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matiḥ sāmayikī vede na tveṣā yujyate yataḥ / | in regard to the Veda however, the idea of ‘conventionality’ is not possible; |
svargayāgādisambandhaḥ kena dṛṣṭo hyatīndriyaḥ // | because by whom has the connection between heaven and the sacrifices (spoken of in the Veda) which is beyond the reach of the senses, been perceived?” (2339-2340) |
padapadārthayoḥ sambandhākaraṇe yo nyāya uktaḥ "śrotuḥ kartuś ca sambandhaṃvaktā kaṃ pratipadyatā"mityādinā, tata eva vaidikavākyasyāpi nityatā vaktavyā / | The reasoning that has been put forward above in support of the view that the Connection between the Word and its Meaning cannot be artificial, under the Text 2257, on the basis of that same reasoning the eternality of the Vedic Sentence also may be asserted. |
samayāt puruṣāṇāṃ hi guṇavṛddhyādivanmatirityatrānaikāntikatām āha dṛṣṭārthavyavahāratvādityādi / adeṅādau dṛṣṭe 'rthe guṇādivyavahārāt samayāt tatra sambhāvyata eva pratītiḥ natu vede svargāder atīndriyatvena samayasya kartum aśakyatvāt // | The Mīmāṃsaka points out the ‘inconclusive’ character of the reasoning put forward by the Opponent, under Text 2337 in the words ‘Because these deal, etc. etc.’ In the case of the Sūtras like ‘adeṅguṇaḥ’, as they deal with things that are perceptible, it is possible that the ideas conveyed may be based upon Convention; this however is not possible in the case of the Veda; because Heaven and such things which are spoken of in the Veda, are beyond the reach of the senses, and hence no Convention could be made (by men) regarding them. |
yadyevam ānarthakyaṃ tarhi prāptamasyetyāha nacānarthakatā tasyeti / | Says the Opponent If that is so, then the Veda may be meaningless. The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2341-2342 next] “It cannot be meaningless; |
[p.643] | (2341b-2342) |
nacānarthakatā tasya tadarthapratyayodayāt / saṅghātatvasya vaktavyam īdṛśaṃ pratisādhanam // | “The argument might be urged in regard to the Mahābhārata also; but it is blocked by the distinct ‘remembrance’ (mention) of its writer. |
vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayaṃ yathā // | though there are such ‘remembrances’ in regard to the Veda also, yet, they are all based upon ‘commendatory’ description”. [Ślokavārtika on sentence, 367]. |
tasyeti vedasya / | ‘It’ stands for the Veda. |
saṅghātatvādityatrāpi sādhane pratisādhanenānaikāntikatām eva darśayannāha saṅghātatvasyetyādi // | The Opponent has urged (under Text 2338 the fact of the Veda being on ‘aggregate’ as a reason for its unreliability. By means of a counterreason, the Mīmāṃsaka shows that the said reason is ‘Inconclusive’: [see verses 2341b-2342 above] |
nanu ca bhāratādhyayane 'pi śakyam evaṃ vaktum, yadbhāratādhyayanaṃ tat sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakaṃ yathedānīntanam iti / | Says the Opponent The same can be said in regard to the ‘study’ of the Mahābhārata also: all ‘study’ of the Mahābhārata is always preceded by the previous study by the Teacher, like the ‘study’ at the present time; |
na caivaṃ śakyate kartum / | but it will not be right to argue thus; |
tasmāt tadvad anaikāntikatā pratisādhanasyetyāśaṅkyāha bhārate 'pītyādi / | hence the counter-argument put forward is ‘inconclusive’. The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2343 above] |
bhārate 'pi bhavedevaṃ kartṛsmṛtyā tu bādhyate / | The same argument might be urged in regard to the Mahābhārata also; |
bhārate 'pi bhavedevaṃ prasañjanaṃ, tatra kartā vyāptaḥ smaryata iti tayā kartṛsmṛtyā pratijñārthasya bādhitatvād aprasaṅgaḥ / vede tu na smṛtiḥ / | but the Author, Vyāsa, is clearly ‘remembered’ (mentioned); hence such an assertion is rendered impossible by this mention of the author, and hence cannot be made. |
nanu ca vede 'pi kartā smaryata eva / | There is no such mention of the ‘Author’ in the case of the Veda. |
yathā ---"agnirāvaścakruḥ sāmāni sāmagirau bhagavati kapotake adharvānāṅgirasa" ityata āha yāpi sārthavādanibandhaneti / | Says the Opponent In regard to the Veda also, the Author is mentioned, in such passages as ‘Agnirāvaścakruḥ sāmāni... atharvānāṅgirasaḥ’. |
yāpi vede kartuḥ smṛtiḥ sārthavādanibandhanā arthaparaṃ vacanam arthavādaḥ, tannibandhanaṃ yasyāḥ sā tathoktā / | The answer to this is ‘Though there are such, etc, etc.’ As regards the mention of ‘authors’ in the Veda, that is based upon commendatory description; ‘arthuvāda’ is the ‘vāda’, description, of ‘artha’, ‘facts’; |
tathāpi cakrur iti na karaṇārthaparaḥ karotiḥ / | hence the word ‘cakruḥ’ in the passage quoted does not stand for creating or producing, but for remembering; |
cakruḥ smṛtavanta ity arthaḥ // | so the meaning is that the persons named ‘remembered’ the Sāman, etc. |
katham ayam artho 'vasita ity āha atītānāgatāvityādi / | Question: How has this meaning been determined? Answer: [see verses 2344-2345 next] |
atītānāgatau kālau vedakāraviyoginau / kālatvāt tadyathā loke{kāle---} vartamānaḥ samīkṣyate // | “The past and future times can have no connection with any ‘author of the Veda’, because they are points of time, like the present time as perceived. |
brahmādayo na vidyānāṃ kartāra iti gamyatām / puruṣatvādihetubhyas tadyathā prakṛtā narāḥ // | It should be understood that Brahmā and the rest are not the makers of the Veda, because they are persons, etc. etc., like ordinary me”. |
pramāṇadvayaṃ sugamam // | The two arguments here set forth are easily understood. |
tataś ca gamyatāṃ vyaktam amṛṣā vaidikaṃ vacaḥ / | “Thus then, it should be understood clearly that the assertion in the Veda is not false (unreliable); |
svārthe vaktranapekṣatvāt padārthe padabuddhivat // [p.644] | because in the expression of its meaning, it is not dependent upon a speaker, just like the word in the expression of the word-meaning (2346). |
tatkṛtaḥ pratya{yaḥ samyag yadayaṃ nityavākyajaḥ / vākyasvarūpaviṣayapratyayas tadbhavo yathā // | “The cognitions derived from the Veda must be right, because they arise from the eternal sentence, like the cognition of the sentence itself. The arguments detailed before are all applicable here”. |
codanāvākyajanitapratyayasya pramāṇatā / | [Ślokavārtika-sambandhākṣepa, 2]. “The cognition brought about by the Vedic injunction must be reliable; |
yato 'yaṃ pratyayastāvad anāptākṛtavākyajaḥ / | (a) because it is produced by causes free from all defects; |
pramāṇe ca sthite vede śiṣyācāryaparamparā / | like the ideas produced by the inferential indicative, or by the assertion of trustworthy persons, or by perception; |
{anādiḥ kalpyamānāpi} nirdoṣatvāya kalpate // | (b) also because it is produced by an assertion which does not emanate from an unreliable person, and because it is free from sublation at all times and places, like the idea produced by the assertion of a reliable person” [Ślokavārtika, sutra 2, 184-185]. |
yadyatra kartṛbhūtavaktranapekṣaṃ jñānam utpādayati, tat tatra mṛṣā na bhavati, yathā padārthe padaṃ, kartṛbhūtapuruṣavaktranapekṣaṃ svārthe pratyayamutpādayati vedavākyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | That which produces a cognition, independently of the person using it, with regard to a certain thing, cannot be false in respect of that thing; e.g. the Word as bringing about the cognition of its own meaning; the Vedic Sentence produces the cognition of its meaning, independently of any speaker in the shape of its Author; |
kartṛbhūtapuruṣasāpekṣajñānotpādakatvena mṛṣātvasya vyāptatvāt / tadviruddhaṃ ca svārthe vaktranapekṣatvam / | ‘falsity’ being ‘less wide’ than ‘being productive of cognitions through dependence upon the composing Person’, which latter thus is the ‘vyāpaka’, the ‘wider condition’, the ‘viruddha’, ‘contrary’, of this would be ‘being productive of cognitions independently of the composing person’; |
padabuddhivad iti / padānām avisaṃvādipratyayanimittatvapradarśanaparam etat / | ‘Like the Word in the expression of its meaning’; this is meant to show that Words are productive of cognitions in conformity with the real state of things; |
natu padabuddhir dṛṣṭāntatvenābhipretā / | and the ‘cognition produced by the word’ is not meant to be the Corroborative Instance; |
kiṃ tarhi padānyeva / | the words themselves being that instance. |
tathāhyatra śabdātmakaḥ sādhyadharmī, tasya cāvisaṃvādijñānotpattinimittatvenāmṛṣātve sādhye tathābhūta eva dṛṣṭāntadharmī nyāyyaḥ / | Thus then, in the argument, Word is the Minor Term; and what is sought to be proved in regard to it is its non-falsity on account of its being the cause of cognitions in conformity with the real state of things -consequently, the Corroborative Instance also should have exactly the same character; |
anyathā sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasya syāt / | otherwise the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum. |
tathāparaḥ prayogaḥ yo nityavākyajanitaḥ pratyayaḥ sa yathārthatvena samyak, yathā vākyasvarūpaviṣayaḥ, nityavākyajanitaścāgnihotrādeḥ svargādisaṃsiddhiniścaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | There is another argument, which is formulated as follows: That Cognition which is brought about by an eternal sentence must be in conformity with the real state of things and hence right; just like the cognition of the verbal form of the sentence itself; the cognition of the fact of the performance of Agnihotra, etc. leading to Heaven is produced by the eternal sentence; |
pūrvaṃ vistareṇa nityatvasya pratipāditatvānnāsiddho hetuḥ / | hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. The eternality (of the Veda) has been proved in detail already; |
codanetyādi pūrvam eva vyākhyātam / | ‘The Cognit ion brought about by the Vedic Injunction, etc. etc.’ This has been already explained. |
tathāparau prayogau yo 'nāptapraṇītavākyajanitaḥ pratyayo{ya}śca deśakālanarāvasthābhedādau visaṃvādarahitaḥ sa pramāṇam, yathā"ptavākyajanitaḥ, pratyayaḥ tathācāyaṃ codanāvākyajanitaḥ pratyaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | There are two other arguments, formulated as follows: The Cognition that is not produced by the assertion of an unreliable Person, and also that which is free from contradiction (sublation, annulment) throughout the variations of time, place and personalities, must be reliable, like the Cognition produced by the assertion of a reliable person; of this same kind is the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunctive Sentence; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing concerned. |
prathamasya hetor nāsiddhiḥ / | The first of the Reasons adduced here cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; |
vistareṇāpauruṣeyatvasya prasādhitatvāt / | because it has been proved at great length that the Veda is not the work of a Person. |
nāpi dvitīyasya / | Nor can the second Reason be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; |
yathoktam "naca svargakāmo yajetetyato vacanāt saṃdigdhamavagamyate, bhavativā sarvo na vā bhavatīti / | because, as has been explained in the following passage ‘The idea brought about by the assertion “Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices” is not an uncertain one; that is, it is not in the form that Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; |
nacāsaṃdigdhamavagamyamānam idam mithyā syāt / | That Cognition alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion that such is not the actual case; |
yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate naitad evam iti sa mithyāpratyayo na caiṣa kālāntare avasthāntare puruṣāntare vā viparyeti tasmād avitatha" iti / | the idea in question (that Heaven follows the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong’ (Śabara-Bhāṣya on 1. |
[p.645] nanu yadi svata eva pramāṇam ālokavat sarvasādhāraṇo vedaḥ kimiti kecit tatra bauddhādayo vipratipadyante / na hi tān prati tasyāprāmāṇyaṃ yuktam ity āśaṅkyāha tasmād ityādi / tasmād ālokavad vede sarvalaukikacakṣuṣi / | From all this it becomes established that the Veda is reliable, by itself, being as it is, the basis of all ideas of Dharma and allied matters; and like Light, it is a trustworthy source of knowledge for all men. Hence, it becomes established that all such theories as ‘all that exists is mere Idea’, which have been propounded by the Buddhists and others, cannot be right. |
ulūkavat pratīghātaḥ kilānyeṣām adharmajaḥ // | The particle ‘Kila’ is meant to indicate displeasure. |
yathā kila paṭutarakiraṇanikaraprotsāritasakalatimiraprasare savitari sakalajanasādhāraṇacakṣuṣi ca samantād bhātyapi svakarmāparāvā{dhā---}nurūpāsaṃjñāpṭutaralocanasyolūkāder na rūpam avatarati darśanapatham, evam adharmatimiropahatabuddhilocanāḥ pratihatimevāsādayanti sthite 'pi sakalalokaikacakṣuṣi vede śākyādaya iti / | “Thus, like light, the Veda being the ‘eye’ for all men, the hostility that arises against it among some people, is like the hostility of the owl (to light), and is the effect of their demerit”. When the Sun, which is the common Eye of all, has dispelled all darkness by its mass of effulgent rays and shines all round, colour does not become visible to the owl which has its Eye inefficient in the performing of its functions; in the same way, people like the Buddhists, whose Eyes of Intelligence have become disabled by Demerit, have their vision obstructed, even when the one common Eye of all people, in the shape of the Veda, is there. |
kilaśabdo 'rucisūcakaḥ // | The particle ‘Kila’ is meant to indicate displeasure. |
tām evābhivyanakti sarvam etad ityādi / | The said ‘hostility’ to the Veda is now expounded: [see verse 2352 above] |
sarvam etad dvijātīnāṃ mithyāmānavijṛmbhitam / | All this is the product of the false pride of the twice-born people. |
ghuṇākṣaravadāpannaṃ sūktaṃ naiṣāṃ hi kiñcana // | ‘Ghuṇākṣaravat’ even by the slightest chance; like the ‘Crow and the Palm-fruit’. |
ghuṇākṣaravad iti / | hence ‘Ghuṇākṣara ‘insect-letters’, stands for ‘mere-chance’. |
kākatālīyanyāyenāpītyarthaḥ // | because it is devoid of those excellences in its source which would make it truthful; |
tatra yaduktaṃ yan mithyātvahetudoṣasaṃsargarahitaṃ tadavitathajñānakaraṇam ityādi / | It has been argued (by the Mīmāṃsaka) that “that which is free from the contact of defects conducive to falsity must be the source of true cognition, etc. etc.”. |
tadatra hetos tāvat siddhatvam abhyupagamyānaikāntikatām udbhāvayann āha ---kartaryasatyapītyādi / | The Author, for the sake of argument, admits the Reason here adduced, and then proceeds to show that it is ‘inconclusive’ [see verse 2353 above] |
eṣeti śrutiḥ / | ‘Eṣā’ stands for the Veda, |
yathā rāgādiyukto mṛṣāvādī dṛṣṭa ityanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ girāṃ mithyātvahetavo doṣā niścitās tathā kṛpādiguṇayuktaḥ satyavāk dṛṣṭa iti kṛpādayoguṇāḥ satyatvahetava iti / | A man under the influence of Love and Hatred, etc. is found to say things that are not true; in this way, through positive and negative concomitance, it is ascertained that there are certain defects which lie at the root of falsity; similarly a man full of mercy and other good qualities is found to be truthful; hence these good qualities are excellences that lie at the root of truthfulness. |
tataś ca kāraṇanivṛttyā mithyātvavatsatyatvam api nivarteta / satyapyapauruṣeyatve satyatvaṃ na siddhyatya{to '}naikāntikatā hetoḥ // | Thus, in the absence (in the case of the Veda) of these causes of truthfulness, the effect, in the shape of Truthfulness, also should be non-existent. So that even though the Veda, may not be the work of a Person, its truthfulness is not established; hence the Reason put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka is ‘Inconclusive (2353) |
atha guṇanivṛttiḥ kathaṃ niścitetyāha guṇāḥ santītyādi / | Question: “But how is it ascertained that the excellences are absent?” |
guṇāṇ satnti na santīti pauruṣeyeṣu śaṅkyate / | It is only in the case of the works of persons that the question arises as to whether the excellences are there or not. |
ānarthyakyamataḥ prāptaḥ gunaśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ // | and we have not the slightest idea of there being any excellence at all. |
yadeva doṣābhāve kāraṇaṃ bhavatābhyadhāyi tadeva satyatvahetuguṇābhāve 'pīti darśayati // | What this shows is that the grounds for denying the defects in the case of the Veda are also the grounds for denying the excellences also [viz.: the absence of a Person as the author]. |
[p.646] ata ityādinopasaṃhṛtya, kāraṇānupalabdhyā satyatvamithyātvayor abhāvaprasaṅgaṃ darśayati / ataḥ satyatvamithyātvahetūnāṃ naca saṃśrayāt / prajñādayākṛpādīnām abhāvānnāsti taddvayam // | Thus, inasmuch as the causes of truthfulness and falsity, in the share (a) of wisdom and mercy and (b) of absence of mercy, etc., are not there, the said two qualities cannot belong to the Veda. Summing up the argument, the Author proceeds to show that when we do not find the causes (of truthfulness and falsity), there cannot be any possibility of the Veda being either true or false: [see verse 2355 above] |
tatra prajñādayaḥ satyatvahetavo mithyātvahetavastvakṛpādaya iti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ / | Wisdom, etc. are the causes of truthfulness, while the absence of mercy, etc. are the causes of falsity, respectively, |
dvayam iti satyatvamithyātve // | ‘The two’ i.e. Truthfulness and Falsity. |
ānarthakyam ataḥ prāptaṃ ṣaḍapūpādivākyavat / | Thus the Veda is reduced to futility, like such sentences as ‘six cakes’. |
arthāścet sampratīyante kriyākārakayoginaḥ // eṣā syāt puruṣākhyānād urvaśīcaritādivat / pratipattir atādarthye 'pyasya prakṛtitas tava // | If it be argued that “meanings are actually comprehended (from Vedic sentences), in respect of actions and active agents”, [the answer is that] there may be such comprehension in cases where there are explanations supplied by men, as in the case of the doings of Urvaśī, even though the words (of the Veda) by themselves do not really convey any such meaning at all, as held by you. |
ṣaḍapūpā daśa dāḍimānītyādyunmattakavākyavadānarthakyaṃ vedasya prāptam / | The Veda now turns out to be as ‘futile’ and meaningless as such stray utterances of the mad-cap as ‘six cakes’, ‘ten pomegranates’ and the like. |
nanu cānarthakyaṃ vedasya sādhayato bauddhasya dṛṣṭabādhā pratijñāyā bhavet / | Says the Mīmāṃsaka “In seeking to prove the futility of the Veda, the Buddhist makes his Proposition contrary to a perceptible fact; |
tathā hyagnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyato vākyād arthapratītiḥ pratyakṣam anubhūyate / | because it is directly perceived that the Vedic sentence actually provides the comprehension of the idea that ‘from the performance of the Agnihotra, follows the attainment of Heaven’. |
sā katham apohyata ityāśaṅkya parasya vacanāvakāśaṃ pariharati eṣetyādi / evaṃ manyate yadi hi svātantreṇānarthakyaṃ vedasya sādhyeta tadā syāt pratijñābādhā, yāvatā prasaṅgāpādanam etat kriyate / | How then can this be denied?” In answer to this, the Author, with a view to leaving no room for the Opponent to say anything, says ‘There may be such comprehension, etc, etc.’ The idea is as follows: There would have been annulment of our Proposition if we tried to prove the meaninglessness of the Veda by itself; what we are doing is only to put forward a Reductio Ad Absurdum; |
na ca tatra prasaṅgena pratijñābādhāsambhavaḥ, tatra pratijñāyamānasyābhāvāt / | and this cannot set aside our Proposition, as there is no Proposition in such an argument at all; |
kevalaṃ parasyaiva vyāpakadharmanivṛttyāpi vyāpyanivṛttimanicchato 'niṣṭāpattyā vacanavyāghātaḥ pratipādyate / | all that is done is to show that when the other party does not admit the absence of the narrower factor even when the wider factor is absent, he incurs an undesirable incongruity and contradicts his own words. |
nāpi dṛṣṭabādhā / | Nor is our Proposition contrary to any perceived fact. |
tathā hi puruṣavyākhyānavaśād eṣā pratītir bhaved anarthakād api vedāt / | Because, even when the Veda is really meaningless, such comprehension of meaning as has been urged may be the effect of the explanations provided by people; |
yathā kenacid agnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādivedavākyasya bharator vaśyādicaritamanenābhidhīyata ityasminnarthe 'nabhijñāya vyākhyāte paścāt tasya tato vākyāt tadarthapratītir bhavatyeva / | for instance, in regard to the Vedic sentence ‘Heaven follows from the Agnihotra’, some one may say ‘what are described in this sentence are the doings of Bharata, Urvaśī and other persons’; and even though he may have offered this explanation without actually knowing the meaning of the sentence, yet subsequently, the man actually has the comprehension of the said idea from the sentence. |
naca tat tenārthenārthavat / | But this does not make the Vedic sentence really expressive of that meaning. |
tadvad iyam arthapratītiḥ prakṛtyā nirarthakād api vedād bhaved iti kuto dṛṣṭabādhā pratijñāyāḥ // | In the same manner, the ‘comprehension of the meaning’ that has been urged by the other party may proceed from the Vedic sentence, even though, in reality, this sentence may be entirely meaningless. |
kiñca bhavatu nāma mithyātvahetor doṣasyaiva nivṛttir na guṇasya, tathāpi hetor anaikāntikatvam anivāryam eveti darśayann āha doṣābhāve 'pītyādi / | How then can our Proposition be annulled by ‘a fact of Perception’, (2356-2357) Further, it may be that in the Veda, there is absence, only of the defects conducive to falsity, not of the excellences; even so, the ‘inconclusiveness’ of your Probans is irresistible. |
doṣābhāve 'pi satyatvaṃ na siddhyatyanyabhāvataḥ / | Even if there be no defects, truthfulness does not become proved simply because the other alternative must be accepted; |
ānarthakyākhyamapyasti tasmād rāśyantaraṃ param // | even so, the ‘inconclusiveness’ of your Probans is irresistible. This is shown in the following: [see verse 2358 above] |
[p.647] yadi hi satyatvamithyātvavyatirekeṇa śabdānāṃ rāśyantaraṃ na syāt, tadaikarāśyabhāve dvitīyarāśisadbhāvo nāntarīyakaḥ syāt / | If, in connection with Words, there were only two possible alternatives falsity and truthfulness, then, the absence of one alternative would necessarily imply the presence of the other; |
yadā tvānarthakyam api tṛtīyaṃ rāśyantaram asti, tadā na mithyātvanivṛttyā satyatvaniścayo 'parasyāpi tṛtīyasyānarthakasyāvinivṛtteḥ // | there is however a third alternative possible that they are meaningless; under the circumstances, the negation of falsity does not necessarily imply the assertion of truthfulness; as there is no negation of the other alternative of meaninglessness. |
atha satyārthavijñānajanmaśaktaḥ svataḥ sthitaḥ / vedo naraḥ{vā---} nirāśaṃsaḥ satyārthoyamato mataḥ // | It might be said that “the Veda by itself, independent of any personalities, stands capable of bringing about the true knowledge of things, and it is on that ground that it is regarded as truthful and reliable”. |
yadyevaṃ sarvadā jñānaṃ nairantaryeṇa tadbhavet / sadāvasthitahetutvāt tadyathābhimate kṣaṇe // | If that is so, that knowledge should be appearing incessantly, because its cause is always there, as at the moment intended. |
ekavijñānakāle vā tajjanyaṃ sakalaṃ bhavet / śaktaṃ hetutayā yadvat tadvijñānaṃ vivakṣitam // | Or at the time that one cognition appears, all cognitions provided by the Veda should appear simultaneously, because it is an efficient cause, as in the case of the intended cognition. |
syād etat yadi vede kṛpādiguṇahetukaṃ satyatvamabhyupagataṃ syāt tadā guṇānāṃ puruṣāśritatvena puruṣanivṛttyā nivṛttau satyāṃ mithyātvavat satyatvam api nivarteta / | The following might be urged “If we had regarded the Veda as truthful by reason of the presence of Mercy and such other excellences.in its author, then, as the excellences would be resting in the Person, when this Person would cease to exist, the excellences would disappear, and thence the truthfulness based upon the excellences would also disappear. |
yāvatā svataḥprāmāṇyād vedasya prakṛtyaiva satyārthajñānahetutvaṃ natu punar guṇakṛtaṃ tena nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, nāpyānarthakyaprasaṅgo vedasyetyetat / | As a matter of fact, however, it is by its very nature that the Veda is the source of knowledge of real things, and this capacity of the Veda is not due to any excellences in any Person; hence there can be no ‘inconclusiveness’ in our Reason. Nor is there any possibility of the Veda being meaningless”. |
yathaiva hi prakṛtyārthavattvam asya vedasya tathā mithyātvam api sambhāvyata ityanaikāntikataiva hetor ityabhiprāyaḥ / | Anticipating this argument of the Mīmāṃsaka, the Author says ‘If that is so, etc. etc.’ Just as, it is by its very nature that the Veda has a meaning, in the same way it might be possible that it is false; so that the Reason still remains Inconclusive. |
etac ca paścād abhidhāsyati / | This is going to be further explained later on. |
prakṛtyā ca jñānahetutve sarvadā yugapac ca tadbhāvijñānaṃ prāpnotyavikalakāraṇatvād iti katham ānarthakyāprasaṅgaḥ / | If the Veda were the source of knowledge, by its very nature, then the cognitions provided by it should appear at all times and all simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there always. How then can the contingency of being meaningless be avoided? |
prayogaḥ yadā yadavikalakāraṇaṃ tat tadā bhavatyeva, yathā abhimatakṣaṇāvasthāyāṃ agnihotrādivākyasambhūtaṃ jñānam avikalakāraṇaṃ ca vedavākyahetukaṃ sarvajñānaṃ, sarvasyāmavasthāyām iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The argument may be formulated as follows When the efficient cause of a certain thing is there, that thing must come about, e.g. the cognition of the Agnihotra provided by the Vedic sentences; the efficient cause, in the shape of Veda, of all cognitions arising from the Vedic sentences, is always present; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
tataḥ paramato jñānajanmaśaktiparikṣayāt / | After that the Veda’s capacity to bring about cognitions would cease; |
na nityaḥ syādayaṃ vedaḥ śaktau vā dhīḥ punar bhavet // | consequently the Veda could not be eternal. |
tathā hi yadi yugapad aśeṣajñānānyutpādyottarakālaṃ tato jñānotpādanaśakteḥ parihīyate vedas tadā śakter ātmabhūtāyāḥ parikṣayāt kṣayī prāpnoti / | if the said capacity continues to exist, then the same cognitions should appear again. It might be said that “the Veda stands in need of explanations, etc., and as these explanations appear in succession, the cognitions (brought about by the Veda) are held to be successive also.” (2363) |
atha na parihīyate tadottarakālaṃ punar api jñānotpattiprasaṅga iti na kathañcin nityasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam // | It cannot be so; when it is efficient (and has the capacity) what sort of ‘dependence’ could there be? If it is efficient because of the presence of that on which it is dependent, what hope, then, can you have of its being eternal? (2364) |
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