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sambandhagrahaṇapurassaratvād arthapratyayasyeti bhāvaḥ / | That is, the cognition of the meaning always follows from the cognition of the Connection. |
anya iti hetuḥ sambandhyate / | ‘Other’ goes with ‘cause |
darśanasyeti / śabdārthapratīteḥ / | ‘Of the perception’ i.e. of the apprehension of the meaning of the Word. |
heturityetad apekṣā ceyaṃ ṣaṣṭhī / sambandhādityanyāpekṣā pañcamī / | ‘Darśanasya’ the Genitive is to be construed with ‘hetuḥ’. In ‘Sambandhāt’, the Ablative is to be construed with ‘anyaḥ’. |
atreti śabdārthavyavahāre / | ‘In the case in question’ i.e. in the matter of the usage relating to Words and their meanings. |
anye tu śaktyaśaktyor narāṇāṃ tu bhedāt tatrāvirodhitet yatraivopapattirūpeṇa varṇayanto vyācakṣate sambandhād iti / puruṣaśakter ity arthaḥ / | Other people take the first half of the text itself as providing the reason demanded by the Opponent, and explain the term ‘Sambandhāt’, as ‘apart from the capacities of men’; |
dārṣṭāntikam upasaṃharann āha evam ivetyādi / | and ‘atra’ as standing for the ‘white object’ spoken of above. |
evam evendriyais tulyaṃ vyavahāropalambhanam / | “Thus then, the ‘knowledge of usage’ stands on the same footing as the sense-organs; |
yeṣāṃ syāt te 'vabudhyante tato 'rthaṃ netare 'ndhavat // | so that those who have the said knowledge apprehend the meaning, while others, not having the said knowledge, do not apprehend it, just as the blind man (being devoid of the visual organ, does not apprehend colour).” [Ślokavārtika-sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 39]. |
vyavahriyate asmād iti vyavahāraḥ śabdārthasambandhaḥ / | The term ‘vyavahāra’, ‘usage’, here stands for the Connection between the word and its meaning, in the sense that it is on the basis of this that words are used ‘vyavahriyate asmāt’; |
tasyopalambhanam parijñānam / tadindriyais tulyam / | the ‘Knowledge’ of this Connection, stands on the same footing as the sense-organs; |
tathā hi / yeṣām evendriyam asti, te 'rthamupalabhante / yeṣāṃ tu nāsti, te satyapyarthe nopalabhante / evaṃ yeṣāṃ sambandhaparijñānam asti, te śabdād artham avabudhyante / | for instance, those alone who have the sense-organ perceive the object, while those who have not do not perceive it even though the object is there; similarly, those who have the knowledge of the Connection comprehend the meaning from the Word, while those who do not have that knowledge do not comprehend it, even though the Connection is there; |
yeṣāṃ tu nāsti, te satyapi sambandhe nopalabhanta ti sarvaṃ samānaṃ kila // | “As a matter of fact, for all persons ignorant (of the connection), the connection becomes known through long-continued tradition, and there has been no beginning of the connection.” (2273) |
yo 'yaṃ prathamaṃ sambandhasya kartā kena tasmai sambandhaḥ pratipādita iti vaktavyam, [p.627] svayam eveti cen na tathaivānyeṣām api prasaṅgāt / | [Under the view that the Connection of the Word with its meaning was created, set up at a certain time, by a certain person] it has to be explained, who the Person was who created the Connection and to whom he communicated it. It cannot be right to say that the man learns it by himself; |
athānyatas tasyāpyanyata iti cet, evaṃ tarhyanāditvān na kenacit kriyata itidarśayati sarveṣām ityādi / sarveṣām anabhijñānāṃ pūrvapūrvaprasiddhitaḥ / siddhaḥ sambandha ityevaṃ sambandhādir na vidyate // | as the same might be said regarding others also. If it was communicated to the present man by some one else, then it should have been communicated to that man also by some one else, then, in that case, there being no beginning, the Connection must be regarded as eternal. This is shown by the Mīmāṃsaka in the following: [see verse 2273 above] |
śabdārthasambandhaḥ sa vṛddhavyavahārapūrvakaḥ, sambandhatvādidānīntarasambandhavat / sambandhaś ca vivādāspadībhūtaḥ sambandha iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The argument may be formulated as follows: The Connection between the Word and its meaning must be regarded as preceded by the usage of elderly people, because it is a Connection, like Connections of the present time, the Connection under dispute is also a Connection; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
pratyuccāraṇanirvṛttir na yuktā vyavahārataḥ / sargādau ca kriyā nāsti tādṛkkālo hi neṣyate // | “Convention in regard to each utterance cannot be made by usage. At the time of the beginning of the creation, there could not be any such action; |
iṣyate hi jagatsarvaṃ na kadācid anīdṛśam / | The view held by us is that the world was never otherwise than what it is now. |
na mahāpralaye nāma jñāyate pāramārthikaḥ // | As for the ‘universal dissolution’, it cannot be known that there can be any such in reality. |
rātrir vā pralayo nāma līnatvātsarvakarmaṇām / | In fact ‘dissolution’ may be a name for the night only, when there is cessation of all activity; |
divasaḥ sṛṣṭisaṃjñaś ca sarvaceṣṭātisarjanāt // | the lay in that case would be ‘creation because all sorts of activity proceed at that time. |
deśotsādakulotsādarūpo vā pralayo bhavet / | Or ‘dissolution’ may be there in the form of the destruction of particular countries or destruction of particular families. |
pralaye tu pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvocchedātmake nahi // | There is no evidence for any such dissolution as consists in the destruction of all things.” (2274-2277) |
vyavahārata iti / vyavahārapravṛtteḥ / | [see verses 2274-2277 above] ‘By usage’ i.e. through the setting up of usage; |
anyathā hi pūrvamakṛtasambandhād vyavahārapravṛttir na syād iti yāvat / | what is meant is that, otherwise, there could be no setting up of the usage prior to the setting up of the Connection. |
sāmprataṃ jagadādau ceti yaduktaṃ tasya pratividhānam āha sargādau ceti / | It has been asserted that the Connection could have been set up either at the beginning of Creation or it might be set up in the present. |
tādṛgiti śabdārthasambandhaśūnyaḥ sṛṣṭisaṃshārātmakaḥ / | This is rebutted by the words ‘At the time, etc. etc.’ ‘Such time’ i.e. the time of the dissolution of the world, when there would be no connection between words and meanings. |
anīdṛśam iti / | ‘Otherwise than what it is’; |
sarvocchedātmakam / | i.e. in the state of the utter annihilation of all things; |
tatra pramāṇābhāvāt / | as there is no evidence for this. |
kathaṃ tarhi loke pralayādivyavahāraprasiddhir ity āha na mahāpralaya ityādi / | Question: How then do people speak of the ‘Dissolution’? Answer: ‘As for Universal Dissolution, etc. etc.’; |
sarvocchedātmakaḥ parikalpitas tu na vāryata ityabhiprāyaḥ / | ‘cannot be known’ by people: ‘in reality’ what is meant is that an assumed destruction of all things may not be denied. |
tameva darśayati rātrir vetyādi / | These assumptions are exemplified ‘Dissolution may be the name for Night only’. |
atha pāramārthikaḥ kasmānneṣyata ity āha pralaye tvityādi //2274 // | Question: Why is not the real ‘Dissolution’ admitted? Answer; ‘There is no evidence, etc. etc.’ (2274-2277) |
bhavatu nāma pāramārthikaḥ pralayaḥ, tathāpi tadānīm abhraṣṭasmṛtiprajñādisaṃskārakasya kasyacidīśvarādeḥ kartur abhāvān na sambandhakāraṇaṃ yuktam iti darśayann āha nacāluptetyādi / nacāluptasmṛtiḥ kaścit sṛṣṭisaṃhārakārakaḥ / | “As a matter of fact there can be no eternal creator and destroyer, in the shape of god or any such being, who, not having lost his memory, could set up the connection.” (2278) Granting that there is real ‘Dissolution’; even so, as at that time, there would be no creative Person, in the shape of God, who has not entirely lost his memory, intuition and other faculties, no setting up of the Connection would be possible. |
īśvarādiḥ sthiro yukto yaḥ sambandhaṃ prakalpayet // | ‘There can be, etc. etc.’ Because the possibility of any such Being has been repudiated in detail. |
[p.628] na yukta iti / tasya vistareṇa pratiṣiddhatvāt // | consequently what is expressive cannot be eternal. because what is regarded as expressive is the word; |
nanvityādinā parasya pratyavasthānam āśaṅkate | In the following texts, the Mīmāṃsaka anticipates the objections of the Opponent [see verse 2279 above] |
nanvānupūrvyanityatvād anityo vācako bhavet / padaṃ vācakamiṣṭaṃ hi kramādhīnā ca tanmatiḥ // varṇanāpūrvī hi padamiṣṭaṃ na sphoṭas tasyāś ca puruṣecchādhīnatvād anityatvam ato varṇānām apyanityatvaṃ prāpnoti / | The Word is held (by the Mīmāṃsaka) to consist of the definite arrangement of the Letters, not of any such single entity as the ‘Sphoṭa’ [which, according to the Grammarian, is what, in the case of every Word, is really the entity representing the whole Word, which expresses the meaning]; and as the arrangement or order of the Letters is always dependent upon the whim of man (the Speaker), it cannot be eternal; |
varṇebhyo 'narthāntaratvād ānupūrvyāḥ / | because the ‘arrangement’ is not anything different from the Letters. |
katham ity āha padamityādi / | How so? |
tathā hi varṇātmakaṃ padam eva vācakam iṣyate, yato varṇakramakṛtā padabuddhir na sphoṭakṛtā, sa ca kramaḥ pauruṣeyaḥ // etad eva vivṛṇoti varṇāḥ sarvagatavād vā iti / | ‘Because what is regarded as expressive, etc. etc.’ It is the Word, consisting of the Letters, that is regarded to be expressive; because the idea of ‘Word’ is due to the particular arrangement of the Letters, not to any such other entity as the ‘Sphoṭa’; and the arrangement is due to human agency. |
varṇāḥ sarvagatatvād vo na svataḥ kramavṛttayaḥ / | “[The opponent continues] ‘as, according to you, the letters are all-pervading, any particular arrangement cannot be inherent in themselves; |
anityadhvanikāryatvāt kramasyāto vināśitā // puruṣādhīnatā cāsya tadvivakṣāvaśād bhavet / | because the arrangement is the product of articulation which is not-eternal, It must, on that account, be non-eternal. further, the said arrangement must be dependent upon the whim of the speaker, as it owes its appearance to his desire to speak. |
varṇānāṃ nityatā tena bhavatāṃ niṣphalā bhavet // | thus the eternality of the letters would be useless for you [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 279-280]. |
vo yuṣmākaṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ varṇānāṃ sarvagatvān na deśakṛtaḥ kramaḥ, nāpikālakṛto nityatvāt teṣām, tasmād abhivyañjakadhvanikṛtaḥ / | According to you Mīmāṃsakas Letters are all-pervading; hence there can be no order or arrangement among them, in relation to space; nor can it be in relation to time, because they are eternal; hence it could be there only as due to the articulation that manifests them; |
tasya cānityatvāt tatkṛtasyāpyanityatvam iti bhāvaḥ / | and as this articulation is not eternal, what is due to it must also be non-eternal. |
prayogaḥ yadanityakṛtaṃ tadanityaṃ yathā ghaṭādi, anityakṛtaś ca varṇakrama iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: ‘What is due to something non-eternal must be non-eternal, e.g. the Jar; the order of the Letters is due to something non-eternal; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.’ |
yat puruṣāvivakṣāvaśād bhavati tat pauruṣeyatvena prekṣāvatā vyavahartavyam, yathā pāṇikampākṣinikocādayaḥ, puruṣecchāvaśāc ca varṇānāṃ bhavati krama iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | Then again, what comes about through the man’s ‘desire to speak’ must be treated by the intelligent as of human origin, like the shaking of the hands, the winking of the Eye and so forth; and the Order of the Letters (in a word) comes about by the desire of man; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
na ca kramād vinā varṇā nirjñātāḥ pratipādakāḥ / | “‘Words, without some order, have never been, known to be expressive; |
kramasthaivaṃ padatvaṃ ca tasmād evaṃ prasajyate // | hence it is the order (or arrangement) which should be regarded as the word. |
padaṃ varṇātiriktaṃ tu yeṣāṃ syāt kramavarjitam / teṣām evārthavatyeṣā śabdanityatvakalpanā // | for those people alone, according to whom the word is something different from the letters, and devoid of any order of sequence (or arrangement), can the assumption of the eternality of words have any use [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 282-283]. |
nahi kramaṃ vinā varṇā evārthapratipattihetavo dṛṣṭās tasmād eṣām avaśyaṃ kramo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ / | The Letters themselves, without any order, have never been found to be expressive of meanings; hence a definite order or arrangement of Letters has got to be admitted. |
evaṃ sati kramasyaiva padatvaṃ vācakatvaṃ bhavatāṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ prasajyate, natu [p.629] kevalānāṃ varṇānām / | Under the circumstances, it is the order that comes to be the Word, and also expressive, for you, Mīmāṃsakas; and all this character cannot belong to the Letters themselves. |
tataś ca vyarthā śabdanityatvakalpanā / tathā hi vācakasya śabdasya nityatvaṃ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ nānyasya, tataś ca yatkevalavarṇanityasādhanaṃ bhavatāṃ tat prastutānupayogi / | hence what is expressive must also be non-eternal; hence the assumption of the eternality of Words is absolutely futile. Because what is desired by you is to prove the eternality of only that Word which is expressive, not of any other; hence the proofs that you adduce in support of the Letters only are of no use in the matter under consideration; |
tasyāvācakatvāt / | because the mere Letters are not expressive; |
yac ca bādha{vāca---}kaṃ kramarūpaṃ na tannityam abhyupagatam iti sarvo viphalaeva prayāsaḥ / | then as regards what is expressive, i.e. the order or arrangement of the Letters, it is not regarded as eternal; hence all your effort is futile. |
yeṣāṃ punastva{rvai}yākaraṇānāṃ varṇavyatiriktaṃ sphoṭākhyamanavayavaṃ padaṃ vācakam itīṣṭaṃ teṣām arthavatyeṣā śabdanityatvakalpanā / tasya sphoṭākhyasya vastuno nityatvāt // | There are some people, e.g. the Grammarians, who regard the Sphoṭa, which is an impartite entity as a whole, apart from the Letters, to, be expressive; for these people alone the assumption of the eternality of the Word can have any use; because the said entity ‘Spoṭa’ is eternal. |
atra parihāram āha na tāvad ityādi / | To the above arguments of the Opponent’, the Mīmāṃsaka offers the following reply: [see verse 2284 next] |
nahi vastvantarādhāram etaddṛṣṭaṃ prakāśakam // anupūrvasvabhāva ānupūrvam, tasyānupūrvamātrasya nāsmākaṃ vācakatvaṃ prasajyate vyabhicāritvād iti bhāvaḥ / | “The contingency of the order or arrangement being regarded as the word does not arise for us. because the order or arrangement as subsisting in anything else has never been found to be illuminative (expressive).” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 284]. |
tadeva darśayann āha nahītyādi / | any such arrangement cannot become expressive, under our view; |
vastvantarādhāram iti / | because it would not be universally true. |
maṇimuktādyādhāram // | This is shown by the words ‘Because, etc, etc.’ ‘Subsisting in anything else’, e.g. that subsisting in gems, pearls and so forth. |
nāpi varṇādhāramānapūrvam eva kevalaṃ vācakam iṣṭam, katham ity āha dharmamātram idam iti / | Further, it is not only the order subsisting in the Letters that is held to be expressive. Why? The reason is explained in the following: [see verse 2285 next] “As a matter of fact, the order or arrangement is only a property of the letters; |
dharmamātram idaṃ teṣāṃ na vastvantaramiṣyate / | it is not regarded to be a distinct entity by itself. |
itthaṃ pratīyamānāḥ syur varṇāścaivāvabodhakāḥ // | the idea, in fact, is that what are expressive are the letters as cognised in the said order [Ślokavārtika eternality of letters, 286-287]. |
na vastvantaram iti / svatantravācakatvenetyabhiprāyaḥ / | ‘Not a distinct entity’ i.e., as expressive independently by itself. |
anyathā hi pāramārthiko dharmadharmiṇor bhedaḥ syāt / sa ca nāmīṣṭaḥ / | Otherwise, there would be real difference between the Property and the Object to which it belongs, which difference is not desirable. |
kiṃ tarhi vācakam ity āha ittham ityādi / ittham viśiṣṭena krameṇa / | Question: What is it then that is expressive? Answer; ‘The idea in fact, etc. etc.’ ‘Ittham’, in a particular order. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati na kramamātraṃ vācakaṃ, nāpi varṇādhāraṃ, nāpi varṇamātraṃ, kiṃ tarhi---, varṇā eva kramopasṛṣṭā vācakā iti / | What is meant is as follows: It is not merely the Order that is expressive; nor the Order as subsisting in the Letters; nor merely the Letters; what are expressive are the Letters as arranged in a certain order; |
tena na kramasya vācakatvaṃ prati prādhānyaṃ tasya tadvattayā pratīyamānasya guṇībhūtatvāt / | hence in the matter of expression, the Order is not the principal factor; because the Letters are cognised as having the Order; hence the Order occupies only a secondary position; |
kiṃ tarhi varṇānāṃ teṣāṃ dharmitayā pratīter iti darśitaṃ bhavati // | and it is the Letters that are recognised as the thing possessing that Order as their property. |
yaduktam anityadhvanikāryatvād iti hetudvayaṃ tasyāsiddhatvatām āha naca kramasyetyādi / | This is what is meant by the Text. “As a matter of fact, the order of sequence is not a product; because it is always accepted as an already established entity; |
na ca kramasya kāryatvaṃ pūrvasiddhaparigrahāt / vaktā nahi kramaṃ kaścit svātantryeṇa prapadyate // | the speaker does not adopt any order independently by his own choice; in fact, he always desires to utter the word in the same form in which it has been uttered by others in the past; |
yathaivāsya parair uktas tathaivainaṃ vivakṣati / | and other persons coming later also utter it in that same form; |
paro 'pyevamataścāsya sambandhavadanāditā // | It is pointed out by the Mīmāṃsaka in the following texts that both these Reasons are ‘inadmissible’: [see verses 2286-2287 above] |
[p.630] pūrvasiddhaparigrahād iti / vyavasthitasyaiva kramasyopādānāt / | ‘Because it is always, etc. etc.’ i.e. the Speaker adopts the already existing order. |
etad eva spaṣṭayati vaktā nahītyādi / | This is further clarified ‘The Speaker does not, etc. etc.’. |
sambandhavadeva hi kramo 'pyanādiḥ // | Like the Connection, the Order also is without beginning. |
teneyaṃ vyavahārāt syād akauṭasthye 'pi nityatā / | “Thus then, even though the order is not something unchangeable (and eternal in that sense), yet it is eternal, in usage. |
yatnataḥ {yatkrame---} pratiṣedhyā naḥ puruṣāṇāṃ svatantratā // | and we have to make an effort to refute the idea of men being independent (in their choice of the order of letters used).” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 289-290]. |
tasmād asatyapi parvatādivadasya kramasya, kūṭasthatve vṛddhavyavahārād evanityatvam avaseyam / tadanena vyavahāranityatā kathitā bhavati kramasya na kūṭasthanityatā yathā parvatādīnām iti // | The objection that has been urged is therefore not applicable. Thus though the Order is not eternal in the sense of being unchangeable, like the Hill, yet its eternality has to be accepted on the basis of the usage of experienced persons. What this means is that the Order is eternal for all practical purposes, and not unchangeably eternal, like the Hills. |
yadyevaṃ varṇānām api kramasyaiva vyavahāranityatvaṃ kasmānneṣyata ity āha varṇānām apīti / | Question: If that is so in the case of the Order, why is not the ‘eternality’ of the Letters also regarded as being for practical purposes only? |
varṇānām api na tvevam akauṭasthye 'pi setsyati / | “In the case of the letters however, such eternality would not be possible if they were not really unchangeable; |
nityeṣu satsu varṇeṣu vyavahārāt kramodayaḥ // ghaṭādiracanā yadbhūnnityeṣu paramāṇuṣu / | it is only when the letters themselves are eternal that their order can appear through usage; just in the same manner as the jar and other things are made only when the eternal atoms are there; |
tadabhāve hi nirmūlā racanā nāvadhāryate // | in the absence of these, the making of these things would have no basis at all, and none such is ever perceived.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 290-292]. |
nahi varṇānāṃ kramavad akauṭasthyanityatve 'pi vyavahāranityatayārthapratipattivyavahāraḥ siddhyati / | Like the Order, the Letters also could not be regarded as eternal in usage, though not unchangeably eternal, and the phenomena of the comprehension of the meanings of words explained on that basis. |
kathaṃ na siddhyatītyāha nityeṣvityādi / | Question: Why can it not be so explained? |
yadi hi kūṭasthanityatayā varṇā nityā bhaveyur evaṃ sati puruṣaparamparayā vyavahārasambhavāt kramodayaḥ kramasyātmalābho bhavet, yathā ghaṭādiracanā paramāṇumūlāt / | Answer: ‘It is only when the Letters, etc. etc.’ If the Letters were unchangeably eternal, in that case, the usage would be possible through tradition among people and thence the appearance of the Order; i.e. the Order would acquire its existence; as for example, the making of the Jar, etc. proceeds from the Atoms as their basis. |
kvacit kramādaya iti pāṭhaḥ / | In some places, the reading is ‘kramādayaḥ’ (for ‘kramodayaḥ’); |
tatrādiśabdena sambandhapratyabhijñānādayo gṛhyante / | in which case the ‘ādi’ would include their ‘Connection’, ‘Recognition’ and so forth. |
athobhayor api varṇaparamāṇvor nityatvam antareṇa kasmād racanā na sambhavatītyāha tadabhāva ityādi / | Question: ‘Why cannot the making (and appearance, of Jar, etc. and Order) be possible without the eternality of the Letters and the Atoms?’ |
varṇaparamāṇvor dvayor api kūṭasthanitya{bhāvā}bhāve / nanu ca ghaṭādyārambhakā iva paramāṇavo varṇanām api sūkṣmabhāgāḥ santi, yathāhuḥ ---" varṇānām api varṇaturīyā bhāgā" iti / tat kathaṃ varṇānāṃ kūṭasthanityatā varṇyate / | Answer: ‘In the absence of these, etc. etc.’ ‘in the absence of these’ stands for ‘if both, the Letters and the Atoms, were not unchangeably eternal’, Says the Opponent Just as the Atoms are the constituent cause of the Jar and other things, so of the Letters also, there would be subtler constituent parts; as has been declared (by Grammarians) that ‘Of Letters there are constituent parts, of which the Letters themselves are only the fourth stage Under the circumstances, how is it that Letters are described as unchangeably eternal? |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | Answer: This does not affect our case. |
sphoṭadūṣaṇena pratipāditam etat yathā na varṇabhāgāḥ santīti // | It has been explained in course of the Refutation of Sphoṭa (Ślokavārtika), that Letters have no constituent parts. |
kiñca yadi kūṭasthanityatayā varṇā nityā na bhaveyus tadā sarveṣāṃ prayokt---ṇāṃ paraprayuktāneva śabdān brūmaha ityeṣā vivakṣā na syāt, atha ca bhavati, tasmāt sā varṇanityatvam antareṇa na yukteti darśayann āha pareṇoktānityādi / | “The idea in the mind, of every speaker is always that ‘i am uttering words that have been used by other persons’; this in itself makes them eternal; and there is nothing for you that would be indicative (of a contrary conclusion).” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 294]. Further, if Letters were not eternal, in the sense of being unchangeable, then, in the mind of every user of words, the idea could not be there that ‘I am uttering only those words that have been used by others’; |
[p.631] | and yet as a matter of fact, this idea is there; |
tathā ca nityatāpattir nacānyaccihnam asti vaḥ // | hence it follows that this could not be possible if the Letters were not eternal. |
nanu ca yadi gakārādikramaḥ paramārthato na nityaḥ, nāpi vyañjakā dhvanayonāpi teṣāṃ prerakās tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgāḥ, dhvanīnāṃ prerakāṃs tān na śaknoti kartum, yāṃś cābhinavān karoti na te dṛṣṭāḥ prerakāḥ, tataś ca kathaṃ varṇāḥ krameṇābhivyaktā arthabhedapratītihetavo bhavantīti sarvametad āśaṅkya pariharann āha jātyā yathetyādi / | Says the Opponent If the Order of the Letters, Ga and the rest, is not eternal in reality, nor are the articulations manifesting them, nor those Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc., then one cannot bring about these prompters of the articulations [as they are past and gone immediately on coming]; and the new ones that one does bring about have never before been found to be such prompters; under the circumstances, how can the Letters, manifested in a certain order, become the means of comprehending the meaning? (2291) In view of all these arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka says: [see verse 2292 next] |
jātyā yathā ghaṭādīnāṃ vyavahāropalakṣaṇam / | “Just as in the case of the jar and such things, their use is characterised (and indicated) by the ‘universal’; |
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