sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
sarvam etad varṇeṣvapi kalpayituṃ śakyata iti darśayann āha varṇeṣvityādi / varṇeṣu śakyate {ceyaṃ pratyabhijñā} vināśiṣu / | Such recognition is possible in the case of letters also, which are perishable, for those who hold that the universal can be recognised. That element wherein there appears the notion of difference, like slow, fast and so forth, in regard to these there can be no recognition...... |
bhedabuddhis tu yatrāṃśe drutamandādike bhavet / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2119, that “Even though the Flame is momentary, yet there is Recognition, etc. etc.” |
tatra na pratyabhijñānaṃ bhave{............} | The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 2455 above] |
sāmānyam iti / | [verses 2456-2457]: |
anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇam // | ‘Universal’ in the form of the ‘exclusion of others (2456-2457) |
{śabdaikatvaprasiddhyarthaṃ} prayukteṣu tu hetuṣu / vijātīyāvirodhitvāt pratibandho na siddhyati // | In the reasons that have been put forward in proof of the idea of the one-ness of the word, there is no invariable concomitance possible; because they are not incompatible with the contrary. |
śabdaikatvapratipādanāya ye anumānaprayogā uktās teṣu siddhe viparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt sarvathaivānaikāntikatā // | For proving the idea of the Word being one only, the Inferential Reasons that have been adduced are such that if a contrary conclusion is established, there has not been shown any reason for sublating such a conclusion consequently all those Reasons are Inconclusive. |
dhūmasāmānyabhāgo 'pi naiva {.............} / | As regards the ‘universal aspect of smoke’...... [lacuna in: the text]..... |
{.....................} siddhasādhanam // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2459 above] |
[p.669] vastveva vijātīyaparāvṛttaṃ sāmānyaṃ liṅgam ucyate nānyat, taccānityameveti sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasya // | What is spoken of as the ‘Inferential Indicative’ (Probans) is the ‘Universal’, which is only the Thing as ‘excluded from heterogeneous things and this is not eternal; |
yaduktaṃ ghaṭāder ekatāpattāvityādi, tadayaṃ varṇeṣviti parihāraḥ samāna ityādarśayati gāder ityādi / gāderapyekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2131, that “If the? one-ness of the Jar, which is urged, etc. etc.” The answer to this is the same, in regard to Letters also. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2460-2461 next] If the one-ness of the letters ga, etc. that is urged as an; |
atadrūpaparāvṛttir abhinnā kalpitaiva hi // vyaktīnā{mekatāpattāvanaikāntikatā bhavet} / | undesirable contingency, is in reference to the ‘universal aspect’, then the argument is superfluous; because the aspect of ‘exclusion of the unlike’ is already postulated by us as one and the same in all individuals. |
{prati} prayogamākṣādyair varṇabhedaviniścayāt // | because the multiplicity of the individual letter has been definitely recognised, in every use of them, by means of sense-perception, etc. |
deśakālādibhinnāścetyādinā prayogaprapañcena yadyanyāpohalakṣaṇasya sāmānyasyaikatvaṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā, sarvatrātadrūpavyāvṛttilakṣaṇasya sāmānyasyaikabuddhyadhyavasāyavaśenaikasyeṣṭatvāt / | if what is meant to be proved by these is the one-ness of the ‘Universal’ in the shape of the ‘exclusion of others’, then they are superfluous, as proving what is already admitted by the other party; as a matter of fact, on the basis of the single uniform notion that people have in regard to all Individuals, the one ‘Universal’, in the shape of the ‘exclusion of others’, is admitted (by us). |
atha vyaktīnāṃ svalakṣaṇānām ekatvaṃ sādhyate tadā pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ vyāpter bādhitatvād anaikāntikatā hetūnām / | If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is the one-ness of the Individuals themselves, in the form of their Specific Individualities; then the Premiss would be one that is contrary to and annulled by Perception and. |
ākṣādyair iti / | Inference; |
akṣamindriyaṃ tatra bhavamākṣam, pratyakṣam iti yāvat / ādiśabdenānumānaparigrahaḥ / | and this would make all the Reasons ‘Inconclusive’, ‘By means of Sense-perception, etc. etc: ‘Ākṣa’ is pertaining to ‘akṣa’, sense-organ. ‘Etc.’ includes Inference. |
bahuvacanaṃ vyaktibhedāpekṣayā // | The Plural number is in view of the large number of individual Perceptions and Inferences. |
yanmanojñāmanojñādibhedaḥ pratyakṣatā gataḥ / | Diversity in the form of ‘agreeable’ and ‘disagreeable’ and so forth, is directly perceived; |
buddhīnāṃ kramabhāvitvād bhedaḥ siddhaḥ{kumārivat} // {deśakā}lādibhinnā hi gośabdavyaktibuddhayaḥ / naikārthā bhinnanirbhāsād rasarūpādivṛddhivat // | the diversity among cognitions is cognised on the ground of their appearing in succession, as in the case of the virgin, the cognitions of the individual ‘cow-words’, appearing at different times and places, cannot all denote one and the same object, because they actually appear as diverse, like the cognitions of taste, colour, etc. |
ṣaḍjādibhedanirbhāsaḥ pratyakṣeṇa hi niścitaḥ / naca vyañjakava....... | The diversity in the cognitions of the various notes (of sound) in the shape of the ‘ṣaḍja’ and the rest is cognised by perception..... |
tadabhidhāsyate // | as is going to be explained later on. |
anukūlo manojñaḥ / | ‘Manojña’ pleasing to the mind, Agreeable; |
viparyayād viparyayaḥ / anumānato 'pi bādhām āha buddhīnām ityādi / asyārtho hyastanādyatanā ityādinā spaṣṭīkariṣyate / | the contrary of this is ‘amanojña’, Disagreeable. Annulment by Inference is next shown ‘The diversity among cognitions, etc. etc.’ The exact meaning of this will be made clear below, under the following Text. The Inference may be formulated as follows; |
prayogaḥ yā yā bhinnavabhāsā buddhayastāḥ sarvā naikaviṣayāḥ, yathā rasarūpādiviṣayāḥ, bhinnanirbhāsāś ca deśakālādibhinnā gośabdavyaktibuddhaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | Those Cognitions that appear as different cannot all envisage the same object, e.g. the cognitions envisaging Taste, Colour and so forth; and the cognitions of the individual ‘Cow-words’ appearing at different times and places appear as different; |
asiddhatām asya pariharann āha ṣaḍjādītyādi // | hence there is apprehension of the wider ‘contrary |
buddhīnāṃ kramabhāvāc ca bhedaḥ siddhaḥ kumārivad ityasyārthaṃ pramāṇayann āha hyastanā ityādi / [p.670] | That the Reason here put forward is not ‘inadmissible’ is shown by the sentence ‘The diversity in the cognitions, etc. etc.’ (2462-2464) |
hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve gośabdapratyayā ime / naikārthāḥ kramasambhūte rūpagandhādibuddhivat // | All these cognitions of the ‘cow-word’, which appeared yesterday and to-day, cannot all envisage the same object, like the successively appearing cognitions of colour and odour, etc. |
prayogaḥ ye ve kramiṇaḥ pratyayās te naikaviṣayāḥ, tadyathā rasarūpādipratyayāḥ kramiṇaḥ, kramabhāvinaśceme hyastanādyatanā gośabdaviṣayāḥ pratyayā iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ // | The argument may be thus formulated: Those Cognitions that appear in succession do not envisage the same object, e.g. the Cognitions of Taste, Colour, etc. appearing one after the other; all these cognitions of the ‘Cow-words’ that appeared yesterday and to-day have appeared in succession hence there is apprehension of the wider contrary. |
anyathā sarvabuddhīnām ekālamba{natā bhave}t / | If it were not so, then all cognitions would have one and the same object; |
kramabhāvavirodhaś ca śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ // | there would be incongruity also as regards their appearing in succession, when their efficient cause is there all the time. |
sarvabuddhīnām iti / rasarūpadibuddhīnām / | ‘Of all cognitions’ i.e. of the cognitions of Taste, Colour and so forth. |
parasparamabhinnālambanatvaprasaṅgo bhinnanirbhāsādityetasya hetor bādhakampramāṇam / | The possibility of all having the same object, though appearing diversely is the argument that annuls the Reason in question. |
kramabhāvavirudhaścetyetat tu kramasambhūter ityetasya // | ‘Incongruity as regards appearing in succession’ would annul the reason ‘because they appear in succession (2466) |
prakṛtyaiva padārthānām ekapratyavamarśane / bhedo 'pi śaktiniyamaḥ purastāt pratipāditaḥ // | It has been explained before that even though there is diversity among things, yet they have the inherent capacity of being conceived as one, with certain restrictions. |
......pratyavamarṣāc ca śabdaikatvādayo 'pi na / | But even with such conception, there can be one-ness, etc. of the word. |
lokaḥ prayogabhūyastvaṃ śabdasyaikasya manyate // | What the common man thinks is that there is repeated use of one and the same word. |
anekavyaktiniṣṭhatvāt sambandha upapadyate / | The relationship also is possible when subsisting in several individuals. |
tasmāt sārvatriko nāke {naiko---}vyaktīnāṃ hyekatāṃ gataḥ // | Consequently in all cases, there is a multiplicity of words, but they come to be conceived of as one. |
subodham // | The meaning of this is easily understood. |
atha kasmālloka ity ucyata ity āha vastutastvityādi / | Question: “Why is it said that it is the common man that thinks so?” Answer: [see verses 2470-2471 next] |
vastutastu na sambandhaḥ śabdasyārthena vidyate / | In reality, there can be no relationship between the word and its meaning; |
bhedāt tasmād anutpatter bhrāntair āropitas tataḥ // | (a) because there is difference between them, and (b) because one is not born from the other. |
tathā hi vistareṇaiṣā prāgeva pratipāditā / | That this is so has been explained in detail already. |
śabdārthasthitiḥ sarvā viplutā vyāptyasambhavāt // | In fact, the whole position of the word and its meaning is highly complicated; as there is no invariable concomitance between them. |
bhedād ityanena tādātmyalakṣaṇaṃ sambandhaṃ niṣedhati / | Answer: [see verses 2470-2471 above] ‘Because there is difference’; this precludes the relationship of Identity; |
tasmād anutpatter ityanena tadutpattilakṣaṇam / nacābhyām anyaḥ sambandho 'sti, naca pratibandhamantareṇa śabdasyārthapratipādakatvaniyamo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | this precludes the relationship of Cause and Effect Apart from these, there is no other relationship possible, and without such a relationship, there can be no restriction regarding the Word expressing a definite meaning if there were, there would be incongruities. |
tasmād āropitaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandha iti prāgevānyapohacintāyāṃ pratipāditam // | For these reasons, the connection between the Word and its meaning must be regarded as imposed upon them; as has been explained before, in the section dealing with ‘Apoha’, the ‘Exclusion, of others’, (2470-2471) |
gotvaṃ nityamapāstaṃ ca sambandho 'pi ca kalpitaḥ / | Any such eternal universal as ‘cow’ has been already rejected; the relationship also is purely imaginary; |
aṇvākāśādyapi ca kṣiptaṃ hetūdāharaṇe na tat // | the ‘ākāśa’ and the ‘atom’ also have been discarded. hence neither the probans nor the corroborative instance is sound. |
gotvaṃ nityamapāstamityanena nityasyāsiddhatām āha / | this asserts the fact of the eternal thing being ‘inadmissible’. |
sambandho 'pi ca kalpita ityanenāpi sambandhādityasya, aṇvākāśādyapi ca kṣiptam ityanenākāśaparimāṇuvanni{tyami}tyasyāsiddhatām āha apāstam iti / | ‘The Relationship also, etc.’ this asserts the ‘inadmissibility’ of the Reason ‘because there is relationship’. ‘The Atom and the Ākāśa also have been discarded’, this asserts the ‘inadmissibility’ of the two Instances cited by the Mīmāṃsaka. |
pratikṣiptaṃ ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyām / | ‘Rejected’, ‘Discarded’, in course of the chapter on the ‘Six Categories’. |
neti pratiṣedhi / taditi tasmād arthe // | ‘Na’ denies the Reason, etc. ‘Tat’ Therefore; hence. |
saṃmukhānekasāmarthyetyādāvāha niṣkṛṣṭetyādi / niṣkṛṣṭagotvavācitvaṃ cireṇa pratipādyatām / ekarūpatayā bhrāntair nairadhyavasāyataḥ // | You may take a long time in explaining the fact of the word (‘cow’) being expressive of the one universal ‘cow’, as extracted (from among the several universals); on the basis of deluded people cognising it in one and the same form. |
bhāvataḥ kṣaṇikatvāt tu tāvat kālam api sthiraḥ / | In reality, the thing is momentary; hence even for that time it cannot remain stationary; |
naivāyam iti kiṃ tasya sthitiḥ paścād apīṣyate // | how then can it be admitted to exist at the subsequent time? (2474) |
yathā śāstrādibhiścheda ityādāvāha ghaṭādāvapītyādi / ghaṭādāvapi naivāsti kiñcinnāśasya kāraṇam / | In the case of the jar and other things also, there is no cause for their destruction, which can be clearly pointed out as ‘this is what will destroy it’; |
itīdam api nirdiṣṭaṃ tat kva śabde bhaviṣyati // | how, then, can any such cause be pointed out in the case of the word? (2475) |
itīdam api nirdiṣṭam iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2475 next] |
sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyām / vināśasyāhetutvapratipādanena / | ‘This is what will, etc. etc.’ As explained in the chapter on the ‘Permanent Character of Things’; |
yadā ghaṭādāvapi naiva nāśakāraṇam astīti kva śabde bhaviṣyatīti / nāśakāraṇam iti vyavahitena sambandhaḥ / | where it has been explained that there can he no cause for the destruction of things. When in the case of the Jar also, there can be no cause for its destruction, how can there be any for the destruction of the Word? The term ‘nāśakāraṇam’ is to be construed with ‘Śabde’, |
anena ca siddhasādhyatā vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasya cāsiddhatoktā bhavati // deśakālaprayokt---ṇām ityādāvāha viplava ityādi / | What is indicated by this is that the Mīmāṃsaka’s Reasoning is superfluous, and the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity is ‘inadmissible’. |
viplave pratyabhijñāyāḥ purastādupapāditaḥ / | That there is mistake in recognitions has already been explained before. |
deśakālaprayokt---ṇāṃ bhedād dharmo vibhidyate // | The ‘property’ varies with the variations of place, time and persons using (the word); |
ṣaḍjaṛṣabhagāndhārapañcamādiprabhedataḥ / | and the variations appear in the shape of the various notes, ṣaḍja, ṛṣabha, gāndhāra, pañcama and so forth; |
pratyakṣato hi vijñātā gavyaktiraparā sphuṭā // | the cogniser also is perceived directly; the individual letter ‘ga’ is also clearly distinct. |
naca vyañjakabhedena yuktaiṣā bhedasaṃsthitiḥ / | All this diversity cannot be regarded as due to the diversity in the ‘manifester’; |
vyaktir nityeṣu nāstīti purastādabhidhāsyate // | that there can be no ‘manifestation’ in the case of eternal things is going to be explained later on. |
[p.672] sugamam // | This is quite easy. |
gakāro 'tyantetyādike prayoge siddhasādhyatādoṣam āha gakāravyatiriktaṃ cetyādi / gakāravyatiriktaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ gatvam iṣyate / vāstavaṃ na prayoge 'to durvārā siddhasādhyatā // | The universal ‘ga’ is not held to be something real, distinct from the letter ‘ga’; hence the charge of ‘futility’ is irresistible, as against the Mīmāṃsaka’s reasoning. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2143, that “The Individual Letter ‘Ga’ has no existence apart from the substratum of the-Universal ‘Ga’, etc. etc.”. |
iṣyata iti / | ‘Iṣyate’, ‘is held’; |
neti vakṣyamāṇena sambandhaḥ // anyathāpohātmakasyāpi na gatvasya samāśrayaḥ / ittham eveti cennaivam āśrayāsiddhatāptitaḥ // | this is to be construed with the ‘na’ following, in the second line. If it be urged that what is sought to be proved (by the mīmāṃsaka’s argument) is that it is not the substratum of the universal ‘ga’, which is of the nature of the ‘exclusion of others’, that cannot be right; |
agakāraparāvṛttagavarṇābhāvato bhavet / gānyabuddhyanirūpyatvaṃ kasya dharmo hi dharmiṇaḥ // | Inasmuch as the letter ‘ga’ is nothing apart from ‘the exclusion of the non-ga’, to which object would the character of ‘being not apprehended by any cognition other than that of ga’ belong? (2480-2481) |
athāpi syāt anyāpohātmakasyāpi gatvāśrayo na bhavatīti, ittham anena prakāreṇa sādhyate, tena siddhasādhyatā na bhavati, nahyanyāpohādhāro gakārādir bhavato neṣṭa iti pūrvapakṣaṃ pratikṣipati / | The following might be urged “What is meant to be proved by the-reasoning in question is that the Individual is not the substratum of that universal ‘Ga’ which is of the nature of the ‘exclusion of others’; hence there is no ‘futility’ in it; because you (Buddhist) do not hold that the-Individual Ga is not the substratum of the ‘exclusion of others’”. |
evaṃ hi sādhyamāne hetor asiddhitā prāpnoti / tathā hi na hyanyāpoho nāmānya eva kaścid anyatra vyāvṛttāt padārthāt /kiṃ tarhi / | Even when what is sought to be proved is put in this way, the Reason becomes ‘inadmissible Because the ‘exclusion of others’ is not anything different from the thing thus ‘excluded’ from others; |
tadeva gakārādivyaktirūpaṃ vijātīyavyāvṛttir bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyām anyavyāvṛttir anyāpoha ityādibhiḥ paryāyaiḥ kathyate / | in fact, it consists of the same Individual ‘Ga’; and it is spoken of as ‘exclusion of others’ or ‘Apoha.’ etc. when its precise nature is meant to be determined which is thus done through the denial of other exclusions of unlike things. |
tasya tu dharmisvarūpasyābhāve sādhye gānyabuddhyanirūpaṇādityayaṃ hetuḥ kasya dharmiṇo dharmo bhavet, naiva kasyacit // | Consequently there being no such object which could form the subject of the argument, to whom could the Reason, in the form ‘because it is not apprehended by any cognition other than that of Ga’ belong? To nothing at all. |
vāstavī cānumā sarvā dvayasiddhamapekṣate / | Every right inference requires such corroborative instance, etc, as are admitted by both parties. |
dṛṣṭāntādi tatastena dṛṣṭānto dharmyasiddhibhāk // | one of which the very basic object is not admissible. This is what is shown in the following: [see verse 2482 above] |
dṛṣṭāntādītyādiśabdena hetvādiparigrahaḥ // | ‘Instance, etc.’ The ‘etc.’ is meant to include the Reason (Probans) and other factors. |
kiñca anukto 'pi vādinā ya evecchayā viṣayīkṛtaḥ sa evāyaṃ sādhya iṣyate / | Further, even when the first party does not state it in so many words, that is regarded as to be proved which he has in mind; |
na cāpi bhavatā gatvamātraṃ sisādhayiṣitam / | and as a matter of fact, it is not merely the Universal ‘Ga’ which you have in your mind as to be proved; |
kiṃ tarhi anenopāyena gakārāsyaikatvaṃ pratipādayitum iṣṭam / | what you really desire is to prove, through this Universal, the one-ness of the letter ‘Ga’; |
asyāṃ ca pratijñāyāṃ pratyakṣādibādhāpūrvam ukteti darśayann āha sarvaścāyam iti / [p.673] | and it has been already shown before that such a Proposition as the latter is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition. This is what is shown in the following: [see verse 2483 above] |
ayam iti vyatiriktagatvādhāraniṣedhaḥ / | ‘This attempt’ at denying the substratum of the Universal ‘Ga’. |
pratyakṣabādhā ceti / caśabdād anumānabādhāparigrahaḥ / | ‘Annulled by Perception’ The particle ‘ca’ includes ‘annulment by Inference’ also. |
yaduktaṃ dvayasiddhastvityādi, tatrāha hyastanetyādi / | ‘Explained’ under the Text 2462 et seq. |
hyastanādyatanādyāś ca gavarṇapratyayā ime / kramabhāvena naikārthā rasarūpādibuddhivat // | All these cognitions of the letter ‘ga’ which appeared yesterday and today, etc. appearing in succession, cannot envisage one and the same thing, like the cognitions of taste, colour, etc. |
ato na dvayasiddho 'yam eko varṇaḥ sadā sthitaḥ / adoṣaṃ{apoha} kalpitasyaiva nityatvaṃ tvasya kalpitam // | Thus the ‘one letter’ is not something ‘admitted by both parties hence the ‘eternality’ that has been assumed appertains to the postulated ‘exclusion of others’. |
uditā ityatrāpi liṅgavibhaktipariṇāmena sambadhyate / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2145, that “The entity in the form of the Letter is admitted by both parties, etc. etc.” |
tataḥ pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ śabdabhedasya pratiṣiddhatvān naiko dvayasiddho varṇātmāstīti kalpitasyaivānyāpohasya nityatvaṃ kalpitam, tulyapratyavamarśapratyayenaikatvādhyavasāyāt // yaduktaṃ nādena saṃskṛtādityādi, tatrāha śabdopalambhavelāyām ityādi / | The term ‘uditā’ is construed here also, with the endings changed. Thus then, on account of the diversity of Words being annulled by Perception and Inference, there is no single entity in the shape of the ‘Letter’; hence the eternality that has been assumed can Only belong to the assumed ‘exclusion of others’, the idea of one-ness being due to the similarity of the conception. |
śabdopalambhavelāyāṃ karṇaparyantavartinaḥ / na vāyavo 'vagamyante śrotrasaṃskārakāriṇaḥ // nādena saṃskṛtācchrotrād yadā śabdaḥ pratīyate / | At the time that the word-sound is heard, there is no perception of the air-currents reaching the ear and embellishing the auditory organ. when the sound is cognised through the ear as embellished by the pitch, there is idea of the pitch as related to that sound; |
tadupaśleṣatas tasya bodho 'dhyakṣeṇa bādhyate // | and this idea is clearly annulled by direct perception. |
yadi hi śrotrasaṃskāriṇo vāyavaḥ kenacit pramāṇena siddhāḥ syuḥ tadaivaṃ syād vaktum nādena śrotraṃ saṃskriyata iti / na caite siddhās tasmāt tadupaśleṣataḥ śabdopaśleṣataḥ tasya nādasya bodho 'dhyakṣam iti kalpanāspadam etat // yaduktaṃ madhuraṃ tiktarūpeṇetyādi, tatrāha tiktapītādirūpeṇetyādi / | If it were known by any Means of Right Cognition that ‘there axe Air-currents embellishing the Auditory organ’, then there might be some justification for saying that ‘the Auditory organ is embellished by the Pitch’, As a matter of fact, however, no such Air-currents are known; hence there is the idea of the Pitch only as related to the Sound and that this idea is perceptional is entirely fanciful. Just as the notion of ‘bitterness’ with regard to what is ‘sweet’, and of ‘yellow’ with regard to what is ‘white’, is without an objective basis, of the same kind would the notion of the word-sound also be. |
tiktapītādirūpeṇa pravṛttaṃ madhurādiṣu / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2150, that “Those who have their minds perverted by the disorders of Bile perceive the Sweet as Bitter, etc. etc.” |
jñānaṃ nirviṣayaṃ yadvacchabdajñānaṃ yathā bhavet // etena yaduktaṃ śabde buddhis tu tadvaśād iti tadapāstam / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2488 above] This also sets aside the idea that ‘the cognition of the Word-Sound is due to that’. Because the Cognition which has no shape cannot have anything else for its object; |
[p.674] | otherwise there would be incongruities. |
drutamadhyādibhedāddhi nānyaḥ śabdo 'vabhāsate / | Under the variations of ‘fast’, ‘middling’ and ‘slow’, the word-sound itself does not appear as different. |
atadrūpe ca tādrūpyajñānaṃ nāviṣayaṃ katham // | under the circumstances, when the cognition envisages something in a form that does not belong to it, why should not this cognition be objectless? (2489) |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.