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drutamadhyavilambinā"kāreṇa hi jñānam upajāyate, na ca śabdasya drutākāraḥ samasti tasya nityavyāpitvenaikarūpatvāt / | The Cognition that appears is in the form of ‘fast’, ‘medium’ and ‘slow’; and the Word-Sound cannot have the ‘fast’ and other forms; because being eternal and all-pervading, it must have only one form; |
na cānyo drutākāravānarthaḥ sambhavati yaḥ pratyavabhāseta / | there is nothing else that could have the ‘fast’ and other forms, and appear in the Cognition; |
tasmād ākārān {nu---}rūpasyārthasyābhāvānnirviṣayatvam evāsya // | hence there being no real object of the said exact form, the Cognition is clearly objectless. |
yathoktam "sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakaḥ "iti, atrāha anyathā veti / | The assertion that ‘one cognises the one thing as otherwise’ involves self-contradiction; |
anyathā ca tamevārthaṃ vettīti vyāhataṃ vacaḥ / anyākārasya saṃvittau sa hyartho viditaḥ katham // | i.e. what is cognised is another form, then how can the same object be said to be cognised? under the view that cognition is formless, it would exist only in the external form; |
bāhyaś ca na tadātmeti kimasau vidyate tathā // sākārajñānapakṣe 'pi bāhyākārānurūpataḥ / | consequently, if what is cognised is external and yet not of the nature of the external thing, then how is it that it exists? Even under the view that cognitions have forms, the cognition always appears in accordance with the external form; |
jñāne nirbhāsasambhūtāvartho vidita ucyate // | and then alone is the object said to be ‘cognised’. |
iha bāhyānurūpeṇa na tu jñānaṃ pravartate / | in the case in question, however, the cognition does not appear in accordance with the external form. |
tasmānnirviṣayaṃ sarvaṃ bhrāntaṃ cittam iti sthitam // | Hence it follows that all this cognition, which is wrong, is entirely objectless (2490-2493) |
vyāhatam iti / tattvānyathākārayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvenaikatra dharmiṇyayogāt / kiñca sarvam eva bhrāntaṃ nirākārapakṣe sākārapakṣe ca nirviṣayameveti pratipādayann āha nirākāre hītyādi / | as has been declared that ‘in every case the objective basis consists in the external thing varying with the variations of Time and Place The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2490-2493 above] ‘Self-contradiction’ ‘The same’ and ‘Otherwise’ are mutually exclusive, the presence and absence of the one involving the absence and presence (respectively) of the other; and as such, these cannot co-exist in the same object. |
nirākārajñānavādināṃ hi nīlādyākāro 'rthagata evānubhūyate / | Then again, under the view that forms do not belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are false; |
na ca yathā bhrāntajñānapratibhāsī pītādis tathā śaṅkhādirartho 'vasthita iti sphuṭataramevāviṣayatvam asya / | This is what is shown by the words ‘Under the view, etc., etc.’ For those who regard the Cognitions as formless, what is perceived is the Blue form as subsisting in the Object. The Conch-shell does not really exist in the yellow form in which it figures in the wrong Cognition; |
nanu ca pītadyākāro yadi nārthagatas tadāvaśyaṃ tena jñānagatena bhavitavyam anyathobhayatrābhāve katham anubhūyeta / | Says the Opponent “If the yellow form is not in the Object, then it must be in the Cognition; otherwise, if it were in neither, how could there be cognition of it? Thus if it resides in the Cognition, it behoves you to explain how Cognition can be formless?” |
tataś ca jñānagatatve kathaṃ nirākāratā vijñānasyeti vaktavyam / | but when we assert that Cognition is objectless, we do so, on accepting the view that Cognition is formless. |
yastu nirākāraṃ jñānam icchati tenaivātra parihāro vācyaḥ / | One who holds Cognitions to be formless has got to provide an answer to the question that has been raised. |
sākārajñānapakṣe 'pyarthasadṛśātmākārānubhavād arthānubhavo vyavasthāpyate / naca bhrānte jñāne 'rthasadṛśātmākārānubhūtirastītyaviṣayam eva / | Even under the view that the form resides in the Cognition, the apprehension of the Object is explained on the basis of the idea that what is actually apprehended is that form of the Cognition which bears the imprint of the form of the Object. In the case of wrong Cognition there is no apprehension of the form of Cognition bearing the imprint of the Object; |
naca sākāranirākārābhyāmanyaḥ prakāro 'sti viṣayagrahaṇaṃ pratīti / | Apart from being with form and being without form, there is no other alternative possible, in regard to the apprehension of things. |
tasmāt sarvam eva bhrāntaṃ jñānaṃ nirviṣayam iti siddham // | Hence it follows that all Cognition, which is wrong, is objectless. |
[p.675] nacāpyatra bhrāntinimittaṃ sambhavatīti darśayann āha naca vyañjakasadbhāva ityādi / | It cannot be right that there should be a ‘manifester’, specially for what is eternal, in accordance with its embellishments (and modifications); |
tat saṃskārānurūpeṇa nāto bhinnā dhiyo dhvanau // | consequently there cannot be diverse cognitions in regard to the word-sound. |
vyañjakabhedo hi dhvanau śabde bhedavibhramanimittam upavarṇyate, naca nityasya kasyacid vyañjako 'sti, tasya tatrākiñcitkaratvāt, nacākurvan kañcid viśeṣaṃ tasya vyañjako yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | In regard to ‘Dhvani’ i.e. Word-Sound, the diversity of the manifester is said to be the cause of the illusion that there is diversity in the sound also. But for anything that is eternal, there can be no ‘manifester’; as in regard to eternal things, there is nothing that the Manif ester can do; and unless it does something to it, it cannot he its ‘Manifester’; |
evaṃ hi yatkiñcid yasya kasyacid vyañjakaṃ syāt / | if it were, there would be an absurdity; and anything could be the ‘Manifester’ of anything. |
tasmān na vyañjakasaṃskārād dhvanau śabde bhinnā buddhayo yuktāḥ // | For these reasons it cannot be right to hold that diverse Cognitions regarding the Word-Sound are due to the embellishments of the manifestor. |
yaduktaṃ yathā ghaṭāer dīpādirabhivyañjaka iṣyata ityādi, tatredaṃ prathamaṃ śrokārthamupakṣipyaikena ślokena dvitīyādiślokair dūṣayann āha ghaṭādigrahaṇārthaṃ hītyādi / ghaṭādigrahaṇārthaṃ hi yathā vyaktiṃ niyacchati / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2170, that “Just as the Lamp is regarded as the manifester of the Jar, through the aid that it affords to the Eye, etc. etc.” In the first of the following texts, the Author explains the opponent’s position, and in the remaining texts, he sets forth the objections to it; |
bhāve ca yogyatāyogī śabdo jāto 'paro bhavet // | [see verses 2495-2499 above] It may be that the Auditory Organ is embellished; |
saṃskṛyatānnāma śrotram, idaṃ tu vaktavyam, kin nu prakṛtyā śabdaḥ svaviṣayajñānotpattau samartha āhosvid asamartha iti / | but what you have to explain is Whether or not the Word-Sound, by its very nature, is capable of bringing about the cognition of itself. In the former case (i.e. if it is so capable), then it should be cognised even before the Auditory Organ has been embellished. |
etad evāha asaṃskṛto 'pītyādi / | This is what is said in the words ‘why is it not apprehended, etc. etc.’ |
tasyeti / śabdasya / | ‘Tasya’ of the Word-Sound. |
tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ therefore. |
prayogastu yadi vikalakāraṇamityādikaḥ pūrvavadvācyaḥ, śrotrasaṃskāravaiyarthyaprasṅgaśca / | The argument may be formulated, as before, thus ‘If its cause is deficient etc.’; and it may be added that in this case the embellishment of the Auditory Organ would be useless. |
atha dvitīyapakṣas tadā śrotrasaṃskāre 'pi śabdopalambho na prāpnoti, sarvadaiva śabdasyāyogyatvāt / | Under the latter view (that the Word-Sound by itself is not capable of bringing about its own cognition), the Cognition of the Sound should not come about even when the embellishment of the Auditory Organ is there; because the Sound must, for ever, remain incapable (of being cognised). |
tataścāsminnapi pakṣe śrotrasaṃskāravaiyarthyam eva / | So that under this view also, the embellishment of the Auditory Organ would be useless. |
prayogaḥ yo yadutpādanāyogyāvasthāto na viśiṣyate na sa tat karoti, yathākodravaḥ śālya [p.676] ṅkuram, na viśiṣyate ca saṃskṛte 'pi śrotre śabdo jñānotpādanāyogyāvasthātaiti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing does not deviate from the condition in which it was not able to produce a particular effect, it cannot produce that effect; as, for instance, the Kodrava -seed cannot produce the Pac£%-sprout; and even on the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, the Word-sound does not deviate from the incapacity to produce Cognition; |
nacāya asiddho heturityādarśayati bhāva iti / | That the Reason here adduced is not ‘inadmissible’ is shown in the words ‘If the apprehension is there, etc. etc.’ |
yogyatayā sambandho yasyāsti sa yogyatāyogī // | ‘Yogyatāyogī’ that which has connection with the capacity. |
nanu ca yadi hiśabdo jñānotpattau kāraṇamiṣṭaḥ syāt tadā tatra tasya yogyāyogyavikalpo 'vatāraṃ labheta, yāvatā śrotram eva saṃskṛtaṃ śabdopalabdhau kāraṇam iṣyate na śabdaḥ, tena na bhavati yathoktadoṣaprasaṅga ityetad āgūryapariharann āha śabdasyetyādi / śabdasyāgrāhyataivaṃ syāt tasminnanupayogataḥ / | Says the Opponent “If the Word-Sound were held to be a cause of the production of the Cognition, then there might be some room for raising the question as to its being capable or not capable; as it is, however, what is held to be the cause of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is the embellished Auditory Organ, and not the Sound; hence there is no room for the objections that have been urged”. |
evaṃ hi rasādivaccabdasyānupayogāt tajjñānajñeyatā na prāpnoti / | In this way, like Taste, etc., the Word-Sound also would have no bearing upon its Cognition; and this would mean that it is not cognisable by that Cognition. |
prayogaḥ yo yatra jñāne nopayogaṃ pratipadyate na sa tajjñānajñeyaḥ, yathā rasādiḥ śrotrajñāne, nopayujyate ca śabdaḥ śrotrajñāna iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When a certain thing has no bearing upon a Cognition, it cannot be cognised by that Cognition; e.g. Taste, etc. in regard to Auditory Cognition; the Word-Sound has no bearing upon the Cognition of that Sound; hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider condition. |
nāyamanaikāntikaḥ anupakārakasya jñeyatve sati niyamābhāvād rasāder api śrotravijñānavijñeyatvaprasaṅgāt // | The reason here adduced is not ‘Inconclusive’; because, if what has no bearing upon a Cognition were cognised by that Cognition, there would be no restriction at all, and Taste might also become cognisable by Auditory Cognition. |
nanu ca svakāraṇasya niyāmakatvānnātiprasaṅgo bhaviṣyati, tathā hi saṃskṛtaśrotrasamanantarapratyayādibhyaḥ samutpadyamānaṃ śabdabodhātmakamevotpadyate na rasādibodhātmakam, kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamāt / | Says the Opponent: “The cause of the Cognition itself would serve to restrict its scope, and there would be no such absurd contingencies as have been indicated. Because it is the cognition of the Word-Sound and not that of Taste, etc. which is actually found to come about from the causal factors appearing immediately after the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, because the efficiency of the causal factors is so restricted. |
avaśyaṃ ca śabdasya hetutvāṅgīkaraṇe 'pi kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ, tathā hi tulye 'pi sarveṣāṃ hetutve kasmācchabdabodhātmakam eva bhavati śabdajñānaṃ na śrotrādibodhātmakam iti codye hetuśaktipratiniyamairevottaraṃvācyam ityetat sarvamālocyānaikāntikatāṃ pariharann āha śabdabodhasvabhāvaṃ vetyādi / | Even if the Word-Sound were necessarily regarded as the cause (of its own cognition), some restriction on the efficiency of the cause will have to be admitted; because, if the question is raised ‘when all things are equally the cause of the Cognition, then, why is it that the cognition of sound that is produced is of the nature of the apprehension of sound only, not of the apprehension of the Auditory organ?’ the only answer possible would be that the efficiency of the Causal factors is restricted in this manner”. Having reviewed all this, the Author answers the charge of ‘Inconclusiveness’ against his reason: [see verse 2501 above] |
śabdabodhasvabhāvaṃ vā janitaṃ nāma tairidam / | ‘Nāma’ ‘may be taken’ this means that it may be taken for granted (for the sake of argument). |
yathā cāyaṃ pakṣo na yujyate tathā paścāt ---"ko vā jñānasye"tyādinā pratipādayiṣyati / | That this view is not tenable is going to be shown later on, under Text 2507. |
saṃskṛtaśravaṇādibhir iti / ādiśabdena samanantarapratyayādiparigrahaḥ // | ‘By the embellished Auditory Organ, etc.’ The ‘etc.’ includes the immediately following causal factors. |
yadi nāma śabdo na kāraṇaṃ tathāpi doṣa eva, tathā hi kimasau śabdau prakṛtyā tajjñānajñeyasvabhāva uta neti pakṣadvayam, prathame pakṣe doṣamāha tajjñānajñeyetyādi / | Even if the Word-Sound is not the cause of the Cognition of it, there are incongruities. For instance, there are two alternatives possible Is the Word-Sound endowed with the nature of being apprehended by its Cognition or not? If it is, then there is the following discrepancy: [see verses 2502-2504 above] |
yadi tajjñānajñeyasvabhāvaḥ śabdaḥ syāt, tadā sarvakālaṃ śabdarūpavattadvijñānasyāpi nityatvaṃ syāt tadvijñeyasvabhāvānuvṛtteḥ / | If the Word-Sound is of the nature of being apprehended by its Cognition, then, like the Word, its Cognition also should be eternal, existing at all times; because the nature of apprehensibility by it continues for all time (in the Word). |
nahi devadattasya daṇḍasambandhasvabhāvānuvṛttau na daṇḍasyānuvṛttir bhavet / | For example, when the character of holding the stick belongs to Devadatta, it is not possible that the stick should not continue as long as Devadatta is there. |
hiśabdo yasmād arthe / | ‘Tied, up together as by a chain’ ‘Hi’ stands for because. |
yasmājjñeyajñānayoḥ svabhāvau śṛṅkhalayeva baddhau, tasmād ekasvabhāvasadbhāve dvitīyasya prāptisadbhāvaḥ prāpnotyevabhicārād iti siddham // | The sense thus is as follows: Because the nature of being cognised and the nature of being Cognition are tied together as by a chain, therefore it becomes established that whenever the one is present, the other also has to be present, without fail. |
bhavatvevaṃ ko doṣa ity āha saṃskṛtetyādi / | Question: “Let that be so; what is the harm?” Answer: [see verse 2505 next] |
saṃskṛtaśravaṇotpādyajñānasambaddha eva hi / | After the compound ending with ‘Sambaddha’, the phrase ‘Śabdaḥ anuvartate’ is understood. |
yasmāt saṃskṛtaśravaṇotpādyena jñānena sambaddhaḥ śabdaḥ sarvadānuvartate tasmād asaṃskṛtaśrotrasyāpi tadvijñānaṃ prāpnotīti vyarthaṃ śrotrasaṃskaraṇam // | Thus then, because the Word connected with the Cognition producible by the Embellished Organ continues for all time, therefore it follows that even for the man whose Auditory Organ has not been embellished, the said Cognition would be there; so that there would be no use for the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe doṣam āha tajjñeyetyādi / tajjñeyātmā na śabdaścedatadātmarasādivat / na tadbodhasvabhāvaṃ yacchrotrajñānaṃ tathāsati // | The second alternative [noted in the Introduction to Text 2502, that ‘by its very nature, the Word-Sound is not endowed with the character, of being apprehended by its Cognition’] also is open to the following objection: [see verse 2506 above] |
subodham // | This is easily understood. |
etac ca sarvaṃ tadanupakāryasyāpi jñānasya tadbodhasvabhāvatvamabhyupagamyoktam, idānīṃ tadbodhasvabhāvatvam evāsati sambandhe jñānsyāyuktam iti pratipādayann āha ko veti / ko vā jñānasya sambandhaḥ śabdena yata iṣyate / | All this has been said after admitting (for the sake of argument) that the Cognition, which is not helped by the Word-Sound, is of the nature of the Apprehension of that Sound. The Author now proceeds to show that the idea of the Cognition having the nature of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is untenable, unless there is some connection between them. |
[p.678] | [see verses 2507-2509 above] |
dvividha eva hi vastūnāṃ pratibandhas tādātmyaṃ tadupattiś ca anyatropakārābhāvāt / | There are only two kinds of relationship among things the relation of Identity and the relation of Cause and Effect; |
nacānupakāryopakārakayoḥ sambandho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | and there can be no relationship between things which do not render some help to one another; |
anyathā hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | otherwise there would be incongruities. |
athāpi syāt tadākārotpattyā tadbodhasvarūpaṃ tajjñānaṃ vyavasthāpyate vināpi pratibandheneti / | It might be urged that “When the Cognition is produced, it is in the form of the Word-Sound, and it is on the basis of this that the Cognition is held to be of the nature of the comprehension of the Sound, even though there is no relationship between the two”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This cannot be right; |
nirākārajñānābhyupagamāt / | because Cognition has been regarded as formless; |
nahi mīmāṃsakaiḥ sākāraṃ jñānam abhyupagamyate / | the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the view that Cognitions have forms, But even if it were as asserted, the view set forth cannot be right; |
bhavatu vā tathāpyayuktaṃ śabdasya parokṣatvaprasaṅgāt evaṃ hi śabdaparokṣatvam eva syān na pratyakṣatvaṃ, tataś ca tat sādhakapramāṇābhāvāt, tadākāraṃ tadvijñānam ityetadeva siddhyet / | as in that case, the Sound would have to be regarded as imperceptible. That is, under the view, Sound would be imperceptible, not perceptible; and hence there being no means of knowing it, the idea of its Cognition having the form of the Word-Sound would itself be an impossibility. |
nāpi kāryavyatirekāt tatsiddhiḥ tasya janakatvānabhyupagamāt / | It could not be known by the presence of its effect; because it is not regarded as productive of effects. |
syād etat yasyāpi sākāravādino janaka eva viṣayas tasyāpi sarvadaivārthasya parokṣatvāt katham arthākāratvaṃ jñānasyāvagatam iti / | The following might be urged “Even for one who holds the view that Cognitions have forms, and the Object is productive of the Cognition, the Object would be always imperceptible; how then can. it be known that the Cognition has the form of the Object?” |
satyam / | True; |
kintvayaṃ tasyopāyo yat tatkāryavyatirekataḥ kāraṇāntaraṃ niścitaṃ, tadvijṇYānasya nīlādyākārabhedakatvena niścitamanvayavyatirekābhyām / | but the way in which it is known is this From the presence-of the Effect, it is deduced that there is a Cause for it; and the idea that Cognition serves to differentiate the Blue and other forms, is got at from positive and negative concomitance. |
tathā hi cakṣurālokamanaskārakārāṇāṃ sarvavijñāneṣu tulyatvān na tat kṛto jñānasya nīlādibheda iti sāmarthyād yattatkāraṇāntaraṃ vyatirekato 'numitaṃ tatkṛto 'yaṃ bheda iti niścīyate / | For instance, the Eye, the Light, and-the Mind-functioning being common to all Visual Cognitions, the difference among the Cognitions of the Blue and others cannot be due to these; hence the implication is that there is some other Cause for it, this implication, being derived from the negative premiss just indicated; and hence it is-concluded that the said difference must be due to this other Cause. |
tena tatkṛtatvāt tasyāsāvākāro jñānena gṛhīta iti vyavasthāpyate / | on the basis of this it is asserted that the form having been brought about, by that, it is this form that is apprehended by the Cognition. |
na tvayam api bhavato 'styupāyas tasya kāraṇatvānabhyupagamāt / | But even this way is not available for you; because you do not regard the Word-Sound to be a Cause at all. |
syād etat cakṣurādīnām api sarvadā parokṣatvāt sarvavijñāneṣvaviśiṣṭatvaṃ katham avasitam iti / | The following might be urged “The Eye and the other factors are themselves imperceptible; how is it known that these are present in all Visual Perceptions?” |
satyamevametad vijñānavādacintāyām / | All this is quite true, when we are discussing the doctrine of Idealism. |
sa hi vijñānavādī svapnādāviva samanantarapratyayakṛtam eva vijñānasya viśeṣaṃ varṇayati / | The Idealist holds that the peculiarities of every Cognition are all due to the immediately preceding subjective causal factors, as in the case of Dreams; |
na bāhyakṛtam / | and he does not regard them as due to any external or objective conditions. |
kintu sati bāhye 'rthe sarvametad ucyate / | But all that is being said on the present occasion is on the understanding; |
anyathā hīdam eva codanīyaṃ kāryavyatirekato 'pi kathaṃ bāhyasiddhiḥ syād iti kāraṇamātrāstitvaṃ siddhyen na tu bāhyam tat tu kāraṇaṃ svapnādāvivāntaram api sambhāvyamityalaṃ prasaṅgena / | that the External Object does exist. If it were not so, then the first point to be urged would be how can the External Object be proved by the Effect? All that could be proved would be the presence of the Cause, not of anything external, objective; because it is quite possible that the said Cause may be something internal, subjective, as in the case of Dreams. |
athāpi janakatvamabhyupagamyate śabdasya tathāpi doṣa iti darśayann āha tadutpattāvityādi / seti tadutpattiḥ / | Even if the idea of the Word-Sound being productive is accepted, the incongruity remains; this is what is shown by the words ‘If it were produced, it would be produced at all times, etc. etc.’ ‘Sā’ stands for the production. |
evam ityādinopasaṃharati / | The argument is summed up in the words ‘Hence the Cognition of that Sound, etc. etc.’ |
navetyajanakatvapakṣe / ityekānta iti / | ‘Or it would not be produced at all’, under the view that Sound is not productive. |
nityaṃ jñānasya sadasattālakṣaṇe // | ‘Undesirable state of things’ that the Cognition must be either always present, or always absent. |
kadācid iti śobheta saṃskāraparikalpanā // | Hitherto the Author has admitted (for the sake of argument) that there is Embellishment of the Auditory Organ; |
jñānakāryāvaseyaś ca saṃskāraḥ śaktilakṣaṇaḥ / tacca jñānaṃ sadābhāvi yadi vā bhavati sarvadā // | and then proceeded to consider whether or not the Object is the productive Cause of the Cognition, which consideration has led to the conclusion that the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ is absolutely useless. |
uttaraṃ śrotrasaṃskārān nātaḥ sādhu prakāśitam // | He now proceeds to show that the Embellishment itself of the Auditory Organ is not possible: [see verses 2510-2512 above] |
evaṃ hi saṃskārakāryaṃ vijñānaṃ kādācitkaṃ yujyate / | Cognition as the effect of Embellishment could be occasional only if the Embellishment were occasional; |
yadi saṃskāraḥ kādācitko bhavet / anyathā kāraṇe nityam avikale sthite tat kārya kimiti kadācid bhavet / | otherwise if the Cause in its efficient state were there always, why should its effect be occasional? As a matter of fact however, the Embellishment is not occasional; |
na ca saṃskāraḥ kādācitko nityasya śrotrasya yujyate iti darśayann āha jṇYānakāryāvaseyaścetyādi / | this is what is shown in the words ‘The idea of the Embellishment is derived, etc, etc.’ That is to say, the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ, deduced from the coming about of its effect in the shape of the Cognition (of Sound), could only consist in a certain Potency; |
tathā hi śrotrādeḥ saṃskāro jñānakāryeṇāvasīyamānaḥ śaktyātmaka eva saṃskāro bhavet, śakter eva kāryāvaseyatvāt, sā ca śaktiḥ śrotrasyātmabhūtaiva na tadvyatirekiṇī, tataḥ kāryotpatteḥ śrotrasya kāraṇatvaprasaṅgāt / | as Potency alone is what can be deduced from an effect; this Potency should form part of the Auditory Organ itself; it cannot be anything different from it; as in the latter case the Auditory Organ itself would not be the Cause of the effect (Cognition). |
sambandhāsiddheś ca śaktisadbhāve sadbhāvavijñānaṃ sadā bhavet / | Then again, as no sort of relationship can be known, whenever the Potency would be there, the resultant Cognition should also be there. |
athāsadbhāvas tadā na kadācit tadbhāvijñānaṃ bhavet / | If the Cognition is not there, then it could never follow from that Potency; |
tataś ca kādācitkatvaṃ jñānasya na syāt, tasmāt kādācitkaṃ vijñānaṃ kathaṃ śrotrasya śaktilakṣaṇaṃ saṃskāraṃ sūcayet, naiva // | and as a result of this, the Cognition could not be occasional. Under the circumstances, how could the occasional Cognition indicate the Potency as the ‘Embellishment of the Auditory Organ’? It could never indicate it. |
athāpi syānnaiva svābhāvikī śaktirjñānakāryānumeyā / | The following might be urged “It is not an inherent Potency that is inferred from the effect in the shape of Cognition; |
śaktirādhīyate śrotre yadi vāvyatirekiṇī / | what happens is that it is an entirely new Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ by the Articulations; |
vyomno diśo vā nityatvaṃ tato hīyeta janmataḥ // | hence it is quite reasonable that the occasional Cognition becomes indicative of the Potency”. |
ātmabhūtā vā śaktirādhīyeta, vyatiriktā vā, vyatiriktāvyatiriktā veti pakṣatrayam / | The Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ (1) is it of the nature of the Organ itself? or (2) is it something different from it? or (3) is it different-non-difîerent? These are the three alternatives possible. |
prathame pakṣe śaktisvarūpavad anityatvaṃ śrotrasyobhayātmakasyāpi prāpnoti / | Under the first alternative, like the Potency itself, the Auditory Organ whether it consists of Ākāśa or of Space, also becomes non-eternal; |
kutaḥ ---, janmataḥ utpatteḥ / | why? ‘as it would be something produced’; i.e. because it is produced. |
athāpi syān na śrotrasya śaktito 'nanyatvamabhyupagatam / kiṃ tarhi śakter eva śrotrād iti, tadetat paśyata mahato hyāndhyasya vilasitam / | It might be argued that “The view held is not that the Auditory Organ is non-difîerent from the Potency; but that the Potency is non-different from the Auditory Organ Now, just look at this working of sheer blindness! |
kathaṃ hi nāmaikasya svabhāvasya saṃśleṣe tadaivāparo dūrībhavet / parasparasvabhāvānupraveśalakṣaṇatvā [p.680] dabhedasya / | When the naturo of one thing is tied up with that of the other, how can this latter be far removed from it at the same time? Because ‘non-difference’ between two things consists in the fusion of the natures of both into one. |
nahi salilaṃ payaso davīyasi gocare vartamānamanubhavati tat saṃśleṣam iti yatkiñcidetat // | 'While the Milk remains at a distance from the Water, it does not become mingled with it; hence the explanation suggested is futile. |
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