buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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atra ca śabdasya nityavyāpitvam antareṇa sarvasmin kāle deśe ca na grahaṇaṃ siddhyatītyato nityavibhutve śabdasyānyathānupapattyā siddhe //	in the present instance, if the Sound did not possess all-pervadingness, its being heard at several places and times would not be possible; hence on the ground of this Presumption, Sound is regarded as eternal and all-pervading.
yathā mahatyāṃ khātāyāṃ mṛdi vyomni mahattvadhīḥ / alpāyāṃ vālpadhīrevam atyantākṛtake matiḥ //	“When a large pit is dug in the ground, there is a notion of the ākāśa in the pit being ‘large’, and when the pit is small, there is the notion of its being ‘small’;
tenātraiva paropādhiśabdavṛttau matibhramaḥ /	in the same way there are similar notions regarding sound, which also (like ākāśa) is not something produced;
naca sthūlatvasūkṣmatve lakṣyete śabdavartinī //	as a matter of fact, ‘largeness’ and ‘smallness’ are never perceived as residing in sound;
buddhitīvratvamandatve mahattvālpatvakalpanā / sā ca paṭvī bhavatyeva mahātejaḥprakāśite // mandaprakāśite mandā ghaṭādāvapi sarvadā /	and the assumption of the ‘largeness’ and ‘smallness’ (of sound) is due to the greater and less keenness of its perception (hearing). As regards perception, it is actually found to be very keen if the object perceived the jar is illumined by a large source of light, but less keen when it is illumined by a small light.
evaṃ dīrghādayaḥ sarve dhvanidharmā iti sthitam //	From all this it follows that such properties as ‘length’, ‘shortness’ and the like really belong to the articulations.” (2230-2233)
atrāyam abhiprāyaḥ yadi śabdagatāstīvramandādayo bhedā hetutvenopādīyante tada na siddho hetuḥ /	The Mīmāṃsaka next proceeds to show that the Reason that ‘because Sound is cognised as having diverse characters, it must be diverse’ is also ‘Inconclusive’, ‘not true’: [see verses 2230-2233 above]
yo hi nityaṃ śabdamicchati sa katham aparopādhikāṃstasya svabhāvabhedān brūyāt / atha tīvramandādyākāro tadviṣayā buddhir hetutvenocyate, sā hi na svabhāve bhedamantareṇa sambhavatīti /	because how could one, who holds Sound to be eternal, admit that the diversity of characters, which, according to him, belong to other circumstantial conditions, belong to the Sound? If, on the other hand, what is adduced by the Opponent as his Reason is the Cognition that people have of Sound being more or less intensive, which Cognition cannot be possible without some difference in the character of the Sound, then the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’;
yathāhi mahatyāṃ mṛdi pṛthivyāṃ khātāyāṃ satyāṃ vyomni ākāśe tadāśrayaṃ mahattvādijñānam utpadyate svato mahattvāder abhāve 'pi tathā śabde 'pyatyantākṛtrime 'yaṃ vyañjakadhvanibhedādbuddhibhedo bhaviṣyati tathāvidhasvabhāvabhedamantareṇāpi /	because when a large Pit is dug in the ground, there appears the Cognition of ‘largeness’ in the Ākāśa contained within the Pit, even though the ‘largeness’ does not belong to the Ākāśa; in the same manner, in the case of Sound also, which is absolutely causeless, not being produced at all, the Cognition of greater or less intensity and the like would be due to the diversity in the articulations (that manifest the Sound), even without the Sound itself having the said diverse characters.
tadevāha tenātraivam ityādi /	This is what is said in the words ‘Consequently the illusory idea, etc. etc.’
atha paropādhirayam natu svata eveti katham avagatam iti cedāha nacetyādi /	Question: How is it known that the said idea is due to other circumstantial conditions, and the characters do not belong to Sound itself? Answer;
anenaitad āha buddhigate eva tīvramandatve śabde samāropya bhrāmyati, natupunaḥ śabdasya svataḥ sthūlādisambhavaḥ, tasya pratyabhijñayaikatvasya siddhatvāt /	What is meant by this is as follows: The man attributes the greater or less intensity, which really belongs to the Perception, to the Sound, and thus falls into an illusion; and it is not possible for the Sound itself to be large or small; because it has been proved through Recognition that Sound is one only.
athāpi syād yadi viṣayasya tathā svabhāvabhedo na bhaved buddherapi kuto bhaved ity āha sā ca paṭvītyādi /	The following might be urged: If there were no such diversity in the character of the object perceived, how could it appear in its Cognition?
yathaiva hi ghaṭādāvasatyapi svabhāvabhede prakāśabhedād bhaviṣyati, asatyapi svataḥ svabhāvabheda ityadoṣaḥ //2230 2231 // punar api śabdānityatvapratijñāyā bādhāṃ śabdasya vācakasāmarthyānyathānupapattyā pratipādayann āha nacādṛṣṭārthasambandha ityādi /	The answer is ‘As regards Perception, it is found to be very keen, etc. etc.’ In the case of the Jar, even though there is no diversity of characters, yet its Perception is more or less keen, on account of the largeness or smallness of the Light illumining it; in the same way, in the case of Sound also, the diversity of ‘Length’, ‘Shortness’ and the like is due to the diversity in the character of the articulation, even though there is no such diversity of character in the Word-Sound itself.
nacādṛṣṭārthasambandhaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ /	“As a matter of fact, a word, whose relation shit to its denotation has not been apprehended, can never be expressive.
tathācetsyād apūrvo 'pi sarvaḥ svārthaṃ prabodhayet //	If it were so expressive, then, each and every new word could express its meaning.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 242-243].
arthāpattipūrvikeyam arthāpattis tathā hi śabdasya vācakasāmarthyaṃ śābdajñānānyathānupapattyā siddham, tadapi sāmarthyaṃ śabdanityatvam antareṇānupapannm ityarthāpattipūrvikeyam arthāpattiḥ /	The Presumption that is here put forward is itself based upon another Presumption: For instance, the expressive Potency of the Word is proved by the Presumption that Verbal Cognition cannot be explained except on that basis; and this Potency cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternality of the Word;
tām eva vistareṇa pratipādayati nahi tāvad agṛhītasambandhaḥ śabdaḥ sattāmātreṇa vācako bhavati /	This same idea is expounded in detail in the Text where it is shown that the Word by itself cannot be expressive if its relationship with its denotation has not been apprehended.
tathācet syāditi /	‘If it were so expressive, etc. etc.’;
yadyadṛṣṭārthasambandho 'pi vācako bhavet tadāpūrvo 'pi prathamamaśruto 'pi nālikeradvīpanivāsināṃ gavādiśabdaḥ svārthaṃ prakāśayet //	if the word, whose relationship to the denotation has not been already apprehended, were expressive of its meaning, then even a new word, never heard before, could express its meaning; for instance, words like ‘Cow’, etc. in the case of the inhabitants of the Nārikela-dvīpa (the Coconut-Isle) (who are not cognisant of such words).
[p.618] nanu cātra sarveṣām avivādāt siddhasādhyatā, nahi kaścid ajñānasambandhaṃśabdaṃ vācakam icchati /	as a matter of fact, there is no one who holds that any meaning is expressed by a Word whose connection with such meaning has not been already known.
nityastu sa katham anena jñātasambandhena pratipādito bhavatītyatāha sambandhadarśanam ityādi /	But the question is In what way does this fact of the relationship of the Word being known prove its eternality? The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2235 above]
śabdamarthaṃ ca puro 'vasthāpya tayoḥ sambandhaḥ kriyate, kṛtaścottarakālaṃ jṇYāyeta / uccaritapradhvaṃsitvāt tu śabdasyaitad ayuktam /	The relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it can he established only when both are present before the man; and it is only when thus made that it could be cognised at a later time. All this could not be possible if the Word perished as soon as it was produced.
tadāha nānityasyopapadyata iti /	This is what is meant by the words ‘It would not be possible if the Word were not-eternal’.
atha tāvat kālamavatiṣṭhet, hanta tarhi kālāntaramapyavasthānamanivāryamevāvirodhāt /	If then, it is admitted that the Word existed at the time, then the idea of its having existed at other times becomes irresistible; as that would not be incompatible with the facts.
yathoktam ---" tāvatkālaṃ sthiraṃ cainaṃ kaḥ paścānnāśayiṣyatī"ti //	This has been thus stated ‘If it exists during that time, who can destroy it later on?’ (Text 2139 Ślokavārtika Eternality of Words, 366).
athāpi syāt sambandhakālaṃ yāvad avatiṣṭhet, paścāt svayam eva naśyatītyāha anyasminnityādi /	It might be argued that It may be that the Word exists at the time that the relationship (with its denotation) is set up; but later on, it would perish of itself.
gośabde jñātasambandhe nāśvaśabdo hi vācakaḥ // anyasmin saṅketakālabhāvini /	‘With one word’ i.e. with the Word that existed at the time that the Convention was set up fixing its denotation.
śeṣaṃ subodham //	The rest is easily understood.
atheti parābhiprāyam āśaṅkate	The following Text anticipates and answers an argument of the Opponent: [see verse 2237 above]
athānyo 'pi svabhāvena kaścid evāvabodhakaḥ /	‘Other Word’ i.e. if the Word that exists at the time of its use is held to be expressive, through its own inherent aptitude, like the Word that existed at the time of the Convention;
athānyo 'pīti /	that cannot be right;
prayogakālabhāvī prakṛtyaiva saṅketakālabhāviśabdavad vācakaḥ syād iti cet tadasamyak / nibandhanamantareṇāsau śabdo 'syārthasya vācaka iti niścayābhāvāt //	because in the absence of a fixed rule, there could be no certainty as to which Word is expressive of which meaning. “If the use of words be assumed to be based upon actual expedience as to which word brings about the cognition (of a certain thing), this may serve the purpose of the hearers of the word;
nanu ca katham ucyate niścayo nāstīti, yāvatā yato 'rthapratyayo bhavati sa eva svabhāvato 'rthasya bodhaka iti spaṣṭam eva niścīyata ity āha yata ityādi /	it cannot do so for those who usb the word.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 246-247]. Says the Opponent How do you say that there can be no certainty, when, as a matter of fact, it is clearly ascertained that it is by its inherent aptitude that the word expresses its meaning?
yataḥ pratyaya ityeva vyavahāre prakalpite /	The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2238 above]
śrot---ṇāṃ syād apītthaṃ tu vakt---ṇāṃ nāvakalpate // satyaṃ śrot---ṇāṃ sambhavedayaṃ niścayo 'yamarthasya pratyāyaka iti /	True; what has been asserted would bring about certainty in the minds of the hearers as to a certain Word being expressive of a particular thing; because they may have a certain cognition arising on the hearing of the Word.
prayokt---ṇāṃ tvayaṃ durlabhaḥ, nahi te tataḥ śabdād arthaṃ pratipadyante, parapratyāyanārtham eva śabdaṃ te prayuñjate /	But this will not be possible for those who use the Word; because they do not derive any cognition of anything from that Word; as they use that Word for the purpose of bringing about the cognition for the hearers only.
tat kuto vakt---ṇām avakalpate niścayaḥ //	Under the circumstances, how could there be any certainty in the minds of the persons using the Word? (2238)
[p.619] etad eva darśayati ajñātvetyādi /	The same idea is further explained [see verse 2239 next]
ajñātvā kamasau śabdamādāveva vivakṣatu / jānāti cedavaśyaṃ sa pūrvam evāvadhāritaḥ //	“Without knowing with certainty (what word expresses what) how could the user make up his mind at the outset as to which word he should use? If, on the other hand, he does know it, then it must have been known to him from before.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 247-248].
tadevamajñānapakṣe 'yaṃ doṣaḥ, jñānapakṣe 'pi niyatam asau prāktena jñāta iti sthiratvamasya balād āpatatīti darśayann āha jānāti cedityādi //	Under the other view, that he does know it at the time of using it, it necessarily follows that the Word must have been known to him from before (as expressive of that meaning) which establishes its permanence. This is what is meant by the words ‘If, on the other hand, etc. etc.’ (2239)
nanu yathā dīpāditejo 'bhinavam api prakāśayatyarthaṃ tathā śabdo 'pi pratipādayiṣyatītyāha tejaḥ pratyakṣaśeṣatvād iti /	“Light is auxiliary to the perception; hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things; [not so the word]. [If it be urged that] in the case of the word the comprehension of the meaning of a certain word is due to its similarity to another well-known word;
tejaḥ pratyakṣaśeṣatvān navatve 'pi prakāśakam /	Says the Opponent The light of the lamp, even when newly lit, illumines the object;
sadṛśatvāpratīteś ca taddūreṇāpyavācakaḥ //	similarly the Word also would express its meaning (when heard and used for the first time).
pratyakṣaśeṣatvam ---(pratyakśe) aṅgabhāvaḥ /	The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2240 above]
tadviṣayasaṃskārādindriyasaṃskārād vā pratyakṣe jñāne 'ṅgatām upagacchadabhinavam api prakāśakaṃ bhavati /	‘Light is auxiliary to the Perception’ i.e. it is an appurtenance of the Perception; as a matter of fact, it becomes an auxiliary to Perceptional Cognition, by embellishing either the Object or the Sense-organ;
śabdasya sākṣād atīndriyārthapratipādakatvān na pratyakṣāṅgam ato vaiṣamyam /	As regards the Word, on the other hand, directly it denotes only supersensuous things, and as such it cannot be an auxiliary to Perception. So that there is no analogy between the two cases.
athavā yat pratyakṣāṅgaṃ tat sambandhaparijñānanirapekṣam api prakāśayati /	Or (the meaning of the Text may be as follows) What is auxiliary to Perception illumines things independently of the idea of any connection between the two (the illuminator and the illuminated);
yathā cakṣus tejaś ca pratyakṣāṅgam /	e.g. the Eye; Light is auxiliary to Perception;
tasmād abhinavam api prakāśayati /	hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things;
śabdas tu parokṣaviṣayatvān na pratyakṣāṅgam iti vaiṣamyam /	Word, on the other hand, pertaining, as it does, to imperceptible things, is not auxiliary to Perception.
nanu cābhinavamapi śabdāntaraṃ pūrvasādṛśyānusāreṇa vācakaṃ bhaviṣyatīt yāha sadṛśatvāpratīter ityādi / na hyapratīte sādṛśye taddvāreṇa vācakatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt //	Says the Opponent Even a new Word would express the meaning through its similarity to a previously-known Word. The answer is ‘So long as the similarity, etc. etc.’ So long as the Similarity has not been actually recognised, the expressiveness of the Word cannot be due to it; otherwise there would be incongruities.
kiñca āstāṃ tāvat sādṛśyapratītiḥ, sādṛśyam eva na sambhavatīti pratipādayann āha kasya caikasyetyādi /	Then again, the recognition of similarity may rest awhile; as a matter -of fact, no similarity is possible at all;
kasya caikasya sādṛśyāt kalpyatāṃ vācako 'paraḥ / adṛṣṭasaṅgatitvena pūrveṣāṃ tulyatā yadā //	“Which particular individual word would it be, through similarity to which another word would be assumed to be expressive? All these words would be equal, in so far as no one among them has its connection (with the meaning) previously known.
arthavān pūrvadṛṣṭaścet tasyaitāvān kṣaṇaḥ kutaḥ / dvistrirvānupalabdho hi nārthavān sampratīyate //	If it be held that ‘the word perceived (heard) first of all did actually have a meaning [and the expressiveness of the others would be dependent upon their similarity to that word]’, then (the answer is) how could it continue to exist for such a long time? As a matter of fact, a word is not comprehended as having a meaning until it has been heard twice or thrice.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 249-250].
ekasmin hi vācake siddhe tat sādṛśyāditaras tathaiveti kalpyeta tac ca na sambhavati, sarveṣām eva śabdānām arthasambandhitvena pratītatvāt /	When one Word has been admitted to be expressive, others could be assumed to be expressive on the ground of their similarity to that Word; but this is not possible; because all Words are equally recognised as not connected with a meaning.
athāpi syādyaḥ prāk saṅkekāle dṛṣṭaḥ so 'rthavāneva, sādṛśyamitareṣāṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha tasyaitāvān kṣaṇaḥ kuta iti / tasya pūrvadṛṣṭasya śabdasya etāvataḥ kṣaṇān kuto 'vasthānamuccaritapradhvaṃsitvāt tasya /	It might be argued that ‘the first Word that was heard at the time of the fixing of the Convention, certainly had a meaning, and all the rest would be similar to this one’. The answer to that is ‘How could it, etc. etc.’ How could that first Word heard previously continue to exist during all this time when (ex-hypothesi) it must be destroyed as soon as produced.
[p.620] atha sajātīyānyagrahaṇe sati sa eva sārthako bhavatītyucyate, tadayuktam ity āha apratītānyaśabdānām ityādi /	It might be asked Even if the Word is destroyed as soon as it is uttered, why cannot it have a meaning? The answer to that is ‘A word is not, etc. etc.’ That is, the connection between the Word and its Denotation is recognised only after repeated hearing of it.
apratītānyaśabdānāṃ tat kāle 'sāvanarthakaḥ /	“For persons who have not heard other words (like it), the word, at the time, must be meaningless (inexpressive);
sa evānyaśrutīnāṃ syād arthavān iti vismayaḥ //	that the same word would become expressive as soon as the man has heard other words, would be a wonder indeed!”.
yeṣāṃ hi pratipatt---ṇāṃ śabdāntaram apratītaṃ teṣāṃ hi śravaṇakāle nāsāvarthasya pratyāyakaḥ /	For those observers who have not heard other Words of the same kind, the Word heard for the first time is not expressive of any meaning;
bhedādhiṣṭhānasya sādṛśyasya tadānīm abhāvāt /	because ‘similarity’ that rests on diversity is not there at the time.
punaḥ sa eva teṣām eva pratipatt---ṇāṃ pratītaśabdāntarāṇām arthapratyāyaka ityalaukikam /	That the same Word, for those same observers, when they have heard other Words of the kind, should become expressive would indeed be something extraordinary!
kathaṃ hi nāmaikasya kriyākriye parasparaviruddhe syātām /	How could the two contradictory actions of expressing and not-expressing belong to one and the same (Word)?
anyaśrutīnām iti / anyā sajātīyaśabdaviṣayā śrutir yeṣāṃ pratipatt---ṇāṃ te tathā //	The compound ‘anyaśrutīnām’ is to be expounded as “those persons who have had the ‘Śruti’, audition, hearing, of ‘anya’ other Words of the same kind”.
śabdaṃ tāvad anuccārya sambandhakaraṇaṃ naca / nacoccāritanaṣṭasya sambandhena prayojanam //	“No connection can be set up without pronouncing the word; and when the word perishes as soon as it is pronounced, it can have no need for any connection.
tenāsambandhanaṣṭatvāt pūrvastāvadanarthakaḥ /	consequently, as the word will have perished and would not have had its connection set up, the first word must be inexpressive (meaningless);
uttaro 'kṛtasambandho vijñāyetārthavān katham //	how then could the subsequent word also, which has had no connection set up, be recognised as expressive?” [Śokavārtika eternality of words, 256-258].
pūrvam uccāraṇaṃ tataḥ sambandhakaraṇaṃ tato vyavahāra ityayaṃ krameṇa vyavahāra uccāritapradhvaṃsino 'kramasya kathaṃ syāt /	First of all there is utterance of the Word, then the setting up of its connection (with its denotation), then its actual use, in practice; such is the way in which Words are dealt with in actual practice.
na kevalaṃ naṣṭasya sambandho 'śakyakriyaḥ, nāpi tena prayojanam vyavahārakālānanuyāyitvāt /	there would not be any use in setting up any such connection; as it would not be present at the time of usage;
vyavahārārthatvāc ca saṅketasya /	and it is only for the purposes of use that Conventions (regarding words and their meanings) are set up.
tenetyādinā nigamayati /	The words ‘Consequently, etc. etc.’ sum up the conclusion;
avidyamānaḥ sambandho yasyāsāvasambandhaḥ, tattvānnaṣṭatvāc ca pūrvastāvat saṅketakālabhāvī śabdo 'narthakaḥ /	the compound ‘asambandhanaṣṭatvāt’ is to be explained as ‘because it would be asambandha without its connection set up, and because it would be naṣṭa perished the first word that was there at the time of making the Convention, must be inexpressive’.
vyavahārakālabhāvī tarhi sārthako bhaviṣyatītyāha uttra ityādi // yadi tarhyakramasya krameṇoccāraṇādayo 'nupapannā yugapat tarhi bhavantvityāha śabdoccāraṇetyādi /	It might be said that ‘the Word appearing at the time of usage would be expressive’. The answer to that is ‘How then could the subsequent Word, etc. etc.’ (2244-2245)
śabdoccāraṇasambandhakaraṇavyāvahārikīḥ /	“The utterance of the word, the setting up of its connection and its use, all this process is, by its very nature, successive;
kriyāḥ kramasvabhāvatvāt kaḥ kuryād yugapatkvacit //	how could any one perform all this simultaneously?” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 258-259].
śabdoccāraṇaṃ sambandhakaraṇaṃ lokavyavahāraścetyetās tisraḥ kriyāḥ svabhāvata eva kramavatyaḥ, tā yugapat kartumaśakyāḥ /	(1) Utterance of the Word, (2) the setting up of its connection, (3) actual usage, all these three acts are, by their very nature, such as can be done only one after the other; and it is absolutely impossible to do them all at the same time.
asati ca yaugapadye sambandhakaraṇānupapattiḥ /	And when there is no simultaneity, there can be no setting up of the Connection.
kramapratīkṣāyāṃ kālāntarasthāyī śabdo 'bhyupagataḥ syāt //	If succession were waited for, that would mean that the Word continues to exist for some time (other than the one at which it is produced).
[p.621] deśakālādibhinnānām iti nigamanam /	The Mīmāṃsaka reaffirms his view in the following: [see verses 2247-2248 next]
deśakālādibhinnānāṃ puṃsāṃ śabdāntarāśruteḥ /	“For those persons who live at different times and places, etc.
pūrvaṃ kṛtrimasambandho 'pyekaḥ śabdo na siddhyati //	prior to the hearing of other words there cannot be even one such word as had its connection set up.
sambandhakathane 'pyasya syād eṣaiva pratikriyā /	Even if the idea be that the connection is ‘asserted’ (not set up or created), the refutation of that also would be the same;
naṣṭāsadvartamāneṣu nākhyānasya hi sambhavaḥ //	as no such ‘assertion’ is possible in regard to what has perished, or what is non-existent, or what exists only at the present moment”. [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 260-261].
ādiśabdena bālakumārādyavasthāparigrahaḥ /	The term ‘ādi’, ‘etcetera’, includes the states of childhood, youth and so forth.
pūrvam iti / śabdāntaraśruter iti sambandhanīyam / naṣṭetyādi/	‘Prior to’ this has to be construed with ‘hearing of other Words’, ‘Perished, etc. etc.’ ‘what has perished’ i.e. the past;
naṣṭaḥ atītaḥ, asan anāgataḥ, tayor asattvādeva na sambandhākhyānasambhavaḥ /	‘what is nonexistent’ the future; with regard to these two no ‘assertion of connection’ can be made, because they are non-existent at the time;
vartamāno 'pyuccāryamāṇas tasya samanantaradhvaṃsitvena kutas tāvānkālaḥ //	as regards ‘what exists’ i.e. the present, which is being uttered, that also perishes immediately; how could it continue to exist till the setting up of the Connection? (2247-2248)
etadeva darśayati arthavānityādi /	The same idea is further explained: [see verses 2249-2251 next]
arthavān ka śabdaḥ śrotur vaktrā ca kathyatām / yadā pūrvaśrutaḥ śabdo nāsau śaknoti bhāṣitum //	“Which word would it be which the speaker would speak of to the hearer, as being expressive of meaning, when he is unable to utter the word that has been heard previously? He cannot speak of the word as expressive.
na tāvad arthavantaṃ sa bravīti sadṛśaṃ vadet /	He might speak of it as similar;
nārthavat sadṛśaḥ śabdaḥ śrotus tatropapadyate // arthavad grahaṇābhāvān na cāsāvarthavān svayam /	but, in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to recognise it as similar to that expressive word; because he has never heard that original expressive word; while the new word that he hears is not expressive.
vaktuḥ śrotṛtvavelāyām etad eva prasajyate //	And when the man who is a speaker now becomes the hearer at a later time, the same difficulties would appear.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 261-264].
na hi vaktā pūrvaśrutaṃ śrotuḥ kathayituṃ śaktaḥ, tasya pūrvaniruddhatvāt /	The Speaker cannot speak of the previously heard Word, to the Hearer, because it has perished already;
yamapi pratipādayati na tamarthavantaṃ śaknuyāt pratipādayitum /	the Word that he does speak to him, that he cannot prove to be expressive;
tasya pūrvamakṛtasambandhatvāt /	because this Word has not yet had any connection set up in regard to itself.
etāvat sambhāvyate sadṛśaṃ brūyād iti /	It might be possible that he might speak of it as similar to the expressive Word.
tadapi na sambhavatītyāha nārthavat sadṛśa ityādi / nahyatra kenacit sādṛśyam iṣṭam, kiṃ tarhi---, arthavatā, taccānupapannam /	But that also is not possible. This is what is explained in the words ‘But in that case, etc. etc.’ What is desired in this connection is not similarity to anything, but similarity to the expressive Word; and that is not possible.
yadi hi śrotrā kaścicchabdo 'rthavānupalabdhaḥ syāt tadānena sādṛśyam upapadyeta, yāvatā pūrvasaṅketakāle 'rthavato grahaṇābhāvān na yuktam etat /	If the Hearer had heard any expressive Word, then the similarity could be pointed out to him; as a matter of fact, however, the Hearer has not heard the expressive Word at the time that the Convention regarding its meaning was set up; hence what has been suggested is not possible.
kathyamāno yaḥ so 'rthavāṃs tarhi bhaviṣyatītyāha na cāsāvityādi /	It might be urged that the Word that is being spoken of to him by the Speaker might be expressive.

atra ca śabdasya nityavyāpitvam antareṇa sarvasmin kāle deśe ca na grahaṇaṃ siddhyatītyato nityavibhutve śabdasyānyathānupapattyā siddhe //

in the present instance, if the Sound did not possess all-pervadingness, its being heard at several places and times would not be possible; hence on the ground of this Presumption, Sound is regarded as eternal and all-pervading.

yathā mahatyāṃ khātāyāṃ mṛdi vyomni mahattvadhīḥ / alpāyāṃ vālpadhīrevam atyantākṛtake matiḥ //

“When a large pit is dug in the ground, there is a notion of the ākāśa in the pit being ‘large’, and when the pit is small, there is the notion of its being ‘small’;

tenātraiva paropādhiśabdavṛttau matibhramaḥ /

in the same way there are similar notions regarding sound, which also (like ākāśa) is not something produced;

naca sthūlatvasūkṣmatve lakṣyete śabdavartinī //

as a matter of fact, ‘largeness’ and ‘smallness’ are never perceived as residing in sound;

buddhitīvratvamandatve mahattvālpatvakalpanā / sā ca paṭvī bhavatyeva mahātejaḥprakāśite // mandaprakāśite mandā ghaṭādāvapi sarvadā /

and the assumption of the ‘largeness’ and ‘smallness’ (of sound) is due to the greater and less keenness of its perception (hearing). As regards perception, it is actually found to be very keen if the object perceived the jar is illumined by a large source of light, but less keen when it is illumined by a small light.

evaṃ dīrghādayaḥ sarve dhvanidharmā iti sthitam //

From all this it follows that such properties as ‘length’, ‘shortness’ and the like really belong to the articulations.” (2230-2233)

atrāyam abhiprāyaḥ yadi śabdagatāstīvramandādayo bhedā hetutvenopādīyante tada na siddho hetuḥ /

The Mīmāṃsaka next proceeds to show that the Reason that ‘because Sound is cognised as having diverse characters, it must be diverse’ is also ‘Inconclusive’, ‘not true’: [see verses 2230-2233 above]

yo hi nityaṃ śabdamicchati sa katham aparopādhikāṃstasya svabhāvabhedān brūyāt / atha tīvramandādyākāro tadviṣayā buddhir hetutvenocyate, sā hi na svabhāve bhedamantareṇa sambhavatīti /

because how could one, who holds Sound to be eternal, admit that the diversity of characters, which, according to him, belong to other circumstantial conditions, belong to the Sound? If, on the other hand, what is adduced by the Opponent as his Reason is the Cognition that people have of Sound being more or less intensive, which Cognition cannot be possible without some difference in the character of the Sound, then the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’;

yathāhi mahatyāṃ mṛdi pṛthivyāṃ khātāyāṃ satyāṃ vyomni ākāśe tadāśrayaṃ mahattvādijñānam utpadyate svato mahattvāder abhāve 'pi tathā śabde 'pyatyantākṛtrime 'yaṃ vyañjakadhvanibhedādbuddhibhedo bhaviṣyati tathāvidhasvabhāvabhedamantareṇāpi /

because when a large Pit is dug in the ground, there appears the Cognition of ‘largeness’ in the Ākāśa contained within the Pit, even though the ‘largeness’ does not belong to the Ākāśa; in the same manner, in the case of Sound also, which is absolutely causeless, not being produced at all, the Cognition of greater or less intensity and the like would be due to the diversity in the articulations (that manifest the Sound), even without the Sound itself having the said diverse characters.

tadevāha tenātraivam ityādi /

This is what is said in the words ‘Consequently the illusory idea, etc. etc.’

atha paropādhirayam natu svata eveti katham avagatam iti cedāha nacetyādi /

Question: How is it known that the said idea is due to other circumstantial conditions, and the characters do not belong to Sound itself? Answer;

anenaitad āha buddhigate eva tīvramandatve śabde samāropya bhrāmyati, natupunaḥ śabdasya svataḥ sthūlādisambhavaḥ, tasya pratyabhijñayaikatvasya siddhatvāt /

What is meant by this is as follows: The man attributes the greater or less intensity, which really belongs to the Perception, to the Sound, and thus falls into an illusion; and it is not possible for the Sound itself to be large or small; because it has been proved through Recognition that Sound is one only.

athāpi syād yadi viṣayasya tathā svabhāvabhedo na bhaved buddherapi kuto bhaved ity āha sā ca paṭvītyādi /

The following might be urged: If there were no such diversity in the character of the object perceived, how could it appear in its Cognition?

yathaiva hi ghaṭādāvasatyapi svabhāvabhede prakāśabhedād bhaviṣyati, asatyapi svataḥ svabhāvabheda ityadoṣaḥ //2230 2231 // punar api śabdānityatvapratijñāyā bādhāṃ śabdasya vācakasāmarthyānyathānupapattyā pratipādayann āha nacādṛṣṭārthasambandha ityādi /

The answer is ‘As regards Perception, it is found to be very keen, etc. etc.’ In the case of the Jar, even though there is no diversity of characters, yet its Perception is more or less keen, on account of the largeness or smallness of the Light illumining it; in the same way, in the case of Sound also, the diversity of ‘Length’, ‘Shortness’ and the like is due to the diversity in the character of the articulation, even though there is no such diversity of character in the Word-Sound itself.

nacādṛṣṭārthasambandhaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ /

“As a matter of fact, a word, whose relation shit to its denotation has not been apprehended, can never be expressive.

tathācetsyād apūrvo 'pi sarvaḥ svārthaṃ prabodhayet //

If it were so expressive, then, each and every new word could express its meaning.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 242-243].

arthāpattipūrvikeyam arthāpattis tathā hi śabdasya vācakasāmarthyaṃ śābdajñānānyathānupapattyā siddham, tadapi sāmarthyaṃ śabdanityatvam antareṇānupapannm ityarthāpattipūrvikeyam arthāpattiḥ /

The Presumption that is here put forward is itself based upon another Presumption: For instance, the expressive Potency of the Word is proved by the Presumption that Verbal Cognition cannot be explained except on that basis; and this Potency cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternality of the Word;

tām eva vistareṇa pratipādayati nahi tāvad agṛhītasambandhaḥ śabdaḥ sattāmātreṇa vācako bhavati /

This same idea is expounded in detail in the Text where it is shown that the Word by itself cannot be expressive if its relationship with its denotation has not been apprehended.

tathācet syāditi /

‘If it were so expressive, etc. etc.’;

yadyadṛṣṭārthasambandho 'pi vācako bhavet tadāpūrvo 'pi prathamamaśruto 'pi nālikeradvīpanivāsināṃ gavādiśabdaḥ svārthaṃ prakāśayet //

if the word, whose relationship to the denotation has not been already apprehended, were expressive of its meaning, then even a new word, never heard before, could express its meaning; for instance, words like ‘Cow’, etc. in the case of the inhabitants of the Nārikela-dvīpa (the Coconut-Isle) (who are not cognisant of such words).

[p.618] nanu cātra sarveṣām avivādāt siddhasādhyatā, nahi kaścid ajñānasambandhaṃśabdaṃ vācakam icchati /

as a matter of fact, there is no one who holds that any meaning is expressed by a Word whose connection with such meaning has not been already known.

nityastu sa katham anena jñātasambandhena pratipādito bhavatītyatāha sambandhadarśanam ityādi /

But the question is In what way does this fact of the relationship of the Word being known prove its eternality? The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2235 above]

śabdamarthaṃ ca puro 'vasthāpya tayoḥ sambandhaḥ kriyate, kṛtaścottarakālaṃ jṇYāyeta / uccaritapradhvaṃsitvāt tu śabdasyaitad ayuktam /

The relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it can he established only when both are present before the man; and it is only when thus made that it could be cognised at a later time. All this could not be possible if the Word perished as soon as it was produced.

tadāha nānityasyopapadyata iti /

This is what is meant by the words ‘It would not be possible if the Word were not-eternal’.

atha tāvat kālamavatiṣṭhet, hanta tarhi kālāntaramapyavasthānamanivāryamevāvirodhāt /

If then, it is admitted that the Word existed at the time, then the idea of its having existed at other times becomes irresistible; as that would not be incompatible with the facts.

yathoktam ---" tāvatkālaṃ sthiraṃ cainaṃ kaḥ paścānnāśayiṣyatī"ti //

This has been thus stated ‘If it exists during that time, who can destroy it later on?’ (Text 2139 Ślokavārtika Eternality of Words, 366).

athāpi syāt sambandhakālaṃ yāvad avatiṣṭhet, paścāt svayam eva naśyatītyāha anyasminnityādi /

It might be argued that It may be that the Word exists at the time that the relationship (with its denotation) is set up; but later on, it would perish of itself.

gośabde jñātasambandhe nāśvaśabdo hi vācakaḥ // anyasmin saṅketakālabhāvini /

‘With one word’ i.e. with the Word that existed at the time that the Convention was set up fixing its denotation.

śeṣaṃ subodham //

The rest is easily understood.

atheti parābhiprāyam āśaṅkate

The following Text anticipates and answers an argument of the Opponent: [see verse 2237 above]

athānyo 'pi svabhāvena kaścid evāvabodhakaḥ /

‘Other Word’ i.e. if the Word that exists at the time of its use is held to be expressive, through its own inherent aptitude, like the Word that existed at the time of the Convention;

athānyo 'pīti /

that cannot be right;

prayogakālabhāvī prakṛtyaiva saṅketakālabhāviśabdavad vācakaḥ syād iti cet tadasamyak / nibandhanamantareṇāsau śabdo 'syārthasya vācaka iti niścayābhāvāt //

because in the absence of a fixed rule, there could be no certainty as to which Word is expressive of which meaning. “If the use of words be assumed to be based upon actual expedience as to which word brings about the cognition (of a certain thing), this may serve the purpose of the hearers of the word;

nanu ca katham ucyate niścayo nāstīti, yāvatā yato 'rthapratyayo bhavati sa eva svabhāvato 'rthasya bodhaka iti spaṣṭam eva niścīyata ity āha yata ityādi /

it cannot do so for those who usb the word.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 246-247]. Says the Opponent How do you say that there can be no certainty, when, as a matter of fact, it is clearly ascertained that it is by its inherent aptitude that the word expresses its meaning?

yataḥ pratyaya ityeva vyavahāre prakalpite /

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2238 above]

śrot---ṇāṃ syād apītthaṃ tu vakt---ṇāṃ nāvakalpate // satyaṃ śrot---ṇāṃ sambhavedayaṃ niścayo 'yamarthasya pratyāyaka iti /

True; what has been asserted would bring about certainty in the minds of the hearers as to a certain Word being expressive of a particular thing; because they may have a certain cognition arising on the hearing of the Word.

prayokt---ṇāṃ tvayaṃ durlabhaḥ, nahi te tataḥ śabdād arthaṃ pratipadyante, parapratyāyanārtham eva śabdaṃ te prayuñjate /

But this will not be possible for those who use the Word; because they do not derive any cognition of anything from that Word; as they use that Word for the purpose of bringing about the cognition for the hearers only.

tat kuto vakt---ṇām avakalpate niścayaḥ //

Under the circumstances, how could there be any certainty in the minds of the persons using the Word? (2238)

[p.619] etad eva darśayati ajñātvetyādi /

The same idea is further explained [see verse 2239 next]

ajñātvā kamasau śabdamādāveva vivakṣatu / jānāti cedavaśyaṃ sa pūrvam evāvadhāritaḥ //

“Without knowing with certainty (what word expresses what) how could the user make up his mind at the outset as to which word he should use? If, on the other hand, he does know it, then it must have been known to him from before.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 247-248].

tadevamajñānapakṣe 'yaṃ doṣaḥ, jñānapakṣe 'pi niyatam asau prāktena jñāta iti sthiratvamasya balād āpatatīti darśayann āha jānāti cedityādi //

Under the other view, that he does know it at the time of using it, it necessarily follows that the Word must have been known to him from before (as expressive of that meaning) which establishes its permanence. This is what is meant by the words ‘If, on the other hand, etc. etc.’ (2239)

nanu yathā dīpāditejo 'bhinavam api prakāśayatyarthaṃ tathā śabdo 'pi pratipādayiṣyatītyāha tejaḥ pratyakṣaśeṣatvād iti /

“Light is auxiliary to the perception; hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things; [not so the word]. [If it be urged that] in the case of the word the comprehension of the meaning of a certain word is due to its similarity to another well-known word;

tejaḥ pratyakṣaśeṣatvān navatve 'pi prakāśakam /

Says the Opponent The light of the lamp, even when newly lit, illumines the object;

sadṛśatvāpratīteś ca taddūreṇāpyavācakaḥ //

similarly the Word also would express its meaning (when heard and used for the first time).

pratyakṣaśeṣatvam ---(pratyakśe) aṅgabhāvaḥ /

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2240 above]

tadviṣayasaṃskārādindriyasaṃskārād vā pratyakṣe jñāne 'ṅgatām upagacchadabhinavam api prakāśakaṃ bhavati /

‘Light is auxiliary to the Perception’ i.e. it is an appurtenance of the Perception; as a matter of fact, it becomes an auxiliary to Perceptional Cognition, by embellishing either the Object or the Sense-organ;

śabdasya sākṣād atīndriyārthapratipādakatvān na pratyakṣāṅgam ato vaiṣamyam /

As regards the Word, on the other hand, directly it denotes only supersensuous things, and as such it cannot be an auxiliary to Perception. So that there is no analogy between the two cases.

athavā yat pratyakṣāṅgaṃ tat sambandhaparijñānanirapekṣam api prakāśayati /

Or (the meaning of the Text may be as follows) What is auxiliary to Perception illumines things independently of the idea of any connection between the two (the illuminator and the illuminated);

yathā cakṣus tejaś ca pratyakṣāṅgam /

e.g. the Eye; Light is auxiliary to Perception;

tasmād abhinavam api prakāśayati /

hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things;

śabdas tu parokṣaviṣayatvān na pratyakṣāṅgam iti vaiṣamyam /

Word, on the other hand, pertaining, as it does, to imperceptible things, is not auxiliary to Perception.

nanu cābhinavamapi śabdāntaraṃ pūrvasādṛśyānusāreṇa vācakaṃ bhaviṣyatīt yāha sadṛśatvāpratīter ityādi / na hyapratīte sādṛśye taddvāreṇa vācakatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt //

Says the Opponent Even a new Word would express the meaning through its similarity to a previously-known Word. The answer is ‘So long as the similarity, etc. etc.’ So long as the Similarity has not been actually recognised, the expressiveness of the Word cannot be due to it; otherwise there would be incongruities.

kiñca āstāṃ tāvat sādṛśyapratītiḥ, sādṛśyam eva na sambhavatīti pratipādayann āha kasya caikasyetyādi /

Then again, the recognition of similarity may rest awhile; as a matter -of fact, no similarity is possible at all;

kasya caikasya sādṛśyāt kalpyatāṃ vācako 'paraḥ / adṛṣṭasaṅgatitvena pūrveṣāṃ tulyatā yadā //

“Which particular individual word would it be, through similarity to which another word would be assumed to be expressive? All these words would be equal, in so far as no one among them has its connection (with the meaning) previously known.

arthavān pūrvadṛṣṭaścet tasyaitāvān kṣaṇaḥ kutaḥ / dvistrirvānupalabdho hi nārthavān sampratīyate //

If it be held that ‘the word perceived (heard) first of all did actually have a meaning [and the expressiveness of the others would be dependent upon their similarity to that word]’, then (the answer is) how could it continue to exist for such a long time? As a matter of fact, a word is not comprehended as having a meaning until it has been heard twice or thrice.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 249-250].

ekasmin hi vācake siddhe tat sādṛśyāditaras tathaiveti kalpyeta tac ca na sambhavati, sarveṣām eva śabdānām arthasambandhitvena pratītatvāt /

When one Word has been admitted to be expressive, others could be assumed to be expressive on the ground of their similarity to that Word; but this is not possible; because all Words are equally recognised as not connected with a meaning.

athāpi syādyaḥ prāk saṅkekāle dṛṣṭaḥ so 'rthavāneva, sādṛśyamitareṣāṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha tasyaitāvān kṣaṇaḥ kuta iti / tasya pūrvadṛṣṭasya śabdasya etāvataḥ kṣaṇān kuto 'vasthānamuccaritapradhvaṃsitvāt tasya /

It might be argued that ‘the first Word that was heard at the time of the fixing of the Convention, certainly had a meaning, and all the rest would be similar to this one’. The answer to that is ‘How could it, etc. etc.’ How could that first Word heard previously continue to exist during all this time when (ex-hypothesi) it must be destroyed as soon as produced.

[p.620] atha sajātīyānyagrahaṇe sati sa eva sārthako bhavatītyucyate, tadayuktam ity āha apratītānyaśabdānām ityādi /

It might be asked Even if the Word is destroyed as soon as it is uttered, why cannot it have a meaning? The answer to that is ‘A word is not, etc. etc.’ That is, the connection between the Word and its Denotation is recognised only after repeated hearing of it.

apratītānyaśabdānāṃ tat kāle 'sāvanarthakaḥ /

“For persons who have not heard other words (like it), the word, at the time, must be meaningless (inexpressive);

sa evānyaśrutīnāṃ syād arthavān iti vismayaḥ //

that the same word would become expressive as soon as the man has heard other words, would be a wonder indeed!”.

yeṣāṃ hi pratipatt---ṇāṃ śabdāntaram apratītaṃ teṣāṃ hi śravaṇakāle nāsāvarthasya pratyāyakaḥ /

For those observers who have not heard other Words of the same kind, the Word heard for the first time is not expressive of any meaning;

bhedādhiṣṭhānasya sādṛśyasya tadānīm abhāvāt /

because ‘similarity’ that rests on diversity is not there at the time.

punaḥ sa eva teṣām eva pratipatt---ṇāṃ pratītaśabdāntarāṇām arthapratyāyaka ityalaukikam /

That the same Word, for those same observers, when they have heard other Words of the kind, should become expressive would indeed be something extraordinary!

kathaṃ hi nāmaikasya kriyākriye parasparaviruddhe syātām /

How could the two contradictory actions of expressing and not-expressing belong to one and the same (Word)?

anyaśrutīnām iti / anyā sajātīyaśabdaviṣayā śrutir yeṣāṃ pratipatt---ṇāṃ te tathā //

The compound ‘anyaśrutīnām’ is to be expounded as “those persons who have had the ‘Śruti’, audition, hearing, of ‘anya’ other Words of the same kind”.

śabdaṃ tāvad anuccārya sambandhakaraṇaṃ naca / nacoccāritanaṣṭasya sambandhena prayojanam //

“No connection can be set up without pronouncing the word; and when the word perishes as soon as it is pronounced, it can have no need for any connection.

tenāsambandhanaṣṭatvāt pūrvastāvadanarthakaḥ /

consequently, as the word will have perished and would not have had its connection set up, the first word must be inexpressive (meaningless);

uttaro 'kṛtasambandho vijñāyetārthavān katham //

how then could the subsequent word also, which has had no connection set up, be recognised as expressive?” [Śokavārtika eternality of words, 256-258].

pūrvam uccāraṇaṃ tataḥ sambandhakaraṇaṃ tato vyavahāra ityayaṃ krameṇa vyavahāra uccāritapradhvaṃsino 'kramasya kathaṃ syāt /

First of all there is utterance of the Word, then the setting up of its connection (with its denotation), then its actual use, in practice; such is the way in which Words are dealt with in actual practice.

na kevalaṃ naṣṭasya sambandho 'śakyakriyaḥ, nāpi tena prayojanam vyavahārakālānanuyāyitvāt /

there would not be any use in setting up any such connection; as it would not be present at the time of usage;

vyavahārārthatvāc ca saṅketasya /

and it is only for the purposes of use that Conventions (regarding words and their meanings) are set up.

tenetyādinā nigamayati /

The words ‘Consequently, etc. etc.’ sum up the conclusion;

avidyamānaḥ sambandho yasyāsāvasambandhaḥ, tattvānnaṣṭatvāc ca pūrvastāvat saṅketakālabhāvī śabdo 'narthakaḥ /

the compound ‘asambandhanaṣṭatvāt’ is to be explained as ‘because it would be asambandha without its connection set up, and because it would be naṣṭa perished the first word that was there at the time of making the Convention, must be inexpressive’.

vyavahārakālabhāvī tarhi sārthako bhaviṣyatītyāha uttra ityādi // yadi tarhyakramasya krameṇoccāraṇādayo 'nupapannā yugapat tarhi bhavantvityāha śabdoccāraṇetyādi /

It might be said that ‘the Word appearing at the time of usage would be expressive’. The answer to that is ‘How then could the subsequent Word, etc. etc.’ (2244-2245)

śabdoccāraṇasambandhakaraṇavyāvahārikīḥ /

“The utterance of the word, the setting up of its connection and its use, all this process is, by its very nature, successive;

kriyāḥ kramasvabhāvatvāt kaḥ kuryād yugapatkvacit //

how could any one perform all this simultaneously?” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 258-259].

śabdoccāraṇaṃ sambandhakaraṇaṃ lokavyavahāraścetyetās tisraḥ kriyāḥ svabhāvata eva kramavatyaḥ, tā yugapat kartumaśakyāḥ /

(1) Utterance of the Word, (2) the setting up of its connection, (3) actual usage, all these three acts are, by their very nature, such as can be done only one after the other; and it is absolutely impossible to do them all at the same time.

asati ca yaugapadye sambandhakaraṇānupapattiḥ /

And when there is no simultaneity, there can be no setting up of the Connection.

kramapratīkṣāyāṃ kālāntarasthāyī śabdo 'bhyupagataḥ syāt //

If succession were waited for, that would mean that the Word continues to exist for some time (other than the one at which it is produced).

[p.621] deśakālādibhinnānām iti nigamanam /

The Mīmāṃsaka reaffirms his view in the following: [see verses 2247-2248 next]

deśakālādibhinnānāṃ puṃsāṃ śabdāntarāśruteḥ /

“For those persons who live at different times and places, etc.

pūrvaṃ kṛtrimasambandho 'pyekaḥ śabdo na siddhyati //

prior to the hearing of other words there cannot be even one such word as had its connection set up.

sambandhakathane 'pyasya syād eṣaiva pratikriyā /

Even if the idea be that the connection is ‘asserted’ (not set up or created), the refutation of that also would be the same;

naṣṭāsadvartamāneṣu nākhyānasya hi sambhavaḥ //

as no such ‘assertion’ is possible in regard to what has perished, or what is non-existent, or what exists only at the present moment”. [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 260-261].

ādiśabdena bālakumārādyavasthāparigrahaḥ /

The term ‘ādi’, ‘etcetera’, includes the states of childhood, youth and so forth.

pūrvam iti / śabdāntaraśruter iti sambandhanīyam / naṣṭetyādi/

‘Prior to’ this has to be construed with ‘hearing of other Words’, ‘Perished, etc. etc.’ ‘what has perished’ i.e. the past;

naṣṭaḥ atītaḥ, asan anāgataḥ, tayor asattvādeva na sambandhākhyānasambhavaḥ /

‘what is nonexistent’ the future; with regard to these two no ‘assertion of connection’ can be made, because they are non-existent at the time;

vartamāno 'pyuccāryamāṇas tasya samanantaradhvaṃsitvena kutas tāvānkālaḥ //

as regards ‘what exists’ i.e. the present, which is being uttered, that also perishes immediately; how could it continue to exist till the setting up of the Connection? (2247-2248)

etadeva darśayati arthavānityādi /

The same idea is further explained: [see verses 2249-2251 next]

arthavān ka śabdaḥ śrotur vaktrā ca kathyatām / yadā pūrvaśrutaḥ śabdo nāsau śaknoti bhāṣitum //

“Which word would it be which the speaker would speak of to the hearer, as being expressive of meaning, when he is unable to utter the word that has been heard previously? He cannot speak of the word as expressive.

na tāvad arthavantaṃ sa bravīti sadṛśaṃ vadet /

He might speak of it as similar;

nārthavat sadṛśaḥ śabdaḥ śrotus tatropapadyate // arthavad grahaṇābhāvān na cāsāvarthavān svayam /

but, in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to recognise it as similar to that expressive word; because he has never heard that original expressive word; while the new word that he hears is not expressive.

vaktuḥ śrotṛtvavelāyām etad eva prasajyate //

And when the man who is a speaker now becomes the hearer at a later time, the same difficulties would appear.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 261-264].

na hi vaktā pūrvaśrutaṃ śrotuḥ kathayituṃ śaktaḥ, tasya pūrvaniruddhatvāt /

The Speaker cannot speak of the previously heard Word, to the Hearer, because it has perished already;

yamapi pratipādayati na tamarthavantaṃ śaknuyāt pratipādayitum /

the Word that he does speak to him, that he cannot prove to be expressive;

tasya pūrvamakṛtasambandhatvāt /

because this Word has not yet had any connection set up in regard to itself.

etāvat sambhāvyate sadṛśaṃ brūyād iti /

It might be possible that he might speak of it as similar to the expressive Word.

tadapi na sambhavatītyāha nārthavat sadṛśa ityādi / nahyatra kenacit sādṛśyam iṣṭam, kiṃ tarhi---, arthavatā, taccānupapannam /

But that also is not possible. This is what is explained in the words ‘But in that case, etc. etc.’ What is desired in this connection is not similarity to anything, but similarity to the expressive Word; and that is not possible.

yadi hi śrotrā kaścicchabdo 'rthavānupalabdhaḥ syāt tadānena sādṛśyam upapadyeta, yāvatā pūrvasaṅketakāle 'rthavato grahaṇābhāvān na yuktam etat /

If the Hearer had heard any expressive Word, then the similarity could be pointed out to him; as a matter of fact, however, the Hearer has not heard the expressive Word at the time that the Convention regarding its meaning was set up; hence what has been suggested is not possible.

kathyamāno yaḥ so 'rthavāṃs tarhi bhaviṣyatītyāha na cāsāvityādi /

It might be urged that the Word that is being spoken of to him by the Speaker might be expressive.