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etad eva darśayati yathārthetyādi / | This same idea is further explained [see verses 2410-2411 next] |
yathārthajñānahetutvaṃ śruteḥ prakṛtamatra hi / | The question that is being considered now is the idea of the Veda being the source of right knowledge; |
na narākaraṇe 'pyetat siddhyatīti ca sādhitam // | and it has been proved that it cannot be so, even if it be not the work of a person. |
āhopuruṣikā yeti / | ‘Āhopuruṣikā’ vanity. |
manojñānditvād vuṭ / abhimāna evocyate / | The nominal affix ‘vuñ’ being due to the term being included under the ‘Manojña’ group. |
dhīreva dṛk sādharmyād dṛksā sūkṣmā dhīdṛk yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ // | ‘Men of keen intelligence’, whose vision, in the shape of Intelligence, is very keen. |
yaduktam sa pañcabhir agamyatvād ityādi, tatrāha pramāṇanām ityādi / pramāṇānām nivṛttyāpi na prameyaṃ nivartate / yasmad vyāpakahetutvaṃ teṣāṃ tatra na vidyate // | The absence of the means of cognition does not necessarily mean the absence of the object of cognition; because the latter are not causes with which the former is invariably concomitant. It has been argued by the Mimāṃsaka under 2095, above, that ‘the author of the Veda’ is not cognisable by any of the five Means of Knowledge, etc. etc. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2412 above] |
anenāsiddhatāṃ maule hetau pratipādayati / | What is meant by this the most important argument (of the Mīmāṃsaka) is ‘inadmissible’, |
vyāpako hi svabhāvaḥ kāraṇaṃ vā nivartamānaṃ vyāpyaṃ kāryaṃ vā nivartayati / tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ tayos tatra pratibaddhatvāt / | It is only what is all-pervading, e.g. the Cause, which, being absent, indicates the absence of the less pervasive, e.g. the Effect; because these two are related to each other the all-pervasive to the less pervasive, by the relation of co-essentiality, and the Cause to the Effect by the relation of the one being produced by the other; |
tadabhāve 'pi bhavataḥ kāryavyāpyatvānupapatteḥ / | and for you, the effect and the less-pervasive factor cannot be present when their correlatives are not there. |
natu teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ tatra sarvasmin vastuni vyāpakahetutve sambhavataḥ / | As regards the Means of Cognition, they cannot be pervasive over, and the Cause of, all things. |
tathā hi deśakālasvabhāvā{t} viprakṛṣṭasya vastuno vināpi pramāṇena sambhavān na tena vyāptiḥ, nāpi kāraṇaṃ pramāṇamata eva, pramāṇasyaiva ca prameyakāryatvāt / | hence the said Means of Cognition cannot be pervasive over all things. Nor can the Means of Cognition be regarded as the Cause of all things, for the same reason; specially as it is the other way about, the Means of Cognition itself being the effect or product of the Objects of Cognition. And yet when the Effect is absent, it does not imply the Absence of the Cause; |
naca kāryaṃ nivartamānaṃ kāraṇamātraṃ nivartayati vyabhicāradarśanāt / | And what is neither the Cause nor all-pervasive cannot indicate the absence of its correlatives; |
tasmāt pramāṇamātrābhāvo vyabhicārī prameyamātrābhāve sādhya iti sthitam // | Thus it is established that in the proving of the absence of the Object of Cognition only, the absence of the Means of Cognition only, if cited as a Reason, is clearly ‘inconclusive’ and wrong. |
[p.659] tāmeva vyabhicāritāṃ vipakṣe sambhavopadarśanena vyaktīkurvann āha tat pañcabhir ityādi / pañcabhir agamyo 'pi nābhāvenai{vo 'syā---}va gamyate / | The same ‘Inconclusiveness’ is further confirmed by the possibility of the Reason in the Contrary of the Probandum: [see verse 2413 next] Thus, even though not cognisable by the five means of cognition, the author of the Veda is not amenable to ‘non-apprehension’ (negation) alone; |
kartā śruter avijñātakartṛkākhyāyikādivat // | he being just like the author of the story-book whose author is not known. |
taditi tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Thus; therefore. |
pañcabhir agamyo 'pīti kartā śruter iti vyavahitena sambandhaḥ / | Construe thus ‘Pañcabhiḥ agamyopi śruteḥ kartā’. |
avijñātaḥ kartā yeṣām ākhyāyikādīnāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | ‘Avijñāta, etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as ‘those whose authors are unknown’; |
athāpītyādinā hetor vyabhicāraviṣayāsiddhimāśaṅkate / | and this to be taken as in opposition to (qualifying). ‘ākhyāyikādi’; and then the Genitive Ending and the ‘vati’ affix. |
athāpi sārthakatvena vibhaktyarthatayāpi vā / teṣāṃ kartānumīyeta, śruter api tathā na kim // | If the author of these story-books is inferred from the fact of their being expressive of distinctly clear meanings, then why cannot the same be done in regard to the Veda also? (2414) |
teṣām iti ākhyāyikādīnām / | The following Text points out the ‘inadmissibility’ and hence ‘Inconclusiveness’ of the Mīmāṃsaka’s Probans: [see verse 2413 above] |
śruter api tathā na kimiti / vedasyāpi tathaiva sārthakatvavibhaktārthatvābhyāṃ kiṃ na kartānumīyate viśeṣābhāvāt / | ‘Teṣām’ stands for the story-books, etc. ‘Why cannot, etc. etc.’ That is, why is not the Author of the Veda also inferred from its being expressive of distinctly clear meanings? there being no difference between the two cases. |
tataś ca pramāṇābhāvo 'siddhaḥ // | Thus the Reason ‘because there is no means of knowing such an Author’ becomes ‘inadmissible’, ‘untrue’. |
sarvasattvair agamyatvaṃ saṃdigdhaṃ tu kadācana / | As regards his being not cognised by all beings, that is always doubtful; |
kenacit ko 'pi mānena vettītyapi hi śaṅkyate // | as it is possible that at some time by some means of cognition, he might become cognised by some one. |
yena {yanna---} tribhuvanāntasthāḥ sarve prāṇabhṛtaḥ sphuṭam / | Because that he is so uncognisable cannot be clearly ascertained by all living beings of all the three worlds coming together without exception. |
svayaṃ tvagamyamānatvaṃ vyabhicāri tathā hi te / puruṣāntarasaṃkalpais tadabhāvo na niścitaḥ // | As regards his being not cognised by the Mīmāṃsaka himself, it is clearly ‘inconclusive’, because that does not prove with certainty that there is no cognition by other persons. |
imam iti sarvasattvair na devasya kartā jñāyata ityevam / | This is shown in the following: [see verses 2415-2417 above] ‘Imam’ i.e. the fact that the Author of the Veda is not cognised by anyone. |
tathāhītyādinā puruṣāntarabhāvibhiśchātrādisaṅkalpair vyabhicāritām eva samarthayate // | ‘Tathā hi, etc. etc.’ confirms the said ‘Inconclusiveness’ through the convictions of other people and also the cogitations of students. |
adhyetāraś ca vedānāṃ kartāro 'dhyakṣato matāḥ / | It is through perception that the readers of the Veda are recognised as the ‘makers’. |
nahi te vyañjakā yuktā nityānāṃ vyaktyasambhavāt // | It cannot be right to regard them as ‘manifesters’; because the ‘manifestation’ of eternal things is impossible. |
[p.660] yadi yaḥ kaścit kartā na dṛṣṭa ityabhyupagamyate tadādhyet---ṇāṃ dṛṣṭatvāt sphuṭataramavataratyasiddhatā / athādikartā na dṛṣṭa itīṣṭaṃ tadāpi saṃdigdhāsiddhataiva / | The following Text shows that this Reason is ‘inadmissible’: [see verse 2418 above] If the opinion held is that ‘no maker of the Veda is ever perceived’, then, in as much as readers of the Veda are always seen, what is asserted is clearly ‘inadmissible’. If the idea held is that the first ‘maker’ of the Veda has not been seen, even so the fact remains doubtful hence inadmissible; |
kadācit kenacid dṛṣṭo 'bhūd iti sambhāvyamānatvāt / | it being possible that he might have been seen by some one at some time. |
athāpi syād adhyetāro na kartāraḥ siddhāḥ, kiṃ tarhi vyaktāra ity āha na hītyādi / ta iti adhyetāraḥ / | If the idea is that the ‘Readers’ cannot be regarded as ‘Makers’ or ‘Authors’, they are only the ‘manifesters’ of the Veda, then the answer to that is that ‘It cannot be right, etc. etc.’ ‘Te’ stands for the Readers. |
yathā ca nityānāṃ vyakter asabhavas tathā paścāt pratipādayiṣyati / | That the ‘Manifestation’ of eternal things is not possible is going to be explained later on. |
anityasyāpi ghaṭādeḥ kathaṃ vyañjaka iti cet / | Question: “How then can there be a ‘Manifester’ of the non-eternal Jar?” |
satyam / | Answer: True; |
tatrāpi na kaścid vyañjakaḥ sambhavati / | there can be no ‘Manifester’ for non-eternal things also. |
kathaṃ tarhi dīpādayo vyañjakatvena pratītā iti cet / | Question: “How then are things like the Lamp regarded as ‘Manifesters’?” |
na / | Answer: No; |
tatra hi vijñānajanane yogyaṃ ghaṭaṃ janayan pradīpādir janaka eva / | in the cases cited, the Lamp is really the producer of the Jar, inasmuch as it produces the jar capable of bringing about its cognition; |
viśiṣṭajanakasvabhāvakhyāpanāya loke vyañjaka iti pratīyate / | and it is spoken of as ‘Manifester’, in order to indicate the exact nature of the ‘producing’ done by it. |
natu tathā vedasya kaścid vyañjakaḥ sambhavati, avyaktānutpannapūrvāparasvabhāvatvāt tasya // | Such a ‘Manifester’ is not possible in the case of the Veda; because its nature is such that its successive stages of production are not clearly perceptible. |
bhavatu nāma nityasya vyañjakas tathāpyasau kārakān na viśiṣyata iti darśayann āha upalabhyetyādi / | Even granting that there can be a ‘Manifester’ of the eternal thing; such a ‘Manifester’ does not differ from the ‘maker’, This is what is shown in the following: [see verse 2419 next] |
upalabhyasvabhāvānāṃ tadvyāpāre samudbhavaḥ / teṣāṃ prāgapi sadbhāve upalabdhiḥ prasajyate // | The Vedas being perceptible in their character, there is appearance of them when there is operation of the ‘manifester’: if they existed even before that operation, then they should be perceptible at that time also. |
nahyakiñcitkaro vyañjako yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / kiñcitkaratve janakatvam evāsyābhyupagataṃ syāt / | Nothing can be regarded as ‘Manifester’ unless it does something; otherwise there would be incongruities'; and if it does something, then it becomes admitt ed that it is the producer; |
janyamānasya viśeṣasya svabhāvāntarotpattilakṣaṇatvāt / | because the production of a particular thing consists only in the coming about of another character. |
upalabhyasvabhāvānām iti vedānām / | ‘Being perceptible in their character’ This qualifies the Vedas. |
athāpi syāt prāgapyupalabhyasvabhāvā vedāḥ sthitā eva, tat kathaṃ tadvyāpāreṇa sambhavas teṣām ity āha teṣām ityādi / teṣām iti upalabhyasvabhāvānāṃ vedānām // | It might be argued that “the Vedas were perceptible in their character even before; then how can they be said to appear through the operation of the Manifester”? The answer to this is ‘If they existed even before, etc. etc.’ ‘Teṣām stands for the Vedas that are perceptible in their character. |
tat kāryetyādinā pramāṇayati / tatkāryavyavahārādiyogyo vedo 'vasīyate / | The Veda is recognised as capable of being, treated as the effect produced by the ‘manifester’, because it appears only when this latter is present; |
tadvyāpāre 'sya sadbhāvād bījāder aṅkurādivat // | like the sprout in the presence of the seed. |
prayogaḥ yo yadvyāpāre sati bhavati sa tat kāryavyavahārādiyogyaḥ, yathābījādivyāpāre sati bhavannaṅkurādis tatkāryaḥ, adhyetṛvyāpāre sati bhavatyupalabhyasvabhāvo veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing is found to appear when there is functioning of another thing, the former is capable of being treated as the effect produced by the latter, for instance, the sprout, appearing when the seed functions, is regarded as its effect; the Veda is found to appear only when the functioning of the Reader (Manifester) is there; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
hānopādānalakṣaṇamanuṣṭhānaṃ vyavahāraḥ / | ‘Being treated’ consists in abandoning or securing the thing. |
ādiśabdena jñānābhidhānaparigrahaḥ / | ‘Ādi’ stands for being cognised, being spoken of and so forth. |
nāsiddho, hetuḥ prāgapyupalabdhiprasaṅgāt / nāpyanaikāntikaḥ, kāryavyavahārasya nimittāntarābhāvāt // | Nor is the Reason ‘Inconclusive’; as there can be no other reason for its being treated as a product. Because they appear in the sequential form in which they become manifested, like dramas and stories, the Vedas must be the work of an author; |
[p.661] yuktam adṛṣṭapūrvasambandha ityādi, tatrāha vyañjanetyādi / | It has been argued under Text 2088 above that “The Author of the Veda has not had his relationship perceived previously, etc. etc. |
vedānāṃ pauruṣeyatvam anumā"pyavagacchati // | hence he cannot be inferred”. |
prayogaḥ yadvyañjanakramarūpaṃ tat pauruṣeyam, yathā nāṭakākhyāyikādi, vyañjanakramarūpaś ca veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The reasoning may be formulated as follows: What appears in the sequential order of the manifestation must be the work of an author; like Dramas and Stories; the Veda appears in the sequential order of its manifestation; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
nāsiddho hetuḥ, krameṇaiva varṇānāṃ pratibhāsanāt // | The Reason here adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because Letters are actually always cognised in a sequential order. |
anyathā kramarūpatvaṃ nityatvād vyāptitaś ca na / nābhivyaktikramaścāsti nityatve vyakyayogataḥ // | Otherwise [if the Veda were not the work of a person], as the Veda would be eternal and all-pervading, there could be no sequential order in it. as a matter of fact, there can be no sequence in what is eternal; as there can be no ‘manifestation’ of it. |
anyatheti yadi pauruṣeyatvaṃ na syād api tu nityatvaṃ vibhutvaṃ ca varṇyeta tadā kramo na syāt / | ‘Otherwise’ if the Veda were not the work of a Person, and if it were eternal and all-pervading, then there should be no sequence in regard to it. |
tathā hi na tāvad bījāṅkuralatādivat kālakṛtaḥ kramo yujyate nityatvena sarveṣāṃ samakālatvāt / | Because in the case of the Veda, there cannot be any sequence of time, as there is in the case of the Seed and the Sprout; because being eternal, the words must be all synchronous. |
nāpi pipīlikādipaṅktivad deśakṛtaḥ, vyāpitvena sarveṣām ekanabhodeśāvasthānāt / | Nor can there be sequence of place, as there is in the case of the line of ants; because, being all-pervading, they must occupy the same points in space. |
nāpyavyaktikṛtaḥ, anādheyātiśayatvena nityasya vyakter ayogāt // | Nor can there be sequence of manifestation; because what is eternal cannot have any peculiarity imposed upon itself, and hence cannot become manifested. |
āgamasyopamāyāś ca sārthāpatteḥ pramāṇatā / | It has been shown that ‘verbal authority’, ‘analogy’ and ‘presumption’ cannot be the means of bight cognition; |
niṣiddhā prāktatas tāsām upanyāso na yujyate // | hence it cannot be right to bring these forward. |
niṣiddheti pramāṇaparīkṣāyām / | ‘It has been shown’ under the chapter on the Means of Eight Cognition. |
tāsām iti āgamopamānārthāpattīnām // | ‘Tāsām’ of Verbal Authority, Analogy and Presumption. |
aprāmāṇyanivṛttyarthā vedasyāpauruṣeyatā / yeṣṭā sāpica vastutvāt sādhanīyaiva sādhanaiḥ // | If the idea of the Veda being without an author is insisted upon, in order to remove all chances of its unreliability, then, such an idea, being a positive entity, must be established by means of proofs. |
śruteḥ svatantrataiṣādi{teṣtā hi---} puṃvyāpārānapekṣaṇāt / | The Veda is regarded to be self-sufficient, because it does not depend upon the action of any person; |
sā ca vastugato dharmo vastvātmā vā tathāvidhaḥ // | and the said self-sufficiency must be either the property of a positive entity only, or such a positive entity itself. |
apauruṣeyatetyanena śruteḥ svatantratābhidhīyate / | What is meant by the Veda ‘being without an Author’ is that it is self-sufficient; |
puruṣavyāpāranirapekṣā tata eva [p.662] śrutiḥ pramāṇam ityabhisambandhena prayogāt / anyathā hi ko 'tiśayaḥ pauruṣeyatvanivṛttimātre pratipādite pratipāditaḥ syāt / | as the argument that is put forward is that “the Veda is independent of the action of Persons, and hence valid and reliable as a means of knowledge If it were not so, then what peculiar character would it be which would be proved by the proving of the fact that the Veda is not the work of an Author? |
sā cāpauruṣeyatā vastudharmo yeṣāṃ dharmadharmibhedaḥ pāramārthikaḥ / | This character of ‘not being the work of an author’ is the property of an entity for those who regard the distinction between the thing and its property as real. |
paramārthatas tu svabhāva eva vastuno bhedāntarapratikṣepajijñāsāyāṃ tathocyata iti darśayati vastvātmā veti / | As a matter of fact, however, the ‘property’ is only the nature of the entity itself, and is spoken of as its ‘property’ for the purpose of precluding other diversities. |
tathāvidha iti svatantraḥ // | This is what is meant by the words ‘or a positive entity itself’ ‘Such’ i.e. self-sufficient. |
bhāvapakṣaprasiddhyartham ucyate yac ca sādhanam / nirākṛte 'pi te tasminnābhāvaḥ siddhyati svayam // tadbhāvasādhane 'pyaste na syāt tadbhāvaniścayaḥ / | If certain proofs are adduced in support of the view that there is an author of the Vedas, if these proofs are refuted, it does not necessarily follow that there is no such author. In fact on the refutation of the proof of his existence, what follows is that there is no certainty regarding his existence; |
tadbhāvavinivṛttes tu tanmātrān nāsti niścayaḥ // nivṛttāvapi mānānām arthābhāvāprasiddhitaḥ / | similarly the mere setting aside of the idea of his existence is not enough to bring about any certainty at all. As a matter of fact, even on the cessation of the means of cognition, there is no certainty regarding the nonexistence of the thing concerned; |
tenaitāvadbhavennāsti pakṣasiddhir dvayor api // | hence all that it can prove is that there is no certainty regarding either of the two views. |
yasya hi vastuno niścayāya sādhanam upādīyate tasminnirākṛte tatra vastuni tato niścayo na bhavatītyetāvanmātraṃ syāt, na vastuno 'pi nivṛttiḥ, yataḥ pramāṇanivṛttāvapi prameyasya na nivṛttir iti pratipāditam / | When a certain proof is adduced for the purpose of bringing. about certainty regarding a certain thing, if that proof is refuted, all that will follow would be that there would be no certainty relating to it; it would not follow that the thing itself does not exist. Because on the cessation of the Means of Cognition, the object of Cognition does not cease, as has been explained above on the basis of its being the Means or the Pervader. |
asta iti / kṣipte / | ‘Aste’ on being refuted. |
etāvat tu vaktuṃ yuktaṃ dvayor api pakṣasiddhir nāstīti / | All that can be asserted with reason is that ‘neither of the two views is proved’; |
sa ca nāstītyasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ // etadevodāharaṇena draḍhayann āha nāmūrttatvād iti / | the particle ‘iti’ has to be added, after ‘nāsti (2426-2428) The same idea is further strengthened by means of an example: [see verse 2429 next] |
nāmūrttatvād yathā śabdaḥ sukhādau vyabhicārataḥ / ityukte 'pi na śabdasya vināśitvaṃ prasiddhyati // | For instance, when on the ground of ‘incorporeality’, the other party seeks to prove the eternality (of word-sounds), and against this it is pointed out that, in view of pleasure, which also is ‘incorporeal’ (and yet not-eternal), the said reason is ‘inconclusive’, it does not necessarily follow (from this counterargument) that the word-sound is perishable. |
yathāhi nityavādinā śabdasya vastubhūtaṃ nityatvaṃ sisādhayiṣatā nityaḥ śabdo amūrttatvād ākāśavad iti prayoge kṛte, prativādinā nāmūrttatvān nityaḥ śabdo yuktaḥ sukhādibhir anaikāntād ityevaṃ vastubhūtanityatve sādhane nirākṛte 'pi nahi śabdasyānityatvaṃ siddhyati, tathedam apīti śeṣaḥ / | For example, the man who holds the Word-Sound to be eternal, with a view to prove the said eternality, which is one entity, puts forward the argument that ‘the Word-Sound must be eternal, because it is incorporeal, like Ākāśa’; thereupon his opponent puts forward the counter-argument that ‘The Word-Sound cannot be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its incorporeality, because in view of the case of Pleasure, the said reason is inconclusive’; in this way, though the Reason for the entity, in the shape of ‘eternality’, has been refuted, yet it does not become proved that the said Word-Sound is not-eternal; |
yatheti bhinnakramaḥ / | The term ‘yathā’ in the text is misplaced; |
ukte 'pītyasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ / | it should be understood as coming after ‘uktepi’. |
śabda ityasyānantaraṃ nityaḥ siddhyatītyetad adhyāhāryam / | After the word ‘Śabdaḥ’, the phrase ‘nityaḥ siddhyati’ has to be added. |
ekadeśaprayogo vā bhīmādivad draṣṭavyaḥ // | Or, a single use may be taken as serving both purposes, as in the case of ‘Bhīmā’ and others. |
yat tu pūrvāparayor ityādāvāha tat pūrvāparayor ityādi / tat pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyor yaduktaṃ sādhanaṃ paraiḥ / tannirākaraṇe 'pyete 'kṛtārthā vedavādinaḥ // | It has been argued above under Text 2101, that “when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the upholders of the Veda have their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2430 above] |
[p.663] taditi tasmāt / | ‘Tat’ Therefore, thus. |
akṛtārthā iti svapakṣasiddheḥ // | ‘They do not have their purpose accomplished’ i.e. their opinion does not become established. |
akṛtatvāvināśābhyāṃ nityatvaṃ ced vivakṣitam / niṣedhamātrarūpābhyāṃ nirupākhye 'pi tat samam // | If ‘eternality’ is what is meant by being not produced and being not destroyed, then, inasmuch as both would be of the nature of mere negation, the same may be said regarding the non-entity also. |
ato gaganarājīva nityatāsti na vāstavī / yathā tathaiva vede 'pi tat prāmāṇyaṃ na siddhyati // | consequently, just as the eternality of the ‘sky-lotus’ is not real, in the same way the reliability of the Veda also does not become established. |
atra dvayīkalpanā, kiṃ prasajyapratiṣedharūpābhyām akṛtakatvāvināśābhyāṃ nityatvam iṣṭam paryudāsarūpābhyāṃ vā / | There are two assumptions here (1) that eternality is asserted on the basis of the two characters of being not produced and being not destroyed, which are of the nature of absolute negation, and (2) that these latter are of the nature of Relative Negation; |
tatrādye pakṣe gaganapadmādinānaikāntād vedasya na vastubhūtanityatvasiddhiḥ / | under the former view (1) the Reason being ‘inconclusive’ (doubtful) in view of the ‘Sky-lotus’, the ‘eternality’ of the Veda does not become established as a real entity; |
tathāhyākāśakuśeśayasya kṛtakatvavināśitvaniṣedhe 'pi na vastubhūtanityatvasiddhiḥ / | because in the case of the ‘Sky-lotus’, though both the said characters of being produced and being destroyed are denied, yet its eternality does not become established as a real entity; |
tathā vede 'pītyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | the same happens in the case of the Veda; hence the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’; |
tataścākāśakusumavadeva prāmāṇyam api na syāt // | and from this it would follow that, as in the Sky lotus, so in the Veda also, there would he no reliability. |
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