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tathaiva cānupūrvyāder jātidvāreṇa setsyati // | so in the same manner, the order or arrangement (of the letters) would become characterised and indicated through the ‘universal’.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 295]. |
yathā ghaṭādeḥ satyapyanityatve jātyāśrayeṇa vyavahāraḥ siddhyati tathā ānupūrvyāder anityatve 'pi setsyati // | Just as in the case of the Jar, etc., even though they are non-eternal, yet their use is indicated by the ‘Universal’, so, in the same way, even though the particular arrangement of the Letters may be non-eternal, their use could be determined and explained. |
vyavahāropalakṣaṇaṃ katham ity āha tālvādijātaya ityādi / | How the use could be determined and indicated is next explained: [see verses 2293-2294 next] |
tālvādijātayas tāvat sarvapuṃsu vyavasthitāḥ / | “Such universals as the ‘palate’, etc. are always present (in their universal or common form) in all men; |
vaktā tāṃśca dhvanīṃstābhir upalakṣya nirasyati // | and it is through these that the speaker emits the articulations; |
teṣāṃ ca jātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ / yāvad varṇaṃ pravartante vyaktayo vā tadanvitāḥ // | and there are distinct universals of these (articulations) also, which serve to bring about the manifestation of the sounds, and there are as many of these as there are letters’ or it is the particular individuals (articulations) themselves as associated with the said universals that bring about the manifestation of the particular letter-sounds.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 296-297]. |
tathā hi tālvādisthānajātayaḥ sarvapuruṣasamavāyitālvādisamavāyāt sarvapuruṣeṣu vyavasthitāḥ / | Such Universals as ‘the Palate’ and other speech-centres subsist in the individual Palates of all men; and as such are present in all men; |
prayoktā ca tābhir eva tālvādijātibhis tālvādīnyupalakṣyāvadhārya paścād dhvanīvyañjakānvāyūnnirasyati prerayati / | it is through these Universals that the Speaker determines these speech-centres, and then emits exhales through them the Articulations in the shape of the manifestive air-currents; |
nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇa viśeṣe buddhir iti nyāyāt / | this is in accordance with the maxim that ‘there can be no idea of the Qualified until there is cognition of the Qualification’. |
teṣāṃ dhvanīnāṃ yadyapyanityatvam, tathāpi gavāśvādijātivadyāvadvarṇaṃ yāvanto varṇās tāvatyo jātayaḥ santi, tā eva vyaktisahāyinyaḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavo bhavanti / | Though these Articulations are evanescent, yet like the Universal ‘Cow’ and the like, there are as many ‘Universals’ as there are Letters; and these same Universals, associated with the Individuals, become manifestaters of the Letter-Sounds. Or, the individual Articulations themselves, associated with the Universals, proceed to manifest the Sounds in consonance with the Letters. |
yadvā dhvanivyaktaya eva jātisahāyinyo varṇānurūpeṇa vyañjanāya pravartata iti pakṣāntaram // | This is an alternative view. “The order of sequence among the articulations would be due to the order among the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate, etc.; |
nanu ca yadyapi dhvanīnāṃ jātayo bhinnāḥ santi, tathāpi te dhvanayo jātyupalakṣitā api na kramamantareṇa varṇābhivyaktikramaṃ sampādayitum alam / | Says the Opponent Though there are distinct Universals of the Articulations, yet, even when these Articulations are marked by those Universals, they cannot bring about the particular order in which the Letters are manifested, unless the Order is there. |
tathā hi teṣāṃ jātibhedena bhinnānām api na svataḥ kramo 'sti, niravayavatvāt / | Because even though, through their respective Universals, they are distinct from one another, yet there can be no Order inherent in themselves; because they are impartite things. |
tat kathaṃ vyañjakakramakṛto varṇānāṃ kramāvasāya ityāśaṅkyāha tatretyādi / | Under the circumstances, how can there be any idea of the Order among Letters, brought about by the Order in their manifester? |
tatra tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgakramapūrvakam / | The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2295 above] |
[p.632] yadyapi dhvanīnām ānupūrvyaṃ na svataḥ, tathāpi teṣāṃ tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgā evānupūrvyaṃ sampādayanti / | Though there is no Order among the Articulations by themselves, yet the Order among them is brought about by the Conjunctions and Disjunctions. |
ubhayasya ca tālvādisaṃyogādikramasya dhvanikramasya ca svāśraya samavetajātīdvāreṇa nityateti sarvamanākulam // | The eternality of both, i.e. (1) of the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions with the Palate, etc., and (2) of the Order of the Articulations, is due to the Universals subsisting in them respectively. |
kathaṃ punar jātyā kramasyānityasyāpi sato nityatvaṃ lakṣayituṃ śakyam / | Question: When the Order is non-eternal by itself, how can its eternality be indicated by the Universal, by virtue of which, it would form part of Usage? |
yathaiva bhramaṇādīnāṃ bhāgā jātyādilakṣitāḥ / | Just as in the case of the particular Actions of Moving About and the like, ‘and the like’ including Ant-lines, etc. |
atrātyādiśabdena pipīlikādijātiparigrahaḥ / tathā tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāk krāmānu vṛttistālvādijātibhir lakṣitā vyavahārāya sampadyata iti sambandhaḥ / tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāgiti / tālvādayaś ca dhvanayaś ca varṇāśceti vigṛhya samāsaḥ, tān bhajata iti tathoktā / | the presence of the Order of Sequence becomes a part of usage, through the ‘Universal’, etc. subsisting in the various factors, here also ‘etcetera’ includes the Universals in the Ant-lines, etc., so, in the same manner, the presence of the Order of Sequence among the Palate, the Articulations and the Letters is adopted in use, as indicated by the Universals subsisting in the Palate, etc. The compound ‘tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāk’ is to be expounded as ‘tālvādi’, ‘Palate, etc.’ ‘dhvanayaḥ’, ‘Articulations’, and ‘varṇāḥ’, ‘Letters’ [a copulative compound] ‘that which bears this’ is ‘tālvā... |
anena tālvādisaṃyogādikramaḥ svajātyupalakṣito dhvaninirāsahetuḥ, dhvanikramo 'pi tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgakramapūrvakaḥ svajātyupalakṣito varṇābhivyaktikramaḥ nibandhanam, so 'pyarthapratīter ityuktaṃ bhavati / | Thus what is meant is that (a) the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, indicated by its own ‘Universal’, is the cause of the exhalation of the Articulation, (2) the Order of the Articulations, due to the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc., indicated by its own ‘Universal’, becomes the cause of the Order in the manifestation of the Letters; and this last becomes the cause of the comprehension of the meaning. |
kvacid bhāgā iti pāṭhaḥ / | In some places, the reading is ‘bhāgāḥ’; |
yathā bhramaṇādīnāṃ karmaṇāṃ bhāgā aṃśāḥ kramavanto jātyā tadanyena vā kenacid dharmeṇopalakṣitā vyavahārahetavo bhavanti / tathā tālvādibhāk kramānuvṛttir vyavahārāṅgam iti / | under which the meaning would be as follows: Just as the parts of the Actions of Moving About and the like, which appear in a certain Order of Sequence, become the basis of usage, when they are marked by a ‘Universal’ or by some other property, similarly the Order of Sequence in the Palate, etc. becomes part of the usage. |
kecit kramānusmṛtirevaṃ syād iti paṭhanti / | Some people read ‘Kramānusmṛtirevam syāt’ (in place ‘Kramānuvṛtti-revam syāt’); |
evaṃ tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāk tālvādiviṣayā tālvādijātyupalakṣitāḥ kramānusmṛtir bhaviṣyati // | which would be construed as follows: Just as the parts of the Actions of Moving About, etc. are remembered as marked by the Universal, etc., similarly in the case of the Palate, etc. also there would be remembrance of the Order, as marked by the Universal, etc. |
athavā na dhvanīnāṃ tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgakramākṛtamānupūrvyam, api tu svata eva, sāvayavatvād iti darśayann āha vyaktīnām iti / | Or, the Order of the Articulations may not be due to the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc., it may be due to the Articulations themselves, because they are made up of component parts. This is the view put forward in the following: [see verse 2297 next] |
vyaktīnām eva vā saukṣmāj jātidharmāvadhāraṇam / | “Or, the individuals (articulations) themselves, being extremely subtle in their nature, there is cognition of the properties of the ‘universal’; |
tadvaśena ca varṇānāṃ vyāpitve 'pi kramagrahaḥ // | and it is through this that there is cognition of order among the letters, even though these are all-pervading.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 300]. |
dhvanīnām / | (2297) commentary. |
teṣāṃ hi ye bhāgā ārambhakāḥ kramavantas te sūkṣmā na tair vyavahārasiddhiḥ / | The parts components of the Articulations which appear in a certain order, are extremely subtle; hence there can be no usage through them; |
atas teṣu jātisvabhāvā dharmā nityatvādayaḥ pratiniyataśabdābhivyaktihetavo nirūpyante / | consequently the properties of the Universal such as eternality and the rest become recognised definitely known as the causes of the manifestation of the Word-Sound. |
tataḥ kiṃ siddhaṃ syād ity āha tadvaśenetyādi / | Question: What if that is so? |
satyapi hi vyāpitve varṇāḥ kramavad dhvanivaśāt kramavanta iva bhāsante // [p.633] evam ityādinā prakṛtam upasaṃharati / | Answer: ‘It is through this, etc. etc.’ Even though the Letters are all-pervading, yet they appear as if in an Order of Sequence, on account of the Order of the Articulations which always appear in a certain order. |
evaṃ dhvaniguṇān sarvān nityatvena vyavasthitān / varṇā anupatantaḥ syur arthabhedāvabodhinaḥ // | “Thus it is that the letters, following up the properties of the articulation which appear there as eternal, become expressive of diverse meanings.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 301]. |
dhvaniguṇāḥ kramatīvra{tva}mandatvapradeśavṛttitvādayaḥ / | ‘Properties of the Articulation’, such as sequential Order, greater or less intensity, limitation in space and so forth. |
nityatvena vyavasthitāniti / | ‘Which appear there as eternal’, through the Universals. |
jātidvāreṇa / | ‘Following up’ in accordance with. |
evaṃ yadi nāma nityatvasarvagatatvābhyāṃ varṇānāṃ svataḥkramādayo na sambhavanti tathāpi vyañjakatvanigatā ete varṇeṣvarthapratipattyaṅgam ti vistareṇa pratipāditam / | Thus, it has been explained in detail that, if on account of their being eternal and all-pervading, Letters cannot have any Order, etc. by themselves, even so, all this Order, etc., really belonging to the manifesting Articulations, become attributed to the Letters and thereby become contributories to the comprehension of the meaning of (the Word). |
sāmpratam yadvā kālagatā evaite dhvanyupādhikāḥ pravibhāgā varṇeṣu gṛhyamāṇāḥ pratipattyaṅgam iti pakṣāntaraṃ darśayann āha ānupūrvītyādi / | Now the Mimamsaka proceeds to set forth another view, under which the said distinctions of Order, etc. really belong to Time, of which the Articulations are only the qualifying adjuncts; |
kālasya pravibhāgās te jñāyante dhvanyupādhayaḥ // | and these being perceived in the Letters, become contributories to the comprehension of the meaning. |
yathoktam | [see verse 2299 above] |
"vyāpāravyatirekeṇa parimāṇakriyāvatām / | The compound ‘dhvanyupādhayaḥ’ is to be expounded as ‘The distinctions of Time which have the manifesting Articulations for their qualification’, (2299) |
nityam ekam vibhudravyaṃ kālameke pracakṣate // | Says the Opponent People who have postulated Time have regarded it as one, all-pervading and eternal; |
" iti tat kathaṃ tasya pravibhāgo yujyata ity āha kālaścaika ityādi / | under the circumstances, how can there be any ‘distinctions’ (or divisions) of Time? The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2300-2301 above] |
kālaścaiko vibhur nityaḥ pravibhakto 'pi gamyate / varṇavat sarvabhāveṣu vyajyate kenacit kvacit // | ‘Divided also’; the term ‘also’ goes with all that has gone before it is one also, eternal also, all-pervading also; though it has been misplaced in the Text. |
kathaṃ pravibhakta ity āha varṇavat sarvabhāveṣviti / | Question: In what way is it ‘divided’? Answer: ‘Among all things, like Letters’. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathaiko 'pi nityo gakārādivarṇo yadā kenacid dhvaniviśeṣeṇa kvacit pradeśe vā vyajyate, tadā deśādivibhāgena pravibhakto gamyate, tathā kālo 'pi / | What is meant is as follows: Though the Letter, Ga for instance, is one only and eternal, yet when it comes to be manifested by a particular Articulation at a particular place then it is known as divided through the divisions of place, etc,; similarly Time also; |
yadyapi cāsau sravadārthavyāpi, tathāpi ydā kenacitkriyāviśeṣeṇ kvacitpadārthe vyagyate, tadā pravibhakto gṛhyate, yadā tu varṇeṣu vyajyate tadārthapratyayāṅgaṃ bhavati / | though it pervades over all things, yet when it comes to be manifested by a certain action in regard to a certain object, it becomes known as ‘divided’ or ‘distinct’; and when it is manifested in connection with Letters, it becomes contributory to the act of expressing. |
yadi tarhi pravibhakto nityavibhutvaṃ kathaṃ tasyāvagatam ity āha anyatrāpītyādi / | Question: If Time is so ‘divided’, how is it regarded as eternal and all-pervading? |
anyatrāpi latākisalādau, [p.634] sadbhāvāt sattāvat tasya nityatvaṃ vibhutvaṃ ca siddham / | Answer: ‘As it exists, etc. etc.’ ‘Elsewhere’ i.e. in Creepers, Leaves of trees and so forth; because it exists in these also, its eternality and allpervasiveness become recognised and established. |
nityatāgrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam // | ‘Eternality’ alone is mentioned in the Text, by way of illustration. |
tasmād ityādinā svapakṣasiddher upasaṃhāraḥ / | ‘From all this, etc. etc.’ This sums up the Mīmāṃsaka’s own view. |
kramādirūpaḥ // | ‘Such property’ as Order, etc. |
yadi tarhi kāladharmo vyañjakadhvanidharmo vā kramaḥ, natu paramārthato varṇadharmas tat katham asya pratyāyanāṅgatvam / na hyanyadharmo hyanyasya bhavatītyāha paradharmo 'pītyādi / | Says the Opponent If the Order then is a property of Time, or of the manifesting Articulation, and does not really belong to Letters, then how does it become contributory to the expressing of the meaning? Certainly the property of one thing cannot belong to the other. |
uktam iti / | The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2303 above] |
nāvārūḍhāś ca gacchanta ityādinā / nāvārūḍhavacanaṃ hi sakalayānārūḍhopalakṣaṇam / | ‘As has been pointed out’ in such assertions as ‘People going in a boat, etc. etc.’ where the ‘boat’ is meant to stand for all kinds of conveyance. |
aśvajavādivad iti / yathā aśvādigato javas tadārūḍhānāṃ puṃsāṃ deśāntaraprāpter vṛkṣādeśca gamanapratipatter aṅgaṃ bhavati, tathā dhvanigato 'pi kramo varṇasyārthapratyāyanaṅgam iti / | ‘Like the Speed of the Horse, etc.’ For example, when people are riding a horse, the speed of the horse is contributory to the man’s reaching a distant-place, and also the man’s notion that the trees on the roadside are moving. Similarly the Order, though belonging to the Articulation, becomes contributory to the Letters bringing about the comprehension of the meaning. |
evaṃ vistareṇa śabdānityatvapratijñāyā arthāpattipramāṇabādhitatvaṃ samarthya upasaṃharannāha nityatāyām ityādi / tasmād ityupasaṃhāro 'tra draṣṭavyaḥ / | Having thus shown in detail that the assertion of the non-eternality of Words is annulled by Presumption, the Mīmāṃsaka sums up his position in the words ‘As regards eternality, etc. etc.’ The term ‘tasmāt’ as introducing the summing up is to be regarded as understood here. |
sarveṣām iti / na kevalaṃ varṇasyārthapratītyanyathānupapattyā nityatvaṃ siddham, kiṃ tarhi---, tālvādīnāṃ dhvanīnāṃ ca / | ‘In the case of all things’ What is meant is that it is not the eternality of Letters only that is proved by the fact that the expression of meaning by the Letters cannot be otherwise explained, but the eternality of the Palate, etc. and also of the Articulations. |
yathoktaṃ bhāṣye ---" uccaritamātre hi vinaṣṭe śabde nacānyo 'nyānarthaṃ pratyāyayituṃ śaknuyād ato na paramārthamuccāryeta / | This has been declared in the Bhāṣya (Śabara. 18, Trans., p. 37) in the following words: ‘If the Word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of anything to others; and in that case, the Word could not be uttered for the benefit of another. |
atha na vinaṣṭas tato bahuśa upalabdhatvād arthāvagama iti yukta"miti // | On the other hand, if the Word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the Word several times, there is comprehension of its meaning’. |
svavacanābhyupetāgamapratītibādhām api pratijñāyāḥ pratipādayann āha svavākyādītyādi / svavākyādivirodhaś ca śabdānityatvasādhane / | The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out that in denying the eternality of Words, the Opponent goes against (a) his own words, (b) against his own doctrine, (c) against scriptures, and (d) against common experience: see verses 2304-2305 above] |
ādiśabdenābhyupetādi virodhagrahaṇam / | ‘His own words, etc.’ ‘Etc.’ is meant to include the contradiction of his own accepted doctrines. |
"nacādṛṣṭārthasambandhaḥ śabdo bhavati vācaka" ityādinā / | ‘It has been explained’ Under the Text ‘A Word is not expressive if its connection with the meaning is not known’, (See Text 2234.) |
tenārthapratyayāpannād iti / | ‘Consequently, it follows, etc. etc.’ The ‘eternality’ follows from is proved by the comprehension of the meaning. |
arthapratītyanyathānupapattisiddhānnityatvād iti yāvat // | That is, the eternality is proved by the fact of the ‘comprehension of meaning’ being otherwise inexplicable. |
[p.635] abhyupetabādhām āha ---{ arthābhidhāneti} | [verse 2306]: |
arthapratītisāmarthyaiḥ pratiśāstram upāśritaiḥ / | The following Texts point out that the Opponent’s assertion implies the rejection of his own accepted doctrine: [see verse 2306 above] |
pratītibādhām āha sarvaloketyādi / sarvalokaprasiddhyā ca bādhaḥ pūrvoktayā diśā / | The Mīmāṃsaka shows that the Opponent’s Proposition goes against all scriptures [see verse 2307 above] |
pratyakṣeṇa viruddhatvaṃ prāgeva pratipāditam // | The Mīmāṃsaka next points out that the Opponent’s Proposition is annulled by common experience [see verses 2308-2309 above] |
pūrvoktā dik samanantaraślokoktā / | [verses 2308-2309]: ‘In the manner shown above’, in the preceding text. |
evaṃ tu paṭhitavyam / "arthapratītisāmarthyaiḥ sarvalokāvadhāritaiḥ / lokaprasiddhyā nāśitvaṃ bādhyate sarvavādinām // | But it should be read as follows ‘For all parties the perishability of words becomes annulled by the potencies of words to bring about the comprehension of their meanings, which potencies are definitely recognised by all men and also by common experience |
pūrvoktamanumānādivirodhaṃ smarayann āha anumānavirodho 'pītyādi / prāgukto hetur nānāprakāraḥ "deśakālādibhinnāś ca gośabdavyaktibuddhayaḥ / | The words ‘There is annulment by Inference, etc. etc.’ serve to remind the reader of what has been said before regarding the Buddhist’s Proposition being opposed to Inference, etc. The ‘reasons stated before’ have been of several kinds those detailed in the Texts 2121 et seq. |
% v.2117 " ityanena // | ‘Has been pointed out before’ under Text 2117. |
śiṣṭān api pakṣadoṣān hetudoṣāṃś ca kāṃścit pratipipādayiṣurāha vaktavyam ityādi / | The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out the defects in the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term) and in the ‘Reasons’ (Probans) of the Reasoning put forward (by the Opponent) [see verses 2310-2312 above] |
aprasiddhaviśeṣatvam āśrayāsiddhahetutā // siddhāntabhedena śabdagatān vikalpamāha / | The Texts sets forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of ‘Śabda’ ‘Word-sound’ (in the present context). |
tatra satvarajastamaḥsvabhāvatvāt triguṇaḥ [p.636] sāṅkhyair iṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ / | (a) According to the Sāṃkhyas, ‘Śabda’ is held to be something consisting of the ‘Three Attributes’ of Harmony, Energy and Inertia. |
paudgalo digambaraiḥ / pudgalāḥ paramāṇava ucyante / teṣām ayaṃ paudgalaḥ / | (b) According to the Digambara (Jainas), it is something atomic; ‘pudgala’ is Atom; what pertains to the pudgala, is paudgala, ‘atomic’; |
tadātmaka iti yāvat / | i.e. consisting of the Atom. |
ākāśaguṇaḥ kāṇādair iṣṭaḥ / varṇavyatirikto nādātmā laukikaiḥ / | (c) The followers of Kaṇāda hold it to be a ‘quality of Ākāśa (d) According to the common people, it is something of the nature of mere Bound, as apart from the Letters; |
yathoktaṃ pātañjale bhāṣye ---" athavā pratipadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda" iti / | as has been declared in Patañjalūs Bhāṣya ‘Or, Śabda among men is known as sound whose meaning is well known’. |
vāyurūpamavācakaṃ śikṣākāraiḥ / | (e) According to the author of the Śikṣā, it is of the nature of Air, not expressive; |
yathāhuḥ ---" vāyurāpadya{te} śabdamā{vā}"niti / padasphoṭātmako vākyasphoṭātmakaś ca vaiyākaraṇair iṣṭaḥ / | as declared by them ‘The Air becomes the Śabda (f) The Grammarians hold Śabda to consist of the Word-sphoṭa and Sentence-sphoṭa; |
āvṛttiparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate // iti / sārūpyam sādṛśyaṃ vindhyavāsīṣṭam / bauddhair anyanivartanamanyāpoho vācakatvena ya iṣṭaḥ / | as has been said by them The sounds sow the seed in the Buddhi, along with the last articulation, and when this seed has developed by repetition, the Śabda becomes cognised’, (g) According to Vindhyavāsin, Śabda consists in ‘similarity (h) According to the Bauddhas what expresses the meaning consists in the ‘exclusion of others’, called ‘Āpoha of others’. |
tatra yadyevaṃ sāṅkhyādīṣṭānām anityatvaṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatāpakṣadoṣaḥ / | If what the Buddhist seeks to prove is the ‘non-eternality’ of these eight kinds of ‘Śabda’ as postulated by the Sāṅkhya and others, then the ‘Subject’ becomes open to the defect of being futile, which is expressed in its own form; |
svarūpeṇaiva nirdiśyata ityanena siddharūpasya nirastatvāt / | as such ‘Subject’ has been rejected by us. |
naca mīmāṃsakair īdṛśe śabde nityatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam / | Nor do the Mīmāṃsakas wish to prove the eternality of such Śabda as these. |
kiñcāsmān prati triguṇādyātmakasya śabdasya dharmiṇo viśeṣasyāsiddhatvād aprasiddhaviśeṣatvaṃ pakṣadoṣaḥ / | Further, any such ‘subject’ as Śabda in the particular forms of the Three-Attribute entity’ and the rest is not admitted or known, so far as we are concerned; hence the ‘subject’ becomes open to the charge of having its exact nature unknown. |
hetoścāśrayāsiddhatādoṣaḥ / | Text 2311 presents what may be regarded as a ‘literary curiosity’. |
tathāvidhasya dharmiṇo 'siddhatvāt //2310 // atheti / | Kamalaśila says, this represents the view of the Śikṣā that ‘the Śabda consists of Air and is inexpressive’; |
athāsmadiṣṭaḥ pakṣaḥ syāt svayam etaddvayaṃ tava / śabdamātramathocyeta śabdatvaṃ vastathāsati // | the reading in the quotation being ‘vāyurūpamavācakam’. The reading in the Ślokavārtika itself, however, is ‘vāyurūpo’rthavācakaḥ’, which makes the Śabda, ‘arthavācaka’, expressive of meaning. |
yat kiñcid iha sāmānyaṃ nityaṃ sarveṇa kalpyate // | The Nyāyaratnākara says this is the view of the Śikṣā One or the other Tattvasaṅgraha and its Commentary on the one hand, and Ślokavārtika and its Commentary on the other, must be wrong; |
athāsmābhir mīmāṃsakair yo 'bhimato varṇā eva gakārādayaḥ śabdo na vyatiriktaḥ ityeṣa pakṣaḥ syāt / | as the subject-matter of the whole discussion is the expressive Śabda, not that which is inexpressive. We, Mīmāṃsakas, hold that ‘Śabda’ consists only in the Letters ‘Ga’ and the rest, it is not anything apart from these; |
tathāsati bauddhāder etad dvayam aprasiddhaviśeṣatvaṃ pratijñādoṣa āśrayāsiddhatā ca hetudoṣa āpadyate / | and if this is the Śabda which the Buddhist and others make the ‘Subject’ of their Proposition, then both these fallacies the Proposition having the exact nature of its Subject unknown and the Reason having no basis would befall them. |
śabdamātramathocyeta, sādhyadharmitveneti śeṣaḥ / tataś ca śabdatvasāmānaṃ vo yuṣmākam anityam, prāpnotītyadhyāhāryam / | If mere ‘Śabda’ were asserted i.e. as the subject of the Proposition, then for you the universal ‘Śabda’ would itself be non-eternal; the phrase ‘be non-eternal’ is to be supplied. |
tathā hi mātraśabdena sarvaviśeṣatyāge kṛte kimaparamanyat sāmānyācchabdamātraṃ bhavet / tasmāt sāmarthyād bhavadbhiḥ śabdatvam evānityaṃ pratijñātaṃ syāt / | Because the epithet ‘mere’ means the exclusion of all particular features, what else apart from the Universal could it be that would be ‘mere Śabda’? Thus by implication your proposition would be declaring the non-eternality of the Universal ‘Śabda’ itself. ‘Be it so, what then?’ |
bhavatvevam iti cet, netyāha tacca sarveṣāṃ nityam iṣṭam ityādi / tathā hi bauddhair apyanyāpohavādibhir uktam "jātidharmavyavasthite"riti / | That cannot be right; as ‘such a view would be contrary, etc. etc. for instance, the Buddhists themselves, who postulate the Exclusion, ‘Apoha, of others’, have declared that ‘it is the Universal that stands’, So that the view now put forth would involve the contradiction of what has been admitted by them. |
tadeva darśayati yat kiñcidihetyādi / yat kiñcit svasiddhāntānusāreṇa sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ tat sarvaṃ sarvavādibhir nityamiṣyate / | This is what is shown in the words ‘In one form or the other, etc, etc,’ In whatever form the ‘Universal’ has been postulated by philosophers, in accordance with their respective doctrines, it is held, by all parties, to be eternal. |
anyathā vyaktivadaparāparotpatter vyaktyantargatyāpanā{pātā---}ttasya sāmānyarūpataiva hīyate // | If it were not so, then, like the Individuals, each Universal, appearing after the other, would become intermingled; and the very character of the ‘Universal’ would become lost. |
[p.637] evaṃ tāvat sādhyadharmivikalpena pakṣadoṣamudbhāvyedānīṃ sādhyadharmavikalpenodvibhāvayiṣurāha anityatvaṃ cetyādi / | Having thus pointed out the defects in the ‘Subject’ through the various alternative views regarding the nature of the thing itself (Śabda) the Mīmāṃsaka now proceeds to point out the same, through the various alternative views regarding the exact nature of the Probandum (non-eternality): [see verses 2315-2316 above] |
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