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na caiṣa deśāntare kālāntare viparyeti / | the idea in question that Heaven follows from the performance of sacrifices is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. |
tasmād avitatha" iti / | Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong.’ (Translation, p. |
anyathā hi pratyakṣaṃ sphuṭat sphuliṅgaprakaraprasaroparuddhāntarālamakṛśakṛśānurāśimanubhavato 'pi bhavataḥ kimiti saṃśayadolāvilolaṃ mano na bhavet / | If it were not so, then why should not your mind be swinging in doubt, even when you may be actually feeling the huge flame of fire with gleaming sparks flying on all sides? In fact, under the circumstances, there would be nothing reliable for you. Such is the sense of the Opponent (Mīmāṃsaka). |
tataś ca na kiñcid api te pramāṇaṃ syād iti parasyābhiprāyaḥ / | His argument may be formulated thus: That Cognition which is free from doubt and mistake must be regarded by all intelligent men as ‘valid and reliable’; |
prayogaḥ yaḥ saṃśayaviparyāsarahitaḥ pratyayaḥ sa prekṣāvatāṃ pramāṇavyavahāraviṣayaḥ yathā vahnāvabhrāntacetaso dāhapākādyarthinastanniścayahetuḥ pratyayaḥ saṃśayaviparyāsarahitaścāgnihotrādivākyodbhava pratyaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | e.g. the certain cognition of fire that the man has who desires heat for cooking and whose mind is not under delusion; and the Cognition arising from the Vedic sentences speaking of the Agnihotra, etc. is free from doubt and mistake; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing. |
nāvalambeteti / pramāṇatām ityanena sambandhaḥ / | ‘Na-avalambīta’ is to be construed with (as governing) ‘pramānatām’. |
tāṃ kurvanniti matim // | ‘Tām kurvan’ bringing about such cognition. |
naivam ityādinā pratividhatte / naivaṃ saṃśayasaṃjāter viparītānyavākyavat / | It is not so; because uncertainty does arise (in the case of the vedic sentence), just in the same way as in the case of another assertion to the contrary; |
prekṣāvanto hi naiteṣāṃ bhedaṃ paśyanti kaścana // | and intelligent people do not perceive any difference between the two cases. |
nātīndriye hi yujyete sadasattāviniścayau / niścayo vedavākyāccedanyādṛg na kimanyataḥ // yadi tāvat prekṣāvatāṃ saṃśayādirahitaḥ pratyayo vedavākyād bhavatīti hetvarthas tadā hetor asiddhatā / | In fact, in regard to things beyond the senses, there can be no certainty regarding their existence or non-existence. If it be urged that “this certainty does arise from the Vedic sentence”, then, (the answer is) why cannot there be certainty regarding the contrary of that, from another sentence? (2389-2390) If your Reason means that the notion that intelligent men obtain from the Veda is free from uncertainty, etc. |
tathā hi prekṣāvatām agnihotrāt svargo na bhavatītyato viparītānyavākyādivāgnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyato 'pi saṃśayaḥ samāna eva, atīndriy 'rthe sadasattāniścayakāraṇābhāvād arthasaṃvādasyobhāyatrāpyanupalambhāt / | then it is not ‘admissible’; because the notion that the intelligent man has of Agnihotra leading to Heaven is just as uncertain as that of Agnihotra not leading to Heaven; in fact, in the matter of all supersensuous things, there can be no cause for any absolutely certain cognition as to the thing being existent or non-existent; because the corroboration of the actual perception of the real state of things is equally unavailable in both cases. |
viparītānyavākyavad iti / | ‘As in the case of another assertion to the contrary’ The ‘vati’ affix is added to the word with the Locative ending. |
athāpi syād vedavākyādeva niścayo bhavati tat kimanyeta kāraṇena paryeṣitenetyata āha anyādṛgityādi / vedārthaviparītārthādhyavasāyī niścayaḥ / | It might be argued that “the certainty is obtained from the Vedic sentence itself; why seek for another cause for it?” The answer to this is ‘Why cannot there be, etc. etc.’ i.e. certainty contrary to what is asserted in the Vedic sentence. |
anyata iti / pauruṣeyāt kiṃ na bhavati bhavatyeveti yāvat / | ‘From another sentence’ i.e. from one emanating from a man. ‘Why cannot there be’ i.e. there must be. |
tataś ca sāpi pramāṇaṃ syād ubhayor api tadānīṃ bādhānupalambhenāviśeṣāt // | Hence that also should be regarded as valid and reliable; as the ‘absence of sublation’ would be equally available in both cases. |
śrotriyāṇāṃ tu niṣkampā buddher eṣopajāyate / | That Vedic scholars derive unshakable notions from the Veda is due to their minds being influenced by faith; |
śraddhāvivaśabuddhīnāṃ sānyeṣām anyataḥ samā // tathā hi saugatādīnāṃ dhīrakampopajāyate / apāyaduḥkhasambhūtir yāgāt prāṇivadhānvitāt // | and this is equally present in other people’s minds, in respect of other assertions, for example, quite as unshakable notions are derived by the Buddhists regarding trouble and suffering resulting from sacrifices which involve the killing of animals. |
asyāś ca na dhiyaḥ kācid bādhā samprati dṛśyate / | Of this latter notion we do not find any sublation till now. |
kvacit kadācicchaṅkyā cedvedavākye 'pi sā samā // | If it be said that “there may be sublation of it at some future time and place”, the same is equally possible in the case of the Vedic sentence also. |
seti akampā buddhiḥ / | The answer to that is that such notions may be obtained; |
anyeṣām iti bauddhādīnām / | ‘Anyeṣām’ of the Buddhist and other people. |
anyata iti yāgāt prāṇivadhāśritāpāyaduḥkhasambhūtir ityato vākyāt / | ‘Anyataḥ’ “from such sentences as ‘From sacrifices, involving the killing of animals, proceed trouble and suffering’. |
etad eva darśayati tathā hītyādi / subodham // | This is what is shown in the sentence beginning with ‘For example, etc. etc.’ It is easily understood. |
narecchādhīnasaṅketanirapekṣo yadi svayam / vedaḥ prakāśayet svārthaṃ pramāṇaṃ yujyate tadā // | If the Veda expressed its meaning by itself independently of conventions made by the whims of men, then it might be valid and reliable. |
tadā hi mohamānādidoṣopaplutabuddhibhiḥ / anyathā"khyāyamāno hi{pi---} nijamarthaṃ na muñcati // | As, in that case, it would not abandon its meaning, even when explained otherwise by men with minds perverted by delusion, vanity and other defects; |
yasāt tadviṣayām eva dhiyam utpādayatyaram / na tviṣṭaṃ puruṣair arthamaparaṃ dyotayatyayam // | and it would directly bring about the cognition of that meaning alone, and not express any meaning that may be desired by men. |
narecchāyāstvapekṣāyāṃ pauruṣeyān na bhidyate / | If however, it depends upon the whims of men, then it does not differ from the common assertions of men; |
dyotanaṃ hi tadāyattaṃ viparyastāpi sā bhavet // | as in that case the expressing of meaning would be dependent upon men, and it is quite possible that it may be wrong. |
icchāyāḥ svātantryāt tadadhīnasaṅketasāpekṣasya vedasya svārthaprakāśane neṣṭārthaprakāśanaṃ syānniyamābhāvāt, yadā tu tannirapekṣo vedo 'rthaṃ bodhayet tadā pramāṇaṃ yujyeta, puruṣavyākhyāmanādṛtya kṣiprataraṃ svārthapratītijananāt, anyathā vyākhyāyamānasyāpi cakṣurādivat prakṛtyaiva svārthaprakāśanāparityāgād iti samudāyārthaḥ / | if then the Veda depended, in the expressing of its meaning, upon Conventions made by the whims of men, it would not express the meaning that is desired; as there would be nothing to restrict it. On the other hand, if the Veda expressed its meaning independently of the Conventions, then it would be possible for it to be valid and reliable; because regardless of the explanations propounded by men, it would directly express its meaning; even though it might be explained otherwise by men, it would never abandon the function of expressing its own meaning by itself, exactly as the eye and other organs do not abandon their inherent function of apprehending things. |
ākhyāyamāna iti vyākhyāyamānaḥ / | This is the sense of the whole argument. ‘Ākhyāyamāna’ Being explained. |
aram iti kṣipram / | ‘Aram’ Quickly; |
viparyastāpi seti narecchā // | at once. ‘Wrong’ i.e. the whims of men may be wrong. |
[p.655] bhavatu nāma svābhāviko 'rthasambandho 'pauruṣeyatvena vedasya, tathāpi veṣṭasiddhir ity anaikāntikatām eva samarthāyam āha āha api cetyādi / apicāpauruṣeyasya yathā prākṛtamiṣyate / satyārthatvam asatyatvam evamāśaṅkyate na kim // | It is said that the Veda, not being the work of an author, has the inherent capacity of asserting what is true; but why cannot it be suspected that what it says is not true? Just as its truthfulness is deduced from the fact that by itself, it brings about the cognition of what is true, in the same manner it might be suspected that by itself it brings about the cognition of what is not true. |
svataḥ satyārthabodhasya hetutvāt satyatāsya hi / | It may be that, on account of the Veda not being the work of an author, its connection with its meaning is inherent; |
evaṃ mithyātvabodhe 'pi hetutvaṃ śaṅkyate svataḥ // | even so, however, what is desired by the Mīmāṃsaka is not proved; as the Reason adduced remains ‘Inconclusive |
prakṛtau bhavaṃ prākṛtam svābhāvikam ity arthaḥ // | This is the view expounded m the following: [see verses 2398-2399 above] ‘Prākṛtam’ pertaining to its nature; inherent. |
kiñca vedapramāṇatve nirbandho yadi vo dhruvam / nirdoṣakartṛkatvādau tadā yatno vidhīyatām // | Further, if you are really eager to regard the Veda as valid and reliable, then try and prove that it is the work of a person free from defects and so forth. |
nirdoṣeṇa hi kartrāyaṃ kṛto 'doṣaiḥ prakāśakaiḥ / dyotamānaś ca loke 'smin bhūtārthajñānasādhanaḥ // | If it is composed by a faultless author and is expounded in the world by faultless expounders, it certainly can be the means of obtaining the cognition of the real truth regarding things. |
nirdoṣakartṛkatvādāvityādiśabdena vyākhyātṛtvaṃ gṛhyate // atha nirdoṣaiḥ kṛtavyākhyātasyāpi kathaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyatītyāha prajṭākṛpādiyuktānām ityādi / | The following text proceeds to urge that the reason for the validity and reliability of the Veda may be held to lie in the fact of its being the work of a reliable person; why rely upon its not being the work of anyone, which only shows your stupidity? [see verses 2400-2401 above] ‘And so forth’ is meant to include the faultless expounders (2400-2401) |
prajñākṛpādiyuktānāṃ tathā hi suviniścitāḥ / pauruṣeyyo 'pi sadvāco yathārthajñānahetavaḥ // | The well-defined and excellent words of persons full of wisdom and compassion, even though emanating from personalities, are actually the means of true cognitions. |
yathoktaṃ śabarasvāminā "yat tu laukikaṃ vacanaṃ taccetpratyāyitāt puruṣādindriyaviṣayaṃ vāvitatham eva tad" iti / | This has been thus declared by Śabarasvāmin (in his Bhāṣya on Sū. 1.1.2) “As regards the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person, or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses, it must be true”. |
sadvāca iti śobhanāḥ // | (Translation, p. ‘Sadvācaḥ’ Excellent assertions. |
punar apyapauruṣeyatvasyānaikāntikatāṃ pratipādayann āha na narākṛtam ityādi / | The following Text again shows the ‘inconclusiveness’ of not being the work of a Person as a Reason for reliability. [see verse 2403 above] |
na narākṛtam ityeva yathārthajñānakāri tu / | Mistaken cognitions do not always arise from the presence of defects in men; |
nahi puruṣadoṣopadhānād evārtheṣu jñānavibhramastadrahitānām api dāvavahnyādīnāṃ nīlotpalādiṣu vitathajñānajananāt / | even in cases where no such defects are possible, e.g. in the case of such things as forest-fire, there are wrong cognitions in regard to the Blue Lotus and such things [the Blue Lotus appearing Red under the glare of the extensive fire]. |
dāvo vanagato vahniḥ / | ‘Dāva-vahni” is the wild fire burning in the woods. |
sa punar yaḥ svayam eva veṇvādīnāṃ saṃgharṣasamudbhūtaḥ sa iha vyabhicāraviṣayatvena draṣṭavyaḥ / | What is meant to be cited as the source of wrong cognition is that Fire which starts by itself through the friction of dried bamboos, etc. in the forest. |
yastvaraṇinirmathanādi puruṣair nivṛttaṃ tatrāpauruṣeyatvāsambhavāt tato na hetor vyabhicāra iti bhāvaḥ / | That fire on the other hand which is produced by men by rubbing together of two sticks, this cannot be regarded as ‘not the work of man’; and hence this could not invalidate the Mīmāṃsaka’s Reason. |
ādiśabdena marīcyādiparigrahaḥ // | ‘Forest-fire and the like’ ‘and the like’ is meant to include the Mirage and such phenomena. |
[p.656] tāmeva mithyājñānahetutāṃ darśayati raktam ityādi / | How these are the source of wrong cognitions is shown in the following: [see verse 2404 next] |
raktaṃ nīlasarojaṃ hi vahnyāloke satīṣyate / | In the glare of fire, the blue lotus appears as red. |
vahnyādiḥ kṛtakatvāccenna hetur upapadyate // athāpi syān nāpauruṣeyatvam eva kevalam asmābhir hetutvena varṇitam / | The following might be said (by the Mīmāṃsaka) “The mere fact of not being the work of a person has not been put forward by us as the Reason (for Reliability), what is meant by us to be the Reason is that fact along with the fact of not being a product. |
kiṃ tarhi akṛtakatve satīti viśeṣaṇam / | Or it is this character of not being a product that is indicated by the character of not being the work of a Person. |
yadvā pauruṣeyagrahaṇamakṛtakopalakṣaṇamato na dāvavahninā kṛtakena vyabhicāra iti manyamānasya parasyottaramāśaṅkayann āha vahnyāder ityādi / | Hence the Reason is not rendered Inconclusive by the case of the Forest fire, which is a product (with a beginning)”. This is the Mīmāṃsaka’s answer which is anticipated and set forth in the words ‘In this case, the Fire, etc. etc.’ |
taddhetuḥ mithyājñānahetuḥ // | ‘Taddhetuḥ’ the source of wrong cognition. |
kiṃ vaikṛtakatetyādinā pariharati / | The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 2405 next] |
kiṃ vaikṛtakatārthānāṃ mithyājñānanibandhanam / evaṃ hi naiva dhūmo 'gner yathāvaddhyotakaṃ bhavet // | Does the ‘character of being a product’ make things the source of wrong cognitions? In that case, smoke would not be the correct indicator of fire. |
tadviśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati yadvipakṣāddhetuṃ vyavacchinatti, anyathā hi yena kenacidviśeṣaṇena hetau yadyaikāntikatā labhyeta tadā na kaścid anaikāntiko hetuḥ syāt, icchāpratibaddhatvena sarvatra viśeṣaṇasya saukaryāt / | That alone can be a qualification of the Reason (Probans) which serves to differentiate the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum; otherwise, if any and every qualification could make the Reason conclusive, then no Reason could ever be Inconclusive; because qualifications would easily be available by the mere wish for it; |
nacākṛtakatvaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ vedasya mithyājñānahetutāṃ nivartayati / | the character of not being a Product does not set aside its capacity to bring about wrong notions; |
tathā hi yadi kṛtakatā mithyājñānahetutvena siddhā syāt tadā sā nivartamānā tām api nivartayet / | because if being a product were known to be the cause of being a source of wrong notions, then the absence of the former might mean the absence of the latter also. |
kadācit paro brūyāt siddhaiveti, āha evaṃ hītyādi / | The Opponent might say “It is so known”. |
yadi kṛtakatā mithyājñānanibandhanaṃ tadā samyajñānasyākṛtakatā hetur iti prāptaḥ / | The answer to that is ‘In that case, etc. etc.’ If the character of being a Product were the reason for being the source of wrong notions, then the character of not being a Product would be the reason for being the source of right notions; |
samyag mithyājñānayoḥ parasparaviruddhayor ekakāraṇānupapatteḥ, nahi vahneruṣnasparśa hetoḥ śītahetutā yuktā / | because Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, both could not proceed from one and the same cause; e.g. Fire, which is the source of Heat, cannot be the source of gold; |
tataśca kṛtakatvād brūmo vahnau yathāvat pratītihetur na syāt // | consequently, as Smoke is a product, it could not be the means of the Right Notion of Fire. |
athāpi syānnaivam avadhāritaṃ mithyājñānasyaiva kṛtakatā hetur nānyasyeti / kiṃ tarhi mithyājñāne kṛtakataiva nibandhanaṃ nānyadityanyahetukatāsya niṣidhyate / | Thus, even though not the work of a person, the Veda cannot be the source of right cognition; hence the assumption of it is entirely futile. The following might be urged: “What is meant by us is, not that the character of being a product is the cause of wrong cognition only, but that the said character alone is the cause of the wrong cognition; there is no other cause for it; |
na tu samyak jñānasya kṛtakahetukatvaniṣedhaḥ / | we do not assert that Right Cognition can never be brought about by what is a Product. |
naca sarvasya kṛtakasyāviśeṣeṇa mithyājñānahetutvam iṣṭam / | Everything that is a product is not equally regarded by us as being the cause of Wrong Cognition; |
yena parasparaviruddhatvāt samyaṅmithyājñānayoḥ sāmarthyāt kṛtakaviparītasya samyagjñānahetutvaṃ syāt / | by virtue of which, the Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, all that is not-product would be the source of Right Cognition. |
kintu kṛtakasya bahubhinnatvāt kiñcideva mithyājñānakāraṇaṃ yathā kāmalādi kiñcit samyagjñānakāraṇaṃ yathānupahatendriyādikalāpaḥ / | What is meant by us is that Products being multifarious, it is only some Products that are the source of Wrong Cognition, e.g. jaundice, etc. while some are the source of Right Cognition, e.g. the whole lot of undiseased sense-organs. |
anyathā hi śītasparśaṃ prati himādeḥ kṛtakasya kasyacit kāraṇatvopalambhāt sāmarthyācchītaviruddhoṣṇasparśaṃ pratyakṛtako hetuḥ kalpanīyaḥ syāt / | If it were not so, then, on finding that some products like Ice are the source of cold, it might be presumed by implication that warmth which is contrary.to cold is due to something that is not a Product. |
nacaivam / | As a matter of fact, however, this is not so. |
tasmāt kṛtakasya samyagjñānaṃ prati hetutvāniṣedhād bhavatyeva dhūmaḥ samyagjñānanibandhanam ityetad āśaṅkyāha evaṃ cāpauruṣeyo 'pītyādi / | Thus, inasmuch as we do not deny the fact of the Product being the source of Right Cognition, Smoke does remain the means of Right Cognition (of Fire)”. Anticipating this argument, the Author answers it in the following [see verse 2406 above] |
vedaṃ santiṣṭhate naiva tadvṛthaivāsya kalpanā // yadi hi samyaṅmithyātvayorubhayayor api kṛtakatā nibandhanaṃ sā nivartamānā mithyāsamyagjñāne nivartayatīti na vedasyākṛtakatvena samyagjñānahetutvam avatiṣṭheta, tasya tatrānibandhanatvāt, tataś ca vyarthaṃ viśeṣaṇam ityanaikāntikataiva hetoḥ / | If the character of being a Product were the cause of both Rightness and Wrongness, then the absence of that character would mean the absence of both Right and Wrong Cognition; consequently the fact of the Veda not being a product could not be a ground for its being a source of Right Cognition; as that is not a cause of this latter; hence the qualification ‘not being a product’ as applied to the Probans, is useless. |
athāpi syānnarākṛtatayetyanena nānvayivyatirekī yathokto hetuḥ saṃsūcitaḥ, kiṃ tarhi vyatirekī prayoga evāyam / | The following might be urged “By the qualification ‘not being the work of man’, what is meant is not the ‘Positive-Negative’ Premiss, but a purely negative Premiss; |
yathāhi hetuviparītena kṛtakatvena sādhyaviparītaṃ mithyātvaṃ vyāptam, pauruṣeyeṣveva mithyātvasya darśanāt, tataś ca yatra mithyātvavyāpakaviruddhamakṛtakatvaṃ sannidhīyate, tatra virodhenākṛtakatvasya mithyātvavyāpakasya nivṛttau vyāpyasyāpi mithyātvasya sāmarthyānnivṛttisiddhir ityakṛtakaṃ satyārtham iti sāmarthyād bhaved vināpyanvayeneti vyarthamanvayapradarśanam / | the sense being that being a Product, which is the contrary of the Probans (‘not being the work of man’), is concomitant with ‘falsity’, which is the contrary of the Probandum (‘Truthfulness’), because falsity is found in the words of man only hence wherever there is the character of not being a Product, which is contrary to that with which Falsity is invariably concomitant, there, the character of not being a Product, which is negatively concomitant with, falsity being negatived, its concomitant, Falsity, also becomes negatived; and thus it would follow that what is not a Product asserts what is true; and as thus the desired conclusion -would be got even without the affirmative premiss, any statement of such a Premiss would be useless |
satyam evam etat / | True; this is so. |
yadi viparyayasya yo vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ siddhyet / | If the concomitance between the two contraries is admitted. |
sa tu na siddhaḥ / | But it is not admitted. |
tathā hi sādhyavipakṣe hetau yadi bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ syāt, tadā bhaved vipakṣayor vyāptiḥ, tac ca nāsti / | For instance, there would be concomitance between the two contraries of the Probandum, if against the Probans, which is contrary to the Probandum, there were a sublative cognition. There is, however, no such sublative cognition. |
nacānupalambhamātrād abhāvasiddhir vyabhicārāt / | Mere non-perception does not prove non-existence; as it is not a conclusive proof for non-existence. |
syād etad akṛtakaviruddhe kṛtake mithyātvasya darśanāt sāmarthyād akṛtake tasyābhāvaḥ siddhyatīti / | The following might be urged “Being a Product is the contrary of not-being a Product; in the former we find falsity, whence it follows by implication that what is not a Product is devoid of falsity”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This is not right. |
na hyekatra dṛṣṭyānyatrābhāvaniścayaḥ śakyate kartum, ekasyāpi hi viruddhavyāpakadarśanāt / | From seeing something in one place, it does not follow that it does not exist elsewhere; because one and the same thing is found to be concomitant with mutually contradictory things. |
tathāhyekam anityatvaṃ viruddhau prayatnānantarīyaketarau vyāpnuvahad dṛśyate / | For instance, the single character of non-eternality is found to be concomitant with what is produced by effort and also what is not so produced; |
nahyanityatvaṃ prayatnānantarīyake dṛṣṭam ityaprayatnānantarīyake tasyābhāvaḥ syāt / | and the mere fact of non-eternality being found in what is produced by effort, cannot lead to the conclusion that it does not exist in what is not produced by effort. |
kiñca tatra dṛṣṭam ityetāvan mātreṇa yadi mithyātvaṃ kṛtakatvena vyāpyenasatyatvam api pauruṣeye kvacid dṛṣṭam iti tadapi tena vyāpyeta, tataś ca kṛtakatvanivṛttau mithyātvavat satyatvasyāpi nivṛtter nāpauruṣeyatvāt satyārthatvaṃ siddhyed ityalam // | Further, if the mere fact of falsity being sometimes found in what is a Product were to mean that the two are invariably concomitant, then it might be that truthfulness being found in words proceeding from men, truthfulness and proceeding from men may be regarded as invariable concomitants; and consequently, on the cessation of the character of being a product, falsity should cease, as also Truthfulness should cease; so that the mere fact of not being the work of a Person does not prove truthfulness-Enough of this discussion. |
tataścāpauruṣeyatvavyaktinityatvasādhanam / nityaśabdārthayogaś ca vyartha e{vopavarṇi}taḥ // | From all this it follows that the reasons in support of (1) the Veda not being the work of a person, (2) of there being only a ‘manifestation’ of it, and (3) of its being eternal, as also (4) of the eternal connection between the words and its meaning, have all been set forth uselessly. |
tasmin satyapi naivāsya yathārthajñānahetutā / | Because, even if the Veda has all this character, it cannot be accepted to be the source of true knowledge; |
upagamyata ityuktaṃ vyāsataḥ samanantaram // | as has been just stated in detail. |
[p.658] tenaivaitatpratikṣepe nāsmākaṃ guru{rādaraḥ} / | Hence we are not paying much attention to the refutation of this idea (of the Veda not being the work of a person). |
{a}prastutopayogasya ko hi kuryānniṣedhanam // | Who would ever care to refute what has no bearing upon the matter under consideration? (2407-2409) |
apauruṣeyatvaṃ ca vyaktiśca nityatvaṃ cetyapauruṣeyatvavyaktinityatvāni, teṣāṃsādhanam iti samāsaḥ / | (1) The idea of its not being the work of a Person, (2) the idea that there is ‘manifestation’ of it, and (3) the idea that it is eternal; the Reasons in support all this. |
sādhyate 'neneti sādhanaṃ hetuḥ / | ‘Sādhana’ being that by which something is proved, i.e. Reason, Probans. |
tac ca nānāvidhaṃ pūrvam uktam / | Various kinds of such Reasons have been shown above already. |
tasminniti / | ‘Tasmin’ even if all this be true. |
asyeti vedasya / | ‘Asya’ of the Veda. |
upagamyata iti upapadyate / | ‘Upagamyate’ cannot be accepted. |
vyāsata iti vistareṇa / | ‘Vyāsataḥ’ in detail. |
etat pratikṣepa iti apauruṣeyatvādidūṣaṇe / | ‘Etatpratikṣepe’ to the refutation of all this idea of the Veda not being the work of a Person and so forth. |
satyapi tasminnābhimatārthāsiddhir iti pratipāditatvāt kriyamāṇe taddūṣaṇe prakṛtānupayogitvaṃ syāt // | Even if all this is true, what is wanted by the Mīmāṃsaka is not accomplished; and as this has been explained already; if a further refutation of all this were done, it would be of no use in the present discussion. |
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