaṃ vicchedavibhrama iti śakyaṃ vaktum / | It cannot be right to say that there is illusion of break on account of the peculiarity of the substratum wherein the conjunction of its Cause subsists. |
na hyaviṣayībhūtapadārthākāramāropayad utpadyate kvacid vijñānam / | Because there is no perception of such place, etc.; and no Cognition ever appears which imposes forms which have never been cognised; |
nahi cakṣur vijñānaṃ rasasārūpyaṃ samāropayatīti // | e.g. the Visual Perception does not impose the form of Taste. |
tadevaṃ prāptigrahaṇe bādhakaṃ pramāṇam abhidhāyāprāptigrahaṇe sādhakam āha tadvicchinna ityādi / tadvicchinna iti jñānajanakatvādyathā manaḥ / śrotramaprāpyakāri syānnānyathaivaṃ tvagādivat // | Having thus stated the proof against the view that Sound is heard on getting into contact with the Sense-organ, the Author next states the proof in support of the view that the perception takes place without the said contact: [see verse 2526 above] |
taditi tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Therefore. |
nānyathaivaṃ tvagādivad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ / | ‘Not otherwise, etc. etc.’ This supplies the Corroborative Instance for dissimilarity. |
yathā tvagāder indriyasya vicchedena grahaṇaṃ na bhavati tathātrāpi syād iti yāvat // | In the case of the Tactile Organ (which operates by contact), the perception is not interrupted, and the same would have been the case with the Auditory Organ also (if this also operated through contact). |
manopītyādinā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām āśaṅkya pariharati | In the following Text, the Author anticipates the objection that the Corroborative Instance of the Mind is one that is devoid of the Probandum, and supplies the answer to it: [see verse 2527 above] |
atrodyotakarakumārilādayaḥ pramāṇayanti prāpyakāriṇī cakṣuḥśrotre bāhyendriyatvāt ghrāṇādivat / | Uddyotakara, Kumārila and others put forward the following arguments in support of the sense-organs being operative by direct contact: “(a) The Eye and the Ear must be regarded as operative by contact, because they are external organs, like the Olfactory Organ. |
bāhyagrahaṇamantaḥkaraṇena manasā vyabhicāraparihārārtham / | The qualification ‘External’ is added in order to avoid the charge of being ‘false’ in view of the Mind (which is not operative by contact). |
tathā karaṇatve sati vyavahitārthānupalambhakatvāt ghrāṇādivat / | (b) The Eye and the Ear must be regarded as operative by contact, because being organs, they do not apprehend things hidden and far off, like the Olfactory Organ. |
viṣayanivṛttyarthaṃ karaṇatve satīti viśeṣaṇam / | The qualification ‘being organs’ has been added for the purpose of excluding the object. |
tathā rūpaśabdau prāpyakāribāhyendriyagrāhyau bāhyendriyārthatvāt gandharasavat / tathā rūpaśabdavijñānaṃ prāpyakāribāhyendriyagrāhyaviṣayālambane bāhyendriyārthālambanatvāt gandharasajñānavad iti / | (c) Colour and Sound must be regarded as cognisable by means of those external organs that are operative by contact, because they are objects of external organs, like Odour and Taste. (d) the Cognitions of Colour and Sound must be regarded as having for their objective basis such objects as are cognisable by means of external organs operative by contact, like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste”. |
anyadharmavijātīyād virodhād vyabhicāri tat // | The objections against these arguments are set forth in the following: [see verse 2528 next] |
subodham // | The meaning is clear. |
[p.685] tasmācchrotriyadṛṣṭeyam ityādāvāha vyastā ityādi / vyastāḥ pūrvaṃ ca saṃyogavibhāgavyatirekiṇaḥ / vāyorakṣati{ṇi---}katvāc ca yuktā nāvyatirekiṇaḥ // | The following Text supplies the answer to what has been urged by the Mīmāṃsaka, under the Text 2176, to the effect that “Thus from the point of view of the Vedic Scholar, let us examine the matter, etc. etc.”: [see verses 2529-2530 above] |
pūrvam iti ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyām / | ‘Before’ under the examination of the ‘Six Categories’. |
avyatiriktās tarhi bhaviṣyatītyāha vāyor ityādi / vāyava eva hi saṃyuktā viyuktāścotpadyamānā avyatiriktāḥ saṃyogavibhāgā ucyante / | Says the Opponent “If they are not different, then they may be non-different, same”. Answer: ‘Inasmuch as the Air, etc. etc.’ The Air-currents themselves, produced as conjoined and disjoined, are spoken of as the ‘non-different Conjunctions and Disjunctions’; |
nacākṣaṇikāḥ krameṇāpi saṃyuktasvabhāvā yujyante teṣām ekarūpatvāt // | and what are non-momentary cannot become conjoined with things, in succession, as they are all of one and the same form. |
yaduktam karṇavyomani samprāpta ityādi, tatrāha karṇetyādi / karṇavyomani samprāptaḥ śaktiṃ śrotre karoti cet / | It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2179, that “Having reached the Ākāśa in the Auditory Organ, the Air imparts a certain capacity to that organ, etc. etc.” |
ityayuktaṃ kaśāghātavātāntaravidastathā // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2531-2532 above] |
atra pakṣadvayaṃ kadācid asau vāyurupalabhyasvabhāvo vā bhavet / | There are two views possible in this connection (1) that the Air is perceptible and (2) that it is not-perceptible. |
prathame pakṣe śabdavittikāle kaśāghātasyeva vāyor api gatirūpalabdhiḥ prāpnoti / | Under the former view, at the time that Sound is cognised, there should be cognition of the Air also, as in the case of the whip-stroke. |
athāpi syād yugapad vijñānadvayānutpatteḥ, śabdāvadhānam śabdopalambhaḥ, etasya vāyor vedanāmupalabdhiṃ pratibadhnātīti / | It might be argued that “as two cognitions cannot appear simultaneously, the cognition of Sound obstructs the cognition of the Air”. |
tadetad yuktaṃ śabdopalabdhikāle kaśāghātavātāntaravido vaktum / | This cannot be right in the mouth of one who is cognisant of the whip-stroke and the other Air, at the time that the Sound is cognised. |
yathāhi vātāntarasya vyajanādikṛtasya kaśāghātasya ca śabdopalambhavelāyām anubhavo bhavet tathā karṇadeśaprāptasyāpi vāyoḥ sparśavittiḥ syāt / | Just as the ‘Other Air’ set up by the fan, and the ‘whip-stroke’ are both perceived at the time that the Sound is heard, in the same manner there should be the perception of the touch of the Air reaching the auditory organ. |
etena yugapad vijñānānutpattipratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣavirodham āha // | What this shows is that the assertion that there cannot be simultaneous cognitions is contrary to a directly perceived fact. |
bhavatu nāma kramabhāge 'pi lāghavakṛto yaugapadyavibhramastathāpyetad uttaram atra prakṛtānupayogitvān na kiñcid iti pratipādayati lāghavad ityādi / lāghavāt kramabhāve 'pi yugapad bhrāntir ityadaḥ / | It has been explained already that the idea of simultaneous cognitions is due to the illusion caused by the quickness with which the cognitions appear. It may be that in the case of Cognitions appearing in succession there may be an illusion of simultaneity due to the quickness with which they appear; |
na kiñcit sarvathāpyasmin vāyor anulambhanāt // | but in the present discussion, the said explanation is of no use; hence it is nothing. |
yadi nāma vijñānasyotpattilāghavādyaugapadyavibhramo bhavatīti, syāt / | It may be that, on account of the quickness in the appearance of the Cognitions, there is an illusion of simultaneity. |
natu puna [p.686] rupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya sarvathānupalambha eva bhavati / | But this cannot apply to the case where there is no perception of a thing which is quite perceptible. |
tathāhyatra sarvathaiva krameṇa yaugapadyena vā vāyoḥ karṇadeśaprāptasyānupalambha eva tasmāllāghavakṛto 'yaṃ vijñāne yaugapadyavibhrama ityetad uttaraṃna kiñcit / | For instance, in the present context, there is absolutely no cognition either successive or simultaneous of the Air that has reached the regions of the Auditory Organ. Hence the explanation that “the illusion of simultaneity of Cognitions is due to the quickness with which they appear” can have no bearing on the present discussion; |
tuccham ity arthaḥ // | i.e. it should be ignored. |
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