sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
kṛtakatvavināśitvaniṣedho 'pi na siddhyati / | Even the denial of the characters of being produced and being destroyed cannot be admitted; |
sādhane 'sta iti proktaṃ tannityatvaṃ na siddhyati // | as it has been said that ‘the proof is set aside’. Hence eternality does not become established. |
asta iti dūṣite / | ‘Bet aside’ Refuted. |
taditi tasmāt // | ‘Tat’ Hence. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ, na tarhi vaktavyam etat tau cābhāvātmakatvena nāpekṣete svasādhanam iti / | If the latter view (2) put forward in the Commentary on 2431 is accepted, then it should not be said that ‘because they are of the nature of Negation, they do not need any proof for themselves’. |
taddarśayati paryudāsātmakābhyām ityādi / | This is what is shown in the following: [see verse 2434-2435 next] |
paryudāsātmakābhyāṃ cennābhyāṃ nityatvamiṣyate / tau tadbhāvātmakatvena vyapekṣeta svasādhanam // | If the two characters meant to be the reasons for eternality are of the nature of relative negation, then, partaking of the nature of affirmation, they do stand in need of proof for themselves. |
nityatvaṃ vasturūpaṃ yat tadasādhayatāṃ na tat / svayaṃ bhavati tat siddhiḥ pūrvapakṣadvaye hate // | Thus, for people who do not wish to prove ‘eternality’ as a real entity, the said eternality does not become proved merely by the rejection of the two contrary views. |
subodham // | This is easily understood. |
yaduktaṃ vedavākyārthamithyātvaṃ yo badatyanumānata ityādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2106, that “One who asserts the falsity of the Vedic Word, on the basis of Inference, has his Proposition annulled by the force of the cognition derived from the Veda”. |
tatrāha viniścita trirūpamityādi / viniścitatrirūpaṃ ca sādhanaṃ yat prakāśitam / | where the three kinds of Reason have been described, as (1) based upon the nature of things, (2) based upon the relation of Cause and Effect, and (3) based on Non-apprehension. |
tan na śakyate pratiṣeddhum, vastupratibaddhatvād asya / | Such a Reason cannot be refuted; because it is inseparable from the real state of things. |
naca vastunaḥ svabhāvānyathātvaṃ kenacit kriyeta, svabhāvāntararotpattilakṣaṇatvāt tasya / naca svabhāvāntarakaraṇe tasya kiñcit kṛtaṃ bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt / | No one can alter the real nature of a thing; because that would mean the producing of another state of the thing; and when another state of the thing is brought about, it does not mean anything for the thing itself; |
tasmād yat pramāṇasiddhavastu na tasya kenacid bādhā / | Consequently when a certain thing has been proved by proofs, it cannot be set aside by any one. |
anyathā hi pramāṇalakṣaṇopapannasya bādhāyāṃ tallakṣaṇam eva dūṣitaṃ syāditi sarvatrānāśvāsān na kvacit tat pramāṇaṃ syāt // | Otherwise if there were setting aside of what is established by proof, the proof itself would become vitiated; this would mean that there would be no confidence in any thing; and hence that proof would not be reliable at all. |
etad eva darśayati nahi śīryata ityādi / | The same idea is further explained in the following: [see verse 2437-2438 next] |
na hi śrīyata ityukto vede yaḥ puruṣo 'sya ca / bādhānumānataḥ spaṣṭā nairātmye pratipāditā // | The person who has been spoken of in the Veda as ‘not perishing’, the denial of such a person through inference has been clearly set forth in the section where ‘the no-soul doctrine’ has been expounded. |
jātyādyanyadapi proktaṃ bādhitaṃ tatra sādhitam / | The ‘universal’ and other things also have been shown there to have been discarded. |
jñāpitapratibandhā ca sānumā prākprabādhikā // | The inference based upon well-recognised invariable concomitance, as explained before, is what sets aside the soul. |
tathoktaṃ vede "sa evāyamātme"ti prakṛtyāmananti "aśīryo nahi śīryata"iti / | It has been declared in the Veda ‘This indeed is the Soul’; and in reference to this Soul, it is asserted ‘It is imperishable, it never perishes’; |
punaścoktam "avināśī vā are 'yam ātmānucchittidharme"ti / na śīryata ityaśīryo nitya ity arthaḥ / | and again ‘Indestructible indeed is the Soul, characterised by indestructibility ‘Does not perish’ i.e. is eternal. |
are ityāmantraṇapadam / | ‘Are’ is an expletive. |
jātyādītyādiśabdena guṇadravyakarmādiparigrahaḥ / | Universal and other things’ ‘Other things’ stands for Qualities and Substances. |
tac ca jātyādi yathā pramāṇabādhitaṃ tac ca ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ sādhitam / | In what way these have been discarded by proofs, has been shown under the chapter on the ‘Six Categories’. |
yā cātmano bādhikānumā sāpi jñāpitapratibandhā nairātmyādhikāre // | And the Inference that discards the Soul is one based upon well-recognised Premisses, shown under the Chapter on ‘No-Soul’, (2437-2438) |
nanu ca vede pra{mī]yamāṇaṃ tatkathamatra{nu}mayā bādhyate, atha pramāṇam api bādhyeta / anumāpi kasmāt tena na bādhyata ityāśaṅkyāha tasyā ityādi / tasyā vastunibaddhāyāḥ ko bādhāṃ maṃsyate jaḍaḥ / śabdamātreṇa tucchena tadbhāvinyāthavā dhiyā // | When the inference is firmly based upon the nature of things who would be the stupid person who would discard it on the strength of mere words, or by the cognition born of such words? (2439) Says the Opponent “What is declared by the Veda how can it be discarded by Inference? If the idea provided by a Means of Right Cognition were discarded, then why should the Inference also not be discarded?” |
tasyā iti anumāyāḥ / | ‘Tasyāḥ’ of the Inference. |
śabdasyecchāmātranibandhanatvān na prameye vastuni pratibandho 'stīti na sa tatra pramāṇam / | Words depend upon the whim of the Speaker, and as such they can have no fixed relationship to any real state of things; hence it cannot be regarded as a Means of Right Cognition in regard to the state of things. |
anumā tu tādāmtyatadutpattipratibaddhaliṅgabalenotpadyamānā tatra vastuni pratibaddheti saiva pramāṇamato bādhikā / | Inference, on the other hand, always appears on the basis of the Probans which is inseparably related either by sameness or by causality; and as such it is inseparably connected with the thing;that is why it is a Means of Right Cognition and is capable of discarding notions to the contrary.. |
tadbhāvinyeti śabdabhāvinyā // | ‘Tadbhāvinyā’ proceeding from words. |
puṃvākyādapi vijñānaṃ yat pravṛttamatīndriye / tasyāpyadhyakṣatulyatvaṃ kasmād abhimataṃ na vaḥ // | When a cognition proceeds from the words of a human-being, in regard to something beyond the senses, why do you not regard it to be as reliable as that derived from sense-perception? (2440) |
agnihotrāt svargo na bhavatītyasyāpi vākyasya kiṃ na prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, ubhayatrāpratibaddhatvenāviśeṣāt // | Why should not reliability belong to the words that ‘Heaven does not result from the performance of the Agnihotra’? Because in both cases [in the case of these words and in that of the Vedic declaration that Heaven does result from the performance of the Agnihotra] the character of not being denied is equally present. |
tamevāviśeṣaṃ darśayann āha dṛṣṭāntetyādi / | The same non-difference between the two cases is further explained: [see verses 2441-2442 next] |
dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvād doṣābhāvo 'pyadṛṣṭitaḥ / | Both cases are equally independent of the need of a corroborative instance, and both are equally free from defects, because both relate to something- imperceptible. |
tasyāpyastyeva bādhā cecchaṅkyate 'sya narāśrayāt // | It might be urged that ‘in the case of the human assertion, its sublation or denial would be suspected, on the ground of its proceeding from a human being’. |
yadyevaṃ vaidike 'pyeṣā na śaṅkā vinivartate / | If that be so, then in the case of the Vedic assertion also, the said suspicion cannot be entirely absent; |
mithyāvabodhahetutvaṃ tasya hi prākṛtaṃ bhavet // | it would be considered only natural that it should be the source of false notions. |
athāpi syāt yadi nāma tadānīṃ doṣo nopalabhyeta tathāpi puruṣāśrayatvena sambhāvyata iti, etad vede 'pi samānam, yathā hi tasya prākṛtaṃ satyārthatvaṃ tathā mithyārthatvam api sambhāvyeteti na kaścid viśeṣaḥ // | The following might be urged “It is possible that at the time that the human assertion is made, no defect may be found in it; but, as it arises from a human source, the suspicion is always there that it may be false”. |
mamāpramāṇamityevaṃ śabdo 'rthaṃ bodhayann api / | The same may be said of the Veda also. Because truthfulness is as natural to it as falsity. |
nāro 'sau dveṣamātreṇa śakyo vaktuṃ na sādhunā // | While the word (human) is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, no right-minded person should say, through sheer malice, that it is human (and hence unreliable). |
agnihotrāt svargo na bhavatītyayaṃ nāraḥ pauruṣeyaśabdo 'rthaṃ bodhayann apimama mīmāṃsakasyāpramāṇam ityevaṃ na sādhunā dveṣamātreṇa śakyaṃ vaktum iti vākyārthaḥ / | The assertion that ‘Heaven does not follow from the performance of the Agnihotra’ in human i.e. it proceeds from man ‘such an assertion even though clearly bringing about the cognition of things, is not reliable for us, Mīmāṃsakas’ this should not be said by any right-minded person, through sheer malice. |
anena {pauruṣā } pauruṣeyayor atyantaparokṣe 'rthe tulyaṃ pratītinibandhanatvamāha / | This is the sense of the passage in the text. What is meant by this is that in the matter of what is entirely beyond the senses, the capacity to bring about cognitions belongs equally to human and non-human Words. |
tataś ca tulye pratītinibandhanatve yadapauruṣeyasyaiva prāmāṇyaṃ tada{netara---}syeti niryuktikam etat / | Thus the capacity of bringing about cognitions being equally present in both, there can be no reason why reliability should belong to one and not to the other. |
naca doṣāṇāṃ puruṣāśrayatvāt tatra mithyātvaṃ śaṅkyate nāpauruṣeyeṣviti śakyaṃ vaktum / | It cannot be right to urge that “Defects being inherent in men, the falsity of their assertion is always suspected; which is not the case with superhuman assertions”. |
apauruṣeyeṣvapi mithyārthapratyayahetutvasya sambhāvyamānatvāt // | Because in the case of assertions not proceeding from man also, the suspicion is always likely that it may be bringing about false cognitions. |
enam evārthaṃ darśayati ityatyakṣeṣviti / | The same idea is further explained: [see verse 2444 next] |
ityatyakṣeṣu sarvo 'pi śabdas tulyabalābalaḥ / | Thus in the matter of super-sensuous things, all words are of equal strength and weakness; |
ekatraivānurāgo 'yaṃ tadvaḥ keneha hetunā // | why then should you be in love with only one kind of them? (2444) |
sarva iti pauruṣeyaḥ / | ‘All’ Human and Non-human. |
ekatraiveti apauruṣeye // | ‘One kind’ The non-human. |
yaduktaṃ dviṣato 'pītyādi, tatrāha anantaroditam ityādi / [p.666] anantaroditaṃ nyāyaṃ vedāprāmāṇyakāraṇam / | The principle just explained forms the reason why it is asserted by the wise that the Veda cannot be regarded as a means of right cognition. |
prājñā jalpanti tenāmī bhaveyuḥ satyavādinaḥ // | And in this they say what is perfectly true. |
anantaroditam iti / | ‘The Principle just explained’ viz. |
śabdasyecchāmātravṛttitvena vastuni pratibandhābhāvād ityādi / | that ‘Words, dependent upon mere whim, can have no inseparable connection with the real state of things |
prājñā iti / | ‘The wise’ i.e. the Buddhists. |
saugatāḥ / | [Translation, p. 6]; |
yatho{cco---}ktaṃ bhāṣyakāreṇa pratyakṣas tu vedavacane pratyayo na cānumānaṃ pratyakṣavirodhena pramāṇībhavatīti, yaccedam uktam codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭam ityevaṃjātīyakam arthaṃ śaknotyavagamayituṃ nānyatkiñcanendriyam ityevam ādi, tat sarvama{me---}tenaivapratyakṣaṃ {stṃ---} bhavati / | and again “As a matter of fact it is the Vedic Injunction which is capable of making known what is past, present and future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any organ of sense”. [Translation. |
pauruṣeye 'pi vākye sarvasyaitasya samānatvāt // | All this becomes discarded by what has been said above; as all this is equally applicable to human assertions also. |
mithyānurāgasaṃjātavedādhyānajaḍīkṛtaiḥ / mithyātvaheturajñāta iti citraṃ na kiñcana // | There is nothing strange in the fact that people, whose intelligence has been dulled by the constant contemplation of the Veda, prompted by false attachment, have failed to detect the sources of falsity (in the Veda). |
nahi mātṛvivāhādau doṣaḥ kaścid apīkṣyate / | The Pārasīka people who are addicted to the practice do not perceive anything wrong in the remarriage of their mothers. |
mithyānurāgeṇa saṃjātaṃ ca tadvedākhyānaṃ ceti samasya tena jaḍīkṛtā iti paścāt tṛtīyāsamāsaḥ / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2446-2447 above] The compound is to be expounded as ‘those who have been jadākṛta dulled by the contemplation of the Veda which has been prompted by false attachment.’ |
ādhyānaṃ cānupūrvyeṇa cintā / | ‘Ādhyāna’ is constant contemplation or pondering. |
mithyānurāgeṇa hi vidyamānasyāpi doṣasyādarśanāt / | On account of these, false attachment, etc. they do not perceive the defect, even though it is there. |
yathā pārasīkādibhir mātṛvivāhāder iti na kiñcid āścaryam // | As for example, the Pārasīka people see nothing wrong in the marriage of their mothers. So there is nothing strange in what has been urged by the Mīmāṃsaka (2446-2447) |
pratyakṣapratyabhijñā tu prāgeva vinivāritā / | The idea of ‘recognition being of the nature of perception’ has been already discarded; |
bhrānteḥ sakalpanatvāc ca nāto nityatvaniścayaḥ // | and as wrong cognition is always associated with ‘conceptual content’, there can be no certainty regarding eternality. |
kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam iti hi pratyakṣalakṣaṇam, naca pratyabhijñānaṃ kalpanāpoḍham, sa evāyam iti śabdākārollekhena pravṛtteḥ / nāpyabhrāntaṃ pūrvadṛṣṭapratyutpannayor aikyānusandhānāt / | Sense-perception has been defined as what is ‘free from Conceptual Content and not wrong’; Recognition is not ‘free from Conceptual Content’, as it always appears as associated with words, in the form ‘this is that same Nor is it ‘not wrong’, because it envisages sameness between what was seen before and what is seen now; |
naca yadeva pūrvadṛṣṭaṃ tadeva paścād dṛśyate, akramiṇaḥ sakāśāt kramijñānānutpatteḥ / | and yet what is seen now can never be the same as that seen on the previous occasion; as there could be no notion of succession in what is not successive. |
kāryaṃ hi kutaścid bhavanadharmi, yat kadācin na bhavati tat tasyāvikalaṃ cetkāraṇaṃ kimiti kāryāṇi parilambante / nacāpi nityasyānupakāryatayā kācid apekṣā sambhavinī / | The effect is always something that follows from, is born of, something else; when an effect does not come into existence at a certain time, if its cause is there in its efficient state, why should there be delay in the appearance of the effect? Then again, what is eternal does not stand in need of the help of anything; |
tasmāt tadbhāvīni jñānāni yugapad bhaveyuḥ / | Hence the Cognitions that would proceed from the Eternal Source should all appear simultaneously. |
prayogaḥ yadyadāvikalakāraṇaṃ tat tadā bhavatyeva, yathā samavahitasakalacakṣurādikāraṇakalāpaṃ cakṣur jñānam / | The argument may be formulated as follows: When the efficient cause of a certain effect is present, that effect must appear at the time; for example, Visual Perception, when the complete set of its causes is present; |
avi [p.667] kalakāraṇāni ca sarvasyāmavasthāyāṃ gavādiśabdabhāvīni vijñānānīti svabhāvahetuḥ / | the cognitions proceeding from all words, ‘Cow’ and the rest, have the complete set of their efficient causes present at all times and under all conditions; |
tasmād bhrānteḥ savikalpakatvāc ca pratyabhijñā na pratyakṣatvena siddheti prāgeva sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ pratipāditam // | hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Consequently, because it is wrong, and because it is associated with Conceptual Content, Recognition cannot be regarded as Perception. |
nacāpi svarūpataḥ sarvatra pratyabhijñānaṃ siddham ityādarśayann āha vyāvartamānetyādi / | All this has been already explained in course of the examination of the ‘Permanence of things’. |
vyāvartamānarūpaś ca bhūyasā pratyayo dhvanau / | The idea that there appears in regard to word-sounds is found to be mostly divergent; |
śukasya vyāhṛtaṃ cedaṃ śārikāyā itīkṣaṇāt // so 'yaṃ vyañjakabhedāccedvakṣyāmo vyaktyapākriyām / | as it is often cognised in such forms as ‘this is spoken by the parrot’ and ‘this other is spoken by the Śārikā’, if it is said that “this is due to the diversity of the manifesters of the sounds”, then, we shall state the reasons for rejecting this idea of the ‘manifestation’ (of sounds). |
asmād eva ca te nyāyāt sarvam ekam idaṃ bhavet // | On this ground alone, all this would be one and the same. |
tato na vyañjakaṃ kiñcid vya{ṅgyaṃ kiñci na vā bhavet} / | Hence there can be no manifester, and no manifested. |
ekasminnavibhakte hi vyāhatā bhedakalpanā // | Because when the thing is one and indivisible, that fact precludes all notions of diversity. |
pauruṣeyā ime śabdā ete cānarakartṛkāḥ / | Further, there can be no determination, based upon recognition, that ‘these words are human’ and ‘those others are not uttered by men (2449-2452) |
vyavasthaiṣāpi vo na syāt pratyabhijñopajīvinī // | Even Recognition is not found to be present in the same form in all cases. |
yadāhi śukasārikādibhir vyāhriyate śabdas tadā idaṃ sārikāyā vyāhratam idaṃ śukasyeti parasparabhinnaviṣayādhyavasāyād vyāvartamānaḥ pratyayo bhavatīti na sarvatra siddhā pratyabhijñā / | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2449-2452 above] When certain word-sounds are uttered by birds, like the Parrot, the Śārikā and the like, there is always the notion of diversity, as that ‘this is uttered by the Parrot’, ‘that by the Śārikā’ and so forth; hence Recognition (Word-Sound) does not appear in all cases. |
athāpi syād vyañjakabhedād ayaṃ śukādivyāhāre parasparavyāvṛttaḥ pratyayo jāyata iti, etad api vārttam, vyañjakasya nirākariṣyamāṇatvāt / | It might be argued that “this notion of diversity, in regard to the utterances of the Parrot, etc. is due to the diversity among the manifesting agencies”; |
so 'yam iti / | that is nothing; |
vyāvartamānarūpaḥ pratyayaḥ / | because the very idea of the ‘manifesting agency’ is going to be discarded. |
kiñca yadi siddho 'pi bhedaḥ śabdānāṃ vyañjakakṛto vyavasthāpyate, na svataḥ, tadā sarvatrānāśvāsa ityatiprasaṅgamāpādayann āha asmād eva cetyādi / | Then again, even if the diversity in the Word were held to be based upon the diversity in the manifesters, and not upon the Word itself, then, there would be no confidence at all. This is the contingency that is indicated in the words ‘On this ground alone, etc. etc.’ ‘all this’ i.e. the entire universe. |
sarvam iti viśvam / | “Let that be so; |
bhavatvevam iti cedāha tato netyādi / idaṃ vyañjakamayaṃ vyaṅgya iti bhedanibandhano vyavahāro na syā{da}bhedāt / | Answer ‘Hence there can be, etc. etc.’ There could be no ideas of difference, such as ‘this is the manifester’ and ‘that the manifested’, which is based upon diversity; as there is no difference at all. |
tathā ime pauruṣeyā ete ca śaṃno devīrityādayo 'pauruṣeyā iti vyavasthā pratyabhijñānaparāyaṇānāṃ bhavatāṃ naiva bhaved viśeṣābhāvāt // | For example, ‘these words are human’ and ‘those others, like Śanno devīḥ, etc. are not human’, all such notions would not be possible for you who are so devoted to Recognition; as there is no distinction at all. |
{kecideka}kramā eva vyañjakakramasaṃsthiteḥ / | “Some words are found always in one and the same order of sequence, the order of the manifested being fixed; |
iṣṭā apauruṣeyās te niyatakramayoginaḥ // | these words are held to be not-human, appearing, as they do, always in the same fixed order of sequence.” (2453) |
vyañjakakramasya saṃsthiter niyatatvāt kecicchaṃno devīrityādayo niyatakramā eva pratī [p.668] yante, atas te niyatakramayogino 'pauruṣeyā iṣṭāḥ, tadviparītāḥ sāmarthyāt pauruṣeyā iti siddham // | Inasmuch as the order of sequence in the manifesters is fixed and rigid, there are certain words such as ‘Śanno devīḥ, etc.’ which are always found in the same order; hence, as always appearing in the same order, they are regarded as not-human in origin. It follows by implication that those which are otherwise i.e. not found always in the same order are human. |
nanvyam ityādinā dūṣayati / | The above idea is rejected in the following: [see verse 2454 next] |
nanvayaṃ pauruṣo dharmas tālvā{divyañjakakramaḥ} / | As a matter of fact, the order of sequence in the manifesting agencies, palate and other speech-centres is something that appertains to men; |
{tasmāt kadācit tasyāpi sambhāvyeta} viparyayaḥ // | hence it is possible that it may be otherwise. |
niyatakramayogitvam asiddham / | That the words always appear in the same order cannot be admitted; |
tathā hi vyañjakakramaniyamāt tadiṣṭaṃ, sa ca vyañjakānāṃ tālvādīnāṃ kramaḥ puruṣecchāyattavṛttitvād aniyataḥ, puruṣecchāyāḥ svātantryāt / | because the order in the words is held to be due to the order in the manifesters; and tills order in the manifesters i.e. in the Palate and other speech-centres, is dependent upon the whim of man, and hence cannot be fixed; as there can be no restraint on the whim of man. |
tataś ca śaṃno devīrityādeḥ sarvakālamayam eva kramo 'bhūdbhaviṣyatītyatra niyāmakapramāṇābhāvāt kadācid anyathāpi sambhāvyeta kramaḥ // | Consequently, there is no reasonable ground for believing that in any set of words ‘Śanno devīḥ, etc.’ the order has been and is going to be always the same; hence it is just possible that the order may he otherwise also. |
tejastvādi ca sāmānyaṃ vistareṇa nirākṛtam / | The idea of any such ‘universal’ as ‘fire’ has been rejected in detail. |
tatrātaḥ pratyabhijñeyaṃ sāmānyaṃ nityameva naḥ{na---} // | hence the ‘universal’ that is recognised cannot be eternal. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.