buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 4 615	english stringlengths 2 1.3k
anityatvaṃ ca nāśitvaṃ yadyātyantikam ucyate / tato 'smān prati pakṣaḥ syād aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ //	If by ‘non-eternality’ you mean that the Word-Sound is liable to absolute destruction, leaving no trace behind, then, so far as we, Mīmāṃsakas, are concerned, the qualification would he ‘inadmissible’, and this would vitiate your premiss.
tathā hi mīmāṃsakānāṃ kāpilānām iva niranvayavināśitvaviśeṣaṇamasiddham /	Because for the Mīmāṃsakas, as for the Sāṅkhyas, there is no such thing as ‘absolute destruction’;
tirobhāve 'pi ghaṭādīnāṃ śaktirūpeṇāvasthānāt /	because even when the Jar disappears, it continues to exist in the form of a Potency;
pradīpādāvapi laghavo hyavayavās tadā deśāntaraṃ laghu laghu prayāntīti matatvāt /	in the case of things like the Lamp also, the view is that (when it is blown out) its subtle particles become scattered in all directions.
tathā hi nityeṣvapyabhivyaktyanabhivyaktyavasthāśrayeṇānityavyapadeśa iṣṭa eva // evaṃ tāvad anityaḥ śabda ityeṣā pratijñā vistareṇa dūṣitā, idānīm aindriyakatvādityasya hetor doṣamudbhāvayann āha kevalaindriyetyādi /	If however what you mean to prove is that the Word-sound is somehow capable of being called ‘non-eternal’, then the argument is open to the charge of being ‘futile’; because even when Word-sounds are eternal, it is admitted by us also that they may be called ‘non-eternal’ in the sense of going from the ‘unmanifested state’ to the ‘manifested state’ and vice-versa. So far the Proposition (of the Buddhist) that ‘Word is non-eternal’ has been criticised in detail.
kevalaindriyayaktve ca hetāvan na prakalpite /	The Mīmāṃsaka now proceeds to criticise his Reason ‘Because it is perceptible by the Senses’.
kevalamaindriyatvam kāryatve satītyādi viśeṣarahitam, tasminnirviśeṣaṇahetau sati, jātyā sāmānyena, prāk prasādhitayānaikāntiko hetuḥ /	‘Only amenability to the sense-organs’, without any such qualification as ‘being a product’ and so forth. If the Reason (Probans) is put forward in this unqualified form, then it becomes ‘fallacious’, ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the ‘Universal’ which has been established before;
syād etat yadi nāma prativādino jāter abhyupagamād vyatireko na siddhas tathāpi bauddhādeḥ svavādino jāter anabhyupagamāt siddha eva tat katham anaikāntikatetyāha asiddha ityādi /	The following might be urged: Even though, by reason of the other party (Vaiśeṣika) admitting the Universal, the negative concomitance is not available, yet as the Bauddha, who is the main opponent of the Mīmāṃsaka, does not admit the Universal, the said negative concomitance would be quite available; how then can the Probans be said to be Inconclusive?
asiddhe pakṣadharmatve yathaiva prativādinaḥ /	The principle is that ‘that Probans alone is able to prove or disprove which is admitted by both parties’;
na hetur labhyate tadvad anvayavyatirekayoḥ //	hence, that Probans which is not admitted by any one of the two parties to reside in the ‘Subject’ becomes ‘fallacious’;
ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ veti nyāyāt yathā pakṣadharmasyānyatarasiddhau hetur duṣṭo bhavati tathānvayavyatirekayor anyatarāsiddhau duṣṭa eva /	in the same manner, it becomes fallacious, if either party does not admit its affirmative and negative concomitance (with the Probandum).
anvayavyatirekayor asiddhayor iti vacanavipariṇāmena sambandhaḥ //	The construction is ‘anvayavyatirekayoḥ asiddhayoḥ’, ‘if the affirmative and negative concomitance are not admitted’.
[p.638] yadyubhayasiddham eva sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vā tat kathaṃ bauddhaṃ pratyasiddhatājātyā vyabhicāro 'bhyadhāyi bhavatetyāha tatratyādi /	Question: If that Probans alone can prove or disprove which is admitted by both parties, then, how is it that you yourself have urged the ‘inconclusiveness’ of a Reason, against the Buddhist, on the basis of the ‘Universal’ (which is not admitted by him)?
yadyapi bauddhādeḥ sādhanavādino jātir vipakṣatvena siddhā, tathāpyāśaṅkā na nivartate / tasyāḥ pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt /	Even though, by the Buddhist and others who have put forward the Probans in question, the ‘Universal’ is not admitted as something wherein the contrary of the Probandum is present, yet, as a matter of fact, the existence of the Universal cannot be denied.
tataś ca saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikateti bhāvaḥ // aparam api sādhyasādhanayor vikalpāntareṇa dūṣaṇam āha kāryā caindriyakatvādāviti /	The sense is that, even under the circumstances, the Probans is one whose concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is suspected (and hence invalid). The Mīmāṃsaka puts forward another objection against the Probans and the Probandum, through another alternative.
vyaktibhyo 'nanyanānātvabhedābhedeṣu ca sphuṭā //	[see verses 2320-2321 above]
ādiśabdenānityatvaparigrahaḥ /	‘And the rest’ includes non-eternality.
tatra kimātmakamaindriyakatvādīti nirūpaṇā kāryā, kiṃ vyaktibhyo 'nanyadāhosvid vyatiriktam, tathā vyatirekapakṣe tadā bhedeṣu ca vicāraṇā kāryā, kiṃ tadvyatiriktaṃ bhinnabhinnamāhosvid abhinnamekam eveti yāvat /	An examination is to be made as to the exact nature of the said ‘amenability to the senses’: (a) Is it the same as the Individuals? (the individual things in which it subsists)? Or (b) is it something different from them? and, if it is different from them, it has to be examined whether these different amenabilities are (c) different with each individual object? or (d) one and the same with all?
tatrāvyatirekapakṣe aindriyakatvasya hetor asādhāraṇatā, vyakter avyatirekāt, tat svarūpavat tasya vyaktyantarānugamābhāvāt /	as there can be no ‘negation’ of individual; and like its own form, one Individual, would not be present in another Individual [so that there could be no concomitance, negative or positive, of it].
vyatirekapakṣe 'pi mīmāṃsakasya vyatirekāniṣṭeḥ prativyaktibhinnam abhinnaṃ vā asiddhamityasiddhatā hetoḥ /	(b) and (c) If it is different from the Individuals, as such difference is not admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka, whether it be different or the same in regard to each individual, it would, in either case, be ‘Inadmissible’.
ata eva bhedābhedapakṣe doṣo noktaḥ / siddhe hi vyatireke tasyāvakāśāt /	It is for this reason that the defect in the fourth alternative (d) whereby the ‘amenability’ is different from the Individuals, but the same in all has not been separately mentioned.
dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti yāvat /	Because there would be room for it only if the difference were admitted.
avyatirekapakṣe 'pi sādhyahīnataiva dṛṣṭāntasya, vyakter vyaktyantarānugamābhāvāt // idānīṃ prayatnāntarīyatvādityasya hetor anaikāntikatvam āha prayatnānantaram ityādi /	In regard to ‘non-eternality’ (which is another Reason put forward by the Opponent, against the expressiveness of words), if it is different from the Individuals, the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandum. If, on the other hand, it is non-different from them, the Instance would be certainly devoid of the Probandum;
prayatnānantaraṃ jñānaṃ kṛtakānityasādhanam /	because one Individual can never be present in another Individual.
yat tatrāpyastyanekāntaḥ kṣaṇikavyatirekiṇaḥ{bhi---} // pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyanirodhavyomabhistribhiḥ /	Next the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out the ‘Inconclusive’ character of another Probans cited by the Opponent ‘Because it is invariably concomitant with effort’.
[p.639]	[see verses 2322-2324 above]
prayatnānantaram upalabhyamānatvaṃ hi prayatnānantarīyatvam ucyate /	What is meant by ‘Prayatnānantarīyatva’ is the character of being perceived as following after an effort.
tacca vipakṣe 'pi hetor anaikāntikatvān na kṛtakānityatvasādhanam / tathā hi bauddhaiḥ pratisaṅkhyānirodho 'pratisaṅkhyānirodha ākāśaṃ ceti trividhamasaṃskṛtaṃ vastu kṣaṇikavyatiriktam akṣaṇikaṃ nityaṃ ceṣṭam /	And as this character is present in cases where the Probandum is absent, the said character, adduced as the Probans, for proving that Words are products and non-eternal, is ‘Inconclusive’, For instance, the Buddhists postulate (1) ‘Conscious Destruction’, (2) ‘Unconscious Destruction’, and (3) ‘Ākāśa’ as three entities which are unmodifiable and not-momentary, i.e. eternal. And yet, the Probans in question (‘being perceived as following after effort’) is found in these also.
tatra cāsya hetor vṛttir iti darśayann āha buddhipūrvetyādi / yo buddhipūrvo ghaṭādīnāṃ vināśaḥ sa pratisaṅkhyānirodhaḥ, yastvabuddhipūrvaḥ so 'pratisaṅkhyānirodha ityeṣā kila bauddhaprakriyā /	This is what is pointed out by the words ‘when the destruction, etc. etc.’ that destruction of things like the Jar which is brought about intentionally, is called ‘Conscious Destruction’; while that which is not intentional, is ‘Unconscious Destruction’; such is the scheme of the Buddhists.
teṣām iti ghaṭādīnām /	‘Teṣām’ of things like the Jar.
tau ceti pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhau /	‘Tau ca’ i.e. the Conscious and Unconscious Destructions.
akṛtakāvapīti /	‘Uncaused also’;
apiśabdānnityāvapi //2322 //	‘also’ includes ‘non-eternal (2322-2324)
yathā cānayor akṛtakatvanityatve / yathā ca tatra hetau vṛttis tathā paramatenaivopapādayann āha āhur ityādi /	How these two Destructions are ‘uncaused’ and ‘eternal’ and how they subsist in the Probans, is pointed out in the following Texts, from the point of view of the Opponent (Bauddha): [see verses 2325-2328 next]
yadā vilakṣaṇo hetuḥ patet sadṛśasantatau / vilakṣaṇena kāryeṇa sthūlo 'bhivyajyate tadā //	How these two Destructions are ‘uncaused’ and ‘eternal’ and how they subsist in the Probans, is pointed out in the following Texts, from the point of view of the Opponent (Bauddha): [see verses 2325-2328 above]
ta iti bauddhāḥ /	‘They’ Buddhists.
nanu ca{nāśyate} agninā kāṣṭhaṃ daṇḍena ghaṭa iti nāśahetavo dṛśyante tat katham ahetukatvam astyetyāha bhavati hītyādi /	Says the Opponent As a matter of fact, we find the wood being burnt by fire, and the Jar smashed by the bludgeon; where there are causes of Destruction; how then can Destruction be without came?
vahnyādayo hi tatrāṅgārādipadārthāntarahetutvenānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitā na vināśasya /	Answer; ‘When fuel comes into contact, etc. etc.’ In this ease what the Fire is the cause of is not Destruction, but the fiery embers, as is ascertained through positive and negative concomitance;
tasya nisargasiddhatvāt /	specially as Destruction exists by its very nature.
yadi tarhi svābhāviko nāśaḥ kimiti vahnyādisampātāt prāgapi nopalakṣyata ity āha sūkṣma ityādi /	Question: If Destruction is something that exists by its very nature, how is it that it is not preceived there prior to the contact of such causes, as the Fire and the like? Answer;
sadṛśāparotpatter vipralabdhā hi mandā nāvasyanti{sūkśmaṃ nāśam} /	‘It is subtle’ Being deceived by the appearance of the several similar factors in the ‘homogeneous series’, people fail to perceive the Destruction in its subtle form;
sādṛśasantānotpattyā tūtprekṣante{ avinaṣtameva} /	in fact by the perception of the homogeneous series, they are led to imagine that the object is ‘undestroyed’.
vilakṣaṇo hetur mudgarādiḥ / vilakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kapālādi /	‘Peculiar cause’ in the shape of the Bludgeon. ‘Peculiar effect’ in the shape of the Potsherds.
asyāṃ kilāvasthāyāṃ vināśasya sthūlatvaṃ vyaktībhavati /	It is under these conditions that the grossness of the Destruction becomes manifested.
tenetyādinopasaṃhāraḥ /	‘Thus, etc. etc.’ sums up the argument.
vilakṣaṇaḥ /	‘Heterogeneous series’, of a different character.
heto [p.640] ryata iti sāmānādhikaraṇyam / tenaiveti hetunā / yata iti yo nirdiṣṭaḥ /	‘Hetoḥ’ is to be conducted with ‘yataḥ’, ‘Tena’ by that same cause, which has been referred to by the pronoun in ‘yataḥ’ is the Destruction manifested.
tasyābhivyajyata iti pareṇābhisambandhaḥ //	Such is the construction with the preceding clause.
vipakṣavṛttitāṃ hetor upadarśayann āha sa mudgaretyādi /	In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that the Probans in question is present in the contrary of the Probandum: [see verse 2329 above]
sa iti / divividho 'pi nirodhaḥ mudgaraprahārādiprayatnānantarajñāno mudgaraprahārādiprayatnānantarīyaka ucyate //	‘This’ the two kinds of Destruction. The compound ‘Prayatnā, etc.’ stands for ‘invariably concomitant with effort involved in the stroke of the Bludgeon (2329)
tribhir ityuktam / tatra dvābhyāṃ vyabhicāramupadarśya tṛtīyenāpyākāśena vyabhicāram upadarśayann āha ākāśamapītyādi /	It was asserted (under Text 2322) that the Probans is shown to be ‘Inconclusive’ in view of three factors. Inconclusiveness due to two factors has been shown, in the shape of the two kinds of Destruction;
tenānaikāntiko hetur yaduktaṃ tatra darśanam //	that due to the third factor of ‘Ākāśa’ is next pointed out: [see verses 2330-2331 above]
tasya bhūmyādeḥ khananādikaraṇabhūtair apanayena / tatreti śabde /	‘By the removal of these’ The removal of the Earth by digging with the ispade, etc. ‘Tatra’ in regard to the Word-sound.
darśanam prayatnānatarajñānam //	‘Darśanam’ i.e. apprehension following from effort.
evaṃ hetudoṣānabhidhāya dṛṣṭānadoṣān vaktukāma āha sapakṣo 'pītyādi /	Having thus pointed out the defects in the Probans (of the Opponent), the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out those in the Corroborative Instance: [see verses 2332-2334 above]
aṃśo hyetasya jātyākhyo nityo dhvaṃsītaro mataḥ / śabalākāram ekaṃ hi vastu prāk pratipāditam // sapakṣo dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	The term ‘Sapakṣa’ (which is that wherein the Probandum is known by all to be present) here stands for the Corroborative Instance (in the reasoning of the Opponent, where the Jar has been cited as an instance of what is perceived as appearing after effort and is non-eternal).
sa kiṃ śrutyartho 'bhipretaḥ āhosvidvyaktiḥ /	The question, as regards the Instance that has been cited (the ‘Jar’) is is the word meant to be taken in its direct denotative sense (which is the Universal)? Or in the sense of the Individual Jar?
yadi śrutyarthas tadā sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ /	If it is meant to be taken in the direct sense, then it is defective, in so far as it is devoid of the Probandum (Non-eternality).
tathā hi śrutiḥ śabdaḥ /	‘Śruti’ here stands for the Word;
tasyārtho 'bhidheyaḥ /	the ‘artha’ is what is directly denoted by it;
sa punaḥ sāmānyaṃ ghaṭatvādiḥ, naca {tacca---} sarvavādināṃ nityameveṣṭam itina tatrānityatvasya sādhyadharmasyānugamaḥ /	and what is so denoted is the Universal ‘Jar’; and the Universal is admitted by all parties to be eternal; hence there cannot be presence, in it, of non-eternality, which forms the Probandum.
kvacijjātyartha iti pāṭhaḥ / tatra karmadhārayaḥ samāsaḥ kāryaḥ /	In some places, the reading is ‘jātyarthaḥ’ in place of ‘śrutyarthaḥ’; under which ‘jāti’ is to be taken as in apposition to ‘artha’.
arthas tulya eva /	The meaning however remains the same as before.
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadāpi tasyā vyakter dṛṣṭāntatveneṣṭāyā [p.641] jātyanyānanyakalpanā kāryā /	If the second alternative is meant that the word ‘Jar’ stands for the Individual Jar, then also, it has to be considered whether the Individual that is intended to be the corroborative Instance is the same as, or different from, the Universal;
kiṃ sā vyaktir jāter anyā, āhosvid ananyā /	that is, whether the Individual is something different from the Universal? Or non-different from it?
ya{dānyā}tadā dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇo mīmāṃsakaṃ pratyasiddhiḥ /	If it is different, then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka;
nahi mīmāṃsako vaiśeṣikādivadekāntena vyakter anyāṃ jātimicchati /	because the Mīmāṃsaka does not hold the Universal to be something absolutely different from the Individual, as the Vaiśeṣikas and others do;
yathoktam ---"sthitaṃ naiva tu jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" iti /	as has been asserted in the words ‘or us the Universal is nothing different from the Individual’.
athānanyapakṣas tadā parān bauddhādīn prati dṛṣṭāntadharma{mya---}siddhiḥ / nahi pare vyakter ananyāṃ jātiṃ manyante /	If, on the other hand, the Individual is meant to be non-different (from the Universal), then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Buddhist and others.’ These ‘others’ do not regard the Universal as non-different from the Individual.
atha bhedābhedavikalpamavadhūya ghaṭo nidarśanatvenopādīyate, tadāpyasmānprati sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasye{ti} nidarśayannāha aviśeṣe 'pītyādi / taditi ghaṭavastu /	If the Jar is meant to be the Instance, in the indefinite form, free from all conceptual contents like difference and non-difference, even then, according to us, the Instance comes to be one devoid of the Probandum. This is what is asserted in the words ‘If it is something indefinite, etc. etc.’ ‘Tat’ stands for the Jar.
katham ity āha aṃśa ityādi /	Question: How so?
etasya hi ghaṭavastuno jātisaṃjñako bhāgo nityaḥ / itarastu vyaktisaṃjñako dhvaṃsī vināśī /	Answer: ‘That element, etc. etc.’ Of the entity called ‘Jar’, that factor which is called the ‘Universal’ is eternal, while the other factor which is called the ‘Individual’ is perishable.
syād etat katham ekasya parasparaviruddhaṃ svabhāvadvayaṃ yuktam ity āha śabalākāram ityādi //2332 //2333 //	Question: How can one and the same thing have two mutually contradictory characters? Answer: ‘Mixed, character, etc. etc.
punar api sādhyadharmavikalpamukhena dṛṣṭāntadoṣān vaktukāma āha anityatetyādi /	The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds again to point out the defects in the Corroborative Instance, through the various alternatives that are possible in regard to the Probandum: [see verse 2335 above]
anityatā vikalpyaivaṃ nāśaścet sādhyahīnatā / mamānyasyāṃ tu bhavatām ityeṣā dūṣaṇoktidik //	If what is meant by your Probandum, ‘non-eternality’ is absolute Destruction, then for us, Mīmāṃsakas, the Instance is devoid of the Probandum;
na hyasmābhir atyantasamucchedo bhāvānām iṣṭaḥ, śaktirūpeṇāvasthānāt /	because we do not admit of any absolute Destruction of things; as they always remain in the form of Potencies.
yadyapi nāśa iti sāmānyaśabdas tathāpi prakaraṇānniranvayavināśātmake 'rthaviśeṣe 'sya vṛttir vijñāyate /	Though the word used in the Text is the common word, ‘nāśa’, yet from the Context, its meaning appears to be restricted to utter, absolute destruction.
nanu cānityatvaṃ nāśitvaṃ yadyātyantikam ucyetetyādinā anityatā vikalpitaiva, tat kimiti bhūyo 'pi vikalpyate /	If it were not so, why should the writer have urged the argument that the Instance is devoid of the Probandum? Question: The question as to what is meant by ‘non-eternality’ has been already discussed before under Text 2315; why is it discussed over again?
satyam, sā hi pakṣasya doṣodbhāvanārtham idānīṃ tu dṛṣṭāntasyeti viśeṣaḥ /	Answer: True; but it was discussed there for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the ‘Subject’, while on the present occasion it is discussed for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the Corroborative Instance.
atha na niranvayavināśalakṣaṇānityatābhipretā kiṃ tvanyaivāvirbhāvatirobhāvalakṣaṇā, atrāha anyasyām iti / anityatāyām iti sambandhaḥ / bhavatām iti /	If, on the other hand, ‘non-eternality’ that is meant is not in the form of ‘absolute Destruction’, but in the form of ‘appearance and disappearance’, then the answer is ‘If it is otherwise’, i.e. if ‘non-eternality’ is something other than ‘Absolute Destruction’.
tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntasyeti śeṣaḥ /	‘For you’ ‘there is absence of Probandum’ this has to be construed here also i.e. in the Instance.
nahi bhavadhir bauddhaiḥ sāṅkhyair iva sānvayo vināśa iṣyate /	As you, Buddhists do not admit of ‘Destruction with a residue’ as the Saṅkhyas do.
tasmād dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā bhavat pakṣe syād ityeṣa śabdānityatvasādhanadūṣaṇamārgo viduṣām ākhyātaḥ, anyad api prājñaiḥ svayam abhyūhya kartavyam //	Hence under your view, the Instance cited would be devoid of the Probandum. This is the way in which the arguments in support of the non-eternality of Words have to be refuted, which has been expounded for the learned;
padārthetyādinā parasya codyamāśaṅkate /	other arguments may also be put forward by intelligent people themselves.
padārthapadasambandhanityatve sādhite 'pi vā / naiva ceha pramāṇatvaṃ vākyārthaṃ prati sidhyati //	“[Says the opponent] ‘Though the word, the meaning and the connection between them have been proved to be eternal, yet so far as the validity (reliability) of the meaning of the sentence is concerned, that cannot be admitted.
[p.642]	[Ślokavārtika on sentence 1].
samayāt puruṣāṇāṃ hi guṇavṛddhyādivan matiḥ / niṣkāraṇo 'pi sannartho yājñikaiḥ parikalpitaḥ //	it may be that the meaning of sentences has been assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, without any basis, in accordance with the conventions of men, just as in the case of such technical terms as guṇa, vṛddhi and the like.
apicāsya kathāvat tu saṅghātāt pauruṣeyatā /	Further, being in the form of a compilation, the Veda must be regarded as a human production, like a book of stories.
nacāptaḥ puruṣo vāsti tena vedāpramāṇatā //	And yet there is no reliable person (known, who could be the author of the Veda);
viśiṣṭasādhanāvacchinnakriyāviśeṣavidhipratiṣedhalakṣaṇo hi vākyārthaḥ /	The ‘meaning of sentence’ consists in the Injunction or Prohibition of particular acts as associated with particular means of accomplishment;
tatraiva codanāyāḥ prāmāṇyaṃ na padārthe / tataś ca vedasya prāmāṇye sādhye yat padapadārthatat sambandhānāṃ trayāṇām api nityatvapratipādanaṃ tat prakṛtānupayogi /	it does not rest in what is expressed by words, Consequently when the validity or authority or reliability of the Veda has to be proved, what has been established regarding the eternality of the Word, its meaning and the connection of these, is of no use in the matter at issue. Further, whenever there is cognition of the meaning of a sentence, it is always found to be based upon Convention;
kiṃ ca yā yā vākyārthapratipattiḥ sā saṅketaprabhavā, yathā ādguṇa ityāder vākyāt guṇavṛddhyādimatiḥ, vākyārthapratipattiś ca codanāvākyasamudbhaveti svabhāvahetuḥ /	e.g. sentences like ‘ād-guṇaḥ’ (Pānini’s Sūtra, defining what is ‘guṇa’), bring about the cognition of what is meant by the technical terms ‘guṇa’, ‘vṛddhi’ and the like; the cognition of the meaning of the Injunctive Sentence is cognition of the meaning of a sentence;
etad eva darśayati samayād ityādi / guṇavṛddhyādivad iti / saptamyarthe vatiḥ /	hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things. This is what is shown in the words ‘In accordance with Conventions, etc. etc.’ ‘Like the technical terms, etc. etc.’ The affix ‘vati’ has the sense of the Locative.
asyaiva samarthanam āha niṣkāraṇo 'pītyādi /	In support of the said idea it is added ‘without any basis’.
niṣkāraṇo 'pi nirnibandhano 'pi san svotprekṣayā niraṅkuśayā yājñikair ājīvikārtham evāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma ityādivedavākyārthaḥ parikalpita iti sambhāvyam /	That is, it is just possible that without any reason, through their unbridled imagination, for the purpose of making a living the ‘Sacrificers’ have assumed the meanings of such Vedic sentences as ‘Desiring Heaven, one should offer the Agnihotra’.
kiṃ ca yat saṅghātarūpaṃ tat pauruṣeyaṃ, yathā nāṭakākhyāyikādikathā, padasaṅghātaś ca veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	Then again, as a matter of fact, whatever is a compilation is a human product, e.g. Dramas and Stories, and the Veda is a compilation of words; hence this is a reason based on the nature of the thing.
tataś ca pauruṣeyatvād rathyāpuruṣavākyavad apramāṇaṃ vedaḥ syāt /	Thus then, as the Veda is a human work, it must be unreliable like the words of the man by the roadside.
āptapraṇītatvāt pauruṣeyo 'pi pramāṇaṃ bhaviṣyatīti cedāha ne cāpta ityādi //2336 //	It might be that it is reliable because it is the work of a reliable person. The answer to that is ‘There is no reliable person known, etc. etc.’ (2336-2338)
sambandhetyādi pratividhatte / sambandhākaraṇānyāyād vaktavyā vākyanityatā /	“The eternality of the sentence is to be asserted in the same manner in which the eternality of the connection (between word and meaning) has been asserted.
dṛṣṭārthavahāratvād vṛddhyādau sambhavedapi //	Even though, in the case of the technical words like ‘vṛddhi’, what has been asserted may be possible because these deal with perceptible things;

anityatvaṃ ca nāśitvaṃ yadyātyantikam ucyate / tato 'smān prati pakṣaḥ syād aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ //

If by ‘non-eternality’ you mean that the Word-Sound is liable to absolute destruction, leaving no trace behind, then, so far as we, Mīmāṃsakas, are concerned, the qualification would he ‘inadmissible’, and this would vitiate your premiss.

tathā hi mīmāṃsakānāṃ kāpilānām iva niranvayavināśitvaviśeṣaṇamasiddham /

Because for the Mīmāṃsakas, as for the Sāṅkhyas, there is no such thing as ‘absolute destruction’;

tirobhāve 'pi ghaṭādīnāṃ śaktirūpeṇāvasthānāt /

because even when the Jar disappears, it continues to exist in the form of a Potency;

pradīpādāvapi laghavo hyavayavās tadā deśāntaraṃ laghu laghu prayāntīti matatvāt /

in the case of things like the Lamp also, the view is that (when it is blown out) its subtle particles become scattered in all directions.

tathā hi nityeṣvapyabhivyaktyanabhivyaktyavasthāśrayeṇānityavyapadeśa iṣṭa eva // evaṃ tāvad anityaḥ śabda ityeṣā pratijñā vistareṇa dūṣitā, idānīm aindriyakatvādityasya hetor doṣamudbhāvayann āha kevalaindriyetyādi /

If however what you mean to prove is that the Word-sound is somehow capable of being called ‘non-eternal’, then the argument is open to the charge of being ‘futile’; because even when Word-sounds are eternal, it is admitted by us also that they may be called ‘non-eternal’ in the sense of going from the ‘unmanifested state’ to the ‘manifested state’ and vice-versa. So far the Proposition (of the Buddhist) that ‘Word is non-eternal’ has been criticised in detail.

kevalaindriyayaktve ca hetāvan na prakalpite /

The Mīmāṃsaka now proceeds to criticise his Reason ‘Because it is perceptible by the Senses’.

kevalamaindriyatvam kāryatve satītyādi viśeṣarahitam, tasminnirviśeṣaṇahetau sati, jātyā sāmānyena, prāk prasādhitayānaikāntiko hetuḥ /

‘Only amenability to the sense-organs’, without any such qualification as ‘being a product’ and so forth. If the Reason (Probans) is put forward in this unqualified form, then it becomes ‘fallacious’, ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the ‘Universal’ which has been established before;

syād etat yadi nāma prativādino jāter abhyupagamād vyatireko na siddhas tathāpi bauddhādeḥ svavādino jāter anabhyupagamāt siddha eva tat katham anaikāntikatetyāha asiddha ityādi /

The following might be urged: Even though, by reason of the other party (Vaiśeṣika) admitting the Universal, the negative concomitance is not available, yet as the Bauddha, who is the main opponent of the Mīmāṃsaka, does not admit the Universal, the said negative concomitance would be quite available; how then can the Probans be said to be Inconclusive?

asiddhe pakṣadharmatve yathaiva prativādinaḥ /

The principle is that ‘that Probans alone is able to prove or disprove which is admitted by both parties’;

na hetur labhyate tadvad anvayavyatirekayoḥ //

hence, that Probans which is not admitted by any one of the two parties to reside in the ‘Subject’ becomes ‘fallacious’;

ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ veti nyāyāt yathā pakṣadharmasyānyatarasiddhau hetur duṣṭo bhavati tathānvayavyatirekayor anyatarāsiddhau duṣṭa eva /

in the same manner, it becomes fallacious, if either party does not admit its affirmative and negative concomitance (with the Probandum).

anvayavyatirekayor asiddhayor iti vacanavipariṇāmena sambandhaḥ //

The construction is ‘anvayavyatirekayoḥ asiddhayoḥ’, ‘if the affirmative and negative concomitance are not admitted’.

[p.638] yadyubhayasiddham eva sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vā tat kathaṃ bauddhaṃ pratyasiddhatājātyā vyabhicāro 'bhyadhāyi bhavatetyāha tatratyādi /

Question: If that Probans alone can prove or disprove which is admitted by both parties, then, how is it that you yourself have urged the ‘inconclusiveness’ of a Reason, against the Buddhist, on the basis of the ‘Universal’ (which is not admitted by him)?

yadyapi bauddhādeḥ sādhanavādino jātir vipakṣatvena siddhā, tathāpyāśaṅkā na nivartate / tasyāḥ pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt /

Even though, by the Buddhist and others who have put forward the Probans in question, the ‘Universal’ is not admitted as something wherein the contrary of the Probandum is present, yet, as a matter of fact, the existence of the Universal cannot be denied.

tataś ca saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikateti bhāvaḥ // aparam api sādhyasādhanayor vikalpāntareṇa dūṣaṇam āha kāryā caindriyakatvādāviti /

The sense is that, even under the circumstances, the Probans is one whose concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is suspected (and hence invalid). The Mīmāṃsaka puts forward another objection against the Probans and the Probandum, through another alternative.

vyaktibhyo 'nanyanānātvabhedābhedeṣu ca sphuṭā //

[see verses 2320-2321 above]

ādiśabdenānityatvaparigrahaḥ /

‘And the rest’ includes non-eternality.

tatra kimātmakamaindriyakatvādīti nirūpaṇā kāryā, kiṃ vyaktibhyo 'nanyadāhosvid vyatiriktam, tathā vyatirekapakṣe tadā bhedeṣu ca vicāraṇā kāryā, kiṃ tadvyatiriktaṃ bhinnabhinnamāhosvid abhinnamekam eveti yāvat /

An examination is to be made as to the exact nature of the said ‘amenability to the senses’: (a) Is it the same as the Individuals? (the individual things in which it subsists)? Or (b) is it something different from them? and, if it is different from them, it has to be examined whether these different amenabilities are (c) different with each individual object? or (d) one and the same with all?

tatrāvyatirekapakṣe aindriyakatvasya hetor asādhāraṇatā, vyakter avyatirekāt, tat svarūpavat tasya vyaktyantarānugamābhāvāt /

as there can be no ‘negation’ of individual; and like its own form, one Individual, would not be present in another Individual [so that there could be no concomitance, negative or positive, of it].

vyatirekapakṣe 'pi mīmāṃsakasya vyatirekāniṣṭeḥ prativyaktibhinnam abhinnaṃ vā asiddhamityasiddhatā hetoḥ /

(b) and (c) If it is different from the Individuals, as such difference is not admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka, whether it be different or the same in regard to each individual, it would, in either case, be ‘Inadmissible’.

ata eva bhedābhedapakṣe doṣo noktaḥ / siddhe hi vyatireke tasyāvakāśāt /

It is for this reason that the defect in the fourth alternative (d) whereby the ‘amenability’ is different from the Individuals, but the same in all has not been separately mentioned.

dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti yāvat /

Because there would be room for it only if the difference were admitted.

avyatirekapakṣe 'pi sādhyahīnataiva dṛṣṭāntasya, vyakter vyaktyantarānugamābhāvāt // idānīṃ prayatnāntarīyatvādityasya hetor anaikāntikatvam āha prayatnānantaram ityādi /

In regard to ‘non-eternality’ (which is another Reason put forward by the Opponent, against the expressiveness of words), if it is different from the Individuals, the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandum. If, on the other hand, it is non-different from them, the Instance would be certainly devoid of the Probandum;

prayatnānantaraṃ jñānaṃ kṛtakānityasādhanam /

because one Individual can never be present in another Individual.

yat tatrāpyastyanekāntaḥ kṣaṇikavyatirekiṇaḥ{bhi---} // pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyanirodhavyomabhistribhiḥ /

Next the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out the ‘Inconclusive’ character of another Probans cited by the Opponent ‘Because it is invariably concomitant with effort’.

[p.639]

[see verses 2322-2324 above]

prayatnānantaram upalabhyamānatvaṃ hi prayatnānantarīyatvam ucyate /

What is meant by ‘Prayatnānantarīyatva’ is the character of being perceived as following after an effort.

tacca vipakṣe 'pi hetor anaikāntikatvān na kṛtakānityatvasādhanam / tathā hi bauddhaiḥ pratisaṅkhyānirodho 'pratisaṅkhyānirodha ākāśaṃ ceti trividhamasaṃskṛtaṃ vastu kṣaṇikavyatiriktam akṣaṇikaṃ nityaṃ ceṣṭam /

And as this character is present in cases where the Probandum is absent, the said character, adduced as the Probans, for proving that Words are products and non-eternal, is ‘Inconclusive’, For instance, the Buddhists postulate (1) ‘Conscious Destruction’, (2) ‘Unconscious Destruction’, and (3) ‘Ākāśa’ as three entities which are unmodifiable and not-momentary, i.e. eternal. And yet, the Probans in question (‘being perceived as following after effort’) is found in these also.

tatra cāsya hetor vṛttir iti darśayann āha buddhipūrvetyādi / yo buddhipūrvo ghaṭādīnāṃ vināśaḥ sa pratisaṅkhyānirodhaḥ, yastvabuddhipūrvaḥ so 'pratisaṅkhyānirodha ityeṣā kila bauddhaprakriyā /

This is what is pointed out by the words ‘when the destruction, etc. etc.’ that destruction of things like the Jar which is brought about intentionally, is called ‘Conscious Destruction’; while that which is not intentional, is ‘Unconscious Destruction’; such is the scheme of the Buddhists.

teṣām iti ghaṭādīnām /

‘Teṣām’ of things like the Jar.

tau ceti pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhau /

‘Tau ca’ i.e. the Conscious and Unconscious Destructions.

akṛtakāvapīti /

‘Uncaused also’;

apiśabdānnityāvapi //2322 //

‘also’ includes ‘non-eternal (2322-2324)

yathā cānayor akṛtakatvanityatve / yathā ca tatra hetau vṛttis tathā paramatenaivopapādayann āha āhur ityādi /

How these two Destructions are ‘uncaused’ and ‘eternal’ and how they subsist in the Probans, is pointed out in the following Texts, from the point of view of the Opponent (Bauddha): [see verses 2325-2328 next]

yadā vilakṣaṇo hetuḥ patet sadṛśasantatau / vilakṣaṇena kāryeṇa sthūlo 'bhivyajyate tadā //

How these two Destructions are ‘uncaused’ and ‘eternal’ and how they subsist in the Probans, is pointed out in the following Texts, from the point of view of the Opponent (Bauddha): [see verses 2325-2328 above]

ta iti bauddhāḥ /

‘They’ Buddhists.

nanu ca{nāśyate} agninā kāṣṭhaṃ daṇḍena ghaṭa iti nāśahetavo dṛśyante tat katham ahetukatvam astyetyāha bhavati hītyādi /

Says the Opponent As a matter of fact, we find the wood being burnt by fire, and the Jar smashed by the bludgeon; where there are causes of Destruction; how then can Destruction be without came?

vahnyādayo hi tatrāṅgārādipadārthāntarahetutvenānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitā na vināśasya /

Answer; ‘When fuel comes into contact, etc. etc.’ In this ease what the Fire is the cause of is not Destruction, but the fiery embers, as is ascertained through positive and negative concomitance;

tasya nisargasiddhatvāt /

specially as Destruction exists by its very nature.

yadi tarhi svābhāviko nāśaḥ kimiti vahnyādisampātāt prāgapi nopalakṣyata ity āha sūkṣma ityādi /

Question: If Destruction is something that exists by its very nature, how is it that it is not preceived there prior to the contact of such causes, as the Fire and the like? Answer;

sadṛśāparotpatter vipralabdhā hi mandā nāvasyanti{sūkśmaṃ nāśam} /

‘It is subtle’ Being deceived by the appearance of the several similar factors in the ‘homogeneous series’, people fail to perceive the Destruction in its subtle form;

sādṛśasantānotpattyā tūtprekṣante{ avinaṣtameva} /

in fact by the perception of the homogeneous series, they are led to imagine that the object is ‘undestroyed’.

vilakṣaṇo hetur mudgarādiḥ / vilakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kapālādi /

‘Peculiar cause’ in the shape of the Bludgeon. ‘Peculiar effect’ in the shape of the Potsherds.

asyāṃ kilāvasthāyāṃ vināśasya sthūlatvaṃ vyaktībhavati /

It is under these conditions that the grossness of the Destruction becomes manifested.

tenetyādinopasaṃhāraḥ /

‘Thus, etc. etc.’ sums up the argument.

vilakṣaṇaḥ /

‘Heterogeneous series’, of a different character.

heto [p.640] ryata iti sāmānādhikaraṇyam / tenaiveti hetunā / yata iti yo nirdiṣṭaḥ /

‘Hetoḥ’ is to be conducted with ‘yataḥ’, ‘Tena’ by that same cause, which has been referred to by the pronoun in ‘yataḥ’ is the Destruction manifested.

tasyābhivyajyata iti pareṇābhisambandhaḥ //

Such is the construction with the preceding clause.

vipakṣavṛttitāṃ hetor upadarśayann āha sa mudgaretyādi /

In the following Text, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that the Probans in question is present in the contrary of the Probandum: [see verse 2329 above]

sa iti / divividho 'pi nirodhaḥ mudgaraprahārādiprayatnānantarajñāno mudgaraprahārādiprayatnānantarīyaka ucyate //

‘This’ the two kinds of Destruction. The compound ‘Prayatnā, etc.’ stands for ‘invariably concomitant with effort involved in the stroke of the Bludgeon (2329)

tribhir ityuktam / tatra dvābhyāṃ vyabhicāramupadarśya tṛtīyenāpyākāśena vyabhicāram upadarśayann āha ākāśamapītyādi /

It was asserted (under Text 2322) that the Probans is shown to be ‘Inconclusive’ in view of three factors. Inconclusiveness due to two factors has been shown, in the shape of the two kinds of Destruction;

tenānaikāntiko hetur yaduktaṃ tatra darśanam //

that due to the third factor of ‘Ākāśa’ is next pointed out: [see verses 2330-2331 above]

tasya bhūmyādeḥ khananādikaraṇabhūtair apanayena / tatreti śabde /

‘By the removal of these’ The removal of the Earth by digging with the ispade, etc. ‘Tatra’ in regard to the Word-sound.

darśanam prayatnānatarajñānam //

‘Darśanam’ i.e. apprehension following from effort.

evaṃ hetudoṣānabhidhāya dṛṣṭānadoṣān vaktukāma āha sapakṣo 'pītyādi /

Having thus pointed out the defects in the Probans (of the Opponent), the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out those in the Corroborative Instance: [see verses 2332-2334 above]

aṃśo hyetasya jātyākhyo nityo dhvaṃsītaro mataḥ / śabalākāram ekaṃ hi vastu prāk pratipāditam // sapakṣo dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

The term ‘Sapakṣa’ (which is that wherein the Probandum is known by all to be present) here stands for the Corroborative Instance (in the reasoning of the Opponent, where the Jar has been cited as an instance of what is perceived as appearing after effort and is non-eternal).

sa kiṃ śrutyartho 'bhipretaḥ āhosvidvyaktiḥ /

The question, as regards the Instance that has been cited (the ‘Jar’) is is the word meant to be taken in its direct denotative sense (which is the Universal)? Or in the sense of the Individual Jar?

yadi śrutyarthas tadā sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ /

If it is meant to be taken in the direct sense, then it is defective, in so far as it is devoid of the Probandum (Non-eternality).

tathā hi śrutiḥ śabdaḥ /

‘Śruti’ here stands for the Word;

tasyārtho 'bhidheyaḥ /

the ‘artha’ is what is directly denoted by it;

sa punaḥ sāmānyaṃ ghaṭatvādiḥ, naca {tacca---} sarvavādināṃ nityameveṣṭam itina tatrānityatvasya sādhyadharmasyānugamaḥ /

and what is so denoted is the Universal ‘Jar’; and the Universal is admitted by all parties to be eternal; hence there cannot be presence, in it, of non-eternality, which forms the Probandum.

kvacijjātyartha iti pāṭhaḥ / tatra karmadhārayaḥ samāsaḥ kāryaḥ /

In some places, the reading is ‘jātyarthaḥ’ in place of ‘śrutyarthaḥ’; under which ‘jāti’ is to be taken as in apposition to ‘artha’.

arthas tulya eva /

The meaning however remains the same as before.

atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadāpi tasyā vyakter dṛṣṭāntatveneṣṭāyā [p.641] jātyanyānanyakalpanā kāryā /

If the second alternative is meant that the word ‘Jar’ stands for the Individual Jar, then also, it has to be considered whether the Individual that is intended to be the corroborative Instance is the same as, or different from, the Universal;

kiṃ sā vyaktir jāter anyā, āhosvid ananyā /

that is, whether the Individual is something different from the Universal? Or non-different from it?

ya{dānyā}tadā dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇo mīmāṃsakaṃ pratyasiddhiḥ /

If it is different, then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka;

nahi mīmāṃsako vaiśeṣikādivadekāntena vyakter anyāṃ jātimicchati /

because the Mīmāṃsaka does not hold the Universal to be something absolutely different from the Individual, as the Vaiśeṣikas and others do;

yathoktam ---"sthitaṃ naiva tu jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" iti /

as has been asserted in the words ‘or us the Universal is nothing different from the Individual’.

athānanyapakṣas tadā parān bauddhādīn prati dṛṣṭāntadharma{mya---}siddhiḥ / nahi pare vyakter ananyāṃ jātiṃ manyante /

If, on the other hand, the Individual is meant to be non-different (from the Universal), then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Buddhist and others.’ These ‘others’ do not regard the Universal as non-different from the Individual.

atha bhedābhedavikalpamavadhūya ghaṭo nidarśanatvenopādīyate, tadāpyasmānprati sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasye{ti} nidarśayannāha aviśeṣe 'pītyādi / taditi ghaṭavastu /

If the Jar is meant to be the Instance, in the indefinite form, free from all conceptual contents like difference and non-difference, even then, according to us, the Instance comes to be one devoid of the Probandum. This is what is asserted in the words ‘If it is something indefinite, etc. etc.’ ‘Tat’ stands for the Jar.

katham ity āha aṃśa ityādi /

Question: How so?

etasya hi ghaṭavastuno jātisaṃjñako bhāgo nityaḥ / itarastu vyaktisaṃjñako dhvaṃsī vināśī /

Answer: ‘That element, etc. etc.’ Of the entity called ‘Jar’, that factor which is called the ‘Universal’ is eternal, while the other factor which is called the ‘Individual’ is perishable.

syād etat katham ekasya parasparaviruddhaṃ svabhāvadvayaṃ yuktam ity āha śabalākāram ityādi //2332 //2333 //

Question: How can one and the same thing have two mutually contradictory characters? Answer: ‘Mixed, character, etc. etc.

punar api sādhyadharmavikalpamukhena dṛṣṭāntadoṣān vaktukāma āha anityatetyādi /

The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds again to point out the defects in the Corroborative Instance, through the various alternatives that are possible in regard to the Probandum: [see verse 2335 above]

anityatā vikalpyaivaṃ nāśaścet sādhyahīnatā / mamānyasyāṃ tu bhavatām ityeṣā dūṣaṇoktidik //

If what is meant by your Probandum, ‘non-eternality’ is absolute Destruction, then for us, Mīmāṃsakas, the Instance is devoid of the Probandum;

na hyasmābhir atyantasamucchedo bhāvānām iṣṭaḥ, śaktirūpeṇāvasthānāt /

because we do not admit of any absolute Destruction of things; as they always remain in the form of Potencies.

yadyapi nāśa iti sāmānyaśabdas tathāpi prakaraṇānniranvayavināśātmake 'rthaviśeṣe 'sya vṛttir vijñāyate /

Though the word used in the Text is the common word, ‘nāśa’, yet from the Context, its meaning appears to be restricted to utter, absolute destruction.

nanu cānityatvaṃ nāśitvaṃ yadyātyantikam ucyetetyādinā anityatā vikalpitaiva, tat kimiti bhūyo 'pi vikalpyate /

If it were not so, why should the writer have urged the argument that the Instance is devoid of the Probandum? Question: The question as to what is meant by ‘non-eternality’ has been already discussed before under Text 2315; why is it discussed over again?

satyam, sā hi pakṣasya doṣodbhāvanārtham idānīṃ tu dṛṣṭāntasyeti viśeṣaḥ /

Answer: True; but it was discussed there for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the ‘Subject’, while on the present occasion it is discussed for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the Corroborative Instance.

atha na niranvayavināśalakṣaṇānityatābhipretā kiṃ tvanyaivāvirbhāvatirobhāvalakṣaṇā, atrāha anyasyām iti / anityatāyām iti sambandhaḥ / bhavatām iti /

If, on the other hand, ‘non-eternality’ that is meant is not in the form of ‘absolute Destruction’, but in the form of ‘appearance and disappearance’, then the answer is ‘If it is otherwise’, i.e. if ‘non-eternality’ is something other than ‘Absolute Destruction’.

tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntasyeti śeṣaḥ /

‘For you’ ‘there is absence of Probandum’ this has to be construed here also i.e. in the Instance.

nahi bhavadhir bauddhaiḥ sāṅkhyair iva sānvayo vināśa iṣyate /

As you, Buddhists do not admit of ‘Destruction with a residue’ as the Saṅkhyas do.

tasmād dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā bhavat pakṣe syād ityeṣa śabdānityatvasādhanadūṣaṇamārgo viduṣām ākhyātaḥ, anyad api prājñaiḥ svayam abhyūhya kartavyam //

Hence under your view, the Instance cited would be devoid of the Probandum. This is the way in which the arguments in support of the non-eternality of Words have to be refuted, which has been expounded for the learned;

padārthetyādinā parasya codyamāśaṅkate /

other arguments may also be put forward by intelligent people themselves.

padārthapadasambandhanityatve sādhite 'pi vā / naiva ceha pramāṇatvaṃ vākyārthaṃ prati sidhyati //

“[Says the opponent] ‘Though the word, the meaning and the connection between them have been proved to be eternal, yet so far as the validity (reliability) of the meaning of the sentence is concerned, that cannot be admitted.

[p.642]

[Ślokavārtika on sentence 1].

samayāt puruṣāṇāṃ hi guṇavṛddhyādivan matiḥ / niṣkāraṇo 'pi sannartho yājñikaiḥ parikalpitaḥ //

it may be that the meaning of sentences has been assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, without any basis, in accordance with the conventions of men, just as in the case of such technical terms as guṇa, vṛddhi and the like.

apicāsya kathāvat tu saṅghātāt pauruṣeyatā /

Further, being in the form of a compilation, the Veda must be regarded as a human production, like a book of stories.

nacāptaḥ puruṣo vāsti tena vedāpramāṇatā //

And yet there is no reliable person (known, who could be the author of the Veda);

viśiṣṭasādhanāvacchinnakriyāviśeṣavidhipratiṣedhalakṣaṇo hi vākyārthaḥ /

The ‘meaning of sentence’ consists in the Injunction or Prohibition of particular acts as associated with particular means of accomplishment;

tatraiva codanāyāḥ prāmāṇyaṃ na padārthe / tataś ca vedasya prāmāṇye sādhye yat padapadārthatat sambandhānāṃ trayāṇām api nityatvapratipādanaṃ tat prakṛtānupayogi /

it does not rest in what is expressed by words, Consequently when the validity or authority or reliability of the Veda has to be proved, what has been established regarding the eternality of the Word, its meaning and the connection of these, is of no use in the matter at issue. Further, whenever there is cognition of the meaning of a sentence, it is always found to be based upon Convention;

kiṃ ca yā yā vākyārthapratipattiḥ sā saṅketaprabhavā, yathā ādguṇa ityāder vākyāt guṇavṛddhyādimatiḥ, vākyārthapratipattiś ca codanāvākyasamudbhaveti svabhāvahetuḥ /

e.g. sentences like ‘ād-guṇaḥ’ (Pānini’s Sūtra, defining what is ‘guṇa’), bring about the cognition of what is meant by the technical terms ‘guṇa’, ‘vṛddhi’ and the like; the cognition of the meaning of the Injunctive Sentence is cognition of the meaning of a sentence;

etad eva darśayati samayād ityādi / guṇavṛddhyādivad iti / saptamyarthe vatiḥ /

hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things. This is what is shown in the words ‘In accordance with Conventions, etc. etc.’ ‘Like the technical terms, etc. etc.’ The affix ‘vati’ has the sense of the Locative.

asyaiva samarthanam āha niṣkāraṇo 'pītyādi /

In support of the said idea it is added ‘without any basis’.

niṣkāraṇo 'pi nirnibandhano 'pi san svotprekṣayā niraṅkuśayā yājñikair ājīvikārtham evāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma ityādivedavākyārthaḥ parikalpita iti sambhāvyam /

That is, it is just possible that without any reason, through their unbridled imagination, for the purpose of making a living the ‘Sacrificers’ have assumed the meanings of such Vedic sentences as ‘Desiring Heaven, one should offer the Agnihotra’.

kiṃ ca yat saṅghātarūpaṃ tat pauruṣeyaṃ, yathā nāṭakākhyāyikādikathā, padasaṅghātaś ca veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

Then again, as a matter of fact, whatever is a compilation is a human product, e.g. Dramas and Stories, and the Veda is a compilation of words; hence this is a reason based on the nature of the thing.

tataś ca pauruṣeyatvād rathyāpuruṣavākyavad apramāṇaṃ vedaḥ syāt /

Thus then, as the Veda is a human work, it must be unreliable like the words of the man by the roadside.

āptapraṇītatvāt pauruṣeyo 'pi pramāṇaṃ bhaviṣyatīti cedāha ne cāpta ityādi //2336 //

It might be that it is reliable because it is the work of a reliable person. The answer to that is ‘There is no reliable person known, etc. etc.’ (2336-2338)

sambandhetyādi pratividhatte / sambandhākaraṇānyāyād vaktavyā vākyanityatā /

“The eternality of the sentence is to be asserted in the same manner in which the eternality of the connection (between word and meaning) has been asserted.

dṛṣṭārthavahāratvād vṛddhyādau sambhavedapi //

Even though, in the case of the technical words like ‘vṛddhi’, what has been asserted may be possible because these deal with perceptible things;